ghsa

### Impact An authenticated user can exploit a vulnerability in MongoDB sessions to execute arbitrary commands, leading to remote code execution. This vulnerability may further be leveraged to gain root privileges on the host system. ### Details Through the WEB CLI interface provided by koko, a user logs into the authorized mongoDB database and exploits the MongoDB session to execute arbitrary commands. ``` admin> const { execSync } = require("child_process") admin> console.log(execSync("id; hostname;").toString()) uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) jms_koko admin> ``` ### Patches Safe versions: - v2.28.20 - v3.7.1 ### Workarounds It is recommended to upgrade the safe versions. After upgrade, you can use the same method to check whether the vulnerability is fixed. ``` admin> console.log(execSync("id; hostname;").toString()) /bin/sh: line 1: /bin/hostname: Permission denied ``` ### References Thanks for **Oskar Zeino-Mahmalat** of [Sonar](https://sonarsource.com/) found an...

### Impact In Nautobot 2.0.x, certain REST API endpoints, in combination with the `?depth=<N>` query parameter, can expose hashed user passwords as stored in the database to any authenticated user with access to these endpoints. > The passwords are *not* exposed in plaintext. > Nautobot 1.x is *not* affected by this vulnerability. Example: ``` GET /api/users/permissions/?depth=1 HTTP 200 OK API-Version: 2.0 Allow: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, HEAD, OPTIONS Content-Type: application/json Vary: Accept ``` ```json { "count": 1, "next": null, "previous": null, "results": [ { "id": "28ea85e4-5039-4389-94f1-9a3e1c787149", "object_type": "users.objectpermission", "display": "Run Job", "url": "http://localhost:8080/api/users/permissions/28ea85e4-5039-4389-94f1-9a3e1c787149/", "natural_slug": "run-job_28ea", "object_types": [ "extras.job" ], "name": ...

**Problem**: Trying to create a new encrypted message with the same cocoon object generates the same ciphertext. It mostly affects `MiniCocoon` and `Cocoon` objects with custom seeds and RNGs (where `StdRng` is used under the hood). **Note**: The issue does **NOT** affect objects created with **`Cocoon::new`** which utilizes `ThreadRng`. **Cause**: `StdRng` produces the same nonce because `StdRng::clone` resets its state. **Measure**: Make encryption API mutable (`encrypt`, `wrap`, and `dump`). **Workaround**: Create a new cocoon object with a new **seed** per each encryption. ## How to Reproduce ```rust let cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b"password", &[1; 32]); let mut data1 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes(); let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data1)?; let mut data2 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes(); let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data2)?; // data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52] // data2: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, ...

### Summary The OGC Web Processing Service (WPS) specification is designed to process information from any server using GET and POST requests. This presents the opportunity for Server Side Request Forgery. ## Details This vulnerability requires: * The WPS extension to be installed * The WPS security setting "Disable complex inputs" to be unselected * Security URL checks to be disabled ### Impact This vulnerability presents the opportunity for Server Side Request Forgery. ### Mitigation The ability to reference an external URL location is defined by the WPS standard Execute operation. This operations is defined by an Industry and International standard and cannot be redefined by the GeoServer application in isolation. To disable complex remote inputs on GeoServer 2.20.5 and GeoServer 2.21.0: 1. Navigate to **Security > WPS Security** page 2. Locate **Complex Inputs** heading 3. Select the check box for **Disable loading complex inputs from remote references** ### Resolution...

### Summary The WMS specification defines an ``sld=<url>`` parameter for GetMap, GetLegendGraphic and GetFeatureInfo operations for user supplied "dynamic styling". Enabling the use of dynamic styles, without also configuring URL checks, provides the opportunity for Service Side Request Forgery. It is possible to use this for "Blind SSRF" on the WMS endpoint to steal NetNTLMv2 hashes via file requests to malicious servers. ### Details This vulnerability requires: * WMS Settings dynamic styling being enabled * Security URL checks to be disabled, or to be enabled and allowing ``file:\\*`` access ### Impact This vulnerability can be used to steal user NetNTLMv2 hashes which could be relayed or cracked externally to gain further access. ### Mitigation The ability to reference an external URL location is defined by the WMS standard GetMap, GetFeatureInfo and GetLegendGraphic operations. These operations are defined by an Industry and International standard and cannot be redefined...

### Impact The Fides web application allows users to edit consent and privacy notices such as cookie banners. These privacy notices can then be served by other integrated websites, for example in cookie consent banners. One of the editable fields is a privacy policy URL and this input was found to not be validated. The vulnerability makes it possible to craft a payload in the privacy policy URL which triggers JavaScript execution when the privacy notice is served by an integrated website. The domain scope of the executed JavaScript is that of the integrated website. Exploitation is limited to Admin UI users with the contributor role or higher. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds.

### Impact The Fides webserver API allows users to retrieve its configuration using the `GET api/v1/config` endpoint. The configuration data is filtered to suppress most sensitive configuration information before it is returned to the user, but even the filtered data contains information about the internals and the backend infrastructure, such as various settings, servers’ addresses and ports and database username. This information is useful for administrative users as well as attackers, thus it should not be revealed to low-privileged users. This vulnerability allows Admin UI users with roles lower than the owner role e.g. the viewer role to retrieve the config information using the API. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds.

### Impact The Fides web application allows a custom integration to be uploaded as a ZIP file containing configuration and dataset definitions in YAML format. It was discovered that specially crafted YAML dataset and config files allow a malicious user to perform arbitrary requests to internal systems and exfiltrate data outside the environment (also known as a Server-Side Request Forgery). The application does not perform proper validation to block attempts to connect to internal (including localhost) resources. Exploitation is limited to API clients with the `CONNECTOR_TEMPLATE_REGISTER` authorization scope. In the Fides Admin UI this scope is restricted to highly privileged users, specifically root users and users with the owner role. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds.

### Impact The length of URIs and the various parts (eg path segments, query parameters) is usually limited by the webserver processing the incoming request. In the case of Puma the defaults are : - path segment length: 8192 - Max URI length: 1024 * 12 - Max query length: 1024 * 10 See https://github.com/puma/puma/blob/master/docs/compile_options.md If too long Puma raises: > Puma caught this error: HTTP element REQUEST_PATH is longer than the (8192) allowed length (was 12503) (Puma::HttpParserError) However due to the performance of `hashids` extremely long encoded IDs will consume a large amount of CPU and allocate a huge number of intermediate objects. For example: ``` curl -vvv https://localhost.ssl:3000//dos?id=abcd-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...

### Impact Given specially crafted zip or JAR file, `IO.unzip` allows writing of arbitrary file. The follow is an example of a malicious entry: ``` +2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys ``` This would have a potential to overwrite `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. Within sbt's main code, `IO.unzip` is used in `pullRemoteCache` task and `Resolvers.remote`; however many projects use `IO.unzip(...)` directly to implement custom tasks - https://github.com/search?q=IO.unzip+language%3AScala&type=code&l=Scala&p=1 ### Patches The problem has been patched in https://github.com/sbt/io/pull/360 sbt 1.9.7 is available with the fix. ### Workarounds A workaround might be use some other library to unzip. ### References - https://github.com/snyk/zip-slip-vulnerability - https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGCODEHAUSPLEXUS-31680 - https://github.com/sbt/io/issues/358