#mac

Gentoo Linux Security Advisory 202211-10 - Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in Pillow, the worst of which could result in arbitrary code execution. Versions less than 9.3.0 are affected.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-8559-01 - The hsqldb packages provide a relational database management system written in Java. The Hyper Structured Query Language Database contains a JDBC driver to support a subset of ANSI-92 SQL.

After months of meticulous planning, investigators finally move in to catch AlphaBay’s mastermind red-handed. Then the case takes a tragic turn.

The Luna Moth campaign has extorted hundreds of thousands of dollars from several victims in the legal and retail sectors. The attacks are notable for employing a technique called callback phishing or telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD), wherein the victims are social engineered into making a phone call through phishing emails containing invoices and subscription-themed lures. Palo Alto

What happens if a bot net starts uploading 100MB files from 100 machines at the same time. This would mean that our network pipes are clogged handling 10GB of data while slowing down our real customers..... the answer the site will down and come not available

CKAN through 2.9.6 account takeovers by unauthenticated users when an existing user id is sent via an HTTP POST request. This allows a user to take over an existing account including superuser accounts.

### Impact User without the right to view documents can deduce their existence by repeated Livetable queries. #### Reproduction steps 1. Restrict "view" access to `Sandbox.TestPage3` by setting an explicit view right for admins 1. As a user who is not an admin, open `<server>/bin/get/XWiki/LiveTableResults?outputSyntax=plain&classname=&collist=doc.title%2Cdoc.location%2Cdoc.content&doc.title=Sandbo&doc.location=Sandbox.TestPage3&doc.content=dummy&limit=0` where `<server>` is the URL of your XWiki installation. #### Expect Result: No results are displayed as the user doesn't have view rights on Sandbox.TestPage3. ##### Actual Result: The result ```json { "reqNo": null, "matchingtags": {}, "tags": [], "totalrows": 1, "returnedrows": 0, "offset": 1, "rows": [ { "doc_viewable": false, "doc_fullName": "obfuscated" } ] } ``` is displayed. This reveals that a document `Sandbox.TestPage3` exists (we explicitly searched for this name) which has a ti...

### Impact Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the menu macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation due to improper escaping of the macro content and parameters of the menu macro. The issue can be demonstrated by opening `<server>/xwiki/bin/view/Main?sheet=CKEditor.HTMLConverter&language=en&sourceSyntax=xwiki%2F2.1&stripHTMLEnvelope=true&fromHTML=false&toHTML=true&text=%7B%7Bmenu%7D%7D%7B%7Bcache+id%3D%22menuMacro%22%7D%7D%7B%7Bgroovy%7D%7Dprintln%28%22Hello+from+Groovy%21%22%29%7B%7B%2Fgroovy%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fcache%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fmenu%7D%7D` where `<server>` is the URL of the XWiki installation. If this displays "Hello from Groovy!", the installation is vulnerable. ### Patches The problem has been patched in XWiki 14.6RC1, 13.10.8 and 14.4.3. ### Workarounds The [patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/2fc20891e6c6b0ca05ee07e315e7f435e8919f8d) for the document `Menu....

### Impact Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the icon picker macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki due to improper neutralization of the macro parameters of the icon picker macro. The URL `<server>/xwiki/bin/view/Main?sheet=CKEditor.HTMLConverter&language=en&sourceSyntax=xwiki%252F2.1&stripHTMLEnvelope=true&fromHTML=false&toHTML=true&text=%7B%7BiconPicker%20id%3D%22'%3C%2Fscript%3E%7B%7B%2Fhtml%7D%7D%7B%7Bcache%7D%7D%7B%7Bgroovy%7D%7Dprintln(%2FHellofromIconPickerId%2F)%7B%7B%2Fgroovy%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fcache%7D%7D%22%20class%3D%22'%3C%2Fscript%3E%7B%7B%2Fhtml%7D%7D%7B%7Bcache%7D%7D%7B%7Bgroovy%7D%7Dprintln(%2FHellofromIconPickerClass%2F)%7B%7B%2Fgroovy%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fcache%7D%7D%22%2F%7D%7D` demonstrates the issue (replace `<server>` by the URL to your XWiki installation). If the output `HellofromIconPickerId` or `HellofromIconPickerClass` is visible, the XWiki installation is vulnerable (normally, all output should be conta...

### Impact Any user with the right to edit his personal page can follow one of the scenario below: **Scenario 1**: - Log in as a simple user with just edit rights on the user profile - Go to the user's profile - Upload an attachment in the attachment tab at the bottom of the page (any image is fine) - Click on "rename" in the attachment list and enter `{{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}.png` as new attachment name and submit the rename - Go back to the user profile - Click on the edit icon on the user avatar - `Hello from groovy!` is displayed as the title of the attachment **Scenario 2**: - Log in as a simple user with just edit rights on a page - Create a Page `MyPage.WebHome` - Create an XClass field of type String named `avatar` - Add an XObject of type `MyPage.WebHome` on the page - Insert an `attachmentSelector` macro in the document with the following values: - **classname**: `MyPage.WebHo...