#js

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5783-1 - Multiple security issues have been found in the Mozilla Firefox web browser, which could potentially result in the execution of arbitrary code.

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5782-1 - Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Linux kernel that may lead to a privilege escalation, denial of service or information leaks.

### Impact The cookie name could be used to set other fields of the cookie, resulting in an unexpected cookie value. For example, `serialize("userName=<script>alert('XSS3')</script>; Max-Age=2592000; a", value)` would result in `"userName=<script>alert('XSS3')</script>; Max-Age=2592000; a=test"`, setting `userName` cookie to `<script>` and ignoring `value`. A similar escape can be used for `path` and `domain`, which could be abused to alter other fields of the cookie. ### Patches Upgrade to 0.7.0, which updates the validation for `name`, `path`, and `domain`. ### Workarounds Avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for these fields, ensure they are set by the application instead of user input. ### References * https://github.com/jshttp/cookie/pull/167

Acronis Cyber Infrastructure version 5.0.1-61 suffers from a cross site request forgery vulnerability.

Vehicle Service Management System version 1.0 suffers from a WYSIWYG code injection vulnerability.

Transport Management System version 1.0 suffers from an arbitrary file upload vulnerability.

util/JSONTokener.java in JSON-lib before 3.1.0 mishandles an unbalanced comment string.

### Summary When creating a new plugin using the `git` source, the user-controlled value `req.body.name` is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the `git clone` command with the user-controlled data is `child_process.execSync`. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability. ### Details Relevant code from source (`req.body`) to sink (`child_process.execSync`). - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400 ```js router.post( "/", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1] [...] try { await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3] plugin, schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github" ); [...] } ...

### Summary The endpoint `/site-structure/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring` accepts two parameter values: `lang` and `defstring`. These values are used in an unsafe way to set the keys and value of the `cfgStrings` object. It allows to add/modify properties of the `Object prototype` that result in several logic issues, including: - RCE vulnerabilities by polluting the `tempRootFolder` property - SQL injection vulnerabilities by polluting the `schema` property when using `PostgreSQL` database. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/infoarch.js#L236-L239 ```js router.post( "/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { lang, defstring } = req.params; // source const cfgStrings = getState().getConfigCopy("localizer_strings"); if (cfgStrings[lang]) cfgStrings[lang][defstring] = text(req.body.value); // [1] sink else cfgStrings[lang] = { [defstring]...

### Summary A user with admin permission can read arbitrary file and directory names on the filesystem by calling the `admin/build-mobile-app/result?build_dir_name=` endpoint. The `build_dir_name` parameter is not properly validated and it's then used to construct the `buildDir` that is read. The file/directory names under the `buildDir` will be returned. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L2884-L2893 ```js router.get( "/build-mobile-app/result", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { build_dir_name } = req.query; // [1] source const rootFolder = await File.rootFolder(); const buildDir = path.join( rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", build_dir_name // [2] ); const files = await Promise.all( fs .readdirSync(buildDir) // [3] sink .map(async (outFile) => await File.from_file_on_disk(outFile, buildDir)) ); [...] }) ); ``` ...