#web

### Summary The Butterfly framework uses the `java.net.URL` class to refer to (what are expected to be) local resource files, like images or templates. This works: "opening a connection" to these URLs opens the local file. However, if a `file:/` URL is directly given where a relative path (resource name) is expected, this is also accepted in some code paths; the app then fetches the file, from a remote machine if indicated, and uses it as if it was a trusted part of the app's codebase. This leads to multiple weaknesses and potential weaknesses: * An attacker that has network access to the application could use it to gain access to files, either on the the server's filesystem (path traversal) or shared by nearby machines (server-side request forgery with e.g. SMB). * An attacker that can lead or redirect a user to a crafted URL belonging to the app could cause arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript to be loaded in the victim's browser (cross-site scripting). * If an app is written ...

### Summary The built-in "Something went wrong!" error page includes the exception message and exception traceback without escaping HTML tags, enabling injection into the page if an attacker can reliably produce an error with an attacker-influenced message. It appears that the only way to reach this code in OpenRefine itself is for an attacker to somehow convince a victim to import a malicious file, as in GHSA-m88m-crr9-jvqq, which may be difficult. However, out-of-tree extensions may add their own calls to `respondWithErrorPage`. ### Details The `Command.respondWithErrorPage` (through `HttpUtilities.respondWithErrorPage`) function renders the Velocity template `error.vt`, which contains the `$message` and `$stack` variables, which are included in the response as-is: https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/blob/master/main/webapp/modules/core/error.vt#L52-L53 However, the message can contain HTML tags, which would then be interpreted by the browser. A mitigation would be to esc...

### Summary The `export-rows` command can be used in such a way that it reflects part of the request verbatim, with a Content-Type header also taken from the request. An attacker could lead a user to a malicious page that submits a form POST that contains embedded JavaScript code. This code would then be included in the response, along with an attacker-controlled `Content-Type` header, and so potentially executed in the victim's browser as if it was part of OpenRefine. The attacker must know a valid project ID of a project that contains at least one row. ### Details The malicious form sets `contentType` to `text/html` (ExportRowsCommand.java line 101) and `preview` to `true` (line 107). This combination causes the browser to treat what OpenRefine thinks of as an export preview as a regular webpage. It would be safer if the `export-rows` command did not allow overriding the Content-Type header at all, instead relying on the exporter to provide the correct Content-Type. It could a...

### Summary Lack of CSRF protection on the `preview-expression` command means that visiting a malicious website could cause an attacker-controlled expression to be executed. The expression can contain arbitrary Clojure or Python code. The attacker must know a valid project ID of a project that contains at least one row. ### Details The `com.google.refine.commands.expr.PreviewExpressionCommand` class contains the following comment: ``` /** * The command uses POST but does not actually modify any state so it does not require CSRF. */ ``` However, this appears to be false (or no longer true). The expression being previewed (executed) can be written in GREL, Python, or Clojure. Since there are no restrictions on what code can be executed, the expression can do anything the user running OpenRefine can do. For instance, the following expressions start a calculator: ``` clojure:(.exec (Runtime/getRuntime) "gnome-calculator") ``` ``` jython:import os;os.system("gnome-calculator") ```...

All SaaS and marketplace setups using Aimeos version from 2024.04 up to 2024.07.1 are affected by a potential denial of service attack

North Korean hackers from Lazarus Group exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome to target cryptocurrency investors with…

When editing objects in the Syncope Console, incomplete HTML tags could be used to bypass HTML sanitization. This made it possible to inject stored XSS payloads which would trigger for other users during ordinary usage of the application. XSS payloads could also be injected in Syncope Enduser when editing “Personal Information” or “User Requests”: such payloads would trigger for administrators in Syncope Console, thus enabling session hijacking. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.0.9, which fixes this issue.

Secure payment solutions ensure safe transfers amidst rising risks of cybercrime and fraud. Discover how third-party platforms like…

ABB Cylon Aspect version 3.08.02 suffers from an authenticated arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability. Input passed through the logFile GET parameter via the logYumLookup.php script is not properly verified before being used to download log files. This can be exploited to disclose the contents of arbitrary and sensitive files via directory traversal attacks.

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from an unauthenticated log information disclosure vulnerability. An unauthorized attacker can reference the affected page and disclose the webserver's log file containing system information running on the device.