Verbatim Store 'n' Go Secure Portable SSD Weak Cryptography

Advisory ID: SYSS-2022-044
Product: Store ‘n’ Go Secure Portable SSD
Manufacturer: Verbatim
Affected Version(s): #53402 (GDMSLK02 C-INIC3637-V1.1)
Tested Version(s): #53402 (GDMSLK02 C-INIC3637-V1.1)
Vulnerability Type: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky
Implementation (CWE-1240)
Risk Level: Low
Solution Status: Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2022-06-29
Solution Date: 2022-07
Public Disclosure: 2022-10-07
CVE Reference: CVE-2022-28382
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH)

Overview:

The Verbatim Store 'n' Go Secure Portable SSD is a portable USB drive  
with AES 256-bit hardware encryption and a built-in keypad for passcode  
entry.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows:

"The AES 256-bit Hardware Encryption seamlessly encrypts all data on the  
drive in real-time with a built-in keypad for password input. The hard  
drive does not store passwords in the computer or system’s volatile  
memory making it far more secure than software encryption. Also, if it  
falls into the wrong hands, the hard drive will lock and require  
re-formatting after 20 failed password attempts."[1]

Due to the use of an insecure encryption AES mode (Electronic Codebook),  
an attacker may be able to extract information even from  
encrypted data, for example by observing repeating byte patterns.

Vulnerability Details:

When analyzing the external storage device Verbatim Store ‘n’ Go Secure
Portable SSD, Matthias Deeg found out that the firmware of the
USB-to-SATA bridge controller INIC-3637EN uses AES-256 with the ECB
(Electronic Codebook) mode.

This operation mode of block ciphers like AES encrypts identical
plaintext data, in this case blocks of 16 bytes, always to identical
ciphertext data.

For some data, for instance bitmap images, the lack of the cryptographic
property called diffusion concerning the ECB mode can leak sensitive
information even in encrypted data.

One famous example for this is an ECB-encrypted image of the TUX
penguin, which, for instance, is referenced in the Wikipedia article
about block cipher modes of operation[2] to illustrate this issue.

Thus, the use of the ECB operation mode can put the confidentiality of
specific information at risk, even in an encrypted form.

Additionally, in attack scenarios where an attacker has short-time
physical access to a Verbatim Store ‘n’ Go Portable Secure SSD, and
later returns it to its legitimate owner, the attacker may be able to
compromise the integrity of the stored data by exploiting the fact that
the same 16-byte plaintext blocks result in the same 16-byte ciphertext
blocks, by replacing specific encrypted 16-byte blocks with other ones.

Proof of Concept (PoC):

The same plaintext pattern with the length of 16 bytes was written  
several times to an unlocked Verbatim Store 'n' Go Secure Portable SSD.

When the SSD was then read using another SSD enclosure, the same 16  
byte long ciphertext pattern could be observed for the corresponding  
plaintext data.

Solution:

The described security issue was fixed by the Verbatim “Security Update
July 2022”[4].

Disclosure Timeline:

2022-06-29: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer  
2022-07   : Manufacturer publishes security update[4]  
2022-10-07: Public release of security advisory

References:

[1] Product website for Verbatim Store ‘n’ Go Secure Portable SSD

https://www.verbatim-europe.co.uk/en/prod/store-n-go-portable-ssd-with-keypad-access-256gb-53402/
[2] Wikipedia article about block cipher mode of operation

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Electronic_codebook_(ECB)
[3] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-044

https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-044.txt
[4] Security Update July 2022: Store ‘n’ Go Portable SSD
https://www.verbatim-europe.co.uk/en/support-centre/?part_no=53402
[5] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de  
Public Key:   
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc  
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is”
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0  
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en