Sure, you can request a deletion of your data from 23andMe, but that doesn’t mean the company will delete it entirely.

Deleting your personal data from 23andMe is proving to be hard.

There are good reasons for people wanting to delete their data from 23andMe: The DNA testing platform has a lot of problems, so let’s start with a recap.

A little over a year ago, cybercriminals put up information belonging to as many as seven million 23andMe customers for sale on criminal forums following a credential stuffing attack against the genomics company.

In December 2023, we learned that the attacker was able to directly access the accounts of roughly 0.1% of 23andMe’s users, which is about 14,000 of its 14 million customers. So far not too many people affected, but with the breached accounts at their disposal, the attacker used 23andMe’s opt-in DNA Relatives (DNAR) feature—which matches users with their genetic relatives—to access information about millions of other users.

For a subset of these accounts, the stolen data contained health-related information based upon the user’s genetics.

In January 2024, 23andMe had the audacity to lay the blame at the feet of victims themselves in a letter to legal representatives of victims. 23andMe reasoned that the customers whose data was directly accessed re-used their passwords, gave permission to share data with other users on 23andMe’s platform, and that the medical information was non-substantive.

And in September 2024, we found out that the company would pay $30 million to settle a class action lawsuit, as that was all that 23andMe could afford to pay. And that’s only because the expectation was that cyberinsurance would cover $25 million.

As a result, the value of 23andMe plummeted. And last month the company said goodbye to all its board members except for CEO Anne Wojcicki who stood by her plans to take the company private.

This uncertainty about the future of the company and, with that, who will be the future holder of all the customer personal information, has caused a surge of users looking to close their accounts and delete their data.

However, it turns out it’s not as easy as just asking for the data to be removed. You can delete your data from 23andMe , but 23andMe says it will retain some of that data (including genetic information) to comply with the company’s legal obligations, according to its privacy policy.

> “23andMe and/or our contracted genotyping laboratory will retain your Genetic Information, date of birth, and sex as required for compliance with applicable legal obligations, including the federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), California Business and Professions Code Section 1265 and College of American Pathologists (CAP) accreditation requirements, even if you chose to delete your account. 23andMe will also retain limited information related to your account and data deletion request, including but not limited to, your email address, account deletion request identifier, communications related to inquiries or complaints and legal agreements for a limited period of time as required by law, contractual obligations, and/or as necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims and for audit and compliance purposes.”

In addition, any information you previously provided and consented to be used in 23andMe research projects cannot be removed from ongoing or completed studies, although the company says it will not use it in any future ones.

This is unfortunate, and is yet another reminder about how once you give information away you cannot always get it back. Let’s hope the policy gets changed and customers are allowed to fully delete their data soon.

It’s still worth deleting as much as possible, though. So here’s how to do that.

**How to delete (most of) your data from 23andMe**

*   Log into your account and navigate to **Settings**.
*   Under **Settings**, scroll to the section titled **23andMe data**. Select **View**.
*   It will ask you to enter your date of birth for extra security. 
*   In the next section, you’ll be asked which, if there is any, personal data you’d like to download from the company (onto a personal, not public, computer). Once you’re finished, scroll to the bottom and select **Permanently delete data**.
*   You should then receive an email from 23andMe detailing its account deletion policy and requesting that you confirm your request. Once you confirm you’d like your data to be deleted, the deletion will begin automatically, and you’ll immediately lose access to your account. 

When you set up your 23andMe account, you had the options to either have the saliva sample that you sent to them securely destroyed or to have it stored for future testing. If you chose to store your sample but now want to delete your 23andMe account, the company says it will destroy the sample for you as part of the account deletion process.

If you want to find out if your personal data was exposed through the 23andMe breach, you can use our free Digital Footprint scan. Fill in the email address you’re curious about (it’s best to submit the one you used to register and 23andMe) and we’ll send you a free report.

**We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identity**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using identity protection.

 23andMe will retain your genetic information, even if you delete the account 

So much jamming is taking place in northeastern Norway, regulators no longer want to know.

From the ground, northeastern Norway might look like fjord country, peppered with neat red houses and dissected by snowmobile tours through the winter. But for pilots flying above, the region has become a danger zone for GPS jamming.

The jamming in the region of Finnmark is so constant, Norwegian authorities decided last month they would no longer log when and where it happens—accepting these disturbance signals as the new normal.

Nicolai Gerrard, senior engineer at NKOM, the country’s communications authority, says his organization no longer counts the jamming incidents. “It has unfortunately developed into an unwanted normal situation that should not be there. Therefore, the \[Norwegian authority in charge of the airports\] are not interested in continuous updates on something that is happening all the time.”

Pilots meanwhile, still have to adapt, usually when they are above 6,000 feet in the air. “We experience this almost every day,” says Odd Thomassen, a captain and senior safety adviser at the Norwegian airline Widerøe. He claims jamming typically lasts between six and eight minutes at a time.

A map of GPS jamming over Europe on 17 October 2024.

Map: Courtesy of Benoit Figuet, Michael Felux and Raphael Monstein of SkAI Data Services and the Zurich University of Applied Sciences. Data sourced from the OpenSky Network.

When a plane gets jammed, warnings flash on cockpit computers and the GPS system used to warn pilots of a potential collision with terrain, such as mountains, stops working. Pilots are still able to navigate without GPS if they can communicate with ground stations nearby, explains Thomassen. But they are left with an eerie sense they are flying without the support of the latest technology. “You're basically \[going\] 30 years back in time,” he says.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, jamming has dramatically increased across Europe’s eastern edges, and authorities in Baltic countries openly blame Russia for overloading GPS receivers with benign signals, meaning they can no longer operate. In April, a Finnair plane trying to land in Tartu, Estonia, was forced to turn back 15 minutes before landing because it could not get an accurate GPS signal.

Over the past decade, GPS systems have been considered so dependable that many smaller, more remote airports have started to rely on it completely instead of maintaining more expensive ground-based equipment, says Andy Spencer, a pilot and international flight ops specialist at OpsGroup, a member organization for pilots and others in the airline industry.

“In Norway, you're probably looking at a lot of airports that only have GPS approaches,” he says, referring to the phase of the flight where planes descend to the runway. “If there is an issue with GPS signals, these airports can become off limits.”

In Finland, even tractors capable of operating automatically have been disrupted. In May, the Finnish transport agency said the problem had intensified since Ukraine began targeting Russian energy infrastructure with drones, suggesting the jamming could be a side effect of Russia’s new drone defense systems. That same month, the agency changed its guidelines so that airlines have to report only GPS interference that has “exceptional effects.”

NKOM also attributes jamming above northeastern Norway to Russia. “In Finnmark, the interference is Russian jamming of several GNSS bands \[systems that help satellites and ground stations communicate\], not only GPS, originating from some place on the Russian side of the border,” Gerrard tells WIRED. Pilots aren’t the only people affected, he stresses. Across Norway, there have been cases of fishing boats unable to carry out certain tasks and diggers on construction sites no longer able to dig precisely, he says. The Russian embassy in Oslo did not respond to WIRED’s request for comment.

NKOM’s decision to stop tracking jamming in Finnmark sets a dangerous precedent, says Melanie Garson, a professor focused on international conflict resolution at University College London. “By not reacting, how do you enforce a deterrent effect?” she asks, adding it is still unclear whether the government is going to find a solution to the jamming problem or leave it to the industries that are affected.

NKOM does try to “eliminate” GPS jamming when its source is inside Norwegian territory, says spokesperson Gerrard. The agency is also among several government departments that organizes the annual event Jammerfest, held on the Norwegian island of Andøya, to experiment with countermeasures. Since 2022, representatives from industry and government travel to the arctic circle to test how their systems respond to jamming and the more serious GPS spoofing, where GPS signals are faked to deceive a plane or other device about its own location.

Yet Widerøe pilots are concerned that this issue might feel remote to the American companies that make a lot of the equipment inside their planes. They believe it is the American Navstar satellite system being targeted because other devices like iPads—which can pick up signals from multiple satellite constellations—still work throughout periods of jamming.

“The providers of the navigation computers, they are mainly American,” says Rolf Fossgård, deputy VP of flight operations at Widerøe. He’s worried that if American businesses are not affected themselves, they might not be motivated to upgrade their systems to be jamming-resistant. “For a lot of European operators or Middle East operators, they are in need of this kind of equipment.”

It's unclear how the situation in the skies above Finnmark is going to evolve. Since 2022, most interference has hit planes above 6,000 feet—suggesting the device that is causing the jamming is located on the ground, and that the more sensitive part of a plane's journey, at lower altitudes, is protected by the curvature of the Earth.

But in April, Thomassen claims, he encountered his first case of jamming as he attempted to land. Flying into Båtsfjord, on Norway’s northern tip, his plane suffered jamming as it approached the runway. “We were able to land just fine based on visual contact with the airport,” he explains, adding that his company Widerøe is yet to verify why this case of jamming took place at such low altitudes.

Luckily the surrounding area is very flat, he says. “Norway is a mountainous country, so if the jamming were in other parts of the country, operational impact would be significant.”

GPS Jamming Is Screwing With Norwegian Planes

Security researchers created an algorithm that turns a malicious prompt into a set of hidden instructions that could send a user's personal information to an attacker.

When talking with a chatbot, you might inevitably give up your personal information—your name, for instance, and maybe details about where you live and work, or your interests. The more you share with a large language model, the greater the risk of it being abused if there’s a security flaw.

A group of security researchers from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) and Nanyang Technological University in Singapore are now revealing a new attack that secretly commands an LLM to gather your personal information—including names, ID numbers, payment card details, email addresses, mailing addresses, and more—from chats and send it directly to a hacker.

The attack, named Imprompter by the researchers, uses an algorithm to transform a prompt given to the LLM into a hidden set of malicious instructions. An English-language sentence telling the LLM to find personal information someone has entered and send it to the hackers is turned into what appears to be a random selection of characters.

However, in reality, this nonsense-looking prompt instructs the LLM to find a user’s personal information, attach it to a URL, and quietly send it back to a domain owned by the attacker—all without alerting the person chatting with the LLM. The researchers detail Imprompter in a paper published today.

“The effect of this particular prompt is essentially to manipulate the LLM agent to extract personal information from the conversation and send that personal information to the attacker’s address,” says Xiaohan Fu, the lead author of the research and a computer science PhD student at UCSD. “We hide the goal of the attack in plain sight.”

The eight researchers behind the work tested the attack method on two LLMs, LeChat by French AI giant Mistral AI and Chinese chatbot ChatGLM. In both instances, they found they could stealthily extract personal information within test conversations—the researchers write that they have a “nearly 80 percent success rate.”

Mistral AI tells WIRED it has fixed the security vulnerability—with the researchers confirming the company disabled one of its chat functionalities. A statement from ChatGLM stressed it takes security seriously but did not directly comment on the vulnerability.

**Hidden Meanings**

Since OpenAI’s ChatGPT sparked a generative AI boom following its release at the end of 2022, researchers and hackers have been consistently finding security holes in AI systems. These often fall into two broad categories: jailbreaks and prompt injections.

Jailbreaks can trick an AI system into ignoring built-in safety rules by using prompts that override the AI’s settings. Prompt injections, however, involve an LLM being fed a set of instructions—such as telling them to steal data or manipulate a CV—contained within an external data source. For instance, a message embedded on a website may contain a hidden prompt that an AI will ingest if it summarizes the page.

Prompt injections are considered one of generative AI’s biggest security risks and are not easy to fix. The attack type particularly worries security experts as LLMs are increasingly turned into agents that can carry out tasks on behalf of a human, such as booking flights or being connected to an external database to provide specific answers.

The Imprompter attacks on LLM agents start with a natural language prompt (as shown above) that tells the AI to extract all personal information, such as names and IDs, from the user’s conversation. The researchers’ algorithm generates an obfuscated version (also above) that has the same meaning to the LLM, but to humans looks like a series of random characters.

“Our current hypothesis is that the LLMs learn hidden relationships between tokens from text and these relationships go beyond natural language,” Fu says of the transformation. “It is almost as if there is a different language that the model understands.”

The result is that the LLM follows the adversarial prompt, gathers all the personal information, and formats it into a Markdown image command—attaching the personal information to a URL owned by the attackers. The LLM visits this URL to try and retrieve the image and leaks the personal information to the attacker. The LLM responds in the chat with a 1x1 transparent pixel that can’t be seen by the users.

The researchers say that if the attack were carried out in the real world, people could be socially engineered into believing the unintelligible prompt might do something useful, such as improve their CV. The researchers point to numerous websites that provide people with prompts they can use. They tested the attack by uploading a CV to conversations with chatbots, and it was able to return the personal information contained within the file.

Earlence Fernandes, an assistant professor at UCSD who was involved in the work, says the attack approach is fairly complicated as the obfuscated prompt needs to identify personal information, form a working URL, apply Markdown syntax, and not give away to the user that it is behaving nefariously. Fernandes likens the attack to malware, citing its ability to perform functions and behavior in ways the user might not intend.

“Normally you could write a lot of computer code to do this in traditional malware,” Fernandes says. “But here I think the cool thing is all of that can be embodied in this relatively short gibberish prompt.”

A spokesperson for Mistral AI says the company welcomes security researchers helping it to make its products safer for users. “Following this feedback, Mistral AI promptly implemented the proper remediation to fix the situation,” the spokesperson says. The company treated the issue as one with “medium severity,” and its fix blocks the Markdown renderer from operating and being able to call an external URL through this process, meaning external image loading isn’t possible.

Fernandes believes Mistral AI’s update is likely one of the first times an adversarial prompt example has led to an LLM product being fixed, rather than the attack being stopped by filtering out the prompt. However, he says, limiting the capabilities of LLM agents could be “counterproductive” in the long run.

Meanwhile, a statement from the creators of ChatGLM says the company has security measures in place to help with user privacy. “Our model is secure, and we have always placed a high priority on model security and privacy protection,” the statement says. “By open-sourcing our model, we aim to leverage the power of the open-source community to better inspect and scrutinize all aspects of these models’ capabilities, including their security.”

**A “High-Risk Activity”**

Dan McInerney, the lead threat researcher at security company Protect AI, says the Imprompter paper “releases an algorithm for automatically creating prompts that can be used in prompt injection to do various exploitations, like PII exfiltration, image misclassification, or malicious use of tools the LLM agent can access.” While many of the attack types within the research may be similar to previous methods, McInerney says, the algorithm ties them together. “This is more along the lines of improving automated LLM attacks than undiscovered threat surfaces in them.”

However, he adds that as LLM agents become more commonly used and people give them more authority to take actions on their behalf, the scope for attacks against them increases. “Releasing an LLM agent that accepts arbitrary user input should be considered a high-risk activity that requires significant and creative security testing prior to deployment,” McInerney says.

For companies, that means understanding the ways an AI agent can interact with data and how they can be abused. But for individual people, similarly to common security advice, you should consider just how much information you’re providing to any AI application or company, and if using any prompts from the internet, be cautious of where they come from.

This Prompt Can Make an AI Chatbot Identify and Extract Personal Details From Your Chats

An advanced persistent threat (APT) actor with suspected ties to India has sprung forth with a flurry of attacks against high-profile entities and strategic infrastructures in the Middle East and Africa.
The activity has been attributed to a group tracked as SideWinder, which is also known as APT-C-17, Baby Elephant, Hardcore Nationalist, Leafperforator, Rattlesnake, Razor Tiger, and T-APT-04.
"

An advanced persistent threat (APT) actor with suspected ties to India has sprung forth with a flurry of attacks against high-profile entities and strategic infrastructures in the Middle East and Africa.

The activity has been attributed to a group tracked as SideWinder, which is also known as APT-C-17, Baby Elephant, Hardcore Nationalist, Leafperforator, Rattlesnake, Razor Tiger, and T-APT-04.

"The group may be perceived as a low-skilled actor due to the use of public exploits, malicious LNK files and scripts as infection vectors, and the use of public RATs, but their true capabilities only become apparent when you carefully examine the details of their operations," Kaspersky researchers Giampaolo Dedola and Vasily Berdnikov said.

Targets of the attacks include government and military entities, logistics, infrastructure and telecommunications companies, financial institutions, universities, and oil trading companies located in Bangladesh, Djibouti, Jordan, Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the U.A.E.

SideWinder has also been observed setting its sights on diplomatic entities in Afghanistan, France, China, India, Indonesia, and Morocco.

The most significant aspect of the recent campaign is the use of a multi-stage infection chain to deliver a previously unknown post-exploitation toolkit called StealerBot.

It all commences with a spear-phishing email with an attachment – either a ZIP archive containing a Windows shortcut (LNK) file or a Microsoft Office document – that, in turn, executes a series of intermediate JavaScript and .NET downloaders to ultimately deploy the StealerBot malware.

The documents rely on the tried-and-tested technique of remote template injection to download an RTF file that is stored on an adversary-controlled remote server. The RTF file, for its part, triggers an exploit for CVE-2017-11882, to execute JavaScript code that's responsible for running additional JavaScript code hosted on mofa-gov-sa.direct888\[.\]net.

On the other hand, the LNK file employs the mshta.exe utility, a Windows-native binary designed to execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files, to run the same JavaScript code hosted on a malicious website controlled by the attacker.

The JavaScript malware serves to extract an embedded Base64-encoded string, a .NET library named "App.dll" that collects system information and functions as a downloader for a second .NET payload from a server ("ModuleInstaller.dll").

ModuleInstaller is also a downloader, but one that's equipped to maintain persistence on the host, execute a backdoor loader module, and retrieve next-stage components. But in an interesting twist, the manner in which they are run is determined by what endpoint security solution is installed on the host.

"The Bbckdoor loader module has been observed since 2020," the researchers said, pointing out its ability to evade detection and avoid running in sandboxed environments. "It has remained almost the same over the years."

"It was recently updated by the attacker, but the main difference is that old variants are configured to load the encrypted file using a specific filename embedded in the program, and the latest variants were designed to enumerate all the files in the current directory and load those without an extension."

The end goal of the attacks is to drop StealerBot via the Backdoor loader module. Described as a .NET-based "advanced modular implant," it is specifically geared to facilitate espionage activities by fetching several plugins to -

*   Install additional malware using a C++ downloader
*   Capture screenshots
*   Log keystrokes
*   Steal passwords from browsers
*   Intercept RDP credentials
*   Steal files
*   Start reverse shell
*   Phish Windows credentials, and
*   Escalate privileges bypassing User Account Control (UAC)

"The implant consists of different modules loaded by the main 'Orchestrator,' which is responsible for communicating with the \[command-and-control\] and executing and managing the plugins," the researchers said. "The Orchestrator is usually loaded by the backdoor loader module."

Kaspersky said it detected two installer components – named InstallerPayload and InstallerPayload\_NET – that don't feature as part of the attack chain, but are used to install StealerBot to likely update to a new version or infect another user.

The expansion of SideWinder's geographic reach and its use of a new sophisticated toolkit comes as cybersecurity company Cyfirma detailed new infrastructure running the Mythic post-exploitation framework and linked to Transparent Tribe (aka APT36), a threat actor believed to be of Pakistani origin.

"The group is distributing malicious Linux desktop entry files disguised as PDFs," it said. "These files execute scripts to download and run malicious binaries from remote servers, establishing persistent access and evading detection."

"APT36 is increasingly targeting Linux environments due to their widespread use in Indian government sectors, particularly with the Debian-based BOSS OS and the introduction of Maya OS."

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SideWinder APT Strikes Middle East and Africa With Stealthy Multi-Stage Attack

By Dmytro Korzhevin, Asheer Malhotra, Vanja Svajcer and Vitor Ventura. 


Cisco Talos has observed a new wave of attacks active since at least late 2023, from a Russian speaking group we track as “UAT-5647”, against Ukrainian government entities and unknown Polish entities. 
UAT-5647 is also known

UAT-5647 targets Ukrainian and Polish entities with RomCom malware variants

Federal prosecutors in the U.S. have charged two Sudanese brothers with running a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet for hire that conducted a record 35,000 DDoS attacks in a single year, including those that targeted Microsoft's services in June 2023.
The attacks, which were facilitated by Anonymous Sudan's "powerful DDoS tool," singled out critical infrastructure, corporate networks,

Federal prosecutors in the U.S. have charged two Sudanese brothers with running a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet for hire that conducted a record 35,000 DDoS attacks in a single year, including those that targeted Microsoft's services in June 2023.

The attacks, which were facilitated by Anonymous Sudan's "powerful DDoS tool," singled out critical infrastructure, corporate networks, and government agencies in the United States and around the world, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) said.

Ahmed Salah Yousif Omer, 22, and Alaa Salah Yusuuf Omer, 27, have been charged with one count of conspiracy to damage protected computers. Ahmed Salah has also been charged with three counts of damaging protected computers.

If convicted on all charges, Ahmed Salah faces a statutory maximum sentence of life in federal prison, while Alaa Salah faces a maximum sentence of five years in federal prison. The DDoS tool is said to have been disabled in March 2024, the same month the pair were arrested from an unknown country.

"Anonymous Sudan sought to maximize havoc and destruction against governments and businesses around the world by perpetrating tens of thousands of cyberattacks," said U.S. attorney Martin Estrada.

"This group's attacks were callous and brazen—the defendants went so far as to attack hospitals providing emergency and urgent care to patients."

Anonymous Sudan, which is tracked by Microsoft under the name Storm-1359, emerged at the start of 2023, orchestrating a series of Swedish, Dutch, Australian, and German organizations. While it claimed to be a hacktivist group, the indictments show that it was just a front for what they really were, a digital mercenary crew.

"After initially joining a brief pro-Russian hacktivist campaign, Anonymous Sudan conducted a series of DDoS attacks with apparent religious and Sudanese nationalist motivations, including campaigns against Australian and Northern European entities," Crowdstrike said.

"The group was also a prominent participant in the annual #OpIsrael hacktivist campaign. Throughout these campaigns, Anonymous Sudan also demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with other hacktivist groups like KillNet, SiegedSec and Türk Hack Team."

Court documents allege that the Anonymous Sudan actors and their customers used the group's Distributed Cloud Attack Tool (DCAT) to conduct thousands of destructive DDoS attacks and publicly claim credit for them, causing more than $10 million in damages to U.S. victims alone.

According to Amazon Web Services (AWS), DDoS services were offered to prospective customers for $100 per day, $600 per week, and $1,700 per month. The service allegedly permitted up to 100 attacks each day.

The DCAT tool, marketed in the criminal underground as Godzilla, Skynet, and InfraShutdown, has been dismantled as part of a court-authorized seizure of its key components, including servers that were used to launch the DDoS attacks, servers that relayed attack commands to a broader network of attack computers, and accounts containing the source code for the DDoS tools used by the group.

"These law enforcement actions were taken as part of Operation PowerOFF, an ongoing, coordinated effort among international law enforcement agencies aimed at dismantling criminal DDoS-for-hire infrastructure worldwide, and holding accountable the administrators and users of these illegal services," the DoJ said.

The development comes as the Finnish Customs office (aka Tulli) disrupted the Sipulitie darknet marketplace — a successor to Sipulimarket that was taken down by law enforcement in 2020 – which specialized in the sale of drugs and had been operational on the dark web since 2023.

"The website in Finnish and English was used for criminal purposes, such as selling drugs under the cover of anonymity," Tulli said. "The website administrator has said on public forums that Sipulitie's turnover was 1.3 million euros."

Elsewhere, Brazil's Department of Federal Police (DPF) said it arrested a hacker in connection with a series of cyber attacks that breached its own systems and those belonging to other international institutions.

Codenamed Operation Data Breach, the effort saw the execution of a search and seizure warrant and a preventive arrest warrant against the defendant in the city of Belo Horizonte over allegations of leaking sensitive data associated with 80,000 members of InfraGard, a collaborative exercise between the U.S. government and critical infrastructure sectors.

The unnamed individual, who went by the names USDoD and EquationCorp, has also been accused of selling data from the Federal Police twice, on May 22, 2020 and February 22, 2022, as well as leaking data from Airbus and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

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U.S. Charges Two Sudanese Brothers for Record 35,000 DDoS Attacks

**What is the version information for this release?**

Microsoft Edge Version

Date Released

Based on Chromium Version

130.0.2849.46

10/17/2024

130.0.6723.59

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