#auth

View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 9.3 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: ABB Equipment: ASPECT-Enterprise, NEXUS, and MATRIX series Vulnerability: Use of Hard-coded Credentials 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to obtain access to devices without proper authentication. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS ABB reports the following products are affected: ABB ASPECT®-Enterprise ASP-ENT-x: Versions 3.08.03 and prior ABB NEXUS Series NEX-2x: Versions 3.08.03 and prior ABB NEXUS Series: Versions 3.08.03 and prior ABB MATRIX Series MAT-x: Versions 3.08.03 and prior 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW 3.2.1 USE OF HARD-CODED CREDENTIALS CWE-798 Several hard-coded credentials for the products internal use are contained in the firmware as plain text information. CVE-2024-51547 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:...

View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 8.7 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Rapid Response Monitoring Equipment: My Security Account App Vulnerability: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow attacker to access sensitive information of other users. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following Rapid Response Monitoring products are affected: My Security Account App API: Versions prior to 7/29/24 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW 3.2.1 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key CWE-639 Rapid Response Monitoring My Security Account App utilizes an API that could be exploited by an attacker to modify request data, potentially causing the API to return information about other users. CVE-2025-0352 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N). A CVSS v4 score ...

An issue was discovered in Kwik before 0.10.1. A hash collision vulnerability (in the hash table used to manage connections) allows remote attackers to cause a considerable CPU load on the server (a Hash DoS attack) by initiating connections with colliding Source Connection IDs (SCIDs).

Hermes versions up to 0.4.0 improperly validated the JWT provided when using the AWS ALB authentication mode, potentially allowing for authentication bypass. This vulnerability, CVE-2025-1293, was fixed in Hermes 0.5.0.

The continent faces "relentless" military espionage, and increased cyber sabotage at the hands of authoritarian regimes, according to a high-ranking intelligence director.

The startup incubator and PR firm with holdings in more than 70 cybersecurity firms has announced a data breach with as-yet-unknown effects.

These sorts of attacks reveal growing adversary interest in secure messaging apps used by high-value targets for communication, Google says.

Overview OpenFGA v1.8.4 or previous (Helm chart < openfga-0.2.22, docker < v.1.8.5) are vulnerable to authorization bypass when certain Check and ListObject calls are executed. Am I Affected? If you are using OpenFGA v1.8.4 or previous, specifically under the following conditions, you are affected by this authorization bypass vulnerability: - Calling Check API or ListObjects with a model that has a relation [directly assignable](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-a-directly-related-user-type) to both [public access](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-type-bound-public-access) AND [userset](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-a-user) with the [same type](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-is-a-type), and - A type bound public access tuple is assigned to an object, and - userset tuple is not assigned to the same object, and - Check request's user field is a userset that has the same type as the type bound public access tuple's user type Fix Upgrade to v1.8.5. ...

While AI-generation services and major camera makers are adopting the specification for digitally signed metadata, creating a workflow around the nascent ecosystem is still a challenge.

### Summary If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily mitigates any form of brute-force. ### Details This occurs because the records and counting process for this system uses the method utilized for sign in rather than the effective username attribute. ### Impact This has a minimal impact on account security, this impact is increased naturally in scenarios when there is no two-factor authentication required and weak passwords are used. This make...