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A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC HMI Comfort Panels (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions < V17 Update 4), SIMATIC HMI KTP Mobile Panels (All versions < V17 Update 4), SIMATIC HMI KTP1200 Basic (All versions < V17 Update 5), SIMATIC HMI KTP400 Basic (All versions < V17 Update 5), SIMATIC HMI KTP700 Basic (All versions < V17 Update 5), SIMATIC HMI KTP900 Basic (All versions < V17 Update 5), SIPLUS HMI KTP1200 BASIC (All versions < V17 Update 5), SIPLUS HMI KTP400 BASIC (All versions < V17 Update 5), SIPLUS HMI KTP700 BASIC (All versions < V17 Update 5), SIPLUS HMI KTP900 BASIC (All versions < V17 Update 5). Affected devices do not properly validate input sent to certain services over TCP. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a permanent denial of service condition (requiring a device reboot) by sending specially crafted TCP packets.
A vulnerability has been identified in Desigo PXM30-1 (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41), Desigo PXM30.E (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41), Desigo PXM40-1 (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41), Desigo PXM40.E (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41), Desigo PXM50-1 (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41), Desigo PXM50.E (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41), PXG3.W100-1 (All versions < V02.20.126.11-37), PXG3.W100-2 (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41), PXG3.W200-1 (All versions < V02.20.126.11-37), PXG3.W200-2 (All versions < V02.20.126.11-41). The device embedded Chromium-based browser is launched as root with the “--no-sandbox” option. Attackers can add arbitrary JavaScript code inside “Operation” graphics and successfully exploit any number of publicly known vulnerabilities against the version of the embedded Chromium-based browser.
Affected devices do not properly authorize the change password function of the web interface. This could allow low privileged users to escalate their privileges.
A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM RM1224 LTE(4G) EU (All versions < V7.1.2), RUGGEDCOM RM1224 LTE(4G) NAM (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M804PB (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M812-1 ADSL-Router (Annex A) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M812-1 ADSL-Router (Annex B) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M816-1 ADSL-Router (Annex A) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M816-1 ADSL-Router (Annex B) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M826-2 SHDSL-Router (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M874-2 (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M874-3 (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M876-3 (EVDO) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M876-3 (ROK) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M876-4 (EU) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE M876-4 (NAM) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE MUM853-1 (EU) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE MUM856-1 (EU) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE MUM856-1 (RoW) (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE S615 (All versions < V7.1.2), SCALANCE WAM763-1 (All versions >= V1.1.0), SCALANCE ...
WordPress installations exposed to spoofed password reset vis cache poisoning threat
When U.S. consumers have their online bank accounts hijacked and plundered by hackers, U.S. financial institutions are legally obligated to reverse any unauthorized transactions as long as the victim reports the fraud in a timely manner. But new data released this week suggests that for some of the nation's largest banks, reimbursing account takeover victims has become more the exception than the rule.
An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the component /php_action/editFile.php of Online Diagnostic Lab Management System v1.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted PHP file.
### Vulnerability type Data Validation ### Detail When an etcd instance attempts to perform service discovery, if a cluster size is provided as a negative value, the etcd instance will panic without recovery. ### References Find out more on this vulnerability in the [security audit report](https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/security/SECURITY_AUDIT.pdf) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Contact the [etcd security committee](https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/security/security-release-process.md#product-security-committee-psc)
### Vulnerability type Data Exposure ### Workarounds The etcd assumes that the on disk files are secure. The possible fixes have been provided, however, it is the responsibility of the etcd users to make sure that the etcd server WAL log files are secure. The [etcd doesn't encrypt key/value data stored on disk drives]( https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/Documentation/op-guide/security.md#does-etcd-encrypt-data-stored-on-disk-drives). ### Detail User credentials (login and password) are stored in WAL entries on each user authentication. If the WAL log files are not secure, it can potentially expose sensitive information. ### References Find out more on this vulnerability in the [security audit report](https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/security/SECURITY_AUDIT.pdf) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Contact the [etcd security committee](https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/security/security-release-process.md...
### Vulnerability type Access Control ### Workarounds The etcdctl and etcd API do not enforce a specific password length during user creation or user password update operations. [It is the responsibility of the administrator to enforce these requirements](https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/Documentation/op-guide/authentication.md#notes-on-password-strength). ### Detail etcd does not perform any password length validation, which allows for very short passwords, such as those with a length of one. This may allow an attacker to guess or brute-force users’ passwords with little computational effort. ### References Find out more on this vulnerability in the [security audit report](https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/security/SECURITY_AUDIT.pdf) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Contact the [etcd security committee](https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/security/security-release-process.md#product-security-committ...