#vulnerability

Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Local Security Authority (LSA) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

**Are the updates for Windows 10 for x64-based Systems and Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems currently available?** The security update for Windows 10 for x64-based Systems and Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems are not immediately available. The updates will be released as soon as possible, and when they are available, customers will be notified via a revision to this CVE information.

Use after free in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.

Google has shipped patches for 62 vulnerabilities, two of which it said have been exploited in the wild. The two high-severity vulnerabilities are listed below - CVE-2024-53150 (CVSS score: 7.8) - An out-of-bounds flaw in the USB sub-component of Kernel that could result in information disclosure CVE-2024-53197 (CVSS score: 7.8) - A privilege escalation flaw in the USB sub-component of Kernel

The broadcast channel internally calls `clone` on the stored value when receiving it, and only requires `T:Send`. This means that using the broadcast channel with values that are `Send` but not `Sync` can trigger unsoundness if the `clone` implementation makes use of the value being `!Sync`. Thank you to Austin Bonander for finding and reporting this issue.

### Impact When generating an ESTree from a value with a property named `__proto__`, `valueToEstree` would generate an object that specifies a prototype instead. Example: ```js import { generate } from 'astring' import { valueToEstree } from 'estree-util-value-to-estree' const estree = valueToEstree({ ['__proto__']: {} }) const code = generate(estree) console.log(code) ``` Output: ```js { "__proto__": {} } ``` ### Patches This was fixed in version [3.3.3](https://github.com/remcohaszing/estree-util-value-to-estree/releases/tag/v3.3.3). ### Workarounds If you control the input, don’t specify a property named `__proto__`. If you don’t control the output, strip any properties named `__proto__` before passing it to `valueToEstree`.

# Impact ## Summary A vulnerability in Apollo Compiler allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to validate. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service in applications. ## Details Named fragments were being processed once per fragment spread in some cases during query validation, leading to exponential resource usage when deeply nested and reused fragments were involved. ## Fix/Mitigation The validation logic has been updated to process each named fragment only once, preventing redundant traversal. # Patches This has been remediated in `apollo-compiler` version 1.27.0. # Workarounds No known direct workarounds exist. ## Acknowledgements We appreciate the efforts of the security community in identifying and improving the performance and security of query validation mechanisms.

# Impact ## Summary A vulnerability in Apollo Gateway allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to query plan, specifically due to internal optimizations being frequently bypassed. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service. ## Details The query planner includes an optimization that significantly speeds up planning for applicable GraphQL selections. However, queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments can generate many selections where this optimization does not apply, leading to significantly longer planning times. Because the query planner does not enforce a timeout, a small number of such queries can render gateway inoperable. ## Fix/Mitigation - A new **Query Optimization Limit** metric has been added: - This metric approximates the number of selections that cannot be skipped by the existing optimization. - The metric is checked against a limit to prevent excessive computation. Given...

# Impact ## Summary A vulnerability in Apollo Gateway allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to query plan, specifically during named fragment expansion. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service. ## Details Named fragments were being expanded once per fragment spread during query planning, leading to exponential resource usage when deeply nested and reused fragments were involved. ## Fix/Mitigation A new **Query Fragment Expansion Limit** metric has been introduced: - This metric computes the number of selections a query would have if its fragment spreads were fully expanded. - The metric is checked against a limit to prevent excessive computation. # Patches This has been remediated in `@apollo/gateway` version 2.10.1. # Workarounds No known direct workarounds exist. # References [Query Planning Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/reference/federation/query-plans) ...

# Impact ## Summary A vulnerability in Apollo Router's usage of Apollo Compiler allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to validate. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service. ## Details Named fragments were being processed once per fragment spread in some cases during query validation, leading to exponential resource usage when deeply nested and reused fragments were involved. ## Fix/Mitigation Apollo Router's usage of Apollo Compiler has been updated so that validation logic processes each named fragment only once, preventing redundant traversal. # Patches This has been remediated in `apollo-router` versions 1.61.2 and 2.1.1. # Workarounds The only known workaround is "Safelisting with IDs only" per [Safelisting with Persisted Queries - Apollo GraphQL Docs](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/security/persisted-queries#router-security-levels). The "Safelisting" security level is ...