**According to the CVSS metrics, successful exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to minor loss of confidentiality (C:L), integrity (I:L), and availability (A:N). What does that mean for this vulnerability?**

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability has limited impacts to Confidentiality and Integrity and no impact on Availability. An attacker would need to combine this vulnerability with other vulnerabilities to perform an attack.

CVE-2025-26643: Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Spoofing Vulnerability

Palo Alto, Singapore, 6th March 2025, CyberNewsWire

**Palo Alto, Singapore, March 6th, 2025, CyberNewsWire**

With recent attack disclosures like Browser Syncjacking and extension infostealers, browser extensions have become a primary security concern at many organizations. SquareX’s research team discovers a new class of malicious extensions that can impersonate any extension installed on the victim’s browser, including password managers and crypto wallets. These malicious extensions can morph themselves to have the exact same user interface, icons and text as the legitimate extension, making it an extremely convincing case for victims to enter their credentials and other sensitive information. This attack impacts most major browsers, including Chrome and Edge.

Polymorphic extensions work by exploiting the fact that most users interact with extensions via the pinned in the browser toolbar. The attack begins with the user installing the malicious extension, which disguises itself, for example, as an unassuming AI tool. To make the attack even more convincing, the extension performs the AI functionality as advertised and remains benign for a predetermined period of time. 

However, while all this is happening, the malicious extension starts figuring out what other extensions are installed in the victim’s browser. Once identified, the polymorphic extension completely changes its own appearance to look like the target, including the icon shown on the pinned toolbar. It can even disable the target extension temporarily, removing it from the pinned bar. Given that most users use these icons as a visual confirmation to inform which extension they are interacting with, changing the icon itself is likely sufficient to convince the average user that they are clicking on the legitimate extension. Even if the victim navigates to the extension dashboard, there is no obvious way to correlate the tools displayed there to the pinned icons. To avoid suspicion, the malicious extension can even temporarily disable the target extension such that they are the only ones with the target’s icon on the pinned tab. 

Critically, the polymorphic extension can impersonate any browser extension. For example, it can mimic popular password managers to trick victims into entering their master password. This password can then be used by the attacker to log on to the real password manager and access all credentials stored in the password vault. Similarly, the polymorphic extension can also mimic popular crypto wallets, allowing them to use the stolen credentials to authorize transactions to send cryptocurrency to the attacker. Other potential targets include developer tools and banking extensions that may provide the attacker unauthorized access to apps where sensitive data or financial assets are stored.

Furthermore, the attack only requires medium-risk permissions based on Chrome Store’s classification. Ironically, many of these permissions are used by password managers themselves, as well as other popular tools like ad blockers and page stylers, making it especially difficult for Chrome Store and security teams to identify malicious intent just by looking at the extension’s code.

> The founder of SquareX, Vivek Ramachandran cautions that “Browser extensions present a major risk to enterprises and users today. Unfortunately, most organizations have no way of auditing their current extension footprint and to check whether they are malicious. This further underscores the need for a browser native security solution like Browser Detection and Response, similar to what an EDR is to the operating system.”

These polymorphic extensions exploit existing features within Chrome to conduct the attack. As such, there is no software bug involved, and it cannot be patched. SquareX has written to Chrome for responsible disclosure, recommending banning or implementation of user alerts for any extension icon changes or abrupt changes in HTML, as these techniques can easily be leveraged by attackers to impersonate other extensions in a polymorphic attack. For enterprises, static extension analysis and permissions-based policies are no longer sufficient – it is critical to have a browser-native security tool that can dynamically analyze extension behaviour at runtime, including polymorphic tendencies of malicious extensions. 

For more information about polymorphic extensions, additional findings from this research are available at https://sqrx.com/polymorphic-extensions.

**About SquareX**

SquareX helps organizations detect, mitigate, and threat-hunt client-side web attacks happening against their users in real time, including defending against malicious extensions. In addition to the polymorphic attack, SquareX was also the first to discover and disclose multiple extension-based attacks, including Browser Syncjacking, the Chrome Store consent phishing attack leading to Cyberhaven’s breach and numerous other MV3-compliant malicious extensions revealed at DEF CON 32.

SquareX’s industry-first Browser Detection and Response (BDR) solution, takes an attack-focused approach to browser security, ensuring enterprise users are protected against advanced threats like malicious QR Codes, Browser-in-the-Browser phishing, macro-based malware and other web attacks encompassing malicious files, websites, scripts, and compromised networks.

Additionally, with SquareX, enterprises can provide contractors and remote workers with secure access to internal applications, enterprise SaaS, and convert the browsers on BYOD / unmanaged devices into trusted browsing sessions. 

**Contact**

**Head of PR**  
**Junice Liew**  
**SquareX**  
**\[email protected\]**

SquareX Unveils Polymorphic Extensions that Morph Infostealers into Any Browser Extension – Password Managers, Wallets at Risk

Angry Likho APT resurfaces, targeting Russian and Belarusian organizations with Lumma Stealer malware via phishing attacks, stealing credentials, banking data, and more.

Cybersecurity researchers at Kaspersky’s Securelist have found a cyber espionage group known as Angry Likho APT (also referred to as Sticky Werewolf by some security vendors) has reemerged with a new wave of cyberattacks, primarily targeting organizations in Russia and Belarus.

This group, which has been active since 2023, shares similarities with the previously analyzed Awaken Likho group, and is linked to cyber attacks against government agencies and large corporate contractors in Russia and parts of Belarus.

**Who Are They Targeting?**

Angry Likho APT has a history of sending highly targeted spear-phishing emails, focusing on employees of large organizations, including government agencies and their contractors. These messages come with malicious RAR files that include harmful shortcut files along with an apparently harmless document.

Once opened, the archive triggers a complex infection chain, ultimately deploying a stealer malware known as Lumma Stealer.

The group’s phishing emails and bait files are written in fluent Russian, suggesting the attackers are likely native Russian speakers. While the majority of victims are in Russia and Belarus, some incidental targets have been identified in other countries, possibly researchers or users of Tor and VPN networks.

According to Securelist’s technical details put together in its blog post, in June 2024, researchers discovered a new implant associated with Angry Likho APT, distributed under the name FrameworkSurvivor.exe. This implant, created using the legitimate Nullsoft Scriptable Install System, functions as a self-extracting archive (SFX).

Upon execution, it extracts files into a folder named $INTERNET_CACHE and launches a heavily obfuscated command file, Helping.cmd. This file, in turn, executes a malicious AutoIt script, which injects the Lumma stealer into the system.

Phishing emails used in the campaign (Via Securelist)

****What Does Lumma Stealer Do?****

The Lumma stealer is designed to harvest sensitive data from infected devices. It collects system information, installed software details, and personal data such as cookies, usernames, passwords, banking card numbers, and connection logs. It also targets data from popular browsers like Chrome, Firefox, and Opera, as well as cryptocurrency wallets and extensions like MetaMask and Authenticator.

****Recent Activity****

In January 2025, Russian cybersecurity firm F6 ( (previously F.A.C.C.T) reported new attacks from Angry Likho APT. These attacks involved image files (e.g., test.jpg and test2.jpg) containing Base64-encoded malicious payloads, a tactic previously observed in 2024.

Researchers also identified several new command servers used by Angry Likho, including domains like averageorganicfallfawshop and distincttangyflippanshop. By analyzing these servers, they uncovered over 60 malicious implants, some of which shared the same payload. This suggests the group is actively expanding its infrastructure to evade analysis and detection.

Nevertheless, the research shows that Angry Likho continues to operate consistently, though in a predictable manner. While they make small changes each time, their approach stays the same: targeted phishing emails, a self-extracting archive, and a final payload designed to steal sensitive data.

Angry Likho APT Resurfaces with Lumma Stealer Attacks Against Russia

Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools

A new information-stealing malware, ACRStealer, is leveraging legitimate platforms like Google Docs and Steam to carry out its…

A new information-stealing malware, ACRStealer, is leveraging legitimate platforms like Google Docs and Steam to carry out its attacks, according to research from the AhnLab Security Intelligence Center (ASEC). This malware, which initially appeared in mid-2024 as a beta version, has seen a significant increase in distribution since 2025, with February’s volume mirroring January’s and indicating a potential surge.

It is worth noting that, according to Hudson Rock’s report, infostealers have become the biggest threat to critical infrastructure. The report reveals that computers belonging to the US Army, Navy, and even the FBI have been compromised, with stolen data available on the dark web for as little as $10.

In the ongoing campaign, ASEC’s monitoring confirms that ACRStealer is spread through software cracks and key generators, commonly used for software piracy, and the malware is frequently disguised as these illegal programs. 

While Lumma Stealer and Vidar have been dominant infostealers distributed this way, researchers observed that ACRStealer’s presence is growing rapidly. According to their report, the distribution trend of ACRStealer from June 2024 to February 2025 indicates a dramatic rise in 2025.

Platforms used to distribute the infostealer disguised as a crack (Screenshot via AhnLab).

ACRStealer boasts a range of malicious capabilities. It can detect installed antivirus solutions, steal cryptocurrency wallets and login credentials, extract browser data, harvest FTP credentials, and read all text files. This stolen information allows cybercriminals to target financial assets and personal accounts. Stolen credentials grant access to email, social media, and banking services. This data can also be used for identity theft or sold on dark web markets.

A key feature is ACRStealer’s C2 server communication. Instead of embedding the server’s IP, it uses a Dead Drop Resolver (DDR). This method involves the malware contacting a legitimate service, such as Google Docs or Steam, to retrieve the C2 server’s domain. ASEC has identified several platforms used as intermediary C2s, including Steam, telegra.ph, and various forms of Google Docs (Forms and Presentations).

This approach allows attackers to easily change the C2 domain if it is compromised without needing to update the malware itself. They simply modify the information within the intermediary C2. 

The actual C2 domain, retrieved from the intermediary C2, is combined with a hardcoded UUID (Universally Unique Identifier) to create the URL for downloading encrypted configuration data. This data contains crucial information like target programs, additional malware URLs, file extensions, and target extension IDs.

The configuration file specifies a wide range of data to be stolen, including browser data, text files, cryptocurrency wallets, FTP information, chat program information, email client information, remote program information, terminal program information, VPN information, password manager information, database (DB) information, and browser extension plugin information. 

Also, it targets numerous programs, from browsers like Chrome and Firefox to cryptocurrency wallets like Binance and Electrum, chat programs like Telegram and Signal, and various browser plugins. Collected files are often compressed before transmission.   

AhnLab’s research highlights ACRStealer’s adaptable approach, constantly changing platforms and the locations of C2 information within them. It operates as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS), making infection tracking difficult. 

However, preventative measures can be taken. This involves avoiding websites distributing cracks and key generators, and downloading software only from official sources. Additionally, be cautious with links and attachments in unsolicited communications, enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for added security, and maintain an active anti-malware solution.

Hackers Use Google Docs and Steam to Spread ACRStealer Infostealer

A list of topics we covered in the week of February 17 to February 23 of 2025

February 21, 2025 - Healthcare security is failing patients time and again. This week DM Clinical Research and Helath Net Federal Services take the spotlight

February 20, 2025 - Beware before downloading Google Chrome from a Google search, you might get more than you expected.

February 20, 2025 - An infostealer known as ACRStealer is using legitimate platforms like Google Docs and Steam as part of an attack.

February 20, 2025 - South Korea says it's uncovered evidence that DeepSeek has secretly been sharing data with ByteDance, the parent company of popular social media app TikTok.

February 19, 2025 - Malwarebytes now protects ARM-based Windows devices, such as Microsoft’s Surface Pro X and Lenovo’s Yoga laptops.

 A week in security (February 17 &#8211; February 23) 

Investigators link the $1.4B Bybit hack to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, exposing a major crypto heist tied to state-backed cybercrime and money laundering.

Bybit, the world’s second-largest cryptocurrency exchange, suffered a devastating $1.4 billion Ethereum (ETH) hack from a cold wallet breach on February 21, 2025. In the days following the attack, independent blockchain investigator ZachXBT traced the stolen funds directly to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, a notorious state-backed hacking organization. His findings were confirmed by Arkham Intelligence, a blockchain analysis firm, and shared with the Bybit team for further investigation.

****ZachXBT Uncovers Lazarus Group’s Crypto Trail****

On February 21 at 19:09 UTC, Arkham tweeted that ZachXBT had submitted definitive proof linking the attack to the Lazarus Group. His submission included detailed test transactions, connected wallet addresses, forensic graphs, and timing analyses; all of which suggested the hack was premeditated.

The next day, February 22, ZachXBT posted further evidence revealing that Lazarus had not only executed the Bybit hack but had also directly connected the stolen funds on-chain to the recent Phemex hack, which occurred on February 20. He identified a key overlapping address **(**0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65**)** where funds from both hacks had been commingled, effectively proving the same entity was responsible.

****On-Chain Evidence of Lazarus Group’s Activity********Bybit Hack Transactions (Feb 22, 2025):****

*   0xc963e65b9ec39b11076f78990c31f29aaa80705c75312dafd1748479e3e94ed0
*   0x411374feedcfa560335f00c0fcfa0a3906fdcc33687e6f924dd78ebecc45cd00

****Phemex Hack Transactions (Feb 20, 2025):****

*   0x6262a3339842240aeebae4ebfe338dbc771aa0e2df8f5a1ebcd7f9b090bedfe3

ZachXBT later tweeted that, before these transactions surfaced, he and another blockchain investigator, Josh from CF (Cryptoforensic Investigators), had already traced Bybit-related testing addresses that were involved in laundering funds from the Phemex hack via Tron. Their findings helped them secure a bounty from Arkham, which had launched a reward for anyone who could identify the Bybit hackers.

> Lazarus Group just connected the Bybit hack to the Phemex hack directly on-chain commingling funds from the intial theft address for both incidents.
> 
> Overlap address:  
> 0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65
> 
> Bybit hack txns on Feb 22, 2025:… pic.twitter.com/dh2oHUBCvW
> 
> — ZachXBT (@zachxbt) February 22, 2025

****New Findings Connect Bybit Hack to BingX Hack****

Later on February 22, ZachXBT made another major revelation: Lazarus Group had also linked an address used in the September 2024 BingX hack to the same cluster of addresses responsible for the Bybit and Phemex hacks. This means that the three hacks: Bybit, BingX, and Phemex, are all connected through on-chain transactions.

****Overlap Address:****

*   0xd555789b146256253cd4540da28dcff6e44f6e50

****Bybit Hack Transaction:****

*   0x4a366130118d750715c2d35fdc07509cf943fcc988fa5e6d02211e3d5472796e

****BingX Hack Transaction:****

*   0x93424aa87731bb9b1d8cc1f708d2ac9f3faf914f368a00494d87cba3e7719e8c

> Lazarus Group just linked an address tied to the BingX hack to this same cluster a few minutes ago which now connects the Bybit, BingX, & Phemex hacks on-chain.
> 
> Overlap  
> 0xd555789b146256253cd4540da28dcff6e44f6e50
> 
> Bybit hack txn:… pic.twitter.com/CGh7pB31Xa
> 
> — ZachXBT (@zachxbt) February 22, 2025

****Investigators Publish 920+ Addresses Linked to the Hack****

On February 22 at 9:05 PM UTC, ZachXBT tweeted that he had spent the entire day graphing the laundering movements of the stolen Bybit funds. He also made 920+ theft-linked wallet addresses publicly available to help exchanges and security teams block illicit transactions.

Bybit responded to his findings with a tweet on February 23 at 9:17 AM, thanking ZachXBT for his work, stating: “Big shoutout to @ZachXBT for always keeping the space sharp. 👀🔍 Your work didn’t go unnoticed—much respect.”

****Bybit Resumes Operations and Warns of Scammers****

Despite the massive theft, Bybit announced that deposits and withdrawals on the platform had returned to normal. However, the exchange warned users of scammers impersonating Bybit employees, urging them to verify all communications and avoid sharing personal information.

“Scammers are out there pretending to be Bybit employees. Stay sharp! Bybit will never ask for your personal info, deposits, or passwords,” Bybit tweeted.

****Coordinated Effort Freezes $42.89M in Stolen Funds****

A coordinated global effort among crypto security teams led to the freezing of $42.89 million in stolen assets within a single day. According to ByBit’s tweet, several key players in the industry, including stablecoin issuers and exchanges, helped track and block the movement of the hacked funds.

****Funds Frozen by Various Entities:****

*   **ChangeNOW:** Froze 34 ETH
*   **Circle:** Assisted with crucial clues
*   **THORChain:** Blocked the blacklist
*   **FixedFloat:** Froze 120K USDC + USDT
*   **Avalanche (AVAX):** Froze 0.38755 BTC
*   **Bitget:** Blocked the blacklist and froze 84 USDT
*   **Tether:** Flagged an address and froze 181K USDT
*   **CoinEx:** Blocked the blacklist and provided key insights

Bybit acknowledged and praised these companies for their swift response, stating that their efforts were essential in tracking and freezing the hacked funds.

****Who is the Lazarus Group?****

The Lazarus Group is a state-sponsored North Korean hacking organization responsible for some of the biggest cyber heists in history. First identified in the early 2010s, the group has been linked to multiple high-profile financial and cyber attacks, including the 2014 Sony Pictures hack, the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, and a long list of crypto exchange breaches.

Their primary objective is stealing funds to support North Korea’s heavily sanctioned economy, which struggles under international financial restrictions. According to intelligence agencies and blockchain analytics firms, Lazarus has stolen over $3 billion in cryptocurrency since 2018, with much of the funds being funnelled into North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and military operations.

The group typically executes attacks through social engineering, phishing, and exploiting security vulnerabilities in crypto platforms. Their laundering methods often involve mixing services, decentralized exchanges, and cross-chain swaps to cover transaction trails before cashing out.

Nevertheless, the ByBit incident is one of the largest crypto hacks in history, backing concerns about security vulnerabilities in centralized exchanges. The rapid response from blockchain investigators like ZachXBT, exchanges, and security teams has helped mitigate the impact, but the attack further highlights the sophisticated tactics of hacking groups like Lazarus.

With Bybit now operational again, the industry remains on high alert as investigations continue into the laundering of the stolen funds.

1.  **North Korean Hackers Team Up with Play Ransomware**
2.  **Lazarus Group Exploits Chrome 0-Day for Crypto Theft**
3.  **KnowBe4 Tricked into Hiring North Korean Hacker as IT Pro**
4.  **Elite North Korean Hackers Breach Russian Missile Developer**
5.  **North Korean APT37 Unleashes Dolphin Backdoor on South Korea**

Investigators Link $1.4B Bybit Hack to North Korea’s Lazarus Group

**What is the version information for this release?**

Microsoft Edge Version

Date Released

Based on Chromium Version

133.0.3065.82

2/21/2025

133.0.6943.126/.127

Tag

#chrome