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The `rquickjs` crate used by SurrealDB implements Rust bindings to the QuickJS C library and is used to execute SurrealDB scripting functions. The `rquickjs` function `Exception::throw_type` takes a string and returns an error object. Prior to version `0.4.2` of the crate, this string would be fed directly into `printf`, which will receive the error string as a format string with no additional arguments, leading to undefined behavior. This issue triggers when a SurrealDB scripting function returns an error and its input contains a format string such as `%s` or `%d`. This vulnerability can only affect SurrealDB servers explicitly enabling the scripting capability with `--allow-scripting` or `--allow-all` and equivalent environment variables `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_SCRIPT=true` and `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_ALL=true`. ### Impact An attacker with privileges to execute scripting functions with arbitrary inputs may be able to exploit this format string vulnerability in order read arbitrary memory...

The span rendering would panic when handling failed parsing of queries where the error occurred on a line terminator character. ### Impact A client that is authorized to run queries in a SurrealDB server is able to execute a malformed query which will fail to parse on a line terminator character and cause a panic in the span rendering code. This will crash the server, leading to denial of service. ### Patches - Version 1.2.1 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Concerned users unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted users to run arbitrary SurrealQL queries in the affected versions of SurrealDB. To limit the impact of the denial of service, SurrealDB administrators may also want to ensure that the SurrealDB process is running so that it can be automatically re-started after a crash. ### References - #3527 - https://github.com/StarlaneStudios/Surrealist/issues/177

Welcome to part 4 of this miniseries on the concept of Environment as a Service. As discussed in part one, an environment comprises everything that is needed to run an application and, in a kubernetes-centric platform, it starts with the provisioning of a namespace.Sometimes, though, we need components and configurations to exist outside of our namespace for our applications to run properly.These external configurations may involve everything from external global load balancers, external firewalls, provisioning of certificates from external PKI’s, and more… just to name a few. Sometimes, t

### Impact For Cilium users who have enabled [an external kvstore](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/installation/k8s-install-external-etcd/#when-do-i-need-to-use-a-kvstore) and [Wireguard transparent encryption](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/network/encryption-wireguard/#encryption-wg), traffic between pods in the affected cluster is not encrypted. ### Patches This issue affects Cilium v1.14 before v1.14.7. This issue has been patched in Cilium v1.14.7. ### Workarounds There is no workaround to this issue - affected users are encouraged to upgrade. ### Acknowledgements The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @giorio94 and @gandro for their work on triaging and remediating this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/community/community/#slack). If you think you found a related vu...

### Impact For Cilium users who are using CRDs to store Cilium state (the default configuration) and [Wireguard transparent encryption](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/network/encryption-wireguard/#encryption-wg), responses from pods to the Ingress and health endpoints are not encrypted. Traffic from the Ingress and health endpoints to pods is not affected by this issue. The health endpoint is only used for Cilium's internal health checks. ### Patches This issue affects Cilium v1.14 before v1.14.7. This issue has been patched in Cilium v1.14.7. ### Workarounds There is no workaround to this issue - affected users are encouraged to upgrade. ### Acknowledgements The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @gandro for their work on triaging and remediating this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.i...

## Overview A potential security vulnerability discovered in `pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle` version up to v1.3.3 . The vulnerability involves a Host Header Injection in the `invitationLinkAction` function of the UserController, specifically in the way `$loginUrl` trusts user input. ## Details The host header from incoming HTTP requests is used unsafely when generating URLs. An attacker can manipulate the HTTP host header in requests to the /admin/user/invitationlink endpoint, resulting in the generation of URLs with the attacker's domain. In fact, if a host header is injected in the POST request, the $loginURL parameter is constructed with this unvalidated host header. It is then used to send an invitation email to the provided user. Here is an excerpt from the affected section of UserController.php file: ``` // /src/Controller/Admin/UserController.php public function invitationLinkAction(Request $request, TranslatorInterface $translator): JsonResponse { ...

### Impact Knowing a user's email address and username, an unauthenticated attacker can hijack the user's account by poisoning the link in the password reset notification message. ### Patches https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/7055731d09ff12b2781410a372f790172e279744 ### Workarounds Define `$g_path` as appropriate in config_inc.php. ### References https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=19381 ### Credits Thanks to the following security researchers for responsibly reporting and helping resolve this vulnerability. - Pier-Luc Maltais (https://twitter.com/plmaltais) - Hlib Yavorskyi (https://github.com/Kerkroups) - Jingshao Chen (https://github.com/shaozi) - Brandon Roldan - nhchoudhary

### Impact The dynamic file upload feature is subject to potential XSS attach in case the attacker manages to modify the file names of the records being uploaded to the server. This appears in sections where the user controls the file upload dialogs themselves and has the technical knowledge to change the file names through the dynamic upload endpoint. Therefore I believe it would require the attacker to control the whole session of the particular user but in any case, this needs to be fixed. Successful exploit of this vulneratibility would require the user to have successfully uploaded a file blob to the server with a malicious file name and then have the possibility to direct the other user to the edit page of the record where the attachment is attached. The users are able to craft the direct upload requests themselves controlling the file name that gets stored to the database as shown here: https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/a967d355c6fee9ad9b8bd115d43bc8b0fc207e7e/activestorage...

When ssl was enabled for Mongo Hook, default settings included "allow_insecure" which caused that certificates were not validated. This was unexpected and undocumented. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.0, which fixes this issue.

### Impact The invites feature allows users to accept the invitation for an unlimited amount of time through the password reset functionality. When using the password reset functionality, the `devise_invitable` gem always accepts the pending invitation if the user has been invited as shown in this piece of code within the `devise_invitable` gem: https://github.com/scambra/devise_invitable/blob/41f58970ff76fb64382a9b9ea1bd530f7c3adab2/lib/devise_invitable/models.rb#L198 The only check done here is if the user has been invited but the code does not ensure that the pending invitation is still valid as defined by the `invite_for` expiry period as explained in the gem's documentation: https://github.com/scambra/devise_invitable#model-configuration- > `invite_for`: The period the generated invitation token is valid. After this period, the invited resource won’t be able to accept the invitation. When `invite_for` is `0` (the default), the invitation won’t expire. Decidim sets this configu...