#maven

### Impact The HTML macro does not systematically perform a proper neutralization of script-related html tags. As a result, any user able to use the html macro in XWiki, is able to introduce an XSS attack. This can be particularly dangerous since in a standard wiki, any user is able to use the html macro directly in their own user profile page. ### Patches The problem has been patched in XWiki 14.8RC1. The patch involve that the HTML macro are systematically cleaned up whenever the user does not have script right. ### Workarounds There's no workaround for this issue. ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-18568 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira](https://jira.xwiki.org) * Email us at [security ML](mailto:[email protected])

### Impact It is possible to bypass the existing security measures put in place to avoid open redirect by using a redirect such as `//mydomain.com` (i.e. omitting the `http:`). It was also possible to bypass it when using URL such as `http:/mydomain.com`. ### Patches The problem has been patched on XWiki 13.10.10, 14.4.4 and 14.8RC1. ### Workarounds The only way to workaround the bug is by providing a patched jar of xwiki-platform-oldcore containing the following changes: https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/e4f7f68e93cb08c25632c126356d218abf192d1e#diff-c445f288d5d63424f56ef13f65514ab4e174a72e979b53b88197c2b7def267cf. ### References * Jira ticket of the reported vulnerability: https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-19994 * Jira ticket of the original mechanism put in place to prevent open redirect: https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-10309 * Original advisory about open redirect: https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-jp55-vvmf-63mv ### For ...

### Impact Any user with edit rights on a page (e.g., it's own user page), can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the section ids in `XWiki.AdminFieldsDisplaySheet`. This page is installed by default. Reproduction steps are described in https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20261 ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 15.0-rc-1, 14.10.1, 14.4.8, and 13.10.11. ### Workarounds The issue can be fixed by applying this [patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/f1e310826a19acdcdecdecdcfe171d21f24d6ede) on `XWiki.AdminFieldsDisplaySheet`. ### References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20261 - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/f1e310826a19acdcdecdecdcfe171d21f24d6ede ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) * Email us at ...

### Impact The Document script API returns directly a DocumentAuthors allowing to set any authors to the document, which in consequence can allow subsequent executions of scripts since this author is used for checking rights. Example of such attack: ``` {{velocity}} $doc.setContent('{{velocity}}$xcontext.context.authorReference{{/velocity}}') $doc.authors.setContentAuthor('xwiki:XWiki.superadmin') $doc.getRenderedContent() {{/velocity}} ``` ### Patches The problem has been patched in XWiki 14.10 and 14.4.7 by returning a safe script API. ### Workarounds There no easy workaround apart of upgrading. ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20380 * https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/905cdd7c421dbf8c565557cdc773ab1aa9028f83 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira](https://jira.xwiki.org) * Email us at [security ML](mailto:[email protected])

### Impact It was possible to inject some code using the URL of authenticate endpoints, e.g.: ``` https://hostname/xwiki/authenticate/wiki/xwiki%22onload=%22alert(origin)%22/resetpassword ``` This vulnerability was present in recent versions of XWiki: - 13.10.8+ - 14.4.3+ - 14.6+ ### Patches This problem has been patched on XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10. ### Workarounds There is no easy workaround except to upgrade. ### References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20335 - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1943ea26c967ef868fb5f67c487d98d97cba0380 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira](https://jira.xwiki.org) * Email us at [security mailing-list](mailto:[email protected])

### Impact Any user with edit rights can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the included pages in the IncludedDocuments panel. **Precondition**: As an admin, add the `Panels.IncludedDocuments` panel on one column. A proof of concept exploit is to edit a document and add the following code before saving. ``` {{display reference="{{cache~}~}{{groovy~}~}println(~"Hello from Groovy~" + ~" in included document!~"){{/groovy~}~}{{/cache~}~}"/}} ``` **expected** The right had side panels contain: ``` One included page: {{cache}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy" + " in included document!"){{/groovy}}{{/cache}} ``` **actual** The right had side panels contain: ``` One included page: XWiki.Hello from Groovy in included document! ``` ### Patches The problem has been patched on XWiki 14.4.7, and 14.10. ### Workarounds The issue can be fixed manually applying this [patch](h...

### Impact Any user with view rights `WikiManager.DeleteWiki` can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the `wikiId` url parameter. A proof of concept exploit is to open <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/WikiManager/DeleteWiki?wikiId=%22+%2F%7D%7D+%7B%7Basync+async%3D%22true%22+cached%3D%22false%22+context%3D%22doc.reference%22%7D%7D%7B%7Bgroovy%7D%7Dprintln%28%22Hello+from+groovy%21%22%29%7B%7B%2Fgroovy%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fasync%7D%7D where <xwiki-host> is the URL of your XWiki installation. ### Patches The problem has been patched on XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7, and 14.10. ### Workarounds The issue can be fixed manually applying this [patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ba4c76265b0b8a5e2218be400d18f08393fe1428#diff-64f39f5f2cc8c6560a44e21a5cfd509ef00e8a2157cd9847c9940a2e08ea43d1R63-R64). ### References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20297 - https://github.com/xw...

### Impact Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the legacy notification activity macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the macro parameters of the [legacy notification activity macro](https://extensions.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Extension/Legacy%20Notification%20Activity%20Macro/). This macro is installed by default in XWiki. A proof of concept exploit is ``` {{activity wikis="~" /~}~} {{async async=~"true~" cached=~"false~" context=~"doc.reference~"~}~}{{groovy~}~}println(~"Hello from Groovy!~"){{/groovy~}~}"/}} ``` If the output of this macro is ``` The [notifications] macro is a standalone macro and it cannot be used inline. Click on this message for details. Hello from Groovy!" displayMinorEvents="false" displayRSSLink="false" /}} ``` or similar, the XWiki installation is vulnerable. The vulnerability can be exploited via ever...

### Impact Rights added to a document are not taken into account for viewing it once it's deleted. Note that this vulnerability only impact deleted documents that where containing view rights: the view rights provided on a space of a deleted document are properly checked. ### Patches The problem has been patched in XWiki 14.10 by checking the rights of current user: only admin and deleter of the document are allowed to view it. ### Workarounds There is no workaround for this vulnerability other than upgrading. ### References * Jira ticket: https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-16285 * Commit: https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/d9e947559077e947315bf700c5703dfc7dd8a8d7 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira](https://jira.xwiki.org) * Email us at [security ML](mailto:[email protected])

Multiple Jenkins plugins do not properly mask (i.e., replace with asterisks) credentials printed in the build log from Pipeline steps like sh and bat, when both of the following conditions are met: - The credentials are printed in build steps executing on an agent (typically inside a node block). - Push mode for durable task logging is enabled. This is a hidden option in Pipeline: Nodes and Processes that can be enabled through the Java system property org.jenkinsci.plugins.workflow.steps.durable_task.DurableTaskStep.USE_WATCHING. It is also automatically enabled by some plugins, e.g., OpenTelemetry and Pipeline Logging over CloudWatch. The following plugins are affected by this vulnerability: - Kubernetes 3909.v1f2c633e8590 and earlier (SECURITY-3079 / CVE-2023-30513) - Azure Key Vault 187.va_cd5fecd198a_ and earlier (SECURITY-3051 / CVE-2023-30514) - Thycotic DevOps Secrets Vault 1.0.0 (SECURITY-3078 / CVE-2023-30515) The following plugins have been updated to properly mask cr...