#git

### Description On Window, when an executable file named `cmd.exe` is located in the current working directory it will be called by the `Process` class when preparing command arguments, leading to possible hijacking. ### Resolution The `Process` class now uses the absolute path to `cmd.exe`. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/18ecd03eda3917fdf901a48e72518f911c64a1c9) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Jordi Boggiano for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

### Description The `Request` class, does not parse URI with special characters the same way browsers do. As a result, an attacker can trick a validator relying on the `Request` class to redirect users to another domain. ### Resolution The `Request::create` methods now assert the URI does not contain invalid characters as defined by https://url.spec.whatwg.org/ The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/5a9b08e5740af795854b1b639b7d45b9cbfe8819) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Sam Mush for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

### Description It is possible to trick a `Validator` configured with a regular expression using the `$` metacharacters, with an input ending with `\n`. ### Resolution Symfony now uses the `D` regex modifier to match the entire input. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/7d1032bbead9a4229b32fa6ebca32681c80cb76f) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Offscript for reporting the issue and Alexandre Daubois for providing the fix.

### Description When using the `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient`, some internal information is still leaking during host resolution, which leads to possible IP/port enumeration. ### Resolution The `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` now filters blocked IPs earlier to prevent such leaks. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/296d4b34a33b1a6ca5475c6040b3203622520f5b) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Linus Karlsson for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

### Description The custom `user_checker` defined on a firewall is not called when Login Programmaticaly with the `Security::login` method, leading to unwanted login. ### Resolution The `Security::login` method now ensure to call the configured `user_checker`. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/22a0789a0085c3ee96f4ef715ecad8255cf0e105) for branch 6.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Oleg Andreyev, Antoine MAKDESSI for reporting the issue and Christian Flothmann for providing the fix.

### Description When the `register_argc_argv` php directive is set to `on` , and users call any URL with a special crafted query string, they are able to change the environment or debug mode used by the kernel when handling the request. ### Resolution The `SymfonyRuntime` now ignores the `argv` values for non-cli SAPIs PHP runtimes The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/a77b308c3f179ed7c8a8bc295f82b2d6ee3493fa) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Vladimir Dusheyko for reporting the issue and Wouter de Jong for providing the fix.

In a time of increasingly sophisticated cross-domain attacks, relying solely on automated solutions isn't enough.

Google has released patches for two zero-days and a lot of other high level vulnerabilities.

A lot of time and effort is put into writing security-focused software. Hardware vendors routinely add new features that help software developers increase the security of their software. Memory safe languages like Rust that help developers write safer code are becoming more and more popular. However, advancements in software security can be rendered useless if the supply chain for delivering software is compromised. As we’ve seen with the recent xz incident, a supply chain vulnerability can be exploited with malicious intent. In the LLVM project, we've been working to secure our own sof

### Impact cap-std's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as "COM1", "COM2", "LPT0", "LPT1", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as "COM¹", "COM²", "LPT⁰", "LPT¹", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports. ### Patches The bug is fixed in https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1. ### Workarounds There are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrad...