#git

### Summary The endpoint `/site-structure/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring` accepts two parameter values: `lang` and `defstring`. These values are used in an unsafe way to set the keys and value of the `cfgStrings` object. It allows to add/modify properties of the `Object prototype` that result in several logic issues, including: - RCE vulnerabilities by polluting the `tempRootFolder` property - SQL injection vulnerabilities by polluting the `schema` property when using `PostgreSQL` database. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/infoarch.js#L236-L239 ```js router.post( "/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { lang, defstring } = req.params; // source const cfgStrings = getState().getConfigCopy("localizer_strings"); if (cfgStrings[lang]) cfgStrings[lang][defstring] = text(req.body.value); // [1] sink else cfgStrings[lang] = { [defstring]...

### Summary A user with admin permission can read arbitrary file and directory names on the filesystem by calling the `admin/build-mobile-app/result?build_dir_name=` endpoint. The `build_dir_name` parameter is not properly validated and it's then used to construct the `buildDir` that is read. The file/directory names under the `buildDir` will be returned. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L2884-L2893 ```js router.get( "/build-mobile-app/result", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { build_dir_name } = req.query; // [1] source const rootFolder = await File.rootFolder(); const buildDir = path.join( rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", build_dir_name // [2] ); const files = await Promise.all( fs .readdirSync(buildDir) // [3] sink .map(async (outFile) => await File.from_file_on_disk(outFile, buildDir)) ); [...] }) ); ``` ...

### Summary A user with admin permission can read and download arbitrary zip files when downloading auto backups. The file name used to identify the zip file is not properly sanitized when passed to `res.download` API. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L671-L682 ```js router.get( "/auto-backup-download/:filename", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { filename } = req.params; // [1] source [...] if ( !isRoot || !(filename.startsWith(backup_file_prefix) && filename.endsWith(".zip")) // [2] ) { res.redirect("/admin/backup"); return; } const auto_backup_directory = getState().getConfig("auto_backup_directory"); res.download(path.join(auto_backup_directory, filename), filename); // [3] sink }) ); ``` ### Steps to reproduce (PoC) - create a file with `.zip` extension under `/tmp` folder: ``` echo "secret12345" > /tmp/secret.zip ``` - log...

### Impact In case a Prototype Pollution vulnerability is present in a user's application or bundled libraries, the Sentry SDK could potentially serve as a gadget to exploit that vulnerability. The exploitability depends on the specific details of the underlying Prototype Pollution issue. > [!NOTE] > This advisory does not indicate the presence of a Prototype Pollution within the Sentry SDK itself. Users are strongly advised to first address any Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities in their application, as they pose a more critical security risk. ### Patches The issue was patched in all Sentry JavaScript SDKs starting from the [8.33.0](https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-javascript/releases/tag/8.33.0) version. ### References * [Prototype Pollution](https://portswigger.net/web-security/prototype-pollution) * [Prototype Pollution gadgets](https://portswigger.net/web-security/prototype-pollution#prototype-pollution-gadgets) * [sentry-javascript#13838](https://github.com/getsentry/sentr...

### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript code through the media download URL in Sulu CMS. It affects the SuluMediaBundle component. The vulnerability is a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issue, which could potentially allow attackers to steal sensitive information, manipulate the website's content, or perform actions on behalf of the victim. ### Patches The problem has not been patched yet. Users should upgrade to patched versions once they become available. Currently affected versions are: * 2.6.4 * 2.5.20 ### Workarounds Until an official patch is released, users can implement additional input validation and output encoding for the 'slug' parameter in the MediaStreamController's downloadAction method. Alternatively, configuring a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to filter potentially malicious input could serve as a temporary mitigation. ### References * GitHub repository: https://github.com/sulu/sulu * Vulnerable code: https://g...

Despite what lessons we thought we learned from Colonial Pipeline, none of those lessons have been able to be put into practice.

New Linux malware ‘Perfctl’ is targeting millions worldwide, mimicking system files to evade detection. This sophisticated malware compromises…

### Impact An abstract UNIX domain socket responsible for introspection is available without authentication locally to any user with access to the network namespace where the local juju agent is running. On a juju controller agent, denial of service can be performed by using the `/leases/revoke` endpoint. Revoking leases in juju can cause availability issues. On a juju machine agent that is hosting units, disabling the unit component can be performed using the `/units` endpoint with a "stop" action. ### Patches Patch: https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/43f0fc59790d220a457d4d305f484f62be556d3b Patched in: - 3.5.4 - 3.4.6 - 3.3.7 - 3.1.10 - 2.9.51 ### Workarounds No workaround. ### References https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/725800953aaa29dbeda4f806097bf838e61644dd/worker/introspection/worker.go#L125

### Impact When combined with an attack of `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID`, any user on the local system with access to the default network namespace may connect to the `@/var/lib/juju/agents/unit-xxxx-yyyy/agent.socket` and perform actions that are normally reserved to a juju charm. ### Patches Patch: https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/2f2ec128ef5a8ca81fc86ae79cfcdbab0007c206 Patched in: - 3.5.4 - 3.4.6 - 3.3.7 - 3.1.10 - 2.9.51 ### Workarounds No workarounds available. ### References [GHSA-mh98-763h-m9v4](https://github.com/juju/juju/security/advisories/GHSA-mh98-763h-m9v4) https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/725800953aaa29dbeda4f806097bf838e61644dd/worker/uniter/paths.go#L222

Authd PAM module up to version 0.3.4 can allow broker-managed users to impersonate any other user managed by the same broker and perform any PAM operation with it, including authenticating as them. This is possible using tools such as `su`, `sudo` or `ssh` (and potentially others) that, so far, do not ensure that the PAM user at the end of the transaction is matching the one who initiated the transaction. Authd 0.3.5 fixes this by not allowing changing the user unless it was never set before in the PAM stack. `su` version that will include https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/pull/3206 will not be affected `ssh` version that will include https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/521 will not be affected `sudo` version that will include https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/pull/412 will not be affected `login` not affected `passwd` not affected <details> <summary>Old report</summary> ### Summary An user can access as another user using its own credentials ### Details ...