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### Impact A maliciously crafted xAPI statement could be used to perform script or other tag injection in the LRS Statement Browser. ### Patches The problem is patched in version 1.2.17 of the LRS library and [version 0.7.5 of SQL LRS](https://github.com/yetanalytics/lrsql/releases/tag/v0.7.5). ### Workarounds No workarounds exist, we recommend upgrading to version 1.2.17 of the library or version 0.7.5 of SQL LRS immediately. ### References * [LRS Tag](https://github.com/yetanalytics/lrs/releases/tag/v1.2.17) * [LRS lib on Clojars](https://clojars.org/com.yetanalytics/lrs/versions/1.2.17) * [SQL LRS 0.7.5 Release](https://github.com/yetanalytics/lrsql/releases/tag/v0.7.5)

## ASA-2024-002: Default `PrepareProposalHandler` may produce invalid proposals when used with default `SenderNonceMempool` **Component**: Cosmos SDK **Criticality**: Medium **Affected** Versions: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.3; <= 0.47.8 **Affected** Users: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators **Impact**: Denial of Service ## Summary When using the default `PrepareProposalHandler` and the default `SenderNonceMempool`, an issue was identified which may allow invalid blocks to be proposed when a single sender includes multiple transactions with non-sequential sequence numbers in certain conditions. If this state is reached, it can lead to a reduction in block production for a network. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If you are a chain developer on an affected version of the Cosmos SDK, it is advised to update to the latest available version of the Cosmos SDK for your project. Once a patched version is available, it is recommended that network operators upgrade. A Gith...

## ASA-2024-003: Missing `BlockedAddressed` Validation in Vesting Module **Component**: Cosmos SDK **Criticality**: Low **Affected Versions**: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.3; <= 0.47.8 **Affected Users**: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators **Impact**: Denial of Service ## Description A vulnerability was identified in the `x/auth/vesting` module, which can allow a user to create a periodic vesting account on a blocked address, for example a non-initialized module account. Additional validation was added to prevent creation of a periodic vesting account in this scenario. If this case is triggered, there is the potential for a chain halt if the uninitialized account in question is called by `GetModuleAccount` in `Begin`/`EndBlock` of a module. This combination of an uninitialized blocked module account is not common. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If your chain has uninitialized blocked module accounts, it is recommended to proactively initialize them, as they are o...

We have identified a cross-site websocket hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability within the control.ashx endpoint of MeshCentral. This component is the primary mechanism used within MeshCentral to perform administrative actions on the server. To demonstrate the impact of the vulnerability we developed a proof-of-concept which leveraged the cross-site websocket hijacking vulnerability to read the server configuration file to leak the sessionKey variable, generating login tokens, and generating an authentication cookie. The vulnerability is exploitable when an attacker is able to convince a victim end-user to click on a malicious link to a page hosting an attacker-controlled site. The attacker can then originate a cross-site websocket connection using client-side JavaScript code to connect to “control.ashx” as the victim user within MeshCentral. There are some caveats to exploiting this issue however as MeshCentral configures `SameSite=Lax` security setting on cookies which introduces some add...

### Summary Ever since https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/pull/204 (or specifically https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/commit/387755eacf0be35591a478d3c67fe10618a6d542) was merged, I can create a reproducible crash when running the snippet under PoC on a current Debian bullseye aarm64 on a Raspberry Pi 3 (I was **not** able to reproduce this on my x86_64 Laptop with Python 3.11; I suspect because there is enough memory to allocate still) ## Details ### PoC ```py import json import concurrent.futures import cbor2 def test(): obj = "x" * 131128 cbor_enc = cbor2.dumps(obj) return cbor2.loads(cbor_enc) with concurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutor() as executor: future = executor.submit(test) print(future.result()) ``` ``` malloc(): unsorted double linked list corrupted Traceback (most recent call last): File "test.py", line 14, in <module> print(future.result()) File "/usr/lib/python3.9/concurrent/futures/_base.py", line 440, in result return self.__get_...

### Impact Path disclosure in JavaScript variable ### Patches Patch in PrestaShop 8.1.4 ### References https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Full_Path_Disclosure Thanks to https://github.com/hugo-fasone

The `rquickjs` crate used by SurrealDB implements Rust bindings to the QuickJS C library and is used to execute SurrealDB scripting functions. The `rquickjs` function `Exception::throw_type` takes a string and returns an error object. Prior to version `0.4.2` of the crate, this string would be fed directly into `printf`, which will receive the error string as a format string with no additional arguments, leading to undefined behavior. This issue triggers when a SurrealDB scripting function returns an error and its input contains a format string such as `%s` or `%d`. This vulnerability can only affect SurrealDB servers explicitly enabling the scripting capability with `--allow-scripting` or `--allow-all` and equivalent environment variables `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_SCRIPT=true` and `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_ALL=true`. ### Impact An attacker with privileges to execute scripting functions with arbitrary inputs may be able to exploit this format string vulnerability in order read arbitrary memory...

The span rendering would panic when handling failed parsing of queries where the error occurred on a line terminator character. ### Impact A client that is authorized to run queries in a SurrealDB server is able to execute a malformed query which will fail to parse on a line terminator character and cause a panic in the span rendering code. This will crash the server, leading to denial of service. ### Patches - Version 1.2.1 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Concerned users unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted users to run arbitrary SurrealQL queries in the affected versions of SurrealDB. To limit the impact of the denial of service, SurrealDB administrators may also want to ensure that the SurrealDB process is running so that it can be automatically re-started after a crash. ### References - #3527 - https://github.com/StarlaneStudios/Surrealist/issues/177

Welcome to part 4 of this miniseries on the concept of Environment as a Service. As discussed in part one, an environment comprises everything that is needed to run an application and, in a kubernetes-centric platform, it starts with the provisioning of a namespace.Sometimes, though, we need components and configurations to exist outside of our namespace for our applications to run properly.These external configurations may involve everything from external global load balancers, external firewalls, provisioning of certificates from external PKI’s, and more… just to name a few. Sometimes, t

### Impact For Cilium users who have enabled [an external kvstore](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/installation/k8s-install-external-etcd/#when-do-i-need-to-use-a-kvstore) and [Wireguard transparent encryption](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/network/encryption-wireguard/#encryption-wg), traffic between pods in the affected cluster is not encrypted. ### Patches This issue affects Cilium v1.14 before v1.14.7. This issue has been patched in Cilium v1.14.7. ### Workarounds There is no workaround to this issue - affected users are encouraged to upgrade. ### Acknowledgements The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @giorio94 and @gandro for their work on triaging and remediating this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/community/community/#slack). If you think you found a related vu...