Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD GDMSFE01-INI3637-C VER1.1 Risky Crypto

Advisory ID: SYSS-2022-010
Product: Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD
Manufacturer: Verbatim
Affected Version(s): GDMSFE01-INI3637-C VER1.1
Tested Version(s): GDMSFE01-INI3637-C VER1.1
Vulnerability Type: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky
Implementation (CWE-1240)
Risk Level: Low
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2022-02-03
Solution Date: -
Public Disclosure: 2022-06-08
CVE Reference: CVE-2022-28382
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH)

Overview:

The Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD is a USB drive with AES  
256-bit hardware encryption and a built-in fingerprint sensor for  
unlocking the device with previously registered fingerprints.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows:

"The AES 256-bit Hardware Encryption seamlessly encrypts all data on the  
drive in real-time. The drive is compliant with GDPR requirements as  
100% of the drive is securely encrypted. The built-in fingerprint  
recognition system allows access for up to eight authorised users and  
one administrator who can access the device via a password. The SSD  
does not store passwords in the computer or system's volatile memory  
making it far more secure than software encryption."[1]

Due to the use of an insecure encryption AES mode (Electronic Codebook),  
an attacker may be able to extract information even from  
encrypted data, for example by observing repeating byte patterns.

Vulnerability Details:

When analyzing the Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD, Matthias
Deeg found out that the firmware of the USB-to-SATA bridge controller
INIC-3637EN uses AES-256 with the ECB (Electronic Codebook) mode.

This operation mode of block ciphers like AES encrypts identical
plaintext data, in this case blocks of 16 bytes, always to identical
ciphertext data.

For some data, for instance bitmap images, the lack of the cryptographic
property called diffusion concerning the ECB mode can leak sensitive
information even in encrypted data.

One famous example for this is an ECB-encrypted image of the TUX
penguin, which, for instance, is referenced in the Wikipedia article
about block cipher modes of operation[2] to illustrate this issue.

Thus, the use of the ECB operation mode can put the confidentiality of
specific information at risk, even in an encrypted form.

Additionally, in attack scenarios where an attacker has short-time
physical access to a Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD, and
later returns it to its legitimate owner, the attacker may be able to
compromise the integrity of the stored data by exploiting the fact
that the same 16-byte plaintext blocks result in the same 16-byte
ciphertext blocks, by replacing specific encrypted 16-byte blocks with
other ones.

Proof of Concept (PoC):

The same 16 byte long plaintext pattern was written several times to an  
unlocked Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD.

When the SSD was then read using another SSD enclosure, the same 16  
byte long ciphertext pattern could be observed for the corresponding  
plaintext data.

Solution:

SySS GmbH is not aware of a solution for the described security issue.

Disclosure Timeline:

2022-02-03: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer  
2022-02-11: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again  
2022-03-07: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again  
2022-06-08: Public release of security advisory

References:

[1] Product website for Verbatim Executive Fingerprint Secure SSD

https://www.verbatim-europe.co.uk/en/prod/executive-fingerprint-secure-ssd-usb-32-gen-1–usb-c-1tb-53657/
[2] Wikipedia article about block cipher mode of operation

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Electronic_codebook_(ECB)
[3] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-010

https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-010.txt
[4] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de  
Public Key:   
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc  
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is”
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0  
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en