Authenticated (contributor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in PluginlySpeaking Easy Org Chart plugin <= 3.1 at WordPress.

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This plugin has been closed as of July 29, 2022 and is not available for download. This closure is temporary, pending a full review.

No support anymore, pro Version not available, pure garbage. I don't know why this Plugin is still live.

This plugin seems perfect, unfortunately it itsn't up to date and is unusable on last versions of WordPress (impossibility to add several people on a chart).

Nice Plugin for creating multiple org chart.

Read all 3 reviews

“Easy Org Chart” is open source software. The following people have contributed to this plugin.

Contributors

*    PluginlySpeaking

CVE-2022-36355: Easy Org Chart

Doctor's Appointment System version 1.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in register.php. Original discovery of cross site scripting in this version is attributed to Soham Bakore in February of 2021.

    # Exploit Title: Doctor's Appointment System v1.0 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)# Google Dork: N/A# Date: 7/13/2022# Exploit Author: Abdullah Zaid - @_aznull# Vendor Homepage:https://www.sourcecodester.com/hashenudara/simple-doctors-appointment-project.html# Software Link:https://www.sourcecodester.com/sites/default/files/download/hshnudr/edoc-doctor-appointment-system-main_1.zip# Version: 1.0# Tested on: Linux# CVE : CVE-2022-36203POC:POST /register.php HTTP/1.1Host: localhostusername=a"><script>alert(1337)</script>&password=123

Doctor's Appointment System 1.0 Cross Site Scripting

Weave GitOps Enterprise before 0.9.0-rc.5 has a cross-site scripting (XSS) bug allowing a malicious user to inject a javascript: link in the UI. When clicked by a victim user, the script will execute with the victim's permission. The exposure appears in Weave GitOps Enterprise UI via a GitopsCluster dashboard link. An annotation can be added to a GitopsCluster custom resource.

Weave GitOps is a powerful extension to Flux, a leading GitOps engine and CNCF project, which provides insights into your application deployments, and makes continuous delivery with GitOps easier to adopt and scale across your teams.

The web UI surfaces key information to help application operators easily discover and resolve issues. The intuitive interface provides a guided experience to build understanding and simplify getting started for new users; they can easily discover the relationship between Flux objects and navigate to deeper levels of information as required.

Weave GitOps is an open source project sponsored by Weaveworks - the GitOps company, and original creators of Flux.

**Why adopt GitOps?​**

> "GitOps is the best thing since configuration as code. Git changed how we collaborate, but declarative configuration is the key to dealing with infrastructure at scale, and sets the stage for the next generation of management tools"

\- Kelsey Hightower, Staff Developer Advocate, Google.

Adopting GitOps can bring a number of key benefits:

*   Faster and more frequent deployments
*   Easy recovery from failures
*   Improved security and auditability

To learn more about GitOps, check out these resources:

*   GitOps for absolute beginners - eBook from Weaveworks
*   Guide to GitOps - from Weaveworks
*   OpenGitOps - CNCF Sandbox project aiming to define a vendor-neutral, principle-led meaning of GitOps.
*   gitops.tech - supported by Innoq

**Getting Started​**

See Installation and Getting Started

**Features​**

*   **Applications view** - allows you to quickly understand the state of your deployments across a cluster at a glance. It shows summary information from kustomization and helmrelease objects.
*   **Sources view** - shows the status of resources which are synchronizing content from where you have declared the desired state of your system, for example Git repositories. This shows summary information from gitrepository, helmrepository and bucket objects.
*   **Flux Runtime view** - provides status on the GitOps engine continuously reconciling your desired and live state. It shows your installed GitOps Toolkit Controllers and their version.
*   Drill down into more detailed information on any given Flux resource.
*   Uncover relationships between resources and quickly navigate between them.
*   Understand how workloads are reconciled through a directional graph.
*   View Kubernetes events relating to a given object to understand issues and changes.
*   Secure access to the dashboard through the ability to integrate with an OIDC provider (such as Dex) or through a configurable cluster user.
*   Fully integrates with Flux as the GitOps engine to provide:
    *   Continuous Delivery through GitOps for apps and infrastructure
    *   Support for GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, and even use s3-compatible buckets as a source; all major container registries; and all CI workflow providers.
    *   A secure, pull-based mechanism, operating with least amount of privileges, and adhering to Kubernetes security policies.
    *   Compatible with any conformant Kubernetes version and common ecosystem technologies such as Helm, Kustomize, RBAC, Prometheus, OPA, Kyverno, etc.
    *   Multitenancy, multiple git repositories, multiple clusters
    *   Alerts and notifications

CVE-2022-38790: Introduction | Weave GitOps

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository francoisjacquet/rosariosis prior to 8.9.3.

**Description**

I found XSS in the file upload function of the message function.

**Proof of Concept****Step**

1.First, access the latest version of the demo environment. "Https://www.rosariosis.org/demonstration/index.php"

2.Then log in with your student account. Student: username and password “student“

3.After logging in, access "MESSAGING > Write" from the menu on the left. (/demonstration/Modules.php?modname=Messaging/Write.php)

4.Then enter the title and message as appropriate.

5.Now upload the SVG file containing XSS to "File Attached".

6.Finally, select "Teach Teacher" as the destination and send.

7.Log in from here with your teacher's account. Teacher: username and password “teacher“

8.After logging in, access "MESSAGING > Messages" from the menu and select the message you just sent.

9.Then click on the last attached file and a pop-up screen will appear.

**Summary**

\-Endpoint: POST /demonstration/Modules.php?modname=Messaging/Write.php&search_modfunc=list&recipients_key=staff_id&subject=<title>&message=<message>&recipients_ids[0]=2&send=Send

\-Attachment: SVG file

\-Test Payload: <script type="text/javascript">alert(document.cookie)</script>

**Impact**

This vulnerability can steal a user's cookie.

**References**

*   https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted\_File\_Upload
*   https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7\_2017-Cross-Site\_Scripting\_(XSS)

CVE-2022-3072: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in rosariosis

### Impact
An attacker could steal an admin's cookie

### Patches
The issue is fixed in 5.0.2

### References
[Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html)


**Cross-site Scripting in prestashop/productcomments**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Aug 31, 2022 in PrestaShop/productcomments • Updated Aug 31, 2022

GHSA-prrh-qvhf-x788: Cross-site Scripting in prestashop/productcomments

Doctor's Appointment System 1.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via the admin panel. In addition, it leads to takeover the administrator account by stealing the cookie via XSS.

Submitted by hshnudr on Wednesday, June 8, 2022 - 10:13.

(Updated)

This project helps a certain medical establishment such as a clinic or a hospital clients/patients to request an appointment with a doctor online. This project can also help doctors to manage the schedules of their appointments with their patients. This doctor's appointment system will organize the schedules of each patient's appointment, which will be submitted as a request to the doctor they have selected. The system has 3 sides which are the administrator, the doctor, and the patient. The system admin will populate the list of the doctors with their specialties and along with the doctor's details and system credentials. The patients will browse the doctor's appointment system website to find a doctor that has the specialty of their needs. The patient can check the doctor's weekly schedule to help them to choose the day and time which they can comply for the appointment and they will submit their request for an appointment. After that, the doctors can view all their appointments and the appointment request of the patients for their availability.

****Admin's Side****

*   **Admin can add doctors, edit doctors, delete doctors;**
    
*   **Schedule new doctors sessions, remove sessions;**
    
*   **View patient details;**
    
*   **View booking of patients;**
    

****Doctor's Side****

*   **View their Appointment;**
*   **view their scheduled sessions;**
*   **view details of patients;**
*   **delete account;**
*   **edit account settings;**

**Patient's Side**

*   **create accounts themselves;**
*   **view their old booking;**
*   **delete account;**
*   **edit account settings;**

****HOW TO GET STARTED?****

1.  **Open** your **XAMPP Control Panel** and start ****Apache**** and ****MySQL****.
2.  **Extract** the **downloaded source code **zip** file**.
3.  **Copy** the extracted source code folder and **paste** it into the **XAMPP's "htdocs" directory**.
4.  **Browse** the ****PHPMyAdmin**** in a **browser**. i.e. ****http://localhost/phpmyadmin****
5.  **Create** a **new database** naming ****edoc****.
6.  **Import** the provided ****SQL**** file. The file is known as ****SQL\_Database\_edoc.sql**** located inside the **source code root** folder.
7.  **Browse** the **Doctor's Appointment System** in a **browser**. i.e. ****http://localhost/edoc-echanneling-main/****.

**DEFAULT USER ACCOUNTS OF THIS PROJECT******ADMIN****

Email: **\[email protected\]**  
Password: **123**

****Doctor****

Email: **\[email protected\]**  
Password: **123**

****Patient****

Email: **\[email protected\]**  
Password: **123**

**DEMO VIDEO**

****The Project was developed using the following:****

Apache Version: 2.4.39

PHP Version: 7.3.5

Server Software: Apache/2.4.39 (Win64) PHP/7.3.5

MySQL Version: 5.7.26

Web developer: Hashen Udara https://github.com/HashenUdara/

HashenUdara/edoc-doctor-appointment-system: Simple web project that made for e-channeling. (github.com)

****More Snapshots:****

*   3074 views

CVE-2022-36203: Doctor's Appointment System using PHP Free Source Code

Piwigo 12.3.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via /search/1940/created-monthly-list.

The value of the /search/1940/created-monthly-list request parameter is copied into the value of an HTML tag attribute which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. The attacker can trick a user to visit some crafted URL that is connected exactly to this system. Then he can trick the user to visit some malicious address that the victim will think is connected with the original web address it depending on the scenario. This can be dangerous for all users of this system.

GET /piwigo/index.php?/search/4863/created\-monthly\-list%22%3Ehttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcomhttps:\\pornhubdotcom%3CYZxWX%3E HTTP/1.1
Host: pwned\_host.com
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q\=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,\*/\*;q\=0.8
Accept\-Language: en\-US,en;q\=0.5
Accept\-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: pwg\_id\=hctfqtab45adhogo2suhq2mr0c; ssc\_phoneSwap\=0
Upgrade\-Insecure\-Requests: 1

CVE-2022-37183: CVE-nu11secur1ty/vendors/Piwigo/2022/12.3.0 at main · nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty

The WordPress Core version 6.0.2 release addresses cross site scripting and remote SQL injection vulnerabilities.

    Description: SQL Injection via Links LIMIT clauseAffected Versions: WordPress Core < 6.0.2Researcher: FVDCVE ID: PendingCVSS Score: 8.0 (High)CVSS Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HFully Patched Version: 6.0.2The WordPress Link functionality, previously known as “Bookmarks”, is no longer enabled by default on new WordPress installations. Older sites may still have the functionality enabled, which means that millions of legacy sites are potentially vulnerable, even if they are running newer versions of WordPress. Fortunately, we found that the vulnerability requires administrative privileges and is difficult to exploit in a default configuration. It is possible that 3rd party plugins or themes might allow this vulnerability to be used by editor-level users or below, and in these cases the Wordfence firewall will block any such exploit attempts.Vulnerable versions of WordPress failed to successfully sanitize the limit argument of the link retrieval query in the get_bookmarks function, used to ensure that only a certain number of links were returned. In a default configuration, only the Links legacy widget calls the get_bookmarks function in a way that allows this argument to be set by a user. Legacy widgets involve additional safeguards, and the injection point of the query itself poses additional difficulties, making this vulnerability nontrivial to exploit.Description: Contributor+ Stored Cross-Site Scripting via use of the_meta functionAffected Versions: WordPress Core < 6.0.2Researcher: John BlackbournCVE ID: PendingCVSS Score: 4.9 (Medium)CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NFully Patched Version: 6.0.2WordPress content creators, such as Contributors, Editors, Authors, and Administrators, have the ability to add custom fields to any page and post created. The purpose of this is to make it possible for site content creators to add and associate additional data to posts and pages.WordPress has several functions available to site owners to display custom fields created and associated with posts and pages. One of these functions is the the_meta function which retrieves the supplied post’s or page’s custom field data, which is stored as post meta data, through the get_post_custom_keys and get_post_custom_values functions. Once the custom fields for a post/page are retrieved, the function outputs the post meta keys and values data as a list. Unfortunately, in versions older than 6.0.2 this data was unescaped on output making it possible for any injected scripts in post meta keys and values to be executed.Due to the fact that any user with access to the post editor can add custom meta fields, users with access to the editor such as contributors could inject malicious JavaScript that executes on any page or post where this function is called.WordPress core does not call the_meta anywhere in its codebase by default. As such this vulnerability does require a plugin or theme that calls the the_meta function, or for this function to have been programmatically added to a PHP file for execution, so the vast majority of site owners are not vulnerable to this issue. The the_meta function is considered deprecated as of 6.0.2 and get_post_meta is the recommended alternative.The Wordfence Threat Intelligence Team deployed a firewall rule to help protect Wordfence Premium, Care & Response customers today. Wordfence Free users will receive the same protection in 30 days on September 29, 2022.Description: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Plugin Deactivation and Deletion errorsAffected Versions: WordPress Core < 6.0.2Researcher: Khalilov MoeCVE ID: PendingCVSS Score: 4.7 (Medium)CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NFully Patched Version: 6.0.2The final vulnerability involves the error messages displayed when a plugin has been deactivated due to an error, or when a plugin can not be deleted due to an error. As these error messages were not escaped, any JavaScript present in these error messages would execute in the browser session of an administrator visiting the plugins page. This vulnerability would require a separate malicious or vulnerable plugin or other code to be installed on the site, which would typically require an administrator to install it themselves. In almost all cases where this vulnerability might be exploitable an attacker would already have a firm foothold on the vulnerable site.Our built-in XSS rule should block any attempts to generate crafted error messages based on user input to a vulnerable plugin, and the Wordfence scanner will detect any malicious plugins uploaded by an administrator.ConclusionIn today’s article, we covered three vulnerabilities patched in the WordPress 6.0.2 Security and Maintenance Release. Most actively used WordPress sites should be patched via automatic updates within the next 24 hours, and any sites that remain vulnerable would only be exploitable under very specific circumstances.We have released a firewall rule to Wordfence Premium, Care, and Response users to protect against any exploits targeting the the_meta function and this rule should become available to Wordfence free users after 30 days, on on September 29, 2022.As always, we strongly recommend updating your site to a patched version of WordPress if it hasn’t been updated automatically. As long as you are running a version of WordPress greater than 3.7, an update is available to patch these vulnerabilities while keeping you on the same major version, so you will not need to worry about compatibility issues.Props to Khalilov Moe, John Blackbourn, & FVD for discovering and responsibly disclosing these vulnerabilities. Special thanks to Wordfence Threat Intelligence Lead Chloe Chamberland for collaborating on this post.

WordPress Core Cross Site Scripting / SQL Injection

New graph-based tool offers a better alternative to current approaches for finding vulnerabilities in JavaScript code, they note.

Researchers at Johns Hopkins University recently uncovered a startling 180 zero-day vulnerabilities across thousands of Node.js libraries using a new code analysis tool they developed specifically for the purpose, called ODGen.

Seventy of those flaws have since received common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) identifiers. They include command injection flaws, path traversal vulnerabilities, arbitrary code execution issues, and cross-site scripting vulnerabilities — some of them in widely used applications.

In a paper released at the Usenix Security Symposium earlier this month, the Johns Hopkins researchers — Song Li, Mingqing Kang, Jianwei Hou, and Yinzhi Cao — described ODGen as a better alternative to current code-analysis and so-called graph query-based approaches for finding Node.js vulnerabilities.

Program analysis-based approaches have proved useful in helping detect individual vulnerability types such as code-injection flaws in JavaScript. But they cannot be easily extended to detect all kind of vulnerabilities that might be present in the Node.js platform, the researchers said. Similarly, graph-based code-analysis methods — where code is first represented as a graph and then queried for specific coding errors — works well in environments such as C++ and PHP. However, graph-based approaches are not as efficient in mining for JavaScript vulnerabilities because of the programming language's extensive use of dynamic features, they noted.

**A 'Novel' Approach for Finding JavaScript Vulnerabilities**

So, the researchers instead developed what they described as a "novel" and better method called Object Dependence Graph (ODG) that can be used for detecting Node.js vulnerabilities. They implemented ODGen to generate "ODG" for Node.js programs to detect vulnerabilities, they said.

Cao, assistant professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and a co-author of the research report, uses a couple of analogies to describe graph-based code analysis in general and their proposed Objective Dependence Graph. "If we consider a vulnerability as a special pattern — say, a green node connected with a red node and then a black node — a graph-based code-analysis tool first converts programs to a graph with many nodes and edges," Cao says. "Then the tool looks for such patterns in the graph to locate a vulnerability."

The Object Dependence Graph that the researchers have proposed refines this approach by representing JavaScript objects as nodes and adding features — including dependencies between objects — that are specific to the programming language, and then querying for errors. Cao describes how the method works using grains in a handful of rice: If all the grains look the same before boiling but assume two different shades after boiling — one representing good grains and the other bad grains — then it becomes easier to spot and weed out the bad grains. "Abstract interpretation is kind of like the boiling process that converts rice — that is, programs — into different colored objects" so errors are easier to spot, Cao says.

**A Variety of Bugs**

To see if their approach works, the researchers first tested ODGen against a sample of 330 previously reported vulnerabilities in Node.js packages on the node package manager (npm) repository. The test showed the scanner correctly identifying 302 of the 330 vulnerabilities. Buoyed by the relatively high accuracy rate, the researchers ran ODGen against some 300,000 Java packages in npm. The scanner reported a total of 2,964 potential vulnerabilities across the packages. The researchers checked 264 of them — all with more than 1,000 downloads per week on average — and were able to confirm 180 as being legitimate vulnerabilities. Forty-three of them were at the application level, 122 were in packages that are imported by other applications or code, and the remaining 15 were present in indirect packages.

A plurality (80) of the confirmed vulnerabilities that ODGen detected were command injection flows that allow attackers to execute arbitrary code at the operating system level via a vulnerable application. Thirty were path traversal flaws; 24 enabled code tampering, and 19 involved a specific type of command injection attack called prototype pollution.

New ODGen Tool Unearths 180 Zero-Days in Node.js Libraries

PicUploader v2.6.3 was discovered to contain a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the component /master/index.php.

Hello,

I would like to report for possible XSS vulnerability.

In file https://github.com/xiebruce/PicUploader/blob/master/index.php

$data = \[
	'code' => 'success',
	'data' => \[
		'filename' => $\_FILES\['file'\]\['name'\],
		'url' => $isWeb ? $link\['formatLink'\] : $link,
              //专用于web上传，其它客户端上传该参数无用
              'notFormatUrl' => $isWeb ? $link\['notFormatLink'\] : '',
	\],
\];

header('Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8');
$json = json\_encode($data, JSON\_UNESCAPED\_UNICODE);
echo $json;

It is possible to do the injection with the name of the file through $\_FILES\['file'\]\['name'\].

Thank you for reporting, I add a htmlspecialchars() to convert something like <script>alert('sdfds')</script> to html entities.

htmlspecialchars($\_FILES\['file'\]\['name'\])

Don't know if this can solve the issue?

Thank you for your response.

Yes exactly that solve the issue.

I would like also to mention to security issue in https://github.com/xiebruce/PicUploader/blob/master/settings/SettingController.php

public function getStorageParams($params){
		$key = $params\['key'\];
		$jsonFile = $this\->storagesDir.'/storage-'.$key.'.json';
		if(is\_file($jsonFile)){
			$columns = json\_decode(file\_get\_contents($jsonFile), true);
			$code = 0;
		}else{
			//....
		}
		unset($columns\['name'\]);
		
		$returnArr = \[
			'code' => $code,
			'data' => $columns,
		\];
		//....
		return json\_encode($returnArr);
	}
	
	public function setStorageParams($params){
		//...
               $config = json\_encode($\_POST, JSON\_UNESCAPED\_SLASHES);
                //...
                $config = str\_replace('\\u202a', '', $config);
		file\_put\_contents($jsonFile, $config);
		//....
	}

You are saving the $\_POST in a file through the function getStorageParams without sanitization. Then you use the function getStorageParams to retrieve the information. Are you using this file in your project ? if yes, we need to sanitize the input.

Thank you so much, now I update the code as below

$post = \[\];
foreach($\_POST as $key\=>$val){
	$post\[$key\] = htmlspecialchars($val);
}
$config = json\_encode($post, JSON\_UNESCAPED\_SLASHES);

Tag

#xss