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### Summary If a `server.ca` file is present in `LXD_DIR` at LXD start up, LXD is in "PKI mode". In this mode, all clients must have certificates that have been signed by the CA. The LXD configuration option `core.trust_ca_certificates` defaults to `false`. This means that although the client certificate has been signed by the CA, LXD will additionally add the certificate to the trust store and verify it via mTLS. When a restricted certificate is added to the trust store in this mode, it's restrictions are not honoured, and the client has full access to LXD. ### Details When authorization was refactored to allow for generalisation (at the time for TLS, RBAC, and OpenFGA, see https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/12313), PKI mode did not account for the `core.trust_ca_certificates` configuration option. When this option is enabled, all CA-signed client certificates are given full access to LXD. [This cherry-pick from Incus](https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/12513/commits/5cdc9a3...
The second zero-day vulnerability found in Windows NTLM in the past two months paves the way for relay attacks and credential theft. Microsoft has no patch, but released updated NTLM cyberattack mitigation advice.
Protect your systems with automated patching and server hardening strategies to defend against vulnerabilities like the NTLM zero-day.…
unstructured v.0.14.2 and before is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) via the XMLParser.
A vulnerability was found in OIDC-Client. When using the RH SSO OIDC adapter with EAP 7.x or when using the elytron-oidc-client subsystem with EAP 8.x, authorization code injection attacks can occur, allowing an attacker to inject a stolen authorization code into the attacker's own session with the client with a victim's identity. This is usually done with a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) or phishing attack.
due to a weakness in the encryption method used in cookie-encrypter an attack can use the world visible IV to edit encrypted cookies without decrypting the cookie itself. This is known as an AES CBC bit flipping attack.
Scammers set up call centers in luxury rentals to run bank help-desk fraud, as well as large-scale phishing campaigns, across at least 10 European countries, according to law enforcement.
## Impact Some HTML attributes in Markdown in the internal templates listed below not escaped. Impacted are Hugo users who do not trust their Markdown content files and are using one or more of these templates. * `_default/_markup/render-link.html` from `v0.123.0` * `_default/_markup/render-image.html` from `v0.123.0` * `_default/_markup/render-table.html` from `v0.134.0` * `shortcodes/youtube.html` from `v0.125.0` ## Patches Patched in v0.139.4. ## Workarounds Replace with user defined templates or disable the internal templates: https://gohugo.io/getting-started/configuration-markup/#renderhooksimageenabledefault ## References * https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/releases/tag/v0.139.4 * https://gohugo.io/about/security/
### Impact Several polynomial time complexity issues in league/commonmark may lead to unbounded resource exhaustion and subsequent denial of service. Malicious users could trigger that inefficient code with carefully crafted Markdown inputs that are specifically designed to ensure the worst-case performance is reached. Sending multiple such requests in parallel could tie up all available CPU resources and/or PHP-FPM processes, leading to denial of service for legitimate users. ### Patches These vulnerabilities have been patched in version 2.6.0. All users on older versions are highly encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, you may be able to mitigate the issues by: - Setting very low `memory_limit` and `max_execution_time` PHP configurations to prevent runaway resource usage - Implementing rate-limiting, bot protection, or other approaches to reduce the risk of simultaneous bad requests hitting your site - Limiting the size of inputs f...
### Impact Affected versions of Winter CMS allow users with access to the CMS templates sections that modify Twig files to bypass the sandbox placed on Twig files and modify resources such as theme customisation values or modify, or remove, templates in the theme even if not provided direct access via the permissions. As all objects passed through to Twig are references to the live objects, it is also possible to also manipulate model data if models are passed directly to Twig, including changing attributes or even removing records entirely. In most cases, this is unwanted behavior and potentially dangerous. To actively exploit this security issue, an attacker would need access to the Backend with a user account with any of the following permissions: - `cms.manage_layouts` - `cms.manage_pages` - `cms.manage_partials` The Winter CMS maintainers strongly recommend that these permissions only be reserved to trusted administrators and developers in general. ### Patches In order to mi...