ghsa

## Impacted Resources bref/src/Event/Http/Psr7Bridge.php:94-125 ## Description When Bref is used with the Event-Driven Function runtime and the handler is a `RequestHandlerInterface`, then the Lambda event is converted to a PSR7 object. During the conversion process, if the request is a MultiPart, each part is parsed and for each which contains a file, it is extracted and saved in `/tmp` with a random filename starting with `bref_upload_`. The function implementing the logic follows: ```php private static function parseBodyAndUploadedFiles(HttpRequestEvent $event): array { $bodyString = $event->getBody(); $files = []; $parsedBody = null; $contentType = $event->getContentType(); if ($contentType !== null && $event->getMethod() === 'POST') { if (str_starts_with($contentType, 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) { parse_str($bodyString, $parsedBody); } else { $document = new Part("Content-type: $contentType\r\n\r\n" . $body...

### Impact HTML files crafted to look like jpg files are able to be uploaded, allowing for XSS. This affects: - front-end forms with asset fields without any mime type validation - asset fields in the control panel - asset browser in the control panel Additionally, if the XSS is crafted in a specific way, the "copy password reset link" feature may be exploited to gain access to a user's password reset token and gain access to their account. The authorized user is required to execute the XSS in order for the vulnerability to occur. ### Patches In versions 4.46.0 and 3.4.17, the XSS vulnerability has been patched, and the copy password reset link functionality has been disabled. (Users may still trigger password reset emails.) ### Credits Statamic thanks Niklas Schilling (discovery, analysis, coordination) from the SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab (https://www.sec-consult.com/) for responsibly reporting the identified issues and working with us as we addressed them.

## Summary [The bounds check for slices](https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/b01cd686aa567b32498fefd76bd96b0597c6f099/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L404-L457) does not account for the ability for `start + length` to overflow when the values aren't literals. If a `slice()` function uses a non-literal argument for the `start` or `length` variable, this creates the ability for an attacker to overflow the bounds check. This issue can be used to do OOB access to storage, memory or calldata addresses. It can also be used to corrupt the `length` slot of the respective array. A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production. tracking in issue https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/issues/3756. ## Details Here the flow for `storage` is supposed, but it is generalizable also for the other locations. When calling `slice()` on a storage value, there are compile time bounds checks if the `start` and `length` values are literals, but of course this cannot ...

The classic builder cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built `FROM scratch`. Also, changes to some instructions (most important being `HEALTHCHECK` and `ONBUILD`) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. For example, an attacker could create an image that is considered as a valid cache candidate for: ``` FROM scratch MAINTAINER Pawel ``` when in fact the malicious image used as a cache would be an image built from a different Dockerfile. In the second case, the attacker could for example substitute a different `HEALTCHECK` command. ### Impact 23.0+ users are only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (`DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0` environment variable) or are using the `/build` API endpoint (which uses the classic builder by default). All users on versions ...

### Summary When someone creates an access key, it inherits the permissions of the parent key. Not only for `s3:*` actions, but also `admin:*` actions. Which means unless somewhere above in the access-key hierarchy, the `admin` rights are denied, access keys will be able to simply override their own `s3` permissions to something more permissive. Credit to @xSke for sort of accidentally discovering this. I only understood the implications. ### Details / PoC We spun up the latest version of minio in a docker container and signed in to the admin UI using the minio root user. We created two buckets, `public` and `private` and created an access key called `mycat` and attached the following policy to only allow access to the bucket called `public`. ```json { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "s3:*" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:s3:::public", "arn:aws:s3:::public/*" ] } ] } ``` We then set an alias in mc: `mcli ali...

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in livewire before v3.0.4, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code getCsrfToken function.

Vault and Vault Enterprise (“Vault”) may expose sensitive information when enabling an audit device which specifies the `log_raw` option, which may log sensitive information to other audit devices, regardless of whether they are configured to use `log_raw`.

Today we are releasing Grafana 8.3.1, 8.2.7, 8.1.8, 8.0.7. This patch release includes a high severity security fix that affects Grafana versions from v8.0.0-beta1 through v8.3.0. Release v8.3.1, only containing a security fix: - [Download Grafana 8.3.1](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/8.3.1) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes/release-notes-8-3-1/) Release v8.2.7, only containing a security fix: - [Download Grafana 8.2.7](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/8.2.7) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes/release-notes-8-2-7/) Release v8.1.8, only containing a security fix: - [Download Grafana 8.1.8](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/8.1.8) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes/release-notes-8-1-8/) Release v8.0.7, only containing a security fix: - [Download Grafana 8.0.7](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/8.0.7) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/lat...

Today we are releasing Grafana 8.3.5 and 7.5.15. This patch release includes MEDIUM severity security fix for Cross Site Request Forgery for Grafana. Release v.8.3.5, only containing security fixes: - [Download Grafana 8.3.5](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/8.3.5) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes/release-notes-8-3-5/) Release v.7.5.15, only containing security fixes: - [Download Grafana 7.5.15](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/7.5.15) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes/release-notes-7-5-15/) ## CSRF ([CVE-2022-21703](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21703)) ### Summary On Jan. 18, security researchers [jub0bs](https://twitter.com/jub0bs) and [abrahack](https://twitter.com/theabrahack) contacted Grafana to disclose a CSRF vulnerability which allows anonymous attackers to elevate their privileges by mounting cross-origin attacks against authenticated high-privilege Grafana us...

### Impact There is a bug in Wasmtime's C API implementation where the definition of the `wasmtime_trap_code` does not match its declared signature in the `wasmtime/trap.h` header file. This discrepancy causes the function implementation to perform a 4-byte write into a 1-byte buffer provided by the caller. This can lead to three zero bytes being written beyond the 1-byte location provided by the caller. ### Patches This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime 2.0.2. ### Workarounds This can be worked around by providing a 4-byte buffer casted to a 1-byte buffer when calling `wasmtime_trap_code`. Users of the `wasmtime` crate are not affected by this issue, only users of the C API function `wasmtime_trap_code` are affected. ### References * [Definition of `wasmtime_trap_code`](https://docs.wasmtime.dev/c-api/trap_8h.html#a6580f4f209d3eaebb6e8b9a901a30b7a) * [Mailing list announcement](https://groups.google.com/a/bytecodealliance.org/g/sec-announce/c/c1HBDDJwNPA...