#xss

Many Zend Framework 2 view helpers were using the `escapeHtml()` view helper in order to escape HTML attributes, instead of the more appropriate `escapeHtmlAttr()`. In situations where user data and/or JavaScript is used to seed attributes, this can lead to potential cross site scripting (XSS) attack vectors. Vulnerable view helpers include: - All `Zend\Form` view helpers. - Most `Zend\Navigation` (aka `Zend\View\Helper\Navigation\*`) view helpers. - All "HTML Element" view helpers: `htmlFlash()`, `htmlPage()`, `htmlQuickTime()`. - `Zend\View\Helper\Gravatar`

`Zend_Service_ReCaptcha_MailHide` had a potential XSS vulnerability. Due to the fact that the email address was never validated, and because its use of `htmlentities()` did not include the encoding argument, it was potentially possible for a malicious user aware of the issue to inject a specially crafted multibyte string as an attack via the CAPTCHA's email argument

Many Zend Framework 2 view helpers were using the escapeHtml() view helper in order to escape HTML attributes, instead of the more appropriate escapeHtmlAttr(). In situations where user data and/or JavaScript is used to seed attributes, this can lead to potential cross site scripting (XSS) attack vectors. Vulnerable view helpers include: - All `Zend\Form` view helpers. - Most `Zend\Navigation` (aka `Zend\View\Helper\Navigation\*`) view helpers. - All "HTML Element" view helpers: `htmlFlash()`, `htmlPage()`, `htmlQuickTime()`. - `Zend\View\Helper\Gravatar`

`Zend_Json_Encoder` was not taking into account the solidus character (/) during encoding, leading to incompatibilities with the JSON specification, and opening the potential for XSS or HTML injection attacks when returning HTML within a JSON string.

`Zend_Filter_StripTags` is a filtering class analogous to PHP's `strip_tags()` function. In addition to stripping HTML tags and selectively keeping those provided in a whitelist, it also provides the ability to whitelist specific attributes to retain per whitelisted tag. The reporter discovered that attributes that contained whitespace, and in paricular, line breaks, surrounding the attribute assignment operator would not be stripped, regardless of whether or not they were whitelisted. As examples of input affected: ``` <!-- newlines before and/or after assignment: --> <a href="http://framework.zend.com/issues" onclick = "alert('Broken'); return false;">Issues</a> ``` When passed to the following code: ``` $filter = new Zend_Filter_StripTags(array('a' => array('href'))); $value = $filter->($html); ``` then the "onclick" attribute would remain, even though it was not specified in the tag's whitelist. This could open potential cross-site scripting attack (XSS) vectors. ## Recommendati...

The default error handling view script generated using `Zend_Tool` failed to escape request parameters when run in the "development" configuration environment, providing a potential XSS attack vector. `Zend_Tool_Project_Context_Zf_ViewScriptFile` was patched such that the view script template now calls the `escape()` method on dumped request variables. Zend Framework 1.11.4 includes a patch that adds escaping to the generated error/error.phtml view script, ensuring that request variables are escaped appropriately for the browser. Do note, however, that this will not update any previously generated code. You will still need to follow the next advice for previously generated error view scripts.

A number of classes, primarily within the `Zend_Form`, `Zend_Filter`, `Zend_Form`, `Zend_Log` and `Zend_View components`, contained character encoding inconsistencies whereby calls to the `htmlspecialchars()` and htmlentities() functions used undefined or hard coded charset parameters. In many of these cases developers were unable to set a character encoding of their choice. These inconsistencies could, in specific circumstances, allow certain multibyte representations of special HTML characters pass through unescaped leaving applications potentially vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) exploits. Such exploits would only be possible if a developer used a non-typical character encoding (such as UTF-7), allowed users to define the character encoding, or served HTML documents without a valid character set defined.

`Zend_Dojo_View_Helper_Editor` was incorrectly decorating a TEXTAREA instead of a DIV. The Dojo team has reported that this has security implications as the rich text editor they use is unable to escape content for a TEXTAREA.

Many Zend Framework 2 view helpers were using the `escapeHtml()` view helper in order to escape HTML attributes, instead of the more appropriate `escapeHtmlAttr()`. In situations where user data and/or JavaScript is used to seed attributes, this can lead to potential cross site scripting (XSS) attack vectors. Vulnerable view helpers include: - All `Zend\Form` view helpers. - Most `Zend\Navigation` (aka `Zend\View\Helper\Navigation\*`) view helpers. - All "HTML Element" view helpers: `htmlFlash()`, `htmlPage()`, `htmlQuickTime()`. - `Zend\View\Helper\Gravatar`

`Zend\Debug`, `Zend\Feed\PubSubHubbub`, `Zend\Log\Formatter\Xml`, `Zend\Tag\Cloud\Decorator`, `Zend\Uri`, `Zend\View\Helper\HeadStyle, Zend\View\Helper\Navigation\Sitemap`, and `Zend\View\Helper\Placeholder\Container\AbstractStandalone` were not using `Zend\Escaper` when escaping HTML, HTML attributes, and/or URLs. While most were performing some escaping, because they were not using context-appropriate escaping mechanisms, they could potentially be exploited to perform Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.