#windows

A specifically crafted packet sent by an attacker to EIPStackGroup OpENer EtherNet/IP commits and versions prior to Feb 10, 2021 may result in a denial-of-service condition.

A specifically crafted packet sent by an attacker to EIPStackGroup OpENer EtherNet/IP commits and versions prior to Feb 10, 2021 may result in a denial-of-service condition.

Adobe Character Animator versions 4.4.2 (and earlier) and 22.3 (and earlier) are affected by an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious SVG file.

By Jon Munshaw.  Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.  Mandatory multi-factor authentication is all the rage nowadays. GitHub just announced that all contributors would have to enroll in MFA by 2023 to log into their accounts. And Google announced as part of... [[ This is only the beginning! Please visit the blog for the complete entry ]]

An exploitable use-after-free vulnerability exists in WPS Spreadsheets ( ET ) as part of WPS Office, version 11.2.0.10351. A specially-crafted XLS file can cause a use-after-free condition, resulting in remote code execution. An attacker needs to provide a malformed file to the victim to trigger the vulnerability.

An exploitable use-after-free vulnerability exists in WPS Spreadsheets ( ET ) as part of WPS Office, version 11.2.0.10351. A specially-crafted XLS file can cause a use-after-free condition, resulting in remote code execution. An attacker needs to provide a malformed file to the victim to trigger the vulnerability.

An out of bounds read vulnerability exists in the malware scan functionality of ESTsoft Alyac 2.5.7.7. A specially-crafted PE file can trigger this vulnerability to cause denial of service and termination of malware scan. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.