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A pay-per-install (PPI) malware service known as PrivateLoader has been spotted distributing a "fairly sophisticated" framework called NetDooka, granting attackers complete control over the infected devices. "The framework is distributed via a pay-per-install (PPI) service and contains multiple parts, including a loader, a dropper, a protection driver, and a full-featured remote access trojan (

In WebKitGTK through 2.36.0 (and WPE WebKit), there is a heap-based buffer overflow in WebCore::TextureMapperLayer::setContentsLayer in WebCore/platform/graphics/texmap/TextureMapperLayer.cpp.

In WebKitGTK through 2.36.0 (and WPE WebKit), there is a heap-based buffer overflow in WebCore::TextureMapperLayer::setContentsLayer in WebCore/platform/graphics/texmap/TextureMapperLayer.cpp.

OCI OpenDDS versions prior to 3.18.1 are vulnerable when an attacker sends a specially crafted packet to flood target devices with unwanted traffic, which may result in a denial-of-service condition and information exposure.

eProsima Fast DDS versions prior to 2.4.0 (#2269) are susceptible to exploitation when an attacker sends a specially crafted packet to flood a target device with unwanted traffic, which may result in a denial-of-service condition and information exposure.

In ffjpeg (commit hash: caade60), the function bmp_load() in bmp.c contains an integer overflow vulnerability, which eventually results in the heap overflow in jfif_encode() in jfif.c. This is due to the incomplete patch for issue 38

In ffjpeg (commit hash: caade60), the function bmp_load() in bmp.c contains an integer overflow vulnerability, which eventually results in the heap overflow in jfif_encode() in jfif.c. This is due to the incomplete patch for issue 38

After extensive testing on RHEL 8.2, 8.4, 8.6 and 9 using the SAP HANA validation test suite, Red Hat’s engineering team concluded that SELinux can run in Enforcing mode with minimal impact to database performance. This is important because it means that RHEL customers will be able to apply higher security levels to their hosts running SAP HANA and tailor the policies to their needs.

WannaCry ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL to execute our own code in order to control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware vulnerability does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code in order to control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.