Morphisec uncovers a new ValleyRAT malware variant with advanced evasion tactics, multi-stage infection chains, and novel delivery methods…

Morphisec uncovers a new ValleyRAT malware variant with advanced evasion tactics, multi-stage infection chains, and novel delivery methods targeting systems.

Cybersecurity researchers at Morphisec Threat Lab have discovered a new version of the sophisticated ValleyRAT malware distributed through various channels including phishing emails, instant messaging platforms and compromised websites. ValleyRAT is a multi-stage malware, linked to the notorious **Silver Fox APT** group.

According to Morphisec’s investigation, shared with Hackread.com, the key targets of this campaign are high-value individuals within organizations, especially those in finance, accounting, and sales, and the objective is to steal sensitive data.

Infection Chain (Via Morphisec)

Earlier ValleyRAT versions utilized PowerShell scripts disguised as legitimate software installers, which often employed DLL hijacking to inject their payload into signed executables from programs like WPS Office and even Firefox. In August 2024, Hackread.com **reported** about a ValleyRAT version using shellcode to inject malware components directly into the memory. 

Conversely, the current version uses a fake Chinese telecom company “Karlos” website (karlostclub/) to distribute the malware, which downloads a series of files, including a .NET executable that checks for administrator privileges and downloads additional components, including a DLL file.

“Interestingly, the actor reused the same URL for both the older and newer versions of their attack,” researchers wrote in the **blog post**.

According to researchers, a fake Chrome browser download from anizomcom/ is the initial infection vector in the attack chain, tricking the victim into downloading and executing the malware. The sscronet.dll file, deliberately named with a legitimate-sounding identifier to avoid suspicion, injects code into the legitimate svchost.exe process, acting as a monitor, terminating any processes on a predefined exclusion list to prevent interference with the malware’s operation. 

Fake Chrome browser download (Via Morphisec)

Next, the malware utilizes a modified version of the Douyin (Chinese TikTok) executable for DLL side-loading and a legitimate Tier0.dll from Valve games (specifically Left 4 Dead 2 and Killing Floor 2) to execute code hidden within the nslookup.exe process. This process retrieves and decrypts the main ValleyRAT payload from mpclient.dat. 

The decrypted payload uses the **Donut shellcode** to execute the malware in memory, bypassing traditional disk-based detection methods. It also tries to disable security mechanisms like AMSI and ETW.

For your information, ValleyRAT is a C++-based remote access trojan with basic **RAT functionalities** such as accessing the WinSta0 window station for screen, keyboard, and mouse interaction and monitoring the victim’s screen. It incorporates extensive anti-VMware checks to evade detection in virtualized environments and connects with its C2 server using IP addresses and ports that are initialized within its code during installation.

“If the malware does not detect that it is running inside a virtual machine (VM), it attempts to establish a connection to baidu.com as part of its network communication check,” researchers noted.

The Silver Fox APT group’s changing tactics/evasion techniques show the growing sophistication of new attacks. Organizations should adopt a proper security strategy, including stricter endpoint protection, **employee training**, and continuous monitoring, to mitigate risks.

New ValleyRAT Malware Variant Spreading via Fake Chrome Downloads

Broadcom has released security updates to patch five security flaws impacting VMware Aria Operations and Aria Operations for Logs, warning customers that attackers could exploit them to gain elevated access or obtain sensitive information.
The list of identified flaws, which impact versions 8.x of the software, is below -

CVE-2025-22218 (CVSS score: 8.5) - A malicious actor with View Only Admin

Broadcom Patches VMware Aria Flaws – Exploits May Lead to Credential Theft

Broadcom has alerted of a high-severity security flaw in VMware Avi Load Balancer that could be weaponized by malicious actors to gain entrenched database access.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-22217 (CVSS score: 8.6), has been described as an unauthenticated blind SQL injection.
"A malicious user with network access may be able to use specially crafted SQL queries to gain database

Broadcom Warns of High-Severity SQL Injection Flaw in VMware Avi Load Balancer

Advanced phishing campaign targets Poland and Germany, delivering Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger and newly identified TorNet backdoor via…

Advanced phishing campaign targets Poland and Germany, delivering Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger and newly identified TorNet backdoor via .tgz attachments. All by leveraging PureCrypter and TOR network for stealthy C2.

A malicious campaign, discovered by Cisco Talos in July 2024, targeted users primarily in Poland and Germany through phishing emails containing malicious attachments disguised as.tgz files. These emails impersonate financial institutions and businesses, often with themes like money transfer confirmations or order receipts. They are primarily written in Polish and German and contain compressed.tgz files.

According to Cisco Talos’ research, shared with Hackread.com ahead of its publishing on Tuesday 28, the actor has deployed other payloads as well, including “Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger and a new undocumented backdoor, which researchers dubbed TorNet. 

Phishing email in Polish and German language (Via: Cisco Talos)

When a user extracts an attachment from a file, a.NET executable file appears, which downloads the next stage of the attack, the PureCrypter malware, from a remote server or within the loader itself (decrypted using the AES algorithm and loaded into the targeted device’s memory). 

The PureCrypter malware is a Windows dynamic-link library obfuscated with Eziriz’s.NET Reactor obfuscator. It contains encrypted binaries of legitimate DLLs, including Protobuf-net and Microsoft task scheduler DLL, and the TorNet backdoor.

PureCrypter employs various evasion techniques, including disconnecting the victim’s machine from the network before dropping payloads, checking for a virtual machine, sandbox environment, or debugger status, and modifying Windows Defender settings. It ensures persistence by creating a scheduled task that runs every few minutes, even on low battery, and adding entries to the Windows registry to ensure the loader runs on startup. 

Moreover, it drops the TorNet backdoor, which is a relatively new .NET backdoor used in this attack to connect to a C2 server over the TOR network for stealthy communication. It anonymizes the communication with the C2 server, making detection harder. After establishing a connection, it sends identifying information and allows attackers to carry out remote code execution by sending arbitrary.NET assemblies to the C2 server, hence, expanding the attack surface substantially.

Attack flow (Via Cisco Talos)

The campaign uses advanced techniques like network disconnections, Tor network exploitation, and multi-stage payloads. The use of the Tor network further hinders tracking/disruption. This campaign highlights the need for continuous caution and network monitoring to address attackers’ growing threat tactics.

1.  **New WarmCookie Malware in Espionage Campaign**
2.  **23% of Tor browser relays found to be stealing Bitcoin**
3.  **Kronos Variant banking trojan spotted using Tor network**
4.  **Fake Tor Browser Installer Spreading Malware Via YouTube**
5.  **BlackByte Ransomware Exploits VMware Flaw in VPN Attacks**

New TorNet Backdoor Exploits TOR Network in Advanced Phishing Attack

Cisco Talos discovered an ongoing malicious campaign operated by a financially motivated threat actor targeting users, predominantly in Poland and Germany.

Tuesday, January 28, 2025 06:00

*   Cisco Talos discovered an ongoing malicious campaign operated by a financially motivated threat actor since as early as July 2024 targeting users, predominantly in Poland and Germany, based on the phishing email language. 
*   The actor has delivered different payloads, including Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger, and a new undocumented backdoor we are calling TorNet, dropped by PureCrypter malware.  
*   The actor is running a Windows scheduled task on victim machines—including on endpoints with a low battery—to achieve persistence.  
*   The actor also disconnects the victim machine from the network before dropping the payload and then connects it back to the network, allowing them to evade detection by cloud antimalware solutions.  
*   We also found that the actor connects the victim’s machine to the TOR network using the TorNet backdoor for stealthy command and control (C2) communications and detection evasion. 

**The campaign **

The intrusions start with a phishing email as the initial infection vector. The actor is impersonating financial institutions and manufacturing and logistics companies by sending fake money transfer confirmations and fake order receipts, respectively. The phishing emails are predominantly written in Polish and German, indicating actor’s intent to primarily target users in those countries. We also found some phishing email samples from the same campaign written in English. We assess with medium confidence that the actor is financially motivated, based on the phishing email themes and the filenames of the email attachments.  

The phishing email has attachments with the file extension “.tgz”, indicating that the actor has used GZIP to compress the TAR archive of the malicious attachment file to disguise the actual malicious content of the attachment and evade email detections. 

Sample phishing email in Polish. 

Sample phishing email in German. 

When a user opens the compressed email attachment and manually unzips it and runs a .NET loader executable, it eventually downloads encrypted PureCrypter malware from a compromised staging server. The Loader decrypts the PureCrypter malware and runs it in the system memory.  

In a few intrusions in this campaign, we found that the PureCrypter malware drops and runs the TorNet backdoor. The TorNet backdoor establishes connection to the C2 server and also connects the victim machine to the TOR network. It has the capabilities to receive and run arbitrary .NET assemblies in the victim machine’s memory, downloaded from the C2 server, increasing the attack surface for further intrusions. 

**.NET loader implants PureCrypter **

Talos found that the compressed attachment files contain a large .NET executable file. The actor has instrumented the .NET executable to either download the next-stage malicious executables from a remote staging server or to reflectively load an embedded malicious binary.  

Some of the loader samples we analyzed in this campaign download the AES-encrypted binary of the PureCrypter malware hosted on compromised websites in paths “/filescontentgalleries/pictorialcoversoffiles/” and “/post-postlogin/” using a hardcoded URL. The encrypted PureCrypter binaries were stored with the arbitrary filenames using different file extensions, including .pdf, .dat, .wav, .vdf, .mp3 and .mp4. The loader decrypts the PureCrypter binary and loads reflectively. 

Snippet of the loader program that downloads the encrypted PureCrypter malware.

Network traffic showing the encrypted PureCrypter malware downloaded from the hosting site. 

In a few other loader samples, we found that the encrypted PureCrypter sample was embedded in the loader, which is decrypted using the AES algorithm and reflectively loaded into the victim machine’s memory.  

Snippet of the loader with embedded PureCrypter binary. 

**PureCrypter drops the TorNet backdoor **

The PureCrypter malware found in this intrusion is a Windows dynamic-link library obfuscated with Eziriz’s .NET Reactor obfuscator. It has resources of encrypted binaries of legitimate DLLs, including Protobuf-net and Microsoft task scheduler DLL along with the TorNet backdoor.  

PureCrypter initially creates a mutex on the victim machine and executes the command to release the currently assigned DHCP IP address of the victim machine, establishes persistence, performs various anti-analysis and detections tasks, drops and runs the payload, and finally executes a command to renew the IP address of the victim machine.  

Cmd /c ipconfig /release 
Cmd /c ipconfig /renew 

The threat actor is likely using this technique to evade detections from the cloud-based anti-malware programs by disconnecting the victim machine from the network and connects back to the network after dropping and running the backdoor.  

The PureCrypter malware performs various anti-debugger, anti-analysis, anti-VM, and anti-malware checks on the victim machine as described below: 

*   It checks if the process is debugged using the function “CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent”. 
*   It checks for the Sandboxie and Cuckoo sandbox environments by enumerating processes to look for “sbieDLL.dll” and “cuckoomon.dll”. 
*   It checks if the DLL is running in the virtual environment by executing the WMI queries and searches for the strings “VMware”, “VIRTUAL”, “AMI”, and “Xen”.  

Select \* from Win32\_BIOS 
Select \* from Win32\_ComputerSystem 

*   It also checks if the process running is associated with “vmGuestLib.dll” to detect the VMWare environment. 
*   It checks if the victim machine username is “john” or “anna” or “xxxxxxxx”.  
*   It checks for the strings “amsi.dll” and “amsiscanbuffer” in the running processes modules of the victim machine.  
*   It checks if the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is configured for the victim machine by attempting to check if any processes point to the function “EtwEventWrite” of “ntdll.dll”.  
*   It modifies the Windows Defender settings by executing the PowerShell commands to add its process and the path of the dropped backdoor to the exclusion lists.

Add-MpPreference –ExclusionPath 
Add-MpPreference –ExclusionProcess 

After the evasion checks, PureCrypter decrypts the encrypted backdoor from its resource and drops it to the user profile application temporary folder with a random file name. It also decrypts another file resource using a custom string decryption algorithm, generating the arbitrary filename strings and the task name strings for the Windows Task scheduler.  

PureCrypter establishes the persistence in the Run registry key by adding the path of the loader. It also creates a Windows task using a task name gained by decrypting the strings from the resource file and executes the loader every two to four minutes with no execution time limit. The task can run if the machine switches to battery power and will not stop if it runs on a low battery power. The threat actor has instrumented this technique to possibly ensure an uninterrupted infection avoiding the victim machine operating system to deprioritize the process when a victim machine is running on low battery power mode.  

Code snippet of creating the Windows schedule task. 

PureCrypter drops a Visual Basic script in the Windows startup folder with the instructions to load and execute the dropped backdoor. 

Code Snippet showing the command to drop and execute a VB Script.

After establishing persistence, PureCrypter loads the dropped backdoor by accessing it through a URL scheme “file\[://\]<Path of the dropped backdoor>” and injects the backdoor into the .NET runtime executable process in the victim machine. The threat actor is using this technique to possibly masquerade the file access activity as a web request in the victim machine logs and to bypass detections for loading a file from suspicious file paths on the victim machine.  

Code snippet showing the process injection.

**Payload TorNet creates a backdoor on the victim machine **

Talos discovered a new .NET backdoor as the payload in the recent intrusions of this campaign, which we call TorNet. TorNet backdoor is also obfuscated with Eziriz’s .NET Reactor obfuscator and has hash values for the compilation time. This could be the artifact that was created when the samples were compiled in Visual Studio with the “/deterministic” parameter. When Visual Studio is configured to generate deterministic binaries, the compiled date/time field of the binaries will be replaced by a hash of the compilation options. Talos had previously seen, and reported this technique used by other threat actors to disguise the actual compilation time of the malware binaries.    

TorNet initially decodes a base64-encoded string to obtain the C2 domain, port number, and an alphanumeric string of 16 characters (5e7a81857a353068). It then performs the anti-debugging, anti-malware, anti-VM, and sandbox evasion checks similar to PureCrypter we discussed in the previous section.  

Code snippet showing the base64 string decoding to obtain the string, C2 domain, and port number. 

After the evasion checks, TorNet establishes a TCP socket connection to the C2 server by resolving the IP address of the C2 domain decoded from the base64-encoded string. The connection uses one of the port numbers 8194, 7890, or 8410. We observed that the C2 domains used by the backdoor were resolving to the IP address 104\[.\]168\[.\]7\[.\]37 during the period of our research. 

TorNet backdoor sample connecting to the C2 using the domain and port number.

After establishing the connection to the C2 server, TorNet sends the gained string “5e7a81857a353068” by decoding the base64-encoded strings to the C2 server, creating a hexadecimal byte stream of length 20 and writes it to a memory stream by compressing it using the GzipStream function.  

HEX stream: “3A 12 12 10 35 65 37 61 38 31 38 35 37 61 33 35 33 30 36 38” 

ASCII equivalent: “:<2-byte place holder>\\n5e7a81857a353068” 

TorNet then generates an MD5 hash value of the string “5e7a81857a353068” and uses it as a key to encrypt the compressed 20-byte hexadecimal data stream using the triple DES algorithm. Using the Bitconverter function, TorNet splits the encrypted byte stream and sends it to the C2 server by writing it to the TCP stream through the socket.  

Code snippet of TorNet showing the data exfiltration to the C2 server through sockets. 

The C2 server may send an arbitrary encrypted .NET assembly as a response to a TorNet’s request. TorNet will decrypt the arbitrary binary and reflectively run it. During our research, we were unable to receive a response from the C2, still analyzing the TorNet binary allowed us to assess that the received response will be an arbitrary .NET assembly code, enabling the attack surface for further attack.  

Code snippet for running the received arbitrary .NET assembly. 

TorNet also connects the victim machine to the TOR network. It downloads the TOR expert bundle from the TOR Project archive site, unpacks it and runs the “tor\[.\]exe” as a background process to connect to TOR.  

Code snippet shows the download and execution of tor\[.\]exe. 

Once TOR is running, TorNet connects to the TOR network using the TOR SocksPort (127\[.\]0\[.\]0\[.\]1:9050), and with the “socket.Poll” function, it routes all traffic from the backdoor process on the victim machine through the TOR network. The threat actor is leveraging the TOR network to anonymize the C2 communication and evade detection.  

Connections from TorNet on analysis machine to the TOR nodes.

****Coverage** **

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. 

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. 

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. 

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SIDs for this threat are 64440, 64439, 64437, 64438 and 301115. 

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: 

Win.Backdoor.TorNet-10041435-0    
Win.Downloader.TorNet-10041463-0    
Win.Malware.TorNet-10041565-0    
Win.Malware.TorNet-10041601-0    
Win.Trojan.TorNet-10041734-0 

**Indicators of Compromise  **

IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here.

New TorNet backdoor seen in widespread campaign

Whether you're facing growing data demands and increased cyber threats, or simply looking to future-proof your business, it's time to consider the long-term benefits of transitioning to a cloud-first infrastructure.

Tom Ferrucci, Chief Information Officer, Natco Home Group

January 27, 2025

4 Min Read

Source: MR3D via Alamy Stock Photo

COMMENTARY

Cyber threats have never held greater risk to digital business operations than they do today. At Natco Home Group, we received a wake-up call when outdated backup systems exposed critical vulnerabilities, jeopardizing decades of business data. This realization set the stage for a sweeping overhaul of the company's data protection strategy, transitioning from legacy infrastructure to a modern cloud-first solution. This shift bolstered our ability to respond to evolving cyber-risks and stay resilient during all-important periods like the holiday season. In today's rapidly changing digital landscape, cloud-based data security is an essential component to improving business continuity and long-term success.

**The Legacy Challenge**

Our journey to modernizing data protection began with a grave realization. When I settled into my role as chief information officer (CIO), I encountered a first in my 30-plus years of experience: If Natco Home were to have a significant data breach, decades of data could not be recovered. This is an issue many organizations face when they hold onto legacy solutions. In retail, the stakes are raised even higher during the holidays and into the new year.

During my first month at Natco, I found the company's existing environment lacked the necessary protections and data security best practices. Unfortunately, we had lost a significant amount of email data in a software incident and were unable to recover the data. Existing data protection infrastructure, relying heavily on outdated technologies like tape backups, was not sufficient to meet today's digital needs.

Older backup systems, especially tape, can be clunky and prone to failure. They require significant manual oversight and management, and often fail to scale effectively as the business grows. Additionally, performing a data restore from tape is a slow and error-prone process. Agile solutions are necessary to enter a new era of resiliency, with the ability to scale up and better serve customers. 

This was not just a technical problem, but a business continuity problem. For a company like ours that provides home décor to major US retailers, we needed to fortify ourselves against cyber threats and potential downtime — without burdening our lean IT team with tedious tasks. The stakes were too high to ignore, especially when downtime has a major impact on company reputation and customer service. Our old infrastructure became a bottleneck, and we had to rethink our entire approach to data security. 

**The Benefits of a Cloud-First Approach**

Ultimately, we decided to shift to a cloud-first infrastructure to both strengthen the company's data protection and future-proof our data security strategy. Cloud-based solutions offer a range of advantages over legacy systems, including scalability, automation, and streamlined management. What was most important for my team was the ability to simplify deployment and reduce the complexities of managing legacy backup storage. This freed up time for the IT team while providing the ability to better manage and protect from evolving data threats. 

After evaluating several options, we moved to software-as-a-service (SaaS) data security with Druva, which supports VMware, Microsoft SQL Server, and Windows workloads while ensuring the protection of Microsoft 365 applications. This provided the cloud-based security features necessary to safeguard critical business applications and handle increased demand during peak periods.

At first, migrating to the cloud did come with some initial challenges, such as system integration and staff training. However, the long-term benefits far outweighed the growing pains. By moving away from legacy systems, we created a more resilient and agile data security infrastructure that is better prepared for potential disasters, including cyber and ransomware threats.

**Embracing Cloud-First Security for Long-Term Resiliency**

The evolving threat landscape demands that businesses adapt quickly and effectively. Modern business environments require agility and resiliency in the face of a growing list of data vulnerabilities. Our decision to embrace a cloud-first data protection strategy has improved our ability to manage and secure critical data while positioning us for continued success. By reassessing our legacy infrastructure and adopting a forward-thinking security approach, we've been able to mitigate risks, improve operational efficiency, and prepare for future challenges.

Our modernization serves as a prime example of how organizations can safeguard mission-critical data with a cloud-first approach. By improving our security posture and simplifying data management, we addressed immediate data and cyber resiliency concerns, and laid a secure foundation for the future.

This transformation goes beyond technology — it's about ensuring business continuity and customer trust. As companies increasingly turn to cloud infrastructure to navigate peak business seasons, the lessons learned from our experience highlight the importance of proactive, strategic investments in data security. The shift to modern, cloud-first solutions is no longer optional. It is essential for ensuring long-term resiliency in the face of evolving threats.

Let this serve as a reminder to reassess your data protection strategy before this year's peak season. Whether you're facing growing data demands, increased cyber threats, or simply looking to future-proof your business, it's time to consider the long-term benefits of transitioning to a cloud-first infrastructure. By taking the necessary steps now, you can protect your business from potential risks and ensure that you're prepared for whatever the future may hold.

**About the Author**

Chief Information Officer, Natco Home Group

Tom Ferrucci is an information technology executive with more than 30 years of experience in leading global IT operations and digital transformation initiatives. Currently serving as the chief information officer at Natco Home Group since November 2020, Tom provides technical and strategic direction, overseeing all IT operations, including development, programs, infrastructure, and service desk. His leadership ensures that IT resources are allocated to priority objectives while maintaining high reliability.  Before joining Natco Home Group, Tom spent almost 23 years at Hope Global, where he was the VP of information technology and later promoted to chief information officer. While there he spearheaded digital transformation projects that enhanced collaboration, increased revenue, and improved operational efficiency. His initiatives involved integrating enterprise-class collaboration systems. His expertise spans project management, application development, network infrastructure, and telecommunications. Tom has a proven history of driving IT innovation and delivering strategic solutions that align with business goals.

The Case for Proactive, Scalable Data Protection

While employees want to take advantage of the increased efficiency of GenAI and LLMs, CISOs and IT teams must be diligent and stay on top of the most up-to-date security regulations.

Anuj Jaiswal, Chief Product Officer, Fortanix

January 23, 2025

3 Min Read

Source: LuckyStep48 via Alamy Stock Vector

COMMENTARY

The rapid rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has cast a long shadow, but its immense promise comes with a significant risk: shadow AI.

Shadow AI refers to the use of AI technologies, including AI models and generative AI (GenAI) tools outside of a company's IT-sanctioned governance. As more people use tools like ChatGPT to increase their efficiency at work, many organizations are banning publicly available GenAI for internal use. Among the organizations looking to prevent unnecessary security risks are those in the financial services and healthcare sectors, as well as technology companies like Apple, Amazon, and Samsung.

Unfortunately, enforcing such a policy is an uphill battle. According to a recent report, non-corporate accounts make up 74% of ChatGPT use and 74% of Gemini and Bard use at work. Employees can easily skirt corporate policies to continue their AI use for work, potentially opening up security risks.

The greatest among these is the lack of protection for sensitive data. As of March 2024, 27.4% of data inputted into AI tools would be considered sensitive, an increase from 10.7% at the same time last year. Protecting this information once it is put into a GenAI tool is virtually impossible.

The uncontrolled risk of shadow AI usage reveals the need for stringent privacy and security practices when employees use AI.

It all boils down to data. Data is the fuel of AI, but it is also the most valuable asset to organizations. Stolen, leaked, or corrupted data causes real, tangible harm to a business — regulatory fines from leaking personally identifiable information (PII), costs associated with leaked proprietary information like source code, and an increase in severe security breaches like hacks and malware.

To mitigate risk, organizations must secure their data while it's at rest, in transit, and in use. The counter to risky shadow AI use is having fine control over the information employees feed into large language models (LLMs).

**How Can CISOs Secure GenAI and Company Data?**

Securing sensitive company data is a challenging balancing act for chief information security officers (CISOs) as they weigh the desire for their organizations to take advantage of the perceived value of GenAI while also protecting the sole asset that makes these benefits possible — their data.

So, the question becomes: How do you do this? How do you get the balance right? How do you extract positive business outcomes while protecting the enterprise's most valuable asset?

At a high level, CISOs should look at protecting data through its entire life cycle. This includes:

*   Protecting the data before it is even ingested into the GenAI model
    

*   Ensuring that the data output is completely secured, as this new data will drive the business outcomes and create true value
    

If the data life cycle isn't secure, this becomes a business-critical exposure.

More specifically, a multifaceted approach is necessary to protect sensitive data from being leaked, and though it starts with limiting shadow AI as much as possible, it is just as important to preserve data security and privacy with some basic best practices:

*   Encryption: Data encryption across its life cycle is vital, but it's equally important to manage and store encryption keys securely and separately from the data itself.
    
*   Obfuscation: Use data tokenization to anonymize any sensitive or PII data that could be fed to an LLM. This prevents data that enters the AI pipeline from being corrupted or leaked.
    
*   Access: Apply granular, role-based access controls to data so that only authorized users can see and use the data in plain text.
    
*   Governance: Commit to ethical business practices, embed data privacy across all operations, and remain current on data privacy regulations.
    

As is often the case with most tech advancements, GenAI's ease and convenience come with some fallbacks. While employees want to take advantage of the increased efficiency of GenAI and LLMs for work, CISOs and IT teams must be diligent and stay on top of the most up-to-date security regulations to prevent sensitive data from entering the AI system. Along with making sure workers know the importance of data protection, it is key to mitigate potential risks by taking all measures to encrypt and secure data from the start.

**About the Author**

Chief Product Officer, Fortanix

Anuj Jaiswal is chief product officer at Fortanixa. He is seasoned product and engineering leader with an impressive track record spanning more than 20 years. Anuj previously served as vice president of engineering at Embrace.io and was a pivotal figure at Arkin, a company that caught the attention of VMware and was subsequently acquired in 2016. During his time at Arkin, Anuj played a critical role in the acquisition process, showcasing his strategic vision and technical insight. Before Arkin, Anuj worked as a senior leader at FrontRange Solutions (acquired by Ivanti) and DBO2 (acquired by Predictive Solutions).

Anuj's domain knowledge is extensive, covering crucial areas such as cloud security, network security, cybersecurity, data security and application performance monitoring (APM) for both cloud and mobile applications. His approach to product management — vision, strategy, customer-centric, roadmapping, partnerships, and UX — has consistently resulted in products that drive revenue and growth for organizations while meeting customer needs. Anuj holds a master's degree in computer applications and a bachelor's degree in business administration.

The Security Risk of Rampant Shadow AI

Chinese hacks, rampant ransomware, and Donald Trump’s budget cuts all threaten US security. In an exit interview with WIRED, former CISA head Jen Easterly argues for her agency’s survival.

When I walk into Jen Easterly’s office on a bright January day in Arlington, Virginia, I’m greeted by a giant shark head lurking on the floor. I instantly spot a Rubik’s Cube—an Easterly hallmark—emblazoned with the logo of the organization she’s run for the past three and a half years—the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, which President Donald Trump created during his first term.

Easterly, who is 56 years old, jumps to her feet to greet me. The first thing that hits me is her denim pants, which have a dragon on one leg and a serpent on the other. Then she launches into updates on CISA’s animated “Secure Our World” video series and, in the same breath, laments that she hasn’t had time for a private guitar lesson in weeks. Seemingly a regular day on the job for her, except for one thing. As of January 20, Inauguration Day, Easterly’s time at CISA would be over. Trump had fired the agency’s first director, Chris Krebs, after CISA refused to question the integrity of the 2020 election, and Easterly now says she wasn’t asked to stay. Rumors are swirling that CISA programs—or even the entire agency—may soon be on Trump’s chopping block.

The timing couldn’t be worse for the nation to lose its top cybersecurity cop. A Beijing-linked group called Salt Typhoon spent months last year rampaging through American telecoms and siphoning call logs, recordings, text messages, and even potentially location data. Many experts have called it the biggest hack in US telecom history. Easterly and her agency unknowingly detected Salt Typhoon activity in federal networks early last year—warning signs that ultimately sped up the unraveling of the espionage campaign.

The work of banishing Chinese spies from victim networks isn’t over, but the walls are already closing in on CISA. Trump's nominee to run the Department of Homeland Security, Kristi Noem, told a senate committee last week that CISA needs to be “smaller” and “more nimble.” And a day after the inauguration, all members of the Cyber Safety Review Board—who were appointed by Easterly and were actively investigating the Salt Typhoon breaches—were let go.

When Easterly officially became the agency’s second director, in 2021, the government was still reeling from a different blockbuster hack—SolarWinds. Kremlin-backed intruders had compromised widely used software to infiltrate the networks of US agencies and other targets. Helping US institutions defend themselves became an even more urgent and daunting project. CISA doesn’t enforce laws or collect intelligence; its job is to evangelize digital security measures and offer free services, so institutions can see what they need to do to not get hacked or—more realistically—get hacked less badly. Easterly got to work building relationships across the federal government and with state and local officials, corporate executives, and utility managers. In crises like the Salt Typhoon campaign, these relationships are crucial to quickly containing the damage.

It takes a determined person, and perhaps a charismatic one, to build rapport with such a wide-ranging group of people. Easterly has the background for it: She has worked in the Army (with multiple deployments), the National Security Agency, and the National Security Council under Barack Obama, and she spent nearly five years in charge of Morgan Stanley’s global cybersecurity. She also helped establish US Cyber Command within the Department of Defense. Somehow, though, she’s chill. To break the ice, and probably to make an impression, Easterly has leaned into her passions while in office, cubing and jamming with executives and utility operators around the country. And, yes, there’s her eclectic style—high fashion (by cybersecurity standards, anyway) mixed with bell-bottoms and Birkenstocks—but also her quiet, intense obsession with trying to solve the puzzle that is digital defense.

_This interview has been edited for length and clarity, combining on-camera and off-camera portions. Check out_ WIRED’_s YouTube channel_ _for the video._

**You’re in your last days as the director of CISA. How's it going?**

It's a little bittersweet.

**Why are you leaving?**

Well, at the end of the day, I'm a Senate-confirmed political appointee. We serve at the pleasure of the president. I've not been asked to stay.

**There are signs that the Trump administration may be hostile to some of CISA’s goals. Do you think the agency has proven it's valuable?**

We are America's cyberdefense agency, but our budget is less than $3 billion. I think the American people are getting an incredible return on investment. Anybody who looks at it will see that there's been an enormous amount of progress made in reducing risk to the critical infrastructure Americans rely on every hour of every day. We're talking water, power, transportation, communication, finance. It's not a political or partisan issue, and these threats are only getting more complicated, more dangerous. Any stepping back of what we've put in place will be to the detriment of the safety and security of the American people.

**One threat that’s top of mind is Salt Typhoon. How have past foreign espionage campaigns, like Russia’s SolarWinds attacks, informed the work you all are doing?**

What we saw in December 2020, with the revelations about the Russian intrusions into US federal government networks, as well as businesses around the world, was a pretty sophisticated supply-chain espionage operation. I would say the bumper sticker was to finally allow CISA to manage the .gov federal digital assets as one enterprise, not as a disparate tribe of a hundred separate departments and agencies. It's still a work in progress, but what we've put in place across the government over the past three and a half years has given us enormous visibility and has allowed us to detect intrusions much more rapidly, to be able to remediate them and to get ahead of future intrusions.

**It’s concerning how difficult it seems to have been for the telecoms to eradicate the Chinese hackers from their networks.** **Has there been progress in terms of that transparency and insight you're talking about?**

After the revelations of these breaches, we stood up what's called a unified coordination group. So we're responding, the FBI is investigating, folks like the National Security Agency are using what we see in the intelligence to understand the extent and the depth of this intrusion. And we're coming together to work with the victims. We've been doing that for months. This has unfortunately been out in the press a lot—

**I would say fortunately!**

Anything that gets out there has the downside of having adversaries change their tactics. So, while I think the transparency to consumers is important, it also makes it more difficult to then find these actors within the network. I don't expect it to be remediated in the short term.

**What about in the long term?**

Everybody should assume that our adversaries, in particular China, are attempting to go after our critical infrastructure. The private sector, they are on the front lines of this fight, because they own and operate the vast majority of our critical infrastructure. It's why companies need to put collaboration over self-preservation.

I want a future where something like a ransomware attack is a shocking anomaly. Where damaging software vulnerabilities exploited by nation-state actors are as infrequent as plane crashes. A world where the technology that we've come to rely on every hour of every day is first and foremost secure.

**It feels like hackers always find new ways to get where they want to go. Can you win at defense?**

I mean, you're right. Defense is hard. I say that as America's cyber head goalie. And that's why it has to be a team. As much as we work to hunt for and eradicate Chinese actors, our partners need to hold those actors accountable, whether that's through offensive cyber capabilities or indictments or sanctions. But, yes, we're on the defensive side, and it's a challenge.

Former CISA director Jen Easterly left office on Inauguration Day as rumors swirled about the fate of the agency.Photograph: Dana Scruggs

**Right now is a very scary and precarious time in cyberspace.**

I spent a lot of time in counterterrorism, and people would often say, “What keeps you up at night?” But it's really not what keeps me up at night. It's all about what gets you up in the morning. I love my team. I love the mission. Not every day is the best day ever, but you work through the issues, you stay resilient, you stay focused.

**Probably a necessary attitude for this type of work. But I just have to be that guy who asks you one more time: What keeps you up at night?**

A major conflict in Asia—the potential invasion or blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China—could have very real consequences here in the US. You could see pipelines and water being affected, telecommunications being severed, rail lines, power. That is all part of a very deliberate effort by the People’s Republic of China to incite what they call “societal panic” and to deter our ability to marshal military might and citizen will. We have to acknowledge that disruption may occur.

**Is the public paying too much attention to espionage campaigns like Salt Typhoon? Should we all be more worried about threats to critical infrastructure, like China’s Volt Typhoon?**

We are very focused overall on PRC cyber actors. CISA is one of the few agencies in the government that has been able to find both Volt Typhoon within critical infrastructure as well as Salt Typhoon. In fact, it was our work several months ago to find Salt Typhoon that then led to law enforcement identifying virtual private servers that were being leased by the adversaries, and then that unraveled the wider campaign.

**You and I have talked before about how Ukraine has faced years of punishing digital attacks and, of course, an ongoing kinetic war with Russia. CISA has partnered for a few years now with its counterpart agency in Ukraine. Do you have concerns that the Trump administration won't prioritize that relationship?**

Ukraine is under active assault by a very sophisticated threat actor. What we are learning from how they are dealing with those attacks actually helps us understand and mitigate similar threats to our own infrastructure. Cyber is a borderless space, and what our foreign partners see can absolutely benefit us. We need to ensure that all of us—from the vendors that create technology to companies that buy technology to citizens that consume technology—recognize our shared role in a collective defense of cyberspace and critical infrastructure.

**Do you feel that there are too many cooks in the US federal cybersecurity kitchen? Has that been an issue?**

It really has not. A lot of people have asked that question, but when the SolarWinds incident occurred I was looking at it as both the cyber policy lead for the Biden-Harris transition team and, perhaps more importantly, from my day job at Morgan Stanley. One advisory came out from CISA that was very SolarWinds-specific. We didn't have SolarWinds in our infrastructure. Another one came from NSA that was focused on VMware, and we did have VMware in our systems. It was not clear how these things were connected. And then you would see an FBI private-sector notice about something else. At this point I've already been in government for 27 years. I'd been in the military, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the White House. It's like, I know this. I thought I understood the government. And I couldn't make sense of what the government was trying to tell us about this Russian espionage campaign. It was one of the motivating things about coming to CISA. How do we bring together the federal cyber ecosystem?

The relationships with NSA, FBI, and CISA have never been better. Some of that is personalities, but I think we have actually developed institutional connective tissue, so that it will last. It's very, very clear what CISA’s role is. Now, you often talk about, what does the National Security Council do? What does the Office of the National Cyber Director do? I think we've sorted out the relationships at that level with policy and strategy, but really at the operational level where CISA lives, those relationships across the federal cyber ecosystem I think have never been better.

**You said that there is unfinished business as you prepare to leave CISA. Where do you wish you could have done more?**

There’s a lot of unfinished business. We have made an impact through our ransomware vulnerability warning pilot and our pre-ransomware notification initiative, and I’m really proud of that, because we work on preventing somebody from having their worst day. But ransomware is still a problem. We have been laser-focused on PRC cyber actors. That will continue to be a huge problem. I'm really proud of where we are, but there's much, much more work to be done. There are things that I think we can continue driving, that the next administration, I hope, will look at, because, frankly, cybersecurity is a national security issue.

**I have to ask you, there are rumors: Are you or are you not going on tour when you leave CISA?**

You know, I certainly hope to. I played piano and guitar when I was young, but I started taking up electric guitar, and that has become my passion, my obsession. So my big postretirement plan several years from now is to start a bar in lower Manhattan, to have a band. We're going to do magic. We're going to do improv. I'm going to be the bartender.

**And will there be Rubik's Cubes at every table?**

There will be Rubik's Cubes. I'm obsessed with the Rubik's Cube. When I was 11 these things were introduced across the world, and I was a huge puzzler and a video game person. I learned how to solve it, and then I would go to toy stores—I was this little kid with pigtails—and say, “Hey, if I can solve this in less than two minutes, will you give me a free one?” So I was able to amass this whole set of them.

**You must see some sort of connection between that and your day job.**

Ernő Rubik, who invented the thing, said something like, if you are curious, you will find puzzles around you. And if you are determined, you will solve them. And when I think about the incredible technical talent that we have here at CISA, it’s the intellectual curiosity, it’s the hacker mindset, it’s the problem solver. But it's also the determination, the relentless drive to solve the most complicated problems out there.

_Let us know what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor at_ _mail@wired.com._

Under Trump, US Cyberdefense Loses Its Head

I have finalized the list of trending vulnerabilities for 2024 according to Positive Technologies. Last year, 74 vulnerabilities were classified as trending (to compare the scale, just over 40,000 were added to NVD in 2024). All trending vulnerabilities are found in Western commercial products and open source projects. This year, the vulnerabilities of domestic Russian […]

**I have finalized the list of trending vulnerabilities for 2024 according to Positive Technologies.** Last year, 74 vulnerabilities were classified as trending (to compare the scale, just over 40,000 were added to NVD in 2024).

All trending vulnerabilities are found in Western commercial products and open source projects. This year, the vulnerabilities of domestic Russian products did not reach the level of criticality required to classify them as trending.

For 55 of all trending vulnerabilities there are currently signs of exploitation in attacks, for 17 there are public exploits (but no signs of exploitation) and for the remaining 2 there is only a possibility of future exploitation.

Vulnerabilities were often added to trending ones before signs of exploitation in the wild appeared. For example, the remote code execution vulnerability in VMware vCenter (CVE-2024-38812) was added to the list of trending vulnerabilities on September 20, 3 days after the vendor’s security bulletin appeared. There were no signs of exploitation in the wild or public exploit for this vulnerability. Signs of exploitation appeared only 2 months later, on November 18.

Most of the vulnerabilities in the trending list are of the following types: Remote Code or Command Execution (24) and Elevation of Privilege (21).

4 vulnerabilities in Barracuda Email Security Gateway (CVE-2023-2868), MOVEit Transfer (CVE-2023-34362), papercut (CVE-2023-27350) and SugarCRM (CVE-2023-22952) were added in early January 2024. These vulnerabilities were massively exploited in the West in 2023, and attacks using these vulnerabilities could also tangentially affect those domestic Russian organizations where these products had not yet been taken out of service. The rest of the vulnerabilities became trending in 2024.

34 trending vulnerabilities affect Microsoft products (45%).

🔹 17 of them are Elevation of Privilege vulnerabilities in the Windows kernel and standard components.

🔹 1 Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service (CVE-2024-38077).

2 trending Elevation of Privilege vulnerabilities affect Linux systems: one in nftables (CVE-2024-1086), and the second in needrestart (CVE-2024-48990).

**Other groups of vulnerabilities**

🔻 Phishing attacks: 19 (Windows components, Outlook, Exchange, Ghostscript, Roundcube)  
🔻 Network security and entry points: 13 (Palo Alto, Fortinet, Juniper, Ivanti, Check Point, Zyxel)  
🔻 Virtual infrastructure and backups: 7 (VMware, Veeam, Acronis)  
🔻 Software development: 6 (GitLab, TeamCity, Jenkins, PHP, Fluent Bit, Apache Struts)  
🔻 Collaboration tools: 3 (Atlassian Confluence, XWiki)  
🔻 CMS WordPress plugins: 3 (LiteSpeed Cache, The Events Calendar, Hunk Companion)

🗒 Full Vulristics report

🟥 Article on the official website “Vulnerable software and hardware vs. security researchers” (rus)

На русском

Hi! My name is Alexander and I am a Vulnerability Management specialist. You can read more about me here. Currently, the best way to follow me is my Telegram channel @avleonovcom. I update it more often than this site. If you haven’t used Telegram yet, give it a try. It’s great. You can discuss my posts or ask questions at @avleonovchat.

А всех русскоязычных я приглашаю в ещё один телеграмм канал @avleonovrus, первым делом теперь пишу туда.

I have finalized the list of trending vulnerabilities for 2024 according to Positive Technologies

A recent cyberattack, mimicking the tactics of the notorious Black Basta ransomware group, targeted one of SlashNext’s clients.…

A recent cyberattack, mimicking the tactics of the notorious Black Basta ransomware group, targeted one of SlashNext’s clients. Within 90 minutes, 1,165 malicious emails bombarded 22 user inboxes, aiming to trick users into clicking on malicious links.

Researchers at SlashNext have published new findings revealing attackers using tactics similar to the **Black Basta ransomware gang**, targeting 22 inboxes within 90 minutes. The attack was swift and targeted, aiming to overwhelm users and bypass traditional security measures.

According to their **blog post**, shared with Hackread.com, this Black Basta-style attack utilizes a ransomware scam that deceives employees into granting remote access to their computers. 

SlashNext’s investigation of this phishing wave revealed five key tactics used by attackers: masquerading as popular platforms like WordPress and Shopify, using legitimate-looking domains to send fake account creation and subscription emails, utilizing seemingly harmless domains, using unusual characters or minor variations in subject lines, and targeting different user roles to increase attention.

The attackers first flood inboxes with seemingly legitimate emails like newsletters or payment receipts. The emails used subject lines like “Account Confirmation” and “Subscription Notice” to entice users to click malicious links, causing a sense of urgency. Attackers further employed social engineering tactics by incorporating foreign languages or odd characters to bypass basic keyword filters. 

This initial barrage creates confusion and makes it difficult to distinguish genuine emails from malicious ones. When users are overwhelmed, attackers swoop in, often via phone calls or messages impersonating IT support. By speaking confidently, they gain trust and trick users into installing remote access software like **TeamViewer or AnyDesk**. Once this software is installed, attackers gain a foothold in the system, potentially spreading malware or compromising sensitive data on the network.

Targeted Campaign Stats and the types of scams (Via SlashNext)

Fortunately, SlashNext’s Integrated Cloud Email Security (ICES) quickly identified hundreds of red flags targeting a small group of users. Within a mere 90 minutes, a whopping 1,165 emails bombarded 22 mailboxes, averaging over 50 emails per user in rapid bursts. This tactic aimed to create panic and encourage impulsive clicks.

The ICES platform’s early detection allowed the client to respond proactively and prevent the attack from spreading. SlashNext’s AI-powered security system, SEER™, proactively identified and blocked these emails in real time. SEER™ analyzes email behaviour beyond simple keyword checks, detecting suspicious patterns like encoded URLs and fake login pages. Researchers noted a sudden rise in these attacks across the web between November and December. SlashNext was the first to launch an automated AI-powered defence to handle the situation in real time.

The incident shows the increasing nature of cybersecurity threats, with attackers using sophisticated techniques to evade traditional security measures. Organizations should prioritize threat detection and response, and regular security assessments to identify vulnerabilities and improve overall security.

1.  **‘Matrix’ Hackers Deploy Massive New IoT Botnet for DDoS Attacks**
2.  Androxgh0st Botnet Integrates Mozi, Expands Attacks on IoT Flaws
3.  Russian APT29 Using NSO Group-Style Exploits in Attacks: Google
4.  Iranian Hackers Team Up with Ransomware Gangs in Attacks on US
5.  BlackByte Ransomware Exploits VMware Flaw in VPN-Based Attacks

Top/Feature Image via Freepik

Tag

#vmware