### Summary

Versions of step-security/harden-runner prior to v2.10.2 contain multiple command injection weaknesses via environment variables that could potentially be exploited under specific conditions. However, due to the current execution order of pre-steps in GitHub Actions and the placement of harden-runner as the first step in a job, the likelihood of exploitation is low as the Harden-Runner action reads the environment variable during the pre-step stage. There are no known exploits at this time. 

### Details

1. setup.ts:169 [1]  performs `execSync` with a command that gets
invoked after interpretation by the shell. This command includes an
interpolated `process.env.USER` variable, which an attacker could
modify (without actually creating a new user) to inject arbitrary
shell expressions into this `execSync`. This may or may not be likely
in practice, but I believe the hygienic way to perform the underlying
operation is to use `execFileSync` or similar and bypass the
underlying shell evaluation.

2. setup.ts:229 [2] has a nearly identical `execSync` to (1) above,
but with `$USER` for shell-level interpolation rather than string
interpolation. However, this is still injectable and would be best
replaced by an `execFileSync`, per above.

3. arc-runner:40-44 [3] has an `execSync` with multiple string
interpolations. Most of these do not appear immediately injectible
(since they appear to come from presumed trusted API responses), but
the expansion of `getRunnerTempDir()` may be injectable due to its
dependence on potentially attacker-controllable environment variables
(e.g. `RUNNER_TEMP`). The underlying operation appears to be a trivial
file copy, so this entire subprocess should in theory be replaceable
with ordinary NodeJS `fs` API calls instead.

4. arc-runner:53 [4] demonstrates the same weakness, and has the same
resolution as (3).

5. arc-runner:57 demonstrates the same weakness as (3) and (4), and
has the same resolution.

6. arc-runner:61 demonstrates the same weakness as (3), (4), and (5),
and has the same resolution.


[1]: https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/blob/951b48540b429070694bc8abd82fd6901eb123ca/src/setup.ts#L169

[2]: https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/blob/951b48540b429070694bc8abd82fd6901eb123ca/src/setup.ts#L229

[3]: https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/blob/951b48540b429070694bc8abd82fd6901eb123ca/src/arc-runner.ts#L40-L44

[4]: https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/blob/951b48540b429070694bc8abd82fd6901eb123ca/src/arc-runner.ts#L53

[5]: https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/blob/951b48540b429070694bc8abd82fd6901eb123ca/src/arc-runner.ts#L57

[6]: https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/blob/951b48540b429070694bc8abd82fd6901eb123ca/src/arc-runner.ts#L61

**Summary**

Versions of step-security/harden-runner prior to v2.10.2 contain multiple command injection weaknesses via environment variables that could potentially be exploited under specific conditions. However, due to the current execution order of pre-steps in GitHub Actions and the placement of harden-runner as the first step in a job, the likelihood of exploitation is low as the Harden-Runner action reads the environment variable during the pre-step stage. There are no known exploits at this time.

**Details**

1.  setup.ts:169 1 performs execSync with a command that gets  
    invoked after interpretation by the shell. This command includes an  
    interpolated process.env.USER variable, which an attacker could  
    modify (without actually creating a new user) to inject arbitrary  
    shell expressions into this execSync. This may or may not be likely  
    in practice, but I believe the hygienic way to perform the underlying  
    operation is to use execFileSync or similar and bypass the  
    underlying shell evaluation.
    
2.  setup.ts:229 2 has a nearly identical execSync to (1) above,  
    but with $USER for shell-level interpolation rather than string  
    interpolation. However, this is still injectable and would be best  
    replaced by an execFileSync, per above.
    
3.  arc-runner:40-44 3 has an execSync with multiple string  
    interpolations. Most of these do not appear immediately injectible  
    (since they appear to come from presumed trusted API responses), but  
    the expansion of getRunnerTempDir() may be injectable due to its  
    dependence on potentially attacker-controllable environment variables  
    (e.g. RUNNER_TEMP). The underlying operation appears to be a trivial  
    file copy, so this entire subprocess should in theory be replaceable  
    with ordinary NodeJS fs API calls instead.
    
4.  arc-runner:53 4 demonstrates the same weakness, and has the same  
    resolution as (3).
    
5.  arc-runner:57 demonstrates the same weakness as (3) and (4), and  
    has the same resolution.
    
6.  arc-runner:61 demonstrates the same weakness as (3), (4), and (5),  
    and has the same resolution.
    

**References**

*   GHSA-g85v-wf27-67xc
*   step-security/harden-runner@0080882

GHSA-g85v-wf27-67xc: Harden-Runner has a command injection weaknesses in `setup.ts` and `arc-runner.ts`

Freshly released court documents reveal new details on controversial Israeli spyware firm's operations.

Source: Shubham singh 007 via Shutterstock

Israel's NSO Group may know a lot more about how customers use its Pegasus commercial spyware product than the company has let on, newly released court documents connected to a legal dispute with Meta's WhatsApp suggest.

In fact, NSO Group installed and operated the spyware on behalf of its customers, making the company directly liable for the spyware's use, WhatsApp lawyers said in one court filing, released Nov. 14 in the US District Court for the Northern District of California.

The court documents are part of a lawsuit that WhatsApp filed against NSO Group in October 2019 after discovering the Israeli firm had used WhatsApp servers to distribute Pegasus to some 1,400 mobile phones, including those belonging to journalists and rights activists.

The lawyers also claimed that NSO Group repeatedly developed and used exploits for abusing WhatsApp's servers to install Pegasus on target devices, including at least once after WhatsApp had sued the company over the issue.

**NSO 'Solely Responsible'**

"NSO is solely responsible for Pegasus’s unauthorized access to WhatsApp's servers," the social media giant noted in one briefing. "Despite what NSO has claimed, its customers had a minimal role in how the spyware tool operated or collected information. All that NSO Group customers typically had to do was enter their target's phone number, press install and wait for the malware to install on the target device without any further interaction," they noted.

Related:Trustwave-Cybereason Merger Boosts MDR Portfolio

"In other words, the customer simply places an order for a target device's data, and NSO controls every aspect of the data retrieval and delivery process through its design of Pegasus," WhatsApp's lawyers said. The company, in fact, was so aware of how customers were using its malware that it actually disconnected service to 10 customers for excessive abuse, the lawyers claimed.

**Controversial Surveillance Software**

Pegasus is a controversial mobile spyware designed to secretly monitor and extract data from iOS and Android smartphones. Once installed, Pegasus can intercept messages, emails, media, and passwords, and track location data, all while evading detection by antivirus software. NSO Group claims to sell the technology solely to authorized government agencies for legitimate law enforcement, crime-fighting, and anti-terror purposes. But critics argue that the tool has been misused, particularly in authoritarian regimes, to target journalists, human rights activists, political dissidents, and others critical of the government.  

Related:Xiphera & Crypto Quantique Announce Partnership

A 2021 database leak revealed that NSO Group customers had, at the time, targeted more than 50,000 phone numbers for surveillance in countries like Mexico, Hungary, and India. The US government formally blacklisted the company in 2021, meaning its ability to operate in the US or do business with US entities abroad is severely restricted.

The NSO Group has tried to get US courts to dismiss WhatsApp's lawsuit against the company, citing, among other things, a lack of jurisdiction and the fact that its clients are mostly governments and therefore are not doing anything illegal. WhatsApp lawyers have sought to portray NSO Group as indeed being liable for Pegasus by attempting to tie the vendor more directly to customer use of the spyware tool.

In the newly released court documents, WhatsApp has alleged that NSO Group repeatedly and deliberated worked around the mechanisms the company put in place to prevent misuse of the secure messaging platform. One of them was a modified WhatsApp client app called the WhatsApp Installation Server (WIS) that could access WhatsApp's back-end servers in ways its own client software could not. NSO Group then developed tools named Heaven and Eden to interact with WIS in such a way as to trigger Pegasus downloads on target phones via WhatsApp. The company developed Eden after WhatsApp discovered Heaven and put up blocks against it. When WhatsApp engineers discovered Eden, NSO developed and used yet another tool, called Erised, through 2020, or after WhatsApp had filed its lawsuit.

Related:North Korea's Andariel Pivots to 'Play' Ransomware Games

The WhatsApp lawsuit is one of several that NSO Group is currently battling in courts worldwide from organizations and individuals impacted by the malware. In September, Apple sought voluntary dismissal of a 2021 lawsuit it had filed against NSO Group, citing concerns over the company having to share information with the court that other spyware makers could abuse going forward.

Back when the lawsuit was filed, the NSO Group was among a handful of known purveyors of such mobile spyware software. Since then, there has been a sharp increase in the number of commercial spyware vendors, driven largely by demand from government agencies. A Google report earlier this year identified spyware vendors like NSO Group as being responsible for nearly half of all zero-day exploits it counted between mid-2014 and December 2023.

**About the Author**

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year career at Computerworld, Jai also covered a variety of other technology topics, including big data, Hadoop, Internet of Things, e-voting, and data analytics. Prior to Computerworld, Jai covered technology issues for The Economic Times in Bangalore, India. Jai has a Master's degree in Statistics and lives in Naperville, Ill.

WhatsApp: NSO Group Operates Pegasus Spyware for Customers

PRESS RELEASE

SILVER SPRING, Md. – The Security Industry Association (SIA) has named 24 recipients for this year’s SIA RISE Scholarship, a program offered through SIA’s RISE community, which supports the education and career development goals of young industry talent and emerging leaders.

Through this scholarship program – open to SIA student members and RISE members who are employees at SIA member companies – each awardee will receive a $3,000 scholarship to use toward continuing education and professional development courses, SIA program offerings and/or other academic or education programs. Scholarship funds can be used to expand knowledge in the areas of business, human resources, information technology, marketing, sales, project management, security engineering and/or risk management.

“SIA congratulates this year’s class of RISE Scholarship awardees – an impressive, diverse array of security professionals and rising stars who are making their mark on our industry,” said SIA CEO Don Erickson. “We are proud to present scholarships to more recipients this year than ever before and honored to support these inspiring young leaders as they pursue their educational and career development goals.”

The winners for this year’s RISE Scholarship are:

*   Zachary Allen, account executive, Convergint Technologies
    
*   Brianna Bonfondeo, account manager, Traka, ASSA ABLOY Global Solutions
    
*   Joi Brown, control center specialist, Rapid Response Monitoring Services
    
*   Brenda Constantin, account executive, 3Sixty Integrated, a Division of the Cook & Boardman Group
    
*   Jonathan Crabtree, channel sales specialist, Genetec
    
*   Taylor Davenport, HR business partner, i-PRO Americas
    
*   Mason Fanning, end user specialist, ASSA ABLOY
    
*   Natalie Fetsko, customer success manager, dormakaba
    
*   Aishwarya Gandhe, senior channel marketing coordinator, North America, Genetec
    
*   Anish Chandra Jalla, software developer II, Genetec
    
*   Kajaanei Kajenthiran, security guard, City of Toronto, Canada
    
*   Will Knehr, senior manager of information assurance and data privacy, i-PRO Americas
    
*   Ryan Knoll, account executive, Pro-Tec Design
    
*   Chandni Lalwani, DevOps engineer, HID Global
    
*   Vincent Malenfer-Henard, security analyst, Genetec
    
*   Josh Martin, mechanical engineer II, dormakaba
    
*   Bryn Menzel, director of strategic accounts and marketing, 3millID Corporation
    
*   Gabriella Moraniec, contracts manager, GSA Schedules
    
*   Taylor Nevells, digital marketing and content specialist, Wavelynx
    
*   Juan Pelayo, technical support supervisor, i-PRO Americas
    
*   Itzel Portillo, marketing specialist, Allegion
    
*   Joel Searle, program manager, ZBeta
    
*   Maria Sturges, project coordinator and administrator, Northland Controls
    
*   Julie Trinh, SDK specialist, Genetec
    

Learn more about the honorees here.

SIA would also like to thank the following individuals and companies which contributed to the 2024 RISE Scholarship fund. Tax-deductible donations were made through the Foundation for Advancing Security Talent (FAST), a nonprofit organization co-founded by SIA and the Electronic Security Association and dedicated to connecting passionate, innovative professionals with new opportunities in the security industry.

*   Secure Access & Digital Systems
    

SIA RISE is a community that fosters the careers of emerging leaders in the security industry. In addition to the SIA RISE Scholarship, SIA RISE offers fun in-person and virtual networking events for young professionals, the Talent Inclusion Mentorship Education (TIME) program for early and mid-career professionals, the 25 on the RISE Awards, career growth webinars and trade show education tracks and the annual AcceleRISE conference – a unique event designed to ignite new thinking, strengthen leadership and sharpen business acumen in young security talent. The SIA RISE community is open to all employees at SIA member companies who are young professionals under 40 or have been in the security industry for less than two years; learn more and sign up to join. 

About SIA

SIA is the leading trade association for global security solution providers, with over 1,500 innovative member companies representing thousands of security leaders and experts who shape the future of the security industry. SIA protects and advances its members’ interests by advocating pro-industry policies and legislation at the federal and state levels, creating open industry standards that enable integration, advancing industry professionalism through education and training, opening global market opportunities and collaborating with other like-minded organizations. As the premier sponsor of ISC Events expos and conferences, SIA ensures its members have access to top-level buyers and influencers, as well as unparalleled learning and network opportunities. SIA also enhances the position of its members in the security marketplace through SIA GovSummit, which brings together private industry with government decision makers, and Securing New Ground, the security industry’s top executive conference for peer-to-peer networking.

Security Industry Association Announces SIA RISE Scholarship Awardees

Experimental counter-offensive system responds to malicious AI probes with their own surreptitious prompt-injection commands.

Source: Valentin Baciu via Shutterstock

Companies worried about cyberattackers using large-language models (LLMs) and other generative AI systems that automatically scan and exploit their systems could gain a new defensive ally — a system capable of subverting the attacking AI.

Dubbed Mantis, the defensive system uses deceptive techniques to emulate targeted services and — when it detects a possible automated attacker — sends back a payload that contains a prompt-injection attack. The counterattack can be made invisible to a human attacker sitting at a terminal and will not affect legitimate visitors who are not using malicious LLMs, according to the paper penned by a group of researchers from George Mason University.

Because LLMs used in penetration testing are singularly focused on exploiting targets, they are easily co-opted, says Evgenios Kornaropoulos, an assistant professor of computer science at GMU and one of the authors of the paper.

"As long as the LLM believes that it's really close to acquiring the target, it will keep trying on the same loop," he says. "So essentially, we are kind of exploiting this vulnerability — this greedy approach — that LLMs take during these penetration-testing scenarios."

Cybersecurity researchers and AI engineers have proposed a variety of novel ways for LLMs to be used by attackers. From the ConfusedPilot attack, which uses indirect prompt injection to attack LLMs when they are ingesting documents during retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) applications, to the CodeBreaker attack, which causes code-generating LLMs to suggest insecure code, attackers have automated systems in their sights.

Yet, research on offensive and defensive uses of LLMs is still early: AI-augmented attacks are essentially automating the attacks that we already know about, says Dan Grant, principal data scientist at threat-defense firm GreyNoise Intelligence. Yet, signs of increasing use of automation among attackers is increasing: the volume of attacks has been slowly increasing in the wild and the time to exploit a vulnerability has been slowly decreasing.

"LLMs enable an extra layer of automation and discovery that we haven't really seen before, but \[attackers are\] still applying the same route to an attack," he says. "If you're doing a SQL injection, it's still a SQL injection whether an LLM wrote it or human wrote it. But what it is, is a force multiplier."

**Direct Attacks, Indirect Injections, and Triggers**

In their research, the GMU team created a game between an attacking LLM and a defending system, Mantis, to see if prompt injection could impact the attacker. Prompt injection attacks typically take two forms. Direct prompt injection attacks are natural-language commands that are entered directly into the LLM interface, such as a chatbot or a request sent to an API interface. Indirect prompt injection attacks are statements included in documents, web pages, or databases that are ingested by an LLM, such as when an LLM scans data as part of a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) capability.

In the GMU research, the attacking LLM attempts to compromise a machine and deliver specific payloads as part of its goal, while the defending system aims to prevent the attacker's success. An attacking system will typically use an iterative loop that assesses the current state of the environment, selects an action to advance toward its goal, execute the action, and analyze the targeted system's response.

Using a decoy FTP server, Mantis sends a prompt-injection attack back to the LLM agent. Source: "Hacking Back the AI-Hacker" paper, George Mason University

The GMU researchers' approach is to target the last step by embedding prompt-injection commands in the response sent to the attacking AI. By allowing the attacker to gain initial access to a decoy service, such as a web login page or a fake FTP server, the group can send back a payload with text that contains instructions to any LLM taking part in the attack.

"By strategically embedding prompt injections into system responses, Mantis influences and misdirects LLM-based agents, disrupting their attack strategies," the researchers stated in their paper. "Once deployed, Mantis operates autonomously, orchestrating countermeasures based on the nature of detected interactions."

Because the attacking AI is analyzing the responses, a communications channel is created between the defender and the attacker, the researchers stated. Since the defender controls the communications, they can essentially attempt to exploit weaknesses in the attacker's LLM.

**Counter Attack, Passive Defense**

The Mantis team focused on two types of defensive actions: Passive defenses that attempt to slow the attacker down and raise the cost of their actions, and active defenses that hack back and aim to gain the ability to run commands on the attacker's system. Both strategies were effective with a greater than 95% success rate using the prompt-injection approach, the paper stated.

In fact, the researchers were surprised at how quickly they could redirect an attacking LLM, either causing it to consume resources or even to open a reverse shell back to the defender, says Dario Pasquini, a researcher at GMU and the lead author of the paper.

"It was very, very easy for us to steer the LLM to do what we wanted," he says. "Usually, in a normal setting, prompt injection is a little bit more difficult, but here — I guess because the task that the agent has to perform is very complicated — any kind of injection of prompt, such as suggesting that the LLM do something else, is \[effective\]."

By bracketing a command to the LLM with ANSI characters that hide the prompt text from the terminal, the attack can happen without the knowledge of a human attacker.

**Prompt Injection is the Weakness**

While attackers who want to shore up the resilience of their LLMs can attempt to harden their systems against exploits, the actual weakness is the ability to inject commands into prompts, which is a hard problem to solve, says Giuseppe Ateniese, a professor of cybersecurity engineering at George Mason University.

"We are exploiting those something that is very hard to patch," he says. "The only way to solve it for now is to put some human in the loop, but if you put the human in the loop, then what is the purpose of the LLM in the first place?"

In the end, as long as prompt-injection attacks continue to be effective, Mantis will still be able to turn attacking AIs into prey.

**About the Author**

Veteran technology journalist of more than 20 years. Former research engineer. Written for more than two dozen publications, including CNET News.com, Dark Reading, MIT's Technology Review, Popular Science, and Wired News. Five awards for journalism, including Best Deadline Journalism (Online) in 2003 for coverage of the Blaster worm. Crunches numbers on various trends using Python and R. Recent reports include analyses of the shortage in cybersecurity workers and annual vulnerability trends.

AI About-Face: 'Mantis' Turns LLM Attackers Into Prey

PRESS RELEASE

NEW YORK, Nov. 14, 2024 /PRNewswire/ -- Kyndryl (NYSE: KD), the world's largest IT infrastructure services provider, today introduced a new suite of services, co-developed with Microsoft, to enhance cyber resilience for businesses globally.

Kyndryl and Microsoft have built upon their successful, long-standing partnership to develop differentiated, scalable security and resiliency services. The new services are integrated into Kyndryl Bridge, the industry-leading, artificial intelligence (AI)-powered, open integration digital business platform. Combining Kyndryl's deep services expertise with Microsoft's security technologies provides businesses a comprehensive approach to defending their operations from nefarious threats and attacks.  

This collaboration between Kyndryl and Microsoft can help customers address their expansive cyber resilience needs, ranging from compliance to secure, resilient IT infrastructure, especially considering that cyberattacks are the top concern for business leaders.

"As businesses continue to embrace digital modernization and rapid advancements in technology, the cyber threat landscape and growing regulatory pressures around the world are becoming increasingly complex," said Michelle Weston, Vice President of Security & Resiliency, Kyndryl. "Through our strategic partnership with Microsoft, we are positioned to meet our customers' needs by providing robust security capabilities and supporting their regulatory readiness. Our combined expertise allows us to deliver services that not only protect our customers' assets, but also empower them to thrive in a rapidly evolving digital environment."

"The need for robust cyber resilience has never been greater," said Ricardo Davila, Senior Director, Kyndryl, at Microsoft. "By leveraging Microsoft's security technologies and Kyndryl's expertise, together, we're helping businesses protect their critical assets, so they can operate with confidence. This partnership reinforces our shared commitment to combat cyber threats, so they can realize digital transformation across industries."

Through its services, Kyndryl provides customers:

*   Enhanced risk and compliance readiness: To help support customers' cyber regulatory readiness around the world, Kyndryl's services with Microsoft Purview can automatically assess and manage compliance across multi-cloud and hybrid cloud environments. A global team of security experts recommend the most relevant assessments and advise on which policies and operational procedures to implement to help mitigate compliance risk. 
    
*   Security information and event management (SIEM) migration: Customers can migrate existing Microsoft Sentinel SIEM solutions quickly, enhancing security operations center (SOC) capabilities and accelerating onboarding processes, reducing time to initiate the delivery of services.
    
*   Identity and access management (IAM): Protecting identities and controlling access is one of the first lines of defense against threats to an organization's data and systems. Using Zero Trust principles, Kyndryl's services with Microsoft Entra enhance security and provide a better user experience for customers by offering simplified user authentication, identity governance and integrations to help secure access to their resources.
    
*   Increased detection and response (XDR) capabilities: Businesses have increasingly complex IT architecture with remote endpoints that use several operating systems and device types. The XDR services with Microsoft Defender enable threat prevention, detection and response against increasingly sophisticated attacks on customer assets, including email, identity, Software as a Service (SaaS) applications, cloud infrastructure and data.
    

As part of the partnership, Kyndryl became a member of the Microsoft Intelligent Security Association (MISA), an ecosystem of independent software vendors (ISVs) and managed security service providers (MSSPs) that have integrated their solutions with Microsoft Security technology to better defend mutual customers against a world of increasing cyber threats.

Visit the Kyndryl and Microsoft alliance page for more information on the strategic partnership.

About Kyndryl  
Kyndryl (NYSE: KD) is the world's largest IT infrastructure services provider, serving thousands of enterprise customers in more than 60 countries. The Company designs, builds, manages and modernizes the complex, mission-critical information systems that the world depends on every day. For more information, visit www.kyndryl.com.

Forward-Looking Statements  
This press release contains "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such forward-looking statements often contain words such as "will," "anticipate," "predict," "project," "plan," "forecast," "estimate," "expect," "intend," "target," "may," "should," "would," "could," "outlook" and other similar words or expressions or the negative thereof or other variations thereon. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including without limitation statements representing management's beliefs about future events, transactions, strategies, operations and financial results, may be forward-looking statements. These statements do not guarantee future performance and speak only as of the date of this press release and the Company does not undertake to update its forward-looking statements. Actual outcomes or results may differ materially from those suggested by forward-looking statements as a result of risks and uncertainties including those described in the "Risk Factors" section of the Company's most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Kyndryl &amp; Microsoft Unveil New Services to Advance Cyber Resilience for Customers

Akamai Reports Third Quarter 2024 Financial Results

PRESS RELEASE

SAN FRANCISCO, Nov. 4, 2024 /PRNewswire/ -- Bugcrowd, the leader in crowdsourced security, today announced the addition of Trey Ford as Chief Information Security Officer for the Americas, to the leadership team.

Trey is a seasoned strategic advisor and security thought leader with over 25 years of experience in offensive and defensive security disciplines. Trey has held key leadership roles at Deepwatch, Vista Equity Partners, Salesforce, Black Hat, and more. He has also been a valued member of Bugcrowd's advisory board for over a decade.

Trey is passionate about working with enterprise leaders, corporate directors, and investors to help teams strengthen their technology and execution strategy.

"I'm really looking forward to joining this amazing Bugcrowd team and this fast-growing, dynamic organization that continues to execute on its compelling vision for the future of cybersecurity, based on the ingenuity of the crowd," Ford said. "I've always believed in taking a hands-on approach to building, breaking, and deconstructing security problems to first principles -- I intend to continue applying that same mindset here at Bugcrowd."

"Trey's addition to our team marks a pivotal moment for enhancing our operational capabilities in the Americas region," said Nick McKenzie, Chief Information and Security Officer of Bugcrowd. "His leadership and offensive security expertise, coupled with his ability to help us connect with and support customers, will elevate the team's capabilities to new heights—a timely appointment with our current business momentum."

Bugcrowd also announced the availability of Bugcrowd Continuous Attack Surface Pentesting as a Service Subscription, a new way to consume pen testing. By using this subscription model, customers can enjoy the flexibility and predictability of pre-paid capacity on the Bugcrowd Platform to be drawn-down on demand.

In addition, Bugcrowd announced an additional growth capital facility of $50 million from Silicon Valley Bank in October. The new financing will further scale Bugcrowd's AI-powered platform globally, fund continued innovation into the Bugcrowd Platform, and leverage opportunities for strategic M&A, providing added value to clients, partners, and the hacker community.

"We are extremely excited by the rapid growth and market momentum that Bugcrowd has achieved so far this year," said Dave Gerry, Chief Executive Officer of Bugcrowd. "We believe we are putting together the world's strongest combination of people and technologies to deliver on the powerful insights provided by elite hackers operating on our global Platform."

The Bugcrowd Platform connects organizations with trusted security researchers and hackers to help proactively defend themselves against sophisticated threats. For over a decade, Bugcrowd's unique "skills-as-a-service" approach has uncovered more high-impact vulnerabilities than traditional methods, along with clearer ROI, for more than 1,200 customers – including OpenAI, Google, T-Mobile, Carvana, the US Department of Defense's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO), ExpressVPN, Rapyd, New Relic, and OpenSea. With unmatched flexibility and access to a decade of vulnerability intelligence, the Bugcrowd Platform has evolved to address a changing attack surface influenced by adoption of mobile infrastructure, hybrid work, APIs, crypto, cloud workloads, and AI. Bugcrowd's crowdsourced solutions include penetration-testing-as-a-service, managed bug bounties, vulnerability disclosure programs (VDPs), and AI Safety and Security products.

To learn more about how the Bugcrowd platform can help your organization fight against today's evolving cyberattacks, visit here.

To download a copy of the Inside the Mind of a Hacker 2024 report, click here.

About Bugcrowd

We are Bugcrowd. Since 2012, we've been empowering organizations to take back control and stay ahead of threat actors by uniting the collective ingenuity and expertise of our customers and trusted alliance of elite hackers, with our patented data and AI-powered Security Knowledge Platform™. Our network of hackers brings diverse expertise to uncover hidden weaknesses, adapting swiftly to evolving threats, even against zero-day exploits. With unmatched scalability and adaptability, our data and AI-driven CrowdMatch™ technology in our platform finds the perfect talent for your unique fight. We are creating a new era of modern crowdsourced security that outpaces threat actors.

Unleash the ingenuity of the hacker community with Bugcrowd, visit www.bugcrowd.com. Read our blog.

Bugcrowd Names Trey Ford as CISO

### Summary
The Python parser parses newlines in chunk extensions incorrectly which can lead to request smuggling vulnerabilities under certain conditions.

### Impact
If a pure Python version of aiohttp is installed (i.e. without the usual C extensions) or `AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS` is enabled, then an attacker may be able to execute a request smuggling attack to bypass certain firewalls or proxy protections.

-----

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/259edc369075de63e6f3a4eaade058c62af0df71

Skip to content

**Navigation Menu**

*   *   GitHub Copilot
        
        Write better code with AI
        
    *   Security
        
        Find and fix vulnerabilities
        
    *   Actions
        
        Automate any workflow
        
    *   Codespaces
        
        Instant dev environments
        
    *   Issues
        
        Plan and track work
        
    *   Code Review
        
        Manage code changes
        
    *   Discussions
        
        Collaborate outside of code
        
    *   Code Search
        
        Find more, search less
        
    

*   Explore
    
    *   Learning Pathways
    *   White papers, Ebooks, Webinars
    *   Customer Stories
    *   Partners
    
*   *   GitHub Sponsors
        
        Fund open source developers
        
    
    *   The ReadME Project
        
        GitHub community articles
        
    
*   *   Enterprise platform
        
        AI-powered developer platform
        
    
*   Pricing

**Provide feedback**

**Saved searches****Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly**

Sign up

1.  GitHub Advisory Database
2.  GitHub Reviewed
3.  CVE-2024-52304

**aiohttp allows request smuggling due to incorrect parsing of chunk extensions**

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Nov 18, 2024 in aio-libs/aiohttp • Updated Nov 18, 2024

**Package**

pip aiohttp (pip)

**Affected versions**

<= 3.10.10

**Description**

**Summary**

The Python parser parses newlines in chunk extensions incorrectly which can lead to request smuggling vulnerabilities under certain conditions.

**Impact**

If a pure Python version of aiohttp is installed (i.e. without the usual C extensions) or AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS is enabled, then an attacker may be able to execute a request smuggling attack to bypass certain firewalls or proxy protections.

Patch: aio-libs/aiohttp@259edc3

**References**

*   GHSA-8495-4g3g-x7pr
*   aio-libs/aiohttp@259edc3

Published to the GitHub Advisory Database

Nov 18, 2024

Last updated

Nov 18, 2024

GHSA-8495-4g3g-x7pr: aiohttp allows request smuggling due to incorrect parsing of chunk extensions

### Summary

A memory leak can occur when a request produces a `MatchInfoError`. This was caused by adding an entry to a cache on each request, due to the building of each `MatchInfoError` producing a unique cache entry.

### Impact

If the user is making use of any middlewares with `aiohttp.web` then it is advisable to upgrade immediately.

An attacker may be able to exhaust the memory resources of a server by sending a substantial number (100,000s to millions) of such requests.

-----

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/bc15db61615079d1b6327ba42c682f758fa96936

**Summary**

A memory leak can occur when a request produces a MatchInfoError. This was caused by adding an entry to a cache on each request, due to the building of each MatchInfoError producing a unique cache entry.

**Impact**

If the user is making use of any middlewares with aiohttp.web then it is advisable to upgrade immediately.

An attacker may be able to exhaust the memory resources of a server by sending a substantial number (100,000s to millions) of such requests.

Patch: aio-libs/aiohttp@bc15db6

**References**

*   GHSA-27mf-ghqm-j3j8
*   aio-libs/aiohttp@bc15db6

GHSA-27mf-ghqm-j3j8: aiohttp has a memory leak when middleware is enabled when requesting a resource with a non-allowed method

Other Biden administration appointees at CISA will also submit their resignations on Jan. 20, as the cyberdefense agency prepares for President-elect Trump's new DHS director.

Source: NurPhoto SRL via Alamy Stock Photo

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has confirmed that Jen Easterly, director of the agency, will step down from her position on President-elect Donald Trump's Inauguration Day.

Other political appointees of President Biden will follow suit with their own resignations as the agency prepares for a second Trump administration.

When Easterly was first nominated for the position by the Biden administration, she filled an eight-month vacancy after then-President Trump fired the agency's first director, Chris Krebs, for denouncing the administration's false claims of a rigged 2020 US election.

During her time as CISA director, Easterly oversaw prominent moments within the cybersecurity field, such as the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack that sent shockwaves throughout the industry and prompted significant change within critical infrastructure security practices. She also led CISA in ushering in new cybersecurity initiatives, such as Secure by Design and CISA's resiliency playbook to provide guidance and improve critical infrastructure security.

It remains unclear what Easterly's plans are after leaving CISA. However, former President Trump has nominated South Dakota Gov. Kristi Noem as secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, which oversees CISA. It's unclear what CISA's future holds, as some Republican lawmakers have called for restricting the scope of its mission and, in some cases, for its elimination.

**About the Author**

Latest News