Hackers can influence voters with media and breach campaigns, or try tampering with votes. Or they can combine these tactics to even greater effect.

Source: Lennart Worthmann via Alamy Stock Photo

If history has anything to tell us, the most significant cyber threat to this year's elections won't be a leak, a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, or a fake news video. Instead, it will be some combination of these or more.

In cyberspace's salad days, hackers caused all kinds of fuss using simple, direct methods: hiding viruses in advertisements, hacking websites with easily guessed passwords, and so on. While that still happens, attackers often have to get more creative by chaining multiple tactics together in order to achieve their goals, thanks to greater cybersecurity awareness and protections.

So too with elections. In 2006, aides to Joe Lieberman's presidential campaign had to resort to their personal emails when a DoS attack froze their IT systems. A decade later, famously, came the Podesta email leak. Now, according to Mandiant, part of Google Cloud, the most potent threats to the democratic process are chained attacks.

"In the most significant cyber incidents targeting elections that Mandiant has tracked, threat actors have deliberately layered multiple tactics in hybrid operations in such a way that the effect of each component magnifies the others," the firm wrote in a new report.

**Combination Election Attacks**

One case study Mandiant pointed to occurred in 2014 when Ukraine's presidential elections were interrupted by a Russian cyber onslaught, following the ouster of its pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich, and Russia's invasion of Crimea.

A week before election day, Russian actors hiding behind the hacktivist moniker "Cyber Berkut" struck websites relating to NATO and Ukrainian media outlets with DDoS attacks. That set the stage for when, with four days to go, the same fake hacktivist group broke into the country's central election computers and deleted files and rendered the vote tallying system inoperable.

A day later, they added to the chaos by breaking more election infrastructure, then leaking the emails and documents stored there to the wider Internet. Lastly, just 40 minutes before election results were to be broadcast to the public, the country's Central Election Commission reportedly removed some kind of virus that was designed to present fake results in favor of the far-right, ultra-nationalist candidate.

This extreme brand of combination cyber warfare might have only happened in a country experiencing such upheaval, but other chained cyberattacks have struck more-stable democracies since.

In 2020, two 20-something Iranian nationals carried out a campaign against multiple US states' voting-related websites. They managed to obtain confidential voter information from at least one of them, which they used to send intimidating and misleading emails, including by spreading a video with disinformation about election infrastructure vulnerabilities. They also breached one media company, which, as the Department of Justice noted, could have provided them another channel through which to disseminate their false claims.

"Leaks are particularly powerful. Potentially more powerful when boosted through the compromise of legitimate media," says John Hultquist, chief analyst with Mandiant Intelligence at Google Cloud.

The breach/fake news ploy is a potent concoction. "These disinformation efforts are often orchestrated by state-backed entities from nations such as China, Russia, and Iran," warns Madison Horn, herself a 2024 candidate running for a congressional seat in Oklahoma's 5th district. "Their impact is undeniable, as seen in instances like Russia’s involvement in the 2016 US election and China’s ongoing global influence operations, which starkly demonstrate their capacity to sway public opinion and disrupt electoral integrity."

**The Threat From Cybercrime**

It's not only state-sponsored actors that pose a threat to the democratic process, Mandiant noted. Insiders, hacktivists, and cybercriminals all muddy the waters in their own ways.

In most cases, "The avenues for these campaigns are popular social media platforms — X, Telegram, Facebook — and YouTube, making the digital battlefield as accessible as it is dangerous," Horn warns.

From January 2023 to March 2024, the cybersecurity firm BrandShield tracked suspicious new social media accounts and web domains relating to Joe Biden's and Donald Trump's presidential campaigns. It found hundreds of imposter accounts across social media sites, as well as 2,335 suspect websites claiming some sort of affiliation with the president and 9,639 for the former president (helped by a 197% boost following his arrest in August).

Fake Trump site. Source: BrandShield

Fake sites and accounts are useful for spreading scams or malware and for stealing funds that voters intended to go to candidates, or they can be used in concert with other tactics to achieve greater ends.

"They can be used to get people's information, and maybe try to influence their views by distributing fake news," says BrandShield CEO Yoav Keren, formerly an adviser in the Israeli Knesset. "I would even think that they can use these platforms to interact with real people from the campaigns, to infiltrate their systems. These impersonations can be used in a lot of different ways."

"I don't want to give too many good ideas to the bad guys," he says, "but they usually come up with them before I do."

**About the Author(s)**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

The Biggest 2024 Elections Threat: Kitchen-Sink Attack Chains

Caliptra 1.0 offers a blueprint for integrating security features directly into microprocessors.

Source: Alexmillos via Alamy Stock Vector

A consortium of top chip makers have finalized the first version of Caliptra, a specification to add zero-trust security features directly inside silicon.

The Caliptra 1.0 specification has hardware and software blocks providing multiple protection layers for encrypted data on chips.

"We believe Caliptra is a foundational aspect to the future of confidential computing and couldn't be more excited to reach our 1.0 milestone," says Andrés Lagar-Cavilla, a distinguished engineer at Google. Caliptra is currently being integrated by companies across the ecosystem into chips that will start to appear in the market in 2026.

Security-focused hardware exists, but usually as separate components on the hardware. At the moment, chips typically access security features that are available as separate hardware components on the motherboard. The Caliptra specification provides a blueprint to embed the security features into the chip instead of accessing those hardware cores.

For example, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which is required on all machines running Windows 11, is a secure processor carrying out cryptographic functions, such as Windows Hello authentication and BitLocker drive encryption. Caliptra could make possible an on-silicon version of TPM.

The specification was built around the concept of confidential computing, an emerging technology focused on building walls to protect data and programs during storage, transport, and execution. Users and code are verified before being allowed to enter the secure area, after which they can run programs.

**Caliptra-Spec Chips on the Way?**

The Caliptra specification aims to fend off cyberattacks and protect from vulnerabilities, such as Meltdown and Spectre, which exposed confidential user data to hackers.

Caliptra's protection layers on silicon include a root-of-trust block, in which code, users, and firmware are isolated, verified, and authenticated. The spec extends to protecting firmware and ROMs. The root-of-trust layer also detects and recovers data that may be corrupted.

The specification is now available for tape-in, which means it is also ready for testing for chips that may be going into production. Google's Lagar-Cavilla says the company is actively integrating Caliptra in first-party silicon designs and collaborating with suppliers to ensure their system-on-chips — across CPUs, GPUs, DPUs, BMCs, SSDs, and more — include Caliptra.

Caliptra is an open source technology, so chip makers can adopt and modify it for free.

A company called Antmicro is developing a Caliptra-based security core for an emerging chip architecture called RISC-V. The technology is an alternative to the dominant x86 and ARM instruction set architectures. RISC-V has a modular design that makes it easier to include technologies like Caliptra in production-level silicon.

Google is a lead developer of Caliptra, working alongside Advanced Micro Devices, Microsoft, Marvell, and NVIDIA. The Linux Foundation's CHIPS Alliance is managing the development of the specification.

Intel is one of the big names in chips missing from the group of companies developing Caliptra. Intel is pushing its own on-chip security technology to protect user data and chips from hackers.

**About the Author(s)**

Agam Shah has covered enterprise IT for more than a decade. Outside of machine learning, hardware, and chips, he's also interested in martial arts and Russia.

Chip Giants Finalize Specs Baking Security Into Silicon

By Waqas
Using Google Chrome? Update your browser to the latest version right now!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Google Patches Critical Chrome Vulnerability and Additional Flaws

Google Chrome users beware! A critical vulnerability (CVE-2024-4058) has been patched in the latest update (version 124). This flaw could allow attackers to take control of your system.

Google addressed a critical vulnerability (CVE-2024-4058) in its Chrome web browser on Wednesday, April 24th, 2024. This flaw resides within the ANGLE graphics layer engine and carries a “critical” severity rating, indicating its potential for severe exploitation.

While the critical CVE-2024-4058 garnered the most attention, Google’s Chrome update (version 124) also patched two additional high-severity vulnerabilities:

*   **CVE-2024-4059:** This vulnerability is classified as an out-of-bounds read within the V8 JavaScript engine. An out-of-bounds read allows attackers to access memory locations they shouldn’t, potentially revealing sensitive information.
*   **CVE-2024-4060:** This vulnerability is a use-after-free issue in the Dawn component. Use-after-free vulnerabilities can lead to crashes or potentially code execution depending on how they are exploited.

****The Importance of Updating****

While the specific details and exploitability of CVE-2024-4059 and CVE-2024-4060 are not yet fully public, it’s important to update Chrome regardless. A high-severity rating suggests these vulnerabilities could also be weaponized by attackers, so patching promptly remains the best course of action.

Jason Soroko, Senior Vice President of Product at Sectigo commented on the update stating, _“_CVE-2024-4058, a Type Confusion in ANGLE, is a vulnerability categorized as critical because it could allow remote code execution (RCE), enabling attackers to put malware onto the victim’s device. This latest vulnerability is a bad one for sure, and therefore it would be critical to patch this immediately._”_

****How to Protect Yourself****

The safest course of action is to update your Google Chrome browser immediately. Google has released Chrome version 124 which addresses this vulnerability alongside other security fixes. Here’s how to update Chrome:

*   **Windows & Mac:** Open Chrome, click the three vertical dots in the top right corner, go to “Help” and then “About Chrome.” Chrome will automatically check for updates and install them if available.
*   **Linux:** The update process for Linux may vary depending on your distribution. Consult your distribution’s documentation for specific update instructions.

Updating to Chrome version 124 protects you from these critical, high-severity, and potentially dangerous vulnerabilities. For additional technical details and a full list of changes in this build visit the Log section.

1.  Critical Chrome Update Counters Spyware Vendor’s Exploits
2.  Google Chrome to Mask User IP Addresses to Protect Privacy
3.  Fake Chrome Browser Update Installs NetSupport Manager RAT
4.  CISA Warns of Chrome and Excel Parsing LibraryExploitable Flaws
5.  Fantom Foundation Suffers Wallet Hack Via Google Chrome 0-Day

Google Patches Critical Chrome Vulnerability and Additional Flaws

Within BEC attacks, adversaries will send phishing emails appearing to be from a known or reputable source making a valid request, such as updating payroll direct deposit information.

Thursday, April 25, 2024 08:00

Business email compromise (BEC) was the top threat observed by Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) in the first quarter of 2024, accounting for nearly half of engagements, which is more than double what was observed in the previous quarter.  

The most observed means of gaining initial access was the use of compromised credentials on valid accounts, which accounted for 29 percent of engagements. The high number of BEC attacks likely played a significant role in valid accounts being the top attack vector this quarter. Weaknesses involving multi-factor authentication (MFA) were observed within nearly half of engagements this quarter, with the top observed weakness being users accepting unauthorized push notifications, occurring within 25 percent of engagements.  

There was a slight decrease in ransomware this quarter, accounting for 17 percent of engagements. Talos IR responded to new variants of Phobos and Akira ransomware for the first time this quarter. 

Manufacturing was the most targeted vertical this quarter, closely followed by education, a continuation from Q4 2024 where manufacturing and education were also two of the most targeted verticals. There was a 20 percent increase in manufacturing engagements from the previous quarter. 

The manufacturing sector faces unique challenges due to its inherently low tolerance for operational downtime. This quarter, Talos IR observed a wide range of threat activity targeting manufacturing organizations including financially motivated attacks, such as BEC and ransomware, and some brute force activity targeting virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure. The use of compromised credentials on valid accounts was the top observed attack vector within attacks targeting the manufacturing sector this quarter, which represents a change from the previous quarter when the top attack vector observed in these types of engagements was exploiting vulnerabilities in public-facing applications.   

**Watch discussion on the report's biggest trends**

**Surge in BEC **

Within BEC attacks, adversaries will send phishing emails appearing to be from a known or reputable source making a valid request, such as updating payroll direct deposit information. BEC attacks can have many motivations, often financially driven, aimed at tricking organizations into transferring funds or sensitive information to malicious actors.  

BEC offers adversaries the advantage of impersonating trusted contacts to facilitate internal spearphishing attacks that can bypass traditional external defenses and increase the likelihood of deception, widespread malware infections and data theft. 

In one engagement, adversaries performed a password-spraying attack and MFA exhaustion attacks against several employee accounts. There was a lack of proper MFA implementation across all the impacted accounts, leading to the adversaries gaining access to at least two accounts using single-factor authentication. The organization detected and disrupted the attack before adversaries could further their access or perform additional post-compromise activities.    

In another cluster of activity, several employees received spear-phishing emails that contained links that, when clicked, led to a redirection chain of web pages ultimately landing on a legitimate single sign-on (SSO) prompt that was pre-populated with each victim’s email address. The attack was unsuccessful because none of the employees interacted with the email, which was likely due to multiple red flags. For example, the email was unexpected and sent from an external email address, and there was small text within the email that referred to the email as a fax, which was all indicators of a phishing attempt. 

**Ransomware trends **

Ransomware accounted for 17 percent of engagements this quarter, an 11 percent decrease from the previous quarter. Talos IR observed new variants of Akira and Phobos ransomware for the first time this quarter. 

**Akira **

Talos IR responded to an Akira ransomware attack for the first time this quarter in an engagement where affiliates deployed the latest ESXi version, “Akira\_v2,” as well as a Windows-based variant of Akira named “Megazord.” These new Akira variants are written in the Rust programming language, which is a notable change from the previously used C++ and Crypto++ programming languages.  

Talos IR could not determine how initial access was gained, which is common because ransomware attacks often involve multi-stage attack strategies that add additional complexity during the investigation process. Once inside the network, the adversaries began collecting credentials from the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) and the New Technology Directory Services Directory Information Tree (NTDS.dit) database, where Active Directory data is stored, and leveraged Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement. Prior to encryption, Megazord ransomware began executing several commands to disable tools and impair defenses, including “net stop” and “taskkill.” Akira\_v2 appended the file extension “.akiranew” during encryption, while Megazord ransomware appended the file extension “.powerranges”.   

First discovered in early 2023, Akira operates as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model and employs a double extortion scheme that involves exfiltrating data before encryption. Akira affiliates are known to heavily target small- to medium-sized businesses within several verticals primarily located within the U.S. but have targeted organizations within the U.K., Canada, Iceland, Australia and South Korea. Akira affiliates are notorious for leveraging compromised credentials and exploiting vulnerabilities as a means of gaining initial access, such as the SQL injection vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2021-27876, affecting certain versions of Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus, and the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2023-27532, affecting certain versions of Veeam’s Backup & Replication (VBS) software.    

**Phobos **

Talos IR has previously observed variants of Phobos ransomware, such as “Faust,” but this quarter, Talos IR responded to an engagement with the “BackMyData” variant of Phobos ransomware. The adversaries leveraged Mimikatz to dump credentials from Active Directory. The adversary also installed several tools in the NirSoft product suite designed to recover passwords, such as PasswordFox and ChromePass, for additional credential enumeration. 

The adversaries used PsExec to access the domain controller before setting a registry key to permit remote desktop connections. Shortly after, the adversaries also modified the firewall to allow remote desktop connections using the Windows scripting utility, netsh. The remote access tool AnyDesk was downloaded to enable remote access as a means of persistence in the environment. Talos IR assessed with high confidence that Windows Secure Copy (WinSCP) and Secure Shell (SSH) were likely used to exfiltrate staged data. Adversaries also relied on PsExec to execute commands, such as deleting volume shadow copies, as a precursor to deploying the ransomware executable. After encryption, the ransomware appended the file extension “.fastbackdata”.   

A notable finding was the persistent use of the “Users/\[username\]/Music” directory as a staging area for data exfiltration to host malicious scripts, tools and malware, a common technique used by numerous ransomware affiliates to evade detection and remain persistent in the environment. Talos IR also identified a digitally signed executable, “HRSword,” developed by Beijing Huorong Network Technology. It is a tool the affiliate used during the attack for potential secure file deletion and as a defensive measure to disable endpoint protection tools, which Phobos affiliates were previously using, according to public reporting.   

Phobos ransomware first emerged in late 2018 and shared many similarities with the Crysis and Dharma ransomware families. Unlike other ransomware families, there are many variants of Phobos ransomware, such as Eking, Eight, Elbie, Devos and Faust. There is little information known about the business model leveraged by the Phobos ransomware operation. In November 2023, Cisco Talos analyzed over a thousand samples of Phobos ransomware to learn more about the affiliate structure and activity, which revealed that Phobos may operate a RaaS model due to the hundreds of contact emails and IDs associated with Phobos campaigns, indicating the malware has a dispersed affiliate base. Talos assessed with moderate confidence that the Phobos ransomware operation is actively managed by a central authority, as there is only one private key capable of decryption in all observed campaigns. 

**Other observed threats  **

Talos IR responded to an attack where adversaries were attempting to brute force several Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASAs). Although the adversaries were unsuccessful in their attack, this activity is in line with the recently observed trend affecting VPN services. 

Cisco Talos has recently seen an increase in malicious activity targeting VPN services, web application authentication interfaces, and Secure Shell (SSH) globally. Since at least March 18, Cisco has observed scanning and brute force activity sourcing from The Onion Router (TOR) exit nodes and other anonymous tunnels and proxies. 

Depending on the target environment, a successful attack could result in unauthorized access to a target network, possibly leading to account lockouts and denial-of-service (DoS) conditions. The brute force attempts include a combination of generic usernames and valid usernames unique to specific organizations. The activity seems indiscriminate and has been observed across multiple industry verticals and geographic regions. 

**Initial vectors **

The most observed means of gaining initial access was the use of compromised credentials on valid accounts, accounting for 29 percent of engagements, a continuation of a trend from the previous quarter when valid accounts were also a top attack vector. 

**Security weaknesses **

For the first time, users accepting unauthorized MFA push notifications was the top observed security weakness, accounting for 25 percent of engagements this quarter. The lack of proper MFA implementation closely followed, accounting for 21 percent of engagements, a 44 percent decrease from the previous quarter. 

Users must have a clear understanding of the appropriate business response protocols when their devices are overwhelmed with an excessive volume of push notifications. Talos IR recommends organizations educate their employees about the specific channels and points of contact for reporting these incidents. Prompt and accurate reporting enables security teams to quickly identify the nature of the issue and implement the necessary measures to address the situation effectively. Organizations should also consider implementing number-matching in MFA applications to provide an additional layer of security to prevent users from accepting malicious MFA push notifications. 

Talos IR recommends implementing MFA on all critical services including all remote access and identity access management (IAM) services. MFA will be the most effective method for the prevention of remote-based compromises. It also prevents lateral movement by requiring all administrative users to provide a second form of authentication. Organizations can set up alerting for single-factor authentication to quickly identify potential gaps. 

**Top observed MITRE ATT&CK techniques **

The table below represents the MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed in this quarter’s IR engagements and includes relevant examples and the number of times seen. Given that some techniques can fall under multiple tactics, we grouped them under the most relevant tactic based on the way they were leveraged. Please note, this is not an exhaustive list. 

Key findings from the MITRE ATT&CK framework include:  

*   Remote access software, such as SplashTop and AnyDesk, were used in 17 percent of engagements this quarter, a 20 percent decrease from the previous quarter.  
*   The use of email hiding rules was the top observed defense evasion technique, accounting for 21 percent of engagements this quarter.   
*   Scheduled tasks were leveraged by adversaries the most this quarter for persistence, accounting for 17 percent of engagements this quarter, a 33 percent increase from the previous quarter.  
*   The abuse of remote services, such as RDP, SSH, SMB and WinRM, more than doubled this quarter compared to the previous quarter, accounting for nearly 60 percent of engagements. 

Reconnaissance 

Example 

T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials 

Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during their attack.  

T1598.003 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link 

Adversaries may send a spearphishing email with a link to a credential harvesting page to collect credentials for their attack. 

Resource Development 

Example 

T1586.002 Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts 

Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during their attack for malicious activities, such as internal spearphishing. 

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains 

Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used for malicious activities, such as hosting malware. 

T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware 

Adversaries may upload malware to compromised domains to make it accessible during their attack.  

T1583.008 Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising 

Adversaries may purchase online advertisements, such as Google ads, that can be used distribute malware to victims. 

T1608.004 Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target 

Adversaries may prepare a website for drive-by compromise by inserting malicious JavaScript.  

Initial Access 

Example 

T1078 Valid Accounts 

Adversaries may use compromised credentials to access valid accounts during their attack. 

T1566 Phishing 

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to target systems. 

T1189 Drive-by Compromise 

Victims may infect their systems with malware over browsing, providing an adversary with access.  

T1190 Exploit in Public-Facing Application 

Adversaries may exploit a vulnerability to gain access to a target system. 

T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link 

Adversaries may send phishing emails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.  

Execution 

Example 

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell to execute commands or scripts throughout their attack. 

T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell 

Adversaries may abuse Windows Command Shell to execute commands or scripts throughout their attack. 

T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution 

Adversaries may abuse Windows service control manager to execute commands or payloads during their attack. 

Persistence 

Example 

T1053.005 Scheduled Task / Job: Scheduled Task 

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for recurring execution of malware or malicious commands. 

T1574.002 Hijack Execution: DLL Side-Loading 

Adversaries may execute their own malicious code by side-loading DLL files into legitimate programs.  

Privilege Escalation 

Example 

T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control 

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate their permissions on a system. 

Defense Evasion 

Example 

T1564.008 Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules 

Adversaries may create inbox rules to forward certain incoming emails to a folder to hide them from the inbox owner. 

T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion 

Adversaries may delete files to cover their tracks during the attack.  

T1218.011 System Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 

Adversaries may abuse the Windows utility rundll32.exe to execute malware.  

T1112 Modify Registry 

Adversaries may modify the registry to maintain persistence on a target system.  

T1562.010 Impair Defenses: Downgrade Attack 

Adversaries may downgrade a program, such as PowerShell, to a version that is vulnerable to exploits. 

Credential Access 

Example 

T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation 

Adversaries may generate MFA push notifications causing an MFA exhaustion attack. 

T1003.005 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS 

Adversaries may dump the contents of the NTDS.dit file to access credentials that can be used for lateral movement. 

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS 

Adversaries may dump the contents of LSASS to access credentials that can be used for lateral movement 

T1003.002 OS Credential Dumping: Service Account Manager 

Adversaries may dump the contents of the service account manager to access credentials that can be used for lateral movement. 

T1110.002 Brute Force: Password Cracking 

Adversaries may use brute force account passwords to compromise accounts. 

Discovery 

Example 

T1069.001 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups 

Adversaries may attempt to discover local permissions groups with commands, such as “net localgroup.”  

T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups 

Adversaries may attempt to discover domain groups with commands, such as “net group /domain.” 

T1201 Password Policy Discovery 

Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the password policy within a compromised network with commands, such as “net accounts.” 

Lateral Movement 

Example 

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol 

Adversaries may abuse valid accounts using RDP to move laterally in a target environment.  

T1534 Internal Spearphishing 

Adversaries may abuse a compromised email account to send internal spearphishing emails to move laterally. 

T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB / Windows Admin Shares 

Adversaries may abuse valid accounts using SMB to move laterally in a target environment. 

T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH 

Adversaries may abuse valid accounts using SSH to move laterally in a target environment. 

T1021.001 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management 

Adversaries may abuse valid accounts using WinRM to move laterally in a target environment. 

Collection 

Example 

T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection 

Adversaries may target a Microsoft Exchange server to collect information.  

T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging 

Adversaries may stage collected data in preparation for exfiltration. 

T1074 Data Staged 

Adversaries may stage collected data in preparation for exfiltration. 

Command and Control 

Example 

T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer 

Adversaries may transfer tools from an external system to a compromised system. 

T1219 Remote Access Software  

Adversaries may abuse remote access software, such as AnyDesk, to establish an interactive C2 channel during their attack.  

Exfiltration 

Example 

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage 

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage provider, such as Dropbox.  

Impact 

Example 

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact 

Adversaries may use ransomware to encrypt data on a target system.  

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery 

Adversaries may disable system recovery features, such as volume shadow copies.  

T1657 Financial Theft 

Adversaries may commit financial fraud during the attack.

Talos IR trends: BEC attacks surge, while weaknesses in MFA persist

Google has once again pushed its plans to deprecate third-party tracking cookies in its Chrome web browser as it works to address outstanding competition concerns from U.K. regulators over its Privacy Sandbox initiative.
The tech giant said it's working closely with the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and hopes to achieve an agreement by the end of the year.
As part of the

Google Postpones Third-Party Cookie Deprecation Amid U.K. Regulatory Scrutiny

Sources suspect China is behind the targeted exploitation of two zero-day vulnerabilities in Cisco’s security appliances.

Network security appliances like firewalls are meant to keep hackers out. Instead, digital intruders are increasingly targeting them as the weak link that lets them pillage the very systems those devices are meant to protect. In the case of one hacking campaign over recent months, Cisco is now revealing that its firewalls served as beachheads for sophisticated hackers penetrating multiple government networks around the world.

On Wednesday, Cisco warned that its so-called Adaptive Security Appliances—devices that integrate a firewall and VPN with other security features—had been targeted by state-sponsored spies who exploited two zero-day vulnerabilities in the networking giant's gear to compromise government targets globally in a hacking campaign it's calling ArcaneDoor.

The hackers behind the intrusions, which Cisco's security division Talos is calling UAT4356 and which Microsoft researchers who contributed to the investigation have named STORM-1849, couldn't be clearly tied to any previous intrusion incidents the companies had tracked. Based on the group's espionage focus and sophistication, however, Cisco says the hacking appeared to be state-sponsored.

“This actor utilized bespoke tooling that demonstrated a clear focus on espionage and an in-depth knowledge of the devices that they targeted, hallmarks of a sophisticated state-sponsored actor,” a blog post from Cisco's Talos researchers reads.

Cisco declined to say which country it believed to be responsible for the intrusions, but sources familiar with the investigation tell WIRED the campaign appears to be aligned with China's state interests.

Cisco says the hacking campaign began as early as November 2023, with the majority of intrusions taking place between December and early January of this year, when it learned of the first victim. “The investigation that followed identified additional victims, all of which involved government networks globally,” the company's report reads.

In those intrusions, the hackers exploited two newly discovered vulnerabilities in Cisco's ASA products. One, which it's calling Line Dancer, let the hackers run their own malicious code in the memory of the network appliances, allowing them to issue commands to the devices, including the ability to spy on network traffic and steal data. A second vulnerability, which Cisco is calling Line Runner, would allow the hackers' malware to maintain its access to the target devices even when they were rebooted or updated. It's not yet clear if the vulnerabilities served as the initial access points to the victim networks, or how the hackers might have otherwise gained access before exploiting the Cisco appliances.

Cisco has released software updates to patch both vulnerabilities, and advises that customers implement them immediately, along with other recommendations for detecting whether they've been targeted. Despite the hackers' Line Runner persistence mechanism, a separate advisory from the UK's National Cybersecurity Center notes that physically unplugging an ASA device does disrupt the hackers' access. “A hard reboot by pulling the power plug from the Cisco ASA has been confirmed to prevent Line Runner from re-installing itself,” the advisory reads.

The ArcaneDoor hacking campaign represents just the latest series of intrusions to target network perimeter applications sometimes referred to as “edge” devices like email servers, firewalls, and VPNs—often devices intended to provide security—whose vulnerabilities allowed hackers to obtain a staging point inside a victim's network. Cisco's Talos researchers warn of that broader trend in their report, referring to highly sensitive networks that they've seen targeted via edge devices in recent years. “Gaining a foothold on these devices allows an actor to directly pivot into an organization, reroute or modify traffic and monitor network communications,” they write. “In the past two years, we have seen a dramatic and sustained increase in the targeting of these devices in areas such as telecommunications providers and energy sector organizations—critical infrastructure entities that are likely strategic targets of interest for many foreign governments.”

State-sponsored hackers' shift to compromising edge devices has become prevalent enough over the past year that Google-owned security firm Mandiant also highlighted it in its annual M-Trends report earlier this week, based on the company's threat intelligence and incident response findings. The report points to widely exploited vulnerabilities in network edge devices sold by Barracuda and Ivanti and notes that hackers—and specifically espionage-focused Chinese groups—are building custom malware for edge devices, in part because many networks have little or no way to monitor for compromise of the devices. Detecting the ArcaneDoor hackers' access to Cisco ASA appliances, in particular, is “incredibly difficult,” according to the advisory from the UK's NCSC.

Mandiant notes that it has observed Russian state-sponsored hackers targeting edge devices too: It's observed the unit of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, known as Sandworm, repeatedly hack edge devices used by Ukrainian organizations to gain and maintain access to those victim networks, often for data-destroying cyberattacks. In some cases, the lack of visibility and monitoring in those edge devices has meant that Sandworm was able to wipe a victim network while holding on to its control of an edge device—then hit the same network again.

“They’re systemically targeting security appliances that sit on the edge for access to the rest of the network,” says John Hultquist, Mandiant's head of threat intelligence. “This is no longer an emerging trend. It's established."

Hultquist notes, however, that China is unmatched in its discovery and use of network appliance zero days, like the ones it has used to run rampant through Cisco firewalls over the past several months. He expects more to come, as China's cyberspies continue to turn devices meant to protect target networks against their owners. “It's unlikely these zero days are being produced haphazardly. We suspect a well-resourced, coordinated effort is underway to find and exploit these vulnerabilities,” Hultquist says. “Unfortunately, we'll almost certainly see several more zero-days in security appliances this year.”

'ArcaneDoor' Cyberspies Hacked Cisco Firewalls to Access Government Networks

Just like you should check the quality of the ingredients before you make a meal, it's critical to ensure the integrity of AI training data.

Source: Nico El Nino via Shutterstock

COMMENTARY

Picture this: It's a Saturday morning, and you made breakfast for your family. The pancakes were golden brown and seemingly tasted OK, but everyone, including you, got sick shortly after eating them. Unbeknown to you, the milk that you used to make the batter expired several weeks ago. The quality of the ingredients impacted the meal, but everything looked fine on the outside.

The same philosophy can be applied to artificial intelligence (AI). Regardless of its purpose, AI's output is directly related to the quality of its input. As the popularity of AI continues to rise, security concerns around the data being fed into AI are coming into question.

A majority of today's organizations are integrating AI into business operations at some capacity — and threat actors are taking note. Over the past few years, a tactic known as AI poisoning has become increasingly prevalent. This new malicious practice involves injecting deceptive or harmful data into AI training sets. The tricky part about AI poisoning is that, despite the input being compromised, the output can initially continue as normal. It isn't until a threat actor gets a firm grip on the data and begins a full-fledged attack that deviations from the norm become obvious. The consequences range from slightly inconvenient to damaging a brand's reputation.

It's a risk affecting organizations of all sizes, even today's most prominent tech vendors. For example, over the past few years, adversaries launched several large-scale attacks to poison Google's Gmail spam filters and even turned Microsoft's Twitter chatbot hostile.

**Defending Against AI Data Poisoning**

Fortunately, organizations can take the following steps to shield AI technologies from potential poisoning.

*   Build a comprehensive data catalog. First, organizations should create a live data catalog that serves as a centralized repository of information that is being fed to its AI systems. Any time new data is added to AI systems, it should be tracked in this index. In addition, the catalog should be able to categorize the data flowing into AI systems by the who, what, when, where, why, and how to ensure transparency and accountability.
    
*   Develop a normal baseline for users and devices interacting with AI data. Once the security and IT teams have a solid understanding of all of the data in AI systems and who has access to it, it's important to develop a baseline of normal user and device behavior.
    

Compromised credentials are one of the easiest ways for cybercriminals to break into networks. All a threat actor has to do is either play a guessing game or buy one of the 24 billion username and password combinations available on the cybercriminal marketplace. Once they have access, a threat actor can easily maneuver their way into accessing AI training datasets.

By establishing user and device baseline behavior, security teams can easily detect abnormalities that might be indicative of an attack. Often, this helps stop a threat actor before an incident escalates into a full-blown data breach. For example, say you have an IT executive who typically works from the New York office and who oversees the AI data training sets. One day, it shows that he is active in another country and is adding large amounts of data to the AI. If your security team already has a baseline of user behavior, they can quickly tell that this is abnormal. Then security could either talk to the executive and verify that he was performing the action or, if he wasn't, temporarily disable his account until the alert is thoroughly investigated to prevent any further damage.

**Taking Responsibility of AI Training Sets**

Just like you should check the quality of the ingredients before you make a meal, it's critical to ensure the integrity of AI training data. AI intelligence is intricately linked to the quality of data it processes. Implementing guidelines, policies, monitoring systems, and improved algorithms plays a pivotal role in ensuring the safety and effectiveness of AI. These measures safeguard against potential threats and empower organizations to harness the transformative potential of AI. It is a delicate balance where organizations must learn to leverage AI's capabilities, while remaining vigilant in the face of the ever-evolving threat landscape.

**About the Author(s)**

CISO, Exabeam

Tyler Farrar is the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) at Exabeam. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 2012, and received his Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering. Tyler continued his education at Robert H. Smith School of Business, where he earned a Master of Business Administration in Accounting and Finance.

Fortify AI Training Datasets From Malicious Poisoning

Beware of this malicious ad campaign currently making the rounds. Read our blog for more details and how to protect yourself.

Today, we are looking at a malicious ad campaign targeting Facebook users via Google search. It is well-known that tech support scammers attract new victims by buying ads for certain keywords related to their audience.

What is perhaps less known is how it is even possible to impersonate top brands and get away with it. We will try to respond to the ‘how they do it’ and the ‘why is Google allowing this’ questions.

Such malvertising attacks are not new and the damage they cause to consumers is growing every day. There is no one way to stop all of them, but public reporting will hopefully drive the point home that this needs to be addressed just like other types of fraud or malware.

We have reported the malicious advertiser to Google, but at the time of publishing this campaign was still on.

Justin Poliachik did what many people would do, he opened up a Google search, typed facebook and clicked on the top result. In the video below, he summarizes what happened next:

Thanks to Justin for the shoutout to our blog and explaining what went down! Not sure if Justin was joking, but we don’t believe AI is going to fix malvertising, at least not for the next little while. Instead, we are going to look into more details about one particular technique. In our view, this is actually where the abuse happens the most, and where things could be improved.

**Two paths make cloaking**

As we said, Google seems to have a problem with brand impersonation that may not be easy to solve. We have reported such cases several times before with pretty much the same techniques.

How can Google differentiate a legitimate affiliate from a malicious actor? There are a number of data points about the advertiser via their account: user profile, payment method, budget, etc. We are not privy to those details, but they can certainly help when it comes to fraud.

More importantly, there is the ad itself: vanity URL, display text, tracking template, final URL. What happens when you click on the ad? Are you actually redirected to the URL claimed in the ad? This is a feature that appears to be so easy to abuse, and yet remains unfixed.

In the video below, we walk you through the classic tale of cloaking:

Cloaking is an old technique and in many ways can be used for legitimate purposes. After all, one needs to be able to detect real humans and not bots or crawlers for their hard-earned ad dollars budget.

Threat actors have long identified such services as very helpful tools for their malicious campaigns. True, they, like others don’t want robots, but they also don’t want Google’s scanners or security researchers to expose their malicious schemes.

**Under the hood**

This part is a little more technical, but integral in understanding how malvertising works. As mentioned in the video above, cloaking allows to deliver two different experiences. Genuine humans can be detected from a number of factors: IP address, browser fingerprinting, etc.

A click tracking service can be used to analyze traffic, collect data, etc. All in all, such services are useful in and of themselves, but they can also easily be abused by bad actors. Within the Google ad ecosystem, advertisers will place their URL as a tracking template, and the rest will be handled outside of Google.

One thing that’s interesting is how scammers will abuse the click tracking service as well! All they have to do is redirect to another “legitimate” domain they control and from there decide on the final destination URL.

We can see in the image below that final redirect, which is either the scam page or the actual Facebook site:

**Safeguarding your online experience**

We have seen these malicious ads for years and years. It would be unfair to say that no action has ever been taken, but there is room for improvement. Individual reports from victims are not always actioned based on our experience and that of others. This is frustrating because it appears as if those individual experiences do not matter in the grander scheme of things.

Security vendors also struggle with these scams. Chasing infrastructure from one host to the next or having trouble blocking URLs that abuse legitimate providers is a real thing.

As a user you can protect yourself in various ways:

*   Beware of sponsored results
*   Block ads altogether
*   Recognize scam pages as fake

If you want the piece of mind and have all this covered for you, download our Malwarebytes Browser Guard extension available for different browsers.

 Google ad for Facebook redirects to scam 

Ubuntu Security Notice 6746-1 - It was discovered that Google Guest Agent and Google OS Config Agent incorrectly handled certain JSON files. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service.

==========================================================================  
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-6746-1  
April 23, 2024

google-guest-agent, google-osconfig-agent vulnerability  
==========================================================================

A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives:

- Ubuntu 23.10  
- Ubuntu 22.04 LTS

Summary:

Google Guest Agent and OS Config Agent could be made to crash  
if it open a specially crafted JSON.

Software Description:  
- google-guest-agent: Google Compute Engine Guest Agent  
- google-osconfig-agent: Google OS Config Agent

Details:

It was discovered that Google Guest Agent and Google OS Config Agent incorrectly  
handled certain JSON files. An attacker could possibly use this issue to  
cause a denial of service.

Update instructions:

The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following  
package versions:

Ubuntu 23.10:  
  google-guest-agent              20231004.02-0ubuntu1~23.10.3  
  google-osconfig-agent           20230504.00-0ubuntu2.2

Ubuntu 22.04 LTS:  
  google-guest-agent              20231004.02-0ubuntu1~22.04.4  
  google-osconfig-agent           20230504.00-0ubuntu1~22.04.1

In general, a standard system update will make all the necessary changes.

References:  
  https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6746-1  
  CVE-2024-24786

Package Information:  
  https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/google-guest-agent/20231004.02-0ubuntu1~23.10.3  
  https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/google-osconfig-agent/20230504.00-0ubuntu2.2  
  https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/google-guest-agent/20231004.02-0ubuntu1~22.04.4  
  https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/google-osconfig-agent/20230504.00-0ubuntu1~22.04.1

Ubuntu Security Notice USN-6746-1

It's time to start regulating LLMs to ensure they're accurately trained and ready to handle business deals that could affect the bottom line.

Kevin Bocek, Chief Innovation Officer, Venafi

April 23, 2024

5 Min Read

Source: Bakhtiar Zein via Alamy Stock Photo

COMMENTARY

OWASP recently released its top 10 list for large language model (LLM) applications, in an effort to educate the industry on potential security threats to be aware of when deploying and managing LLMs. This release is a notable step in the right direction for the security community, as developers, designers, architects, and managers now have 10 areas to clearly focus on. 

Similar to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) guidelines provided for the security industry, OWSAP's list creates an opportunity for better alignment within organizations. With this knowledge, chief information security officers (CISOs) and security leaders can ensure the best security precautions are in place around the use of LLM technologies that are quickly evolving. LLMs are just code. We need to apply what we have learned about authenticating and authorizing code to prevent misuse and compromise. This is why identity provides the kill switch for AI, which is the ability to authenticate and authorize each model and their actions, and stop it when misuse, compromise, or errors occur.

**Adversaries Are Capitalizing on Gaps in Organizations**

As security practitioners, we've long talked about what adversaries are doing, such as data poisoning, supply chain vulnerabilities, excessive agency and theft, and more. This OWASP list for LLMs is proof that the industry is recognizing where risks are. To protect our organizations, we have to course correct quickly and be proactive. 

Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is putting a spotlight on a new wave of software risks that are rooted in the same capabilities that made it powerful in the first place. Every time a user asks an LLM a question, it crawls countless Web locations in an attempt to provide an AI-generated response or output. While every new technology comes with new risks, LLMs are especially concerning because they're so different from the tools we're used to.

Almost all of the top 10 LLM threats center around a compromise of authentication for the identities used in the models. The different attack methods run the gamut, affecting not only the identities of model inputs but also the identities of the models themselves, as well as their outputs and actions. This has a knock-on effect and calls for authentication in the code-signing and creating processes to halt the vulnerability at the source.

**Authenticating Training and Models to Prevent Poisoning and Misuse**

With more machines talking to each other than ever before, there must be training and authentication of the way that identities will be used to send information and data from one machine to another. The model needs to authenticate the code so that the model can mirror that authentication to other machines. If there's an issue with the initial input or model — because models are vulnerable and something to keep a close eye on — there will be a domino effect. Models, and their inputs, must be authenticated. If they aren't, security team members will be questioning if this is the right model they trained or if it's using the plug-ins they approved. When models can use APIs and other models' authentication, authorization must be well defined and managed. Each model must be authenticated with a unique identity.

We saw this play out recently with AT&T's breakdown, which was dubbed a "software configuration error," leaving thousands of people without cellphone service during their morning commute. The same week, Google experienced a bug that was very different but equally concerning. Google's Gemini image generator misrepresented historical images, causing diversity and bias concerns due to AI. In both cases, the data used to train GenAI models and LLMs — as well as the lack of guardrails around it — was the root of the problem. To prevent issues like this in the future, AI firms need to spend more time and money to adequately train the models and inform the data better. 

In order to design a bulletproof and secure system, CISOs and security leaders should design a system where the model works with other models. This way, an adversary stealing one model does not collapse the entire system, and allows for a kill-switch approach. You can shut off a model and keep working and protecting the company's intellectual property. This positions security teams in a much stronger way and prevents any further damages. 

**Acting on Lessons From the List **

For security leaders, I recommend taking OWASP's guidance and asking your CISO or C-level execs how the organization is scoring on these vulnerabilities overall. This framework holds us all more accountable for delivering market-level security insights and solutions. It is encouraging that we have something to show our CEO and board to illustrate how we're doing when it comes to risk preparedness. 

As we continue to see risks arise with LLMs and AI customer service tools, like we just did with Air Canada's chatbot giving a reimbursement to a traveler, companies will be held accountable for mistakes. It's time to start regulating LLMs to ensure they're accurately trained and ready to handle business deals that could affect the bottom line. 

In conclusion, this list serves as a great framework for rising Web vulnerabilities and the risks we need to pay attention to when using LLMs. While more than half of the top 10 risks are ones that are essentially mitigated and calling for the kill switch for AI, companies will need to evaluate their options when deploying new LLMs. If the right tools are in place to authenticate the inputs and models, as well as the models' actions, companies will be better equipped to leverage the AI kill-switch idea and prevent further destruction. While this may seem daunting, there are ways to protect your organization amid the infiltration of AI and LLMs in your network.

**About the Author(s)**

Chief Innovation Officer, Venafi

As Chief Innovation Officer, Kevin is leading Venafi’s growth in new innovations, and is at the forefront of Venafi’s cutting-edge machine identity management for workload identity, Kubernetes and AI. He also drives Venafi’s technology ecosystem and developer community to futureproof customer success and is responsible for the company’s Machine Identity Management Development Fund, which has sponsored innovations with more than 50 developers globally. Kevin brings more than 25 years of experience in cybersecurity with industry leaders including RSA Security, PGP Corporation, IronKey, CipherCloud, Thales, nCipher, and Xcert.

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