Latest News

Although the veto was a setback, it highlights key debates in the emerging field of AI governance and the potential for California to shape the future of AI regulation.

New Linux malware ‘Perfctl’ is targeting millions worldwide, mimicking system files to evade detection. This sophisticated malware compromises…

Google has revealed the various security guardrails that have been incorporated into its latest Pixel devices to counter the rising threat posed by baseband security attacks. The cellular baseband (i.e., modem) refers to a processor on the device that's responsible for handling all connectivity, such as LTE, 4G, and 5G, with a mobile phone cell tower or base station over a radio interface. "This

### Impact An abstract UNIX domain socket responsible for introspection is available without authentication locally to any user with access to the network namespace where the local juju agent is running. On a juju controller agent, denial of service can be performed by using the `/leases/revoke` endpoint. Revoking leases in juju can cause availability issues. On a juju machine agent that is hosting units, disabling the unit component can be performed using the `/units` endpoint with a "stop" action. ### Patches Patch: https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/43f0fc59790d220a457d4d305f484f62be556d3b Patched in: - 3.5.4 - 3.4.6 - 3.3.7 - 3.1.10 - 2.9.51 ### Workarounds No workaround. ### References https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/725800953aaa29dbeda4f806097bf838e61644dd/worker/introspection/worker.go#L125

### Impact When combined with an attack of `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID`, any user on the local system with access to the default network namespace may connect to the `@/var/lib/juju/agents/unit-xxxx-yyyy/agent.socket` and perform actions that are normally reserved to a juju charm. ### Patches Patch: https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/2f2ec128ef5a8ca81fc86ae79cfcdbab0007c206 Patched in: - 3.5.4 - 3.4.6 - 3.3.7 - 3.1.10 - 2.9.51 ### Workarounds No workarounds available. ### References [GHSA-mh98-763h-m9v4](https://github.com/juju/juju/security/advisories/GHSA-mh98-763h-m9v4) https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/725800953aaa29dbeda4f806097bf838e61644dd/worker/uniter/paths.go#L222

Authd PAM module up to version 0.3.4 can allow broker-managed users to impersonate any other user managed by the same broker and perform any PAM operation with it, including authenticating as them. This is possible using tools such as `su`, `sudo` or `ssh` (and potentially others) that, so far, do not ensure that the PAM user at the end of the transaction is matching the one who initiated the transaction. Authd 0.3.5 fixes this by not allowing changing the user unless it was never set before in the PAM stack. `su` version that will include https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/pull/3206 will not be affected `ssh` version that will include https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/521 will not be affected `sudo` version that will include https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/pull/412 will not be affected `login` not affected `passwd` not affected <details> <summary>Old report</summary> ### Summary An user can access as another user using its own credentials ### Details ...

### Impact Users who have opted into static evaluation of module sources, versions, and backend configurations may be at risk of exposing sensitive variables and locals. This is a workflow that should not be possible and explicitly show errors. ### Workarounds Check that you are not using sensitive variables in module sources and versions, as well as backend configurations. The patch will add explicit errors and prevent this from being possible. ### Examples ```hcl variable "backend_path" { type = string sensitive = true } terraform { backend "local" { path = var.backend_path } } ``` ```hcl variable "mod_info" { type = string sensitive = true } module "foo" { source = var.mod_info //version = var.mod_info } ```

### Impact Configuration supplied through `APP_CONFIG_*` environment variables, for example `APP_CONFIG_backend_listen_port=7007`, where unexpectedly ignoring the visibility defined in configuration schema. This occurred even if the configuration schema specified that they should have backend or secret visibility. This was an intended feature of the `APP_CONFIG_*` way of supplying configuration, but now clearly goes against the expected behavior of the configuration system. This behavior leads to a risk of potentially exposing sensitive configuration details intended to remain private or restricted to backend processes. ### Patches The issue has been resolved in version `0.3.75` of the `@backstage/plugin-app-backend` package. Users are encouraged to upgrade to this version to mitigate the vulnerability. ### Workarounds As a temporary measure, avoid supplying secrets using the `APP_CONFIG_` configuration pattern. Consider alternative methods for setting secrets, such as the [enviro...

`JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` is the authentication measure on the unit hook tool abstract domain socket. It looks like `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID=appname/0-update-status-6073989428498739633`. This value looks fairly unpredictable, but due to the random source used, it is highly predictable. `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` has the following components: - the application name - the unit number - the hook being currently run - a uint63 decimal number On a system the application name and unit number can be deduced by reading the structure of the filesystem. The current hook being run is not easily deduce-able, but is a limited set of possible values, so one could try them all. Finally the random number, this is generated from a non cryptographically secure random source. Specifically the random number generator built into the go standard library, using the current unix time in seconds (at startup) as the seed. There is no rate limiting on the abstract domain socket, the only limiting factor is time (window of time the h...

For years, securing a company’s systems was synonymous with securing its “perimeter.” There was what was safe “inside” and the unsafe outside world. We built sturdy firewalls and deployed sophisticated detection systems, confident that keeping the barbarians outside the walls kept our data and systems safe. The problem is that we no longer operate within the confines of physical on-prem