Headline
DiCal-RED 4009 Cryptography Failure
DiCal-RED version 4009 provides an administrative web interface that requests the administrative system password before it can be used. Instead of submitting the user-supplied password, its MD5 hash is calculated on the client side and submitted. An attacker who knows the hash of the correct password but not the password itself can simply replace the value of the password URL parameter with the correct hash and subsequently gain full access to the administrative web interface.
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Hash: SHA512
Advisory ID: SYSS-2024-038
Product: DiCal-RED
Manufacturer: Swissphone Wireless AG
Affected Version(s): Unknown
Tested Version(s): 4009
Vulnerability Type: Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication (CWE-836)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2024-04-16
Solution Date: None
Public Disclosure: 2024-08-20
CVE Reference: CVE-2024-36439
Author of Advisory: Sebastian Hamann, SySS GmbH
Overview:
DiCal-RED is a radio module for communication between emergency vehicles and
control rooms. It provides Ethernet, Wi-Fi and cellular network connectivity
and runs a Linux- and BusyBox-based operating system.
The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):
"The DiCal-Red radio data module reliably guides you to your destination. This
is ensured by the linking of navigation (also for the transmission of position
data) and various radio modules."
Due to the use of a password hash instead of a password for authentication,
the device is vulnerable to unauthorized access to administrative
functionality.
Vulnerability Details:
The device provides an administrative web interface that requests the
administrative system password before it can be used. Instead of submitting
the user-supplied password, its MD5 hash is calculated on the client side
and submitted.
An attacker who knows the hash of the correct password but not the password
itself can simply replace the value of the password URL parameter with the
correct hash and subsequently gain full access to the administrative web
interface.
Proof of Concept (PoC):
1. Access the device's web interface and log in with an arbitrary password.
2. Use a local proxy or browser plug-in to intercept the HTTP requests.
One of them looks like this:
http://192.0.2.1/cgi-bin/fdmcgiwebv2.cgi?action=validatepassword&password=2ab96390c7dbe3439de74d0c9b0b1767
3. Replace the value of the password parameter with the hash of the correct
device password.
Solution:
The manufacturer recommends not running the device in an untrusted network.
Disclosure Timeline:
2024-02-29: Vulnerability discovered
2024-04-16: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2024-05-10: Manufacturer states that the vulnerability will not be fixed
2024-05-14: Vulnerability reported to CERT-Bund
2024-08-13: CERT-Bund informs us that the vendor declared the product EOL
2024-08-20: Public disclosure of vulnerability
References:
[1] Product website for DiCal-RED
https://www.swissphone.com/solutions/components/terminals/radio-data-module-dical-red/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2024-038
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-038.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Sebastian Hamann of SySS GmbH.
E-Mail: [email protected]
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Sebastian_Hamann.asc
Key ID: 0x9CE0E440429D8B96
Key Fingerprint: F643 DF21 62C4 7C53 7DB2 8BA1 9CE0 E440 429D 8B96
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is”
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
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