New hands-on testing results show that most devices are unable to catch phishing emails, texts, or calls, leaving users at risk.

Source: Thomas Bethge via Alamy Stock Photo

Highlights:

*   Consumer survey shows that the most common security issues are phishing attacks, such as text or emails seeking personal information, as well as malware and physical theft. 
    

*   Hands-on device testing shows that Samsung S24 offers the best anti-phishing protection, while the Google Pixel 9 Pro leads in many other areas. 
    

*   The iPhone 16 Pro and other premium Android smartphones from Honor, Xiaomi, and OnePlus lack security features and protections. 
    

COMMENTARY  
New research from Omdia shows that the security capabilities on several of the latest consumer smartphones, including top devices from Apple, Google, and Samsung, fail to detect several types of common phishing attacks.

As part of the fourth-annual Omdia Mobile Device Security Scorecard, Omdia surveyed 1,572 consumers across 13 major countries in the Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe, in October 2024. This survey covered the demographics of smartphone users, their security concerns and attitudes, their perception of the most common security threats, and the key smartphone purchasing drivers.

Consumers reported that the most common security issue they encountered was phishing scams and attacks (texts, emails or calls which use false pretenses to try to get the target to give away valuable personal information), with 24% reporting to have experienced phishing. 

Omdia also asked consumers to rate how important various security features were, with anti-phishing having the largest net-importance rating. In fact, over the four years Omdia has conducted its Mobile Device Security Scorecard research, anti-phishing has been rising in importance. This is no surprise, as phishing not only becomes more common, but also as consumers become more familiar with the attacks and the potential for personal information theft or financial loss. 

The next most common security issue was malware and viruses. The third most common was physical theft, such as pickpocketing, mugging or snatching. 

**Mobile Device Security Testing Results**

For each of these security issues, Omdia tested leading premium smartphones to determine availability and effectiveness of security features and capabilities. Google's Pixel 9 Pro and Samsung's Galaxy S24 both scored highly, ahead of Apple's iPhone 16 Pro and other leading Android-based devices, including the OnePlus 12, Xiaomi 14, and Honor Magic 6 Pro.

Despite the importance consumers place on phishing prevention on mobile devices, the anti-phishing features failed to some degree on every device Omdia tested. No device caught all the attempted phishing texts, calls, and emails initiated as part of the testing.  

Several of the devices did catch simulated spam calls: All Android devices from Google, Xiaomi, OnePlus, Honor, and Samsung, which have voice call protection, flagged suspected spam calls before the recipient could answer the call. The iPhone 16 Pro, however, did not have the same protections and did not catch the simulated spam call. 

Text messages with malicious short links were sent from an unknown number and sender ID, but these were not successfully caught by the test devices. Simulated phishing emails were sent from both Gmail and Google's Mail Delivery subsystem, but no device caught the phishing emails from Gmail; the messages were only identified as spam when sent from Google's SMTP. 

Despite not all phishing texts and emails being caught, once malicious links were opened on the devices, those that use Google Safe Browsing protections successfully blocked the link from opening. A warning screen was raised, forcing the user to bypass it to proceed.

Yet not all Android devices performed similarly: Samsung Internet blocked most links except the more sophisticated custom URLs, while the Xiaomi Mii and OnePlus Internet browsers failed to warn the user even when loading known malicious links. 

In previous years' testing, smartphones have been able to detect and successfully block or warn against the attempted phish. However, the difference year-on-year showcases the ever-changing nature of threats.

**Lack of Mobile Security Impacts Consumer Trust**

The lack of effective security protections on mobile devices, particularly against the growing threat of phishing attacks, is eroding consumer trust.

When Omdia asked consumers if their trust following a security issue increased (due to how well the issue was handled) or decreased, 73% reported they had reduced trust in the smartphone brand and operating system developer. 

Despite some manufacturers' efforts to ensure the latest mobile device security protections are in place, Omdia notes that it is difficult to protect against 100% of phishing attempts. This highlights the severity of the issue and potential impact to consumers.

That said, Omdia asserts that smartphone manufacturers can (demonstrated by the more advanced phishing protection capabilities on the market) and should have more effective baseline phishing protection in place — such as voice call protection, and all Android devices making use of Google’s Safe Browsing protections. 

Omdia sees the value in the phishing protection features implemented by the leading smartphone vendors, and how this can help to protect consumers — at least in most instances, based on Omdia's latest round of testing.

However, these features need to be paired with awareness activity from manufacturers, as well as the wider industry, to help consumers be vigilant and prepared for the instance when a security threat evades a protection mechanism. Such awareness adds an important additional layer of protection against the rising number of scams targeting consumers through their mobile devices.

**About the Authors**

Principal Analyst, IoT Cybersecurity, Omdia

Hollie works as a Principal Analyst within the Omdia team, providing insight into the fascinating and fast-moving domain of IoT Cybersecurity.

Hollie has a range of experience in research. She began her career in the legal sector, writing and researching for expert witness reports on the labour market. She then moved into product testing, with a consumer protection focus. In this role she was responsible for managing comparative tests of various tech products, as well as regular testing and investigative work into the security of these products.

She has published various articles for Which?, the UK's largest consumer organisation and one of the largest subscription magazines, and Computing magazine.

Senior Analyst, Smartphones, Omdia

Aaron West provides expertise and analysis of the smartphone market, joining Omdia in 2022. His areas of reporting include the active smartphone installed base, eSIM development, mmWave 5G, sustainability, and the foldable smartphone market.

Aaron has a range of research and publishing experience. He graduated with a degree in theoretical physics before moving into consumer product testing, with a focus on sustainability and the environment.

In this role, he was responsible for research project management, including comparative testing of technology products and consumer surveys. He also reported on the energy efficiency and longevity of home appliances, as well as the product lifecycle and obsolescence of smartphones.

Phishing Attacks Are the Most Common Smartphone Security Issue for Consumers

A cybercriminal campaign linked to Russia is deploying QR codes to access the WhatsApp accounts of high-profile targets like journalists, members...

A cybercriminal campaign linked to Russia is deploying QR codes to access the WhatsApp accounts of high-profile targets like journalists, members of think tanks, and employees of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), according to new details revealed by Microsoft.

The group, which Microsoft tracks by the name “Star Blizzard,” is also referred to as Coldriver by other researchers. Last year, the group created impersonation accounts where members posed as experts in a field that their targets might be interested in—or that was somehow affiliated with the target. Once a relationship had been established, the target would receive a phishing link or a document that contained a phishing link.

But over time, that tactic became widely known, and part of the cybercriminals’ infrastructure was taken down. Now, it seems the group has changed tactics and is sending QR codes instead of malicious links to the targets that they have established an initial relationship with.

These QR codes do not take the target to a malicious website, nor will they join them to the promised WhatsApp group on “the latest non-governmental initiatives aimed at supporting Ukraine NGOs,” as is claimed in one of the cybercriminal lures.

In reality, the link in the QR code is intentionally broken. The idea is that the target will respond with a remark about the broken link. When that happens the cybercriminals send out a shortened URL to a website that displays another QR code.

_Screenshot courtesy of Microsoft_

> “I apologize for the inconvenience with the QR code. Kindly try this alternative link: US-Ukraine NGOs Group  
> It should work without any issues.

By scanning this QR code and following the instructions on the website they confirm the addition of an extra device to the WhatsApp account of the target. With that access the group can read the messages in their WhatsApp account and use existing browser plugins, particularly those designed for exporting WhatsApp messages from an account accessed via WhatsApp Web.

**How to stay safe**

These spear phishing campaigns are highly targeted and you’ll probably never see an invite to this group. But cybercriminals tend to copy ideas that work, so you may see them in another form.

There are a few simple rules that will help you avoid this kind of phishing.

*   Always hover over links before clicking them.
*   When you find a shortened URL, think about the possible reason for shortening. Was there a real need to do this or is it just meant to hide the destination?
*   When still in doubt, unshorten the URL.
*   When following instructions on a website, scrutinize whether the prompts on your device actually match the expected ones. WhatsApp will double-check whether you want to add a device to the account.
*   Double-check whether the sender is who they claim to be through another method of contact.

**We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

 WhatsApp spear phishing campaign uses QR codes to add device 

Residents across the United States are being inundated with text messages purporting to come from toll road operators like E-ZPass, warning that recipients face fines if a delinquent toll fee remains unpaid. Researchers say the surge in SMS spam coincides with new features added to a popular commercial phishing kit sold in China that makes it simple to set up convincing lures spoofing toll road operators in multiple U.S. states.

Residents across the United States are being inundated with text messages purporting to come from toll road operators like **E-ZPass**, warning that recipients face fines if a delinquent toll fee remains unpaid. Researchers say the surge in SMS spam coincides with new features added to a popular commercial phishing kit sold in China that makes it simple to set up convincing lures spoofing toll road operators in multiple U.S. states.

Last week, the **Massachusetts Department of Transportation** (MassDOT) warned residents to be on the lookout for a new SMS phishing or “smishing” scam targeting users of **EZDriveMA**, MassDOT’s all electronic tolling program. Those who fall for the scam are asked to provide payment card data, and eventually will be asked to supply a one-time password sent via SMS or a mobile authentication app.

Reports of similar SMS phishing attacks against customers of other U.S. state-run toll facilities surfaced around the same time as the MassDOT alert. People in Florida reported receiving SMS phishing that spoofed **Sunpass**, Florida’s prepaid toll program.

This phishing module for spoofing MassDOT’s EZDrive toll system was offered on Jan. 10, 2025 by a China-based SMS phishing service called “Lighthouse.”

In Texas, residents said they received text messages about unpaid tolls with the **North Texas Toll Authority**. Similar reports came from readers in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington. This is by no means a comprehensive list.

A new module from the Lighthouse SMS phishing kit released Jan. 14 targets customers of the North Texas Toll Authority (NTTA).

In each case, the emergence of these SMS phishing attacks coincided with the release of new phishing kit capabilities that closely mimic these toll operator websites as they appear on mobile devices. Notably, none of the phishing pages will even load unless the website detects that the visitor is coming from a mobile device.

**Ford Merrill** works in security research at SecAlliance, a CSIS Security Group company. Merrill said the volume of SMS phishing attacks spoofing toll road operators skyrocketed after the New Year, when at least one Chinese cybercriminal group known for selling sophisticated SMS phishing kits began offering new phishing pages designed to spoof toll operators in various U.S. states.

According to Merrill, multiple China-based cybercriminals are selling distinct SMS-based phishing kits that each have hundreds or thousands of customers. The ultimate goal of these kits, he said, is to phish enough information from victims that their payment cards can be added to mobile wallets and used to buy goods at physical stores, online, or to launder money through shell companies.

A component of the Chinese SMS phishing kit Lighthouse made to target customers of The Toll Roads, which refers to several state routes through Orange County, Calif.

Merrill said the different purveyors of these SMS phishing tools traditionally have impersonated shipping companies, customs authorities, and even governments with tax refund lures and visa or immigration renewal scams targeting people who may be living abroad or new to a country.

“What we’re seeing with these tolls scams is just a continuation of the Chinese smishing groups rotating from package redelivery schemes to toll road scams,” Merrill said. “Every one of us by now is sick and tired of receiving these package smishing attacks, so now it’s a new twist on an existing scam.”

In October 2023, KrebsOnSecurity wrote about a massive uptick in SMS phishing scams targeting **U.S. Postal Service** customers. That story revealed the surge was tied to innovations introduced by “**Chenlun**,” a mainland China-based proprietor of a popular phishing kit and service. At the time, Chenlun had just introduced new phishing pages made to impersonate postal services in the United States and at least a dozen other countries.

SMS phishing kits are hardly new, but Merrill said Chinese smishing groups recently have introduced innovations in deliverability, by more seamlessly integrating their spam messages with Apple’s **iMessage** technology, and with RCS, the equivalent “rich text” messaging capability built into **Android** devices.

“While traditional smishing kits relied heavily on SMS for delivery, nowadays the actors make heavy use of iMessage and RCS because telecom operators can’t filter them and they likely have a higher success rate with these delivery channels,” he said.

It remains unclear how the phishers have selected their targets, or from where their data may be sourced. A notice from MassDOT cautions that “the targeted phone numbers seem to be chosen at random and are not uniquely associated with an account or usage of toll roads.”

Indeed, one reader shared on Mastodon yesterday that they’d received one of these SMS phishing attacks spoofing a local toll operator, when they didn’t even own a vehicle.

Targeted or not, these phishing websites are dangerous because they are operated dynamically in real-time by criminals. If you receive one of these messages, just ignore it or delete it, but please do not visit the phishing site. The FBI asks that before you bin the missives, consider filing a complaint with the agency’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), including the phone number where the text originated, and the website listed within the text.

Chinese Innovations Spawn Wave of Toll Phishing Via SMS

CVE-2024-44243, a critical macOS vulnerability discovered recently by Microsoft, can allow attackers to bypass Apple’s System Integrity Protection…

CVE-2024-44243, a critical macOS vulnerability discovered recently by Microsoft, can allow attackers to bypass Apple’s System Integrity Protection (SIP). Learn how this vulnerability can be exploited and how to protect your devices from this threat.

A recently discovered macOS vulnerability tracked as CVE-2024-44243, has raised alarms for jeopardizing the security of Apple devices. This vulnerability, uncovered by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, allows attackers to circumvent Apple’s robust System Integrity Protection (SIP) mechanism.

****How Does It Work?****

The flaw is found in the Storage Kit daemon, allowing local attackers with root privileges to exploit low-complexity attacks. According to Microsoft’s technical blog, shared with Hackread.com, CVE-2024-44243 exploits a weakness in the macOS storage management system. By leveraging the “storagekitd” daemon, attackers can potentially load third-party kernel extensions, bypassing the strict controls imposed by SIP.  

****What are the Implications?****

System Integrity Protection (SIP) is a crucial cybersecurity measure for macOS systems, protecting against malware and attackers. Bypassing it can significantly compromise the system’s security, Microsoft noted. Such as, attackers can install malicious software at the kernel level, and gain deep access to the system and data.

Moreover, malicious software can establish a persistent presence on the system, making it difficult to remove and potentially enabling future attacks. Also, attackers could bypass TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control), Apple’s privacy framework, allowing unauthorized access to user data and sensitive information.  The vulnerability creates a wider attack surface, enabling attackers to exploit other vulnerabilities and escalate their privileges.

****Mitigating the Threat****

Apple has released security updates to address CVE-2024-44243. All macOS users must update their systems to the latest version to patch this vulnerability.

Microsoft’s responsible disclosure to Apple and their joint efforts to address this threat highlights the importance of shared knowledge and coordinated action in safeguarding user security. 

While we focus on patching vulnerabilities to protect ourselves from cyberattacks, it is important to remember that social engineering scams remain a prevalent threat. 

A recent campaign discovered by Group-IB targeted Apple iOS and Android users with fake trading apps. These apps were designed to steal from unsuspecting cryptocurrency investors. Therefore, staying informed about the latest threats, practicing safe online habits, and keeping software updated, are essential to minimize cybersecurity risks.

Jason Soroko, Senior Fellow at Sectigo, a Scottsdale, Arizona-based provider of comprehensive certificate lifecycle management (CLM) commented on this stating, _“_This exposes the entire operating system to deeper compromise without needing physical access, threatening sensitive data and system controls._“_ 

“Security teams should ensure macOS systems are patched with the latest updates, closely monitor for unusual disk management or privileged process behaviour, and implement endpoint detection tools that watch for unsigned kernel extensions,“ Jason explained. _“_Regular integrity checks, principle-of-least-privilege policies, and strict compliance with Apple’s security guidelines further reduce exposure to this critical threat._“_

Microsoft Discovers macOS Flaw CVE-2024-44243, Bypassing SIP

An insurance company is accused of unlawfully collecting, using, and selling location data from millions of people's cell phones.

Insurance company Allstate and its subsidiary Arity unlawfully collected, used, and sold data about the location and movement of Texans’ cell phones through secretly embedded software in mobile apps, according to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton.

Attorney General Paxton says the companies didn’t give consumers notice or get their consent, which violates Texas’ new Data Privacy and Security Act.

Arity would pay app developers to incorporate software that tracks consumers’ driving data in their apps. When consumers installed these apps they unwittingly downloaded that software, which allowed Arity to monitor the consumer’s location and movement in real-time.

Using this method, the company collected trillions of miles worth of location data from over 45 million people across the US, and used the data to create the “world’s largest driving behavior database.”

Allstate then used the covertly obtained data to justify raising insurance rates, according to Attorney General Paxton. Allstate is accused of not just using the data for its own business, but also for selling it on to third parties, including other car insurance carriers.

Location and movement data is valuable for insurance companies when they are preparing a quote. By having insight in the driver’s behavior, they can offer a rate that covers the risk better.

Car manufacturers are known to be selling similar data on to insurance companies. Last year, Attorney General Paxton sued General Motors (GM) for the unlawful collection and sale of over 1.5 million Texans’ private driving data to insurance companies, also without their knowledge or consent.

Privacy violation aside, these companies don’t always keep the data safe. Just last week we spoke about a breach at data broker Gravy Analytics, which is said to have led to the loss of millions of people’s sensitive location data.

Back to the Allstate case, the Texas Data Privacy and Security Act (TDPSA) requires clear notice and informed consent regarding how a company will use Texans’ sensitive data. That is something which Allstate allegedly failed to do.

In the press release, Paxton states:

> “Our investigation revealed that Allstate and Arity paid mobile apps millions of dollars to install Allstate’s tracking software. The personal data of millions of Americans was sold to insurance companies without their knowledge or consent in violation of the law. Texans deserve better and we will hold all these companies accountable.”

**Protect your location data**

Sometimes apps ask permission to use your location data and you find yourself wondering, why does this app need to know where my phone is?

This is one possible reason.

Whenever you are asked to share your location data with an app and there’s no clear reason why you might need to, deny the app that permission.

If you have to share your location—for example, when using a map app—choose the “Allow only while using the app” option, so that it will be unable to continuously track your location and movement.

**We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

 Insurance company accused of using secret software to illegally collect and sell location data on millions of Americans 

Data WIRED collected during the 2024 Democratic National Convention strongly suggests the use of a cell-site simulator, a controversial spy device that intercepts sensitive data from every phone in its range.

A device capable of intercepting phone signals was likely deployed during the 2024 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago, WIRED has learned, raising critical questions about who authorized its use and for what purpose.

The device, known as a cell-site simulator, was identified by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a digital rights advocacy organization, after analyzing wireless signal data collected by WIRED during the August event.

Cell-site simulators mimic cell towers to intercept communications, indiscriminately collecting sensitive data such as call metadata, location information, and app traffic from all phones within their range. Their use has drawn widespread criticism from privacy advocates and activists, who argue that such technology can be exploited to covertly monitor protesters and suppress dissent.

The DNC convened amid widespread protests over Israel’s assault on Gaza. While credentialed influencers attended exclusive yacht parties and VIP events, thousands of demonstrators faced a heavy law enforcement presence, including officers from the US Capitol Police, the Secret Service, Homeland Security Investigations, local sheriff’s offices, and Chicago police.

Concerns over potential surveillance prompted WIRED to conduct a first-of-its-kind wireless survey to investigate whether cell-site simulators were being deployed. Reporters, equipped with two rooted Android phones and Wi-Fi hot spots running detection software, used Rayhunter—a tool developed by the EFF to detect data anomalies associated with these devices. WIRED’s reporters monitored signals at protests and event locations across Chicago, collecting extensive data during the political convention.

Initial tests conducted during the DNC revealed no conclusive evidence of cell-site simulator activity. However, months later, EFF technologists reanalyzed the raw data using improved detection methods. According to Cooper Quintin, a senior technologist at the EFF, the Rayhunter tool stores all interactions between devices and cell towers, allowing for deeper analysis as detection techniques evolve.

A breakthrough came when EFF technologists applied a new heuristic to examine situations where cell towers requested IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) numbers from devices. According to the EFF’s analysis, on August 18—the day before the convention officially began—a device carried by WIRED reporters en route a hotel housing Democratic delegates from states in the US Midwest abruptly switched to a new tower. That tower asked for the device’s IMSI and then immediately disconnected—a sequence consistent with the operation of a cell-site simulator.

“This is extremely suspicious behavior that normal towers do not exhibit,” Quintin says. He notes that the EFF typically observed similar patterns only during simulated and controlled attacks. “This is not 100 percent incontrovertible truth, but it’s strong evidence suggesting a cell-site simulator was deployed. We don’t know who was responsible—it could have been the US government, foreign actors, or another entity.”

Under Illinois law, law enforcement agencies must obtain a warrant to deploy cell-site simulators. Similarly, federal agents—including those from the Department of Homeland Security—are required to secure warrants unless an immediate national security threat exists. However, a 2023 DHS Inspector General report found that both the Secret Service and Homeland Security Investigations did not always comply with these requirements.

The Chicago Police Department tells WIRED it did not deploy a cell-site simulator during the DNC, while the Secret Service tells WIRED in a statement that, “as a matter of practice,” it does not discuss the “means and methods” of its operations for “National Special Security Events.”

Other components of DHS as well as the DNC have not responded to requests for comment.

Quintin notes that the EFF detected similar anomalous behavior in a previous test conducted in Washington, DC’s Embassy Row, an area known for its high concentration of embassies and diplomatic offices. It wouldn’t be the first time that cell-site simulators were found in the nation's capitol. In 2019, the FBI accused Israel’s government of deploying a cell-site simulator near the White House—a claim Israel denied.

While the possible deployment of a cell-site simulator at the DNC has raised more questions than answers, for privacy and civil liberties advocates the implications are troubling nonetheless.

Nate Wessler, deputy director of the ACLU’s Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, says, “It would be a big deal if the digital artifacts you found were in fact due to the presence of a cell-site simulator deployed to identify people at a protest.” However, Wessler adds, “it is also entirely possible that law enforcement was using a cell-site simulator in the area for a lawful purpose.”

For Wessler, the lack of clarity around their use is itself a cause for concern. “The ambiguity is really chilling,” he says. “The uncertainty around their use undermines people’s ability to express themselves.”

Secret Phone Surveillance Tech Was Likely Deployed at 2024 DNC

Cybersecurity researchers have detailed a now-patched security flaw impacting Monkey's Audio (APE) decoder on Samsung smartphones that could lead to code execution.
The high-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-49415 (CVSS score: 8.1), affects Samsung devices running Android versions 12, 13, and 14.
"Out-of-bounds write in libsaped.so prior to SMR Dec-2024 Release 1 allows remote

Google Project Zero Researcher Uncovers Zero-Click Exploit Targeting Samsung Devices

A hack of location data company Gravy Analytics has revealed which apps are—knowingly or not—being used to collect your information behind the scenes.

Some of the world’s most popular apps are likely being co-opted by rogue members of the advertising industry to harvest sensitive location data on a massive scale, with that data ending up with a location data company whose subsidiary has previously sold global location data to US law enforcement.

The thousands of apps, included in hacked files from location data company Gravy Analytics, include everything from games like _Candy Crush_ and dating apps like Tinder to pregnancy tracking and religious prayer apps across both Android and iOS. Because much of the collection is occurring through the advertising ecosystem—not code developed by the app creators themselves—this data collection is likely happening without users’ or even app developers’ knowledge.

“For the first time publicly, we seem to have proof that one of the largest data brokers selling to both commercial and government clients appears to be acquiring their data from the online advertising ‘bid stream,’” rather than code embedded into the apps themselves, Zach Edwards, senior threat analyst at cybersecurity firm Silent Push and who has followed the location data industry closely, tells 404 Media after reviewing some of the data.

The data provides a rare glimpse inside the world of real-time bidding (RTB). Historically, location data firms paid app developers to include bundles of code that collected the location data of their users. Many companies have turned instead to sourcing location information through the advertising ecosystem, where companies bid to place ads inside apps. But a side effect is that data brokers can listen in on that process and harvest the location of peoples’ mobile phones.

“This is a nightmare scenario for privacy, because not only does this data breach contain data scraped from the RTB systems, but there's some company out there acting like a global honey badger, doing whatever it pleases with every piece of data that comes its way,” Edwards says.

Included in the hacked Gravy data are tens of millions of mobile phone coordinates of devices inside the US, Russia, and Europe. Some of those files also reference an app next to each piece of location data. 404 Media extracted the app names and built a list of mentioned apps.

The list includes dating sites Tinder and Grindr; massive games such as _Candy Crush_, _Temple Run_, _Subway Surfers_, and _Harry Potter: Puzzles & Spells_; transit app Moovit; My Period Calendar & Tracker, a period-tracking app with more than 10 million downloads; popular fitness app MyFitnessPal; social network Tumblr; Yahoo’s email client; Microsoft’s 365 office app; and flight tracker Flightradar24. The list also mentions multiple religious-focused apps such as Muslim prayer and Christian Bible apps, various pregnancy trackers, and many VPN apps, which some users may download, ironically, in an attempt to protect their privacy.

The full list can be found here. Multiple security researchers have published other lists of apps included in the data, of varying sizes. Our version is relatively larger because it includes both Android and iOS apps, and we decided to keep duplicate instances of the same app that had slight name variations to make it easier for readers to search for apps they have installed.

Although this dataset came from an apparent hack of Gravy, it is not clear whether Gravy collected this location data itself or sourced it from another company, or which location company ultimately owns it or is licensed to use it.

Much of the location data attached to these app names does not have a time stamp. But there are indications it dates from 2024. One of the apps listed is _Call of Duty: Mobile_, and specifically its Season 5 iteration, which launched in May 2024.

Gravy is a company that powers much of the rest of the location data industry. It collates mobile phone location data from various sources, then sells that to commercial companies or, through its subsidiary Venntel, to US government agencies. Norwegian outlet NRK and I previously revealed the flow of location data from a handful of ordinary apps to Gravy and then to Venntel. Venntel’s clients have included Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, the IRS, the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Venntel has also provided the underlying data for another government-bought surveillance tool called Locate X. 404 Media and a group of other outlets showed last year how that tool, made by a company called Babel Street, could be used to monitor visitors to out-of-state abortion clinics.

But the newly hacked data shows for the first time just how many apps could be part of a location data supply chain, even if their developers are not aware of it. Most app developers and companies included in the list did not respond to a request for comment. Flightradar24 said in an email that it had never heard of Gravy, but that it does display ads, which “help keep Flightradar24 free.”

Tinder said in an email that “Tinder takes safety and security very seriously. We have no relationship with Gravy Analytics and have no evidence that this data was obtained from the Tinder app” but did not answer questions about ads inside the app.

Muslim Pro, one of the Muslim prayer apps included in the list, said in an email that it was not aware of Gravy. “Yes, we display ads through several ad networks to support the free version of the app. However, as mentioned above, we do not authorize these networks to collect location data of our users,” the email said. That does not necessarily mean that a member of the advertising ecosystem can’t extract such data, though. (In 2020 I revealed Muslim Pro was selling its users’ location data to a company called X-Mode, whose clients included US military contractors; Muslim Pro stopped the practice after my reporting.)

A Grindr spokesperson told 404 Media in an email that “Grindr has never worked with or provided data to Gravy Analytics. We do not share data with data aggregators or brokers and have not shared geolocation with ad partners for many years. Transparency is at the core of our privacy program, therefore the third parties and service providers we work with are listed here on our website.” Grindr was previously found to have allowed data brokers to obtain its users’ location data.

It’s important that the data appears to be sourced through real-time bidding, because that dictates who is responsible (rogue members of the advertising industry and the tech giants that facilitate that industry), how users can protect themselves (attempting to block ads), and the fact that massive app publishers may not even be aware their users’ data is being harvested and therefore might not know how to stop it. An app developer will know if it implemented location-data-gathering code itself. It might not know that some company, somewhere, is silently listening in on the advertising process and siphoning data from their app.

Surveillance firms can obtain RTB data by acquiring ad tech companies and posing as prospective advertisers. The spy-run location data company doesn’t need to successfully place an ad; instead, it is able to gather data on devices by simply being plugged into that industry. Location data in this case can also include a users’ IP address, which is then geolocated to give their coarse location.

Last January, 404 Media reported on an Israeli surveillance company called Patternz, which was sourcing masses of location data through the RTB process.

In an exposed training video, Patternz showed some of the popular apps it got location data from: 9GAG, Kik, sports app FUTBIN, caller ID apps such as CallApp and Truecaller; and various word, sudoku, and solitaire puzzle games. Every one of these apps are also in the Gravy data. This suggests that Gravy, or wherever Gravy got that data from, also sourced it from interacting with the advertising system rather than location-tracking code baked into the apps.

404 Media shared some of the location data with another security researcher with knowledge of the advertising and location data industries. “It appears that at least some of this data would likely have been sourced from advertising related, real-time bidding,” Krzysztof Franaszek, founder of Adalytics, a digital forensics firm, told 404 Media after reviewing the data. He pointed out some of the user-agents in the file, which show how a user’s device connected to a service, referenced “afma-sdk.” That is a string used by Google’s Mobile Ads SDK (software development kit). In other words, in some cases, it is Google’s advertising platform that is delivering the ads that are eventually leading to this tracking by outside companies and potentially government contractors.

Google did not respond to multiple requests for comment for this article. Neither did Apple.

Franaszek also says that “a significant amount of this geolocation dataset appears to be inferred by IP address to geolocation lookups, meaning the vendor or their source is deriving the user's geolocation by checking their IP address rather than by using GNSS \[Global Navigation Satellite System\]/GPS data. That would suggest that the data is not being sourced entirely from a location data SDK.”

“What we’re seeing here in this data appears to me to be a huge diversity of apps,” Edwards says. “That’s not what you see from an SDK ingestion; that’s what you see from bulk RTB ingestions.”

In December the Federal Trade Commission banned another location data company called Mobilewalla from collecting consumer data “from online advertising auctions for purposes other than participating in those auctions.” In other words, the agency banned Mobilewalla from participating in the RTB process for building datasets on peoples’ devices. The FTC also said Venntel and Gravy collected data without obtaining user consent, ordered the company to delete historical location data, and banned it from selling data related to sensitive areas like health clinics and places of worship, except in “limited circumstances” involving national security or law enforcement.

404 Media has verified the hacked Gravy data in various ways. Some files include credentials for Gravy’s Snowflake instances, a data warehousing tool. 404 Media checked that the URLs in the hacked files do correspond to real Snowflake instances. One file called “users” contains a long list of companies. Some of these firms denied having any relationship with Gravy; Cuebiq, another location data firm mentioned in the file, told 404 Media it “routinely evaluates available data in the market to determine if they are an appropriate fit for our business. Most do not make it past the evaluation stage to production, as was the case here. Cuebiq tested a limited data sample, which was never made available to our customers, and the data was deleted at the end of the limited trial.”

404 Media also sent a section of the data to another data broker called Datonics. “We investigated the matter described in your email, and the segment IDs in those files are those of Gravy, not Datonics,” the company said in an email.

Unacast, which merged with Gravy in 2023, did not respond to multiple requests for comment, both on the hack and whether it or any of its suppliers have derived location data from the real-time bidding process.

Candy Crush, Tinder, MyFitnessPal: See the Thousands of Apps Hijacked to Spy on Your Location

Hazel gets inspired by watching Wendy Nather’s recent keynote, and explores ways to challenge security assumptions.

Thursday, January 9, 2025 14:15

Welcome to the first edition of the Threat Source newsletter for 2025.  

Upon returning to work this week from my Lindt chocolate reindeer coma, my first task was to write this newsletter. As I stared at a blank template hoping for inspiration to suddenly strike, I did what any security professional should do at the start (and indeed any) time of year. I listened to Wendy Nather. 

Legendary Security Hall of Famer Wendy recently gave the keynote at BSides NYC and the video has just landed. The theme? “When do we get to play in easy mode?” I.e why is security still so hard? 

Wendy showed a list of the InfoSec Research Council’s “Hard Problems” list of 2005. Any of these sound familiar? 

*   Global scale identity management 
*   Insider threat 
*   Availability of time critical systems 
*   Building scalable secure systems 
*   Attack attribution and situational understanding 
*   Information provenance 
*   Security with privacy 
*   Enterprise level security metrics 

If the toughest challenges we face in 2025 are also the same challenges we were dealing with twenty years ago, what hope is there? 

Plus, if anything, security is even harder today than it was then, due to all the added complexity. Wendy also pointed out the larger ripple effect of breaches today due to supply chains, stolen credentials up for sale, and shared infrastructure. 

Jeez Hazel, way to start 2025 on a massive downer. 

However, something we can perhaps do more of this year is to go a bit easier on ourselves. Plus, ﻿if something you’ve been trying for a while isn’t working and is only leading to deeper frustrations, is it possible to come at from it a different way? 

One of Wendy’s recommendations on how to do just that uses the example of user awareness training. As she said in her keynote, it’s easy to get someone to click on a link (sorry to any bad guys reading this, but you’re not exactly carrying out rocket surgery with your phishing campaigns). 

Getting 1000 people NOT to click on a link is infinitely harder. Wendy even said that she once worked in an organization where the people who attended cybersecurity awareness training were even MORE likely to click on malicious links. The theory being that these people really wanted to help the security team, and were more than happy to respond to emails asking them to test the strength of their passwords. 

And that’s where social engineering, defender style, can come in. "People are your greatest asset, if you treat them that way." 

I'm seeing a lot of "how to thrive in 2025!" posts right now. For anyone who isn't ready for that, or tired of it all, I just want to say, I'm right there with you. But if you're also feeling like it's "new year, same problems"  perhaps there's one thing that you can pick this year which has the potential to change that story.

Wendy’s keynote contains a bunch of insights for defenders on how to go about picking something to change or improve, from knowledge sharing, to hiring, and addressing complexity. I’m also looking forward to reading the upcoming National Academy of Science’s report on Cyber Hard Problems, of which Wendy is on the committee for. 

I'd thoroughly recommend checking out the full keynote, if only to see Wendy yielding a hammer in a moderately threatening manner.

**The one big thing**

Attacks in which malicious actors are deliberately installing known vulnerable drivers, only to exploit them later, is a technique referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).   

Cisco Talos recently published our research into the real-world application of the BYOVD technique. We identified three major payloads used, as well as recent activity linked to ransomware groups. 

** Why do I care?  **

With the wide availability of tools exploiting vulnerable drivers, exploitation has moved from the domain of advanced threat actors into the domain of commodity threats - primarily ransomware. Malicious actors use corrupted drivers to perform a myriad of actions that help them achieve their goals, such as escalating privileges, deploying unsigned malicious code, or even terminating EDR tools. 

**So now what?  **

There are a few things we can do to mitigate the risks and detect potential campaigns using BYOVD technique. This could include enforcement of Extended Validation (EV) and Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) certified drivers, preventing risks associated with legacy drivers. If the blocking of all legacy drivers is not possible, employing the Windows Defender Application Control (Windows Security) drivers blocklist is recommended way to prevent the execution of known vulnerable drivers. Read more in the Talos blog. 

**Top security headlines of the week   **

*   CISA says there is ‘no indication’ of a wider government hack beyond the treasury, following the disclosure that the department had been the target of a “major incident” in December. TechCrunch 
*   FireScam Android spyware campaign fakes the Telegram Premium app and delivers information-stealing malware. Researchers say this is a prime example of the rising threat of adversaries leveraging everyday applications. Dark Reading. 
*   Meduza stealer analysis: A closer look at its techniques and attack vector. Splunk Threat Research 

**Can’t get enough Talos?  **

*   Talos Takes is now in video format! Catch up on the latest discussion, all about the major shifts and changes in ransomware since the very first iteration over 35 years ago. 

*   The evolution and abuse of proxy networks – check out this piece of research by Nick Biasini and Vitor Ventura. 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos     **

Cisco Live EMEA (February 9-14, 2025)  

Amsterdam, Netherlands  

**Most prevalent malware files of the week**

**SHA 256:**  
9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f

**VirusTotal:** https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe  
**Detection Name:** Simple\_Custom\_Detection

**SHA 256:**  
7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5    
**MD5:** ff1b6bb151cf9f671c929a4cbdb64d86  

**VirusTotal :** https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5  
**Typical Filename:** endpoint.query    
**Claimed Product:** Endpoint-Collector    
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent  

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5**: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376 

**VirusTotal:** https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91/details%C2%A0  
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

**SHA 256:**47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca   
**MD5**: 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde 

**VirusTotal:**  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca  
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe  
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos

**SHA256:**873ee789a177e59e7f82d3030896b1efdebe468c2dfa02e41ef94978aadf006f   
**MD5:** d86808f6e519b5ce79b83b99dfb9294d  

**VirusTotal:** https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/873ee789a177e59e7f82d3030896b1efdebe468c2dfa02e41ef94978aadf006f   
**Typical Filename:** n/a   
**Claimed Product:** n/a    
**Detection Name:** Win32.Trojan-Stealer.Petef.FPSKK8

Do we still have to keep doing it like this?

SUMMARY Cybersecurity researchers at Group-IB have discovered a sophisticated refund scam where scammers are using remote access tools…

****SUMMARY****

*   **Sophisticated Scam in the Middle East**: Cybercriminals are posing as government officials to carry out refund scams, using remote access tools like AnyDesk and TeamViewer to steal victims’ personal and financial information.

*   **Scam Process**: Victims are contacted via phone, asked to download legitimate remote access software, and unknowingly grant access to their devices, exposing sensitive data such as card details and OTPs.

*   **Targeted Victims and Impact**: The scam focuses on individuals who have lodged complaints with government services portals, making it easier for scammers to gain their trust. Average losses per victim are around $1,300, with some losing as much as $5,000.

*   **Potential Inside Job**: The scam’s effectiveness suggests possible insider involvement, as scammers appear to have access to government complaint data.

*   **Prevention and Awareness**: Individuals should avoid downloading remote access software or sharing sensitive information during unsolicited calls. Government and financial institutions must enhance security measures and educate the public about social engineering risks.

Cybersecurity researchers at Group-IB have discovered a sophisticated refund scam where scammers are using remote access tools and software to steal personal and financial information from victims in the Middle East.

The modus operandi of the scam involves these scammers posing as government officials, gaining the trust of their targets by offering to help them claim refunds for unsatisfactory purchases. In return, scammers end up collecting personal details from victims including personal information, card data, and the one-time passwords (OTPs) necessary for online transactions.

****The Call****

The scam begins with a phone call from scammers claiming to be a government representative. The victim is required to download a legitimate remote access application, such as AnyDesk or TeamViewer, which allows them to access the victim’s device. Once access is granted, these scammers can view the victim’s screen and capture sensitive information, including credit card details and one-time passwords (OTPs).

How it works (Via Group-IB)

The scammers use this information to make online purchases or recharge local e-wallets, often using 3D-secured transactions to avoid detection. The average loss per transaction is estimated to be around $1,300, although some victims have reported losses of up to $5,000.

The scam is particularly effective because it targets individuals who have previously submitted complaints to government services portals. The scammers use this information to gain the victim’s trust, making it more likely that they will cooperate with the scam.

Although it’s unclear how the scammers gained access to the complainant, it suggests the possibility of an inside job involving government officials. Group-IB has been tracking this scam and reports that it is widespread in the Middle East. The company believes that having access to customers’ real-time information can also be possible due to the widespread use of inforstealers like META, Redline, Vidar and Formbook.

The company’s analysts have identified several key features of the scam, including the use of remote access software and the targeting of victims who have submitted complaints to government services portals.

Screenshot of two of the genuine complaints (Via Group-IB)

To avoid falling victim to this scam, individuals are advised to be careful when receiving unsolicited phone calls from government officials. It is also important to be wary of requests to download remote access software or provide sensitive information over the phone.

Tools like AnyDesk and TeamViewer, originally developed for legitimate assistance purposes, can become major threats in the wrong hands. Last year, thousands of compromised AnyDesk login credentials were sold on the dark web. Similarly, TeamViewer has been exploited in several high-profile cyberattacks, including the attempted water supply poisoning in Oldsmar, Florida, in 2021.

Government agencies and financial institutions can also take steps to prevent this scam. This includes implementing stronger security measures to protect against account breaches and theft, as well as educating customers about the risks of social engineering attacks.

1.  **Hackers Sending Fake Tax Refund Emails with Malware**
2.  **Black Basta Ransomware Uses MS Teams to Spread Malware**
3.  **FireScam Infostealer Spyware Hits Android via Fake Telegram**
4.  **Fake TeamViewer download ads distributing new ZLoader variant**
5.  **TeamViewer Abused to Obtain Remote Access, Deploy Ransomware**

Tag

#android