CVE

Sudo-rs, a memory safe implementation of sudo and su, allows users to not have to enter authentication at every sudo attempt, but instead only requiring authentication every once in a while in every terminal or process group. Only once a configurable timeout has passed will the user have to re-authenticate themselves. Supporting this functionality is a set of session files (timestamps) for each user, stored in `/var/run/sudo-rs/ts`. These files are named according to the username from which the sudo attempt is made (the origin user). An issue was discovered in versions prior to 0.2.1 where usernames containing the `.` and `/` characters could result in the corruption of specific files on the filesystem. As usernames are generally not limited by the characters they can contain, a username appearing to be a relative path can be constructed. For example we could add a user to the system containing the username `../../../../bin/cp`. When logged in as a user with that name, that user could...

plone.rest allows users to use HTTP verbs such as GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc. in Plone. Starting in the 2.x branch and prior to versions 2.0.1 and 3.0.1, when the `++api++` traverser is accidentally used multiple times in a url, handling it takes increasingly longer, making the server less responsive. Patches are available in `plone.rest` 2.0.1 and 3.0.1. Series 1.x is not affected. As a workaround, one may redirect `/++api++/++api++` to `/++api++` in one's frontend web server (nginx, Apache).

plone.namedfile allows users to handle `File` and `Image` fields targeting, but not depending on, Plone Dexterity content. Prior to versions 5.6.1, 6.0.3, 6.1.3, and 6.2.1, there is a stored cross site scripting vulnerability for SVG images. A security hotfix from 2021 already partially fixed this by making sure SVG images are always downloaded instead of shown inline. But the same problem still exists for scales of SVG images. Note that an image tag with an SVG image as source is not vulnerable, even when the SVG image contains malicious code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would first need to upload an image, and then trick a user into following a specially crafted link. Patches are available in versions 5.6.1 (for Plone 5.2), 6.0.3 (for Plone 6.0.0-6.0.4), 6.1.3 (for Plone 6.0.5-6.0.6), and 6.2.1 (for Plone 6.0.7). There are no known workarounds.

DataEase is an open source data visualization and analysis tool. Prior to version 1.18.11, DataEase has a vulnerability that allows an attacker to to obtain user cookies. The program only uses the `ImageIO.read()` method to determine whether the file is an image file or not. There is no whitelisting restriction on file suffixes. This allows the attacker to synthesize the attack code into an image for uploading and change the file extension to html. The attacker may steal user cookies by accessing links. The vulnerability has been fixed in v1.18.11. There are no known workarounds.

There is a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Webmin 2.002 and below via the Cluster Cron Job tab Input field, which allows attackers to run malicious scripts by injecting a specially crafted payload.

Phpjabbers PHP Shopping Cart 4.2 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the id parameter.

On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”. If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot. This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some debug functions. This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the “debug.enable.ssh” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before. Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “debug.enable.usb” key, allowing VNC access via the “app.allow.vnc” key, and more. An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker can gain full control over the devic...

On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”. If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot. This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some debug functions. This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the “debug.enable.ssh” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before. Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “debug.enable.usb” key, allowing VNC access via the “app.allow.vnc” key, and more. An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker can gain full control over the devic...

On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/authorized_keys”. If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login. An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. Note: This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config partition measurement was added to PCR13: • aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141 ...

On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/authorized_keys”. If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login. An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. Note: This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config partition measurement was added to PCR13: • aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141 ...