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Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed multiple security flaws in SimpleHelp remote access software that could lead to information disclosure, privilege escalation, and remote code execution. Horizon3.ai researcher Naveen Sunkavally, in a technical report detailing the findings, said the "vulnerabilities are trivial to reverse and exploit." The list of identified flaws is as follows -
In 2024, the Taiwanese government saw the daily average of attempted attacks by China double to 2.4 million, with a focus on government targets and telecommunications firms.
January Microsoft Patch Tuesday. 170 CVEs, 10 of them were added since December MSPT. 3 exploited in the wild: 🔻 EoP – Windows Hyper-V NT Kernel Integration VSP (CVE-2025-21333, CVE-2025-21334, CVE-2025-21335). No details yet. No vulnerabilities have public exploits. 5 have private ones: 🔸 Security Feature Bypass – Microsoft Update Catalog (CVE-2024-49147), MapUrlToZone (CVE-2025-21268, CVE-2025-21189)🔸 […]
Company has issued patches for an unprecedented 159 CVEs, including eight zero-days, three of which attackers are already exploiting.
Microsoft today unleashed updates to plug a whopping 161 security vulnerabilities in Windows and related software, including three "zero-day" weaknesses that are already under active attack. Redmond's inaugural Patch Tuesday of 2025 bundles more fixes than the company has shipped in one go since 2017.
> [!IMPORTANT] > This vulnerability only affects sites which are in the "dev" environment mode. If your production website is in "dev" mode, it has been misconfigured, and you should immediately swap it to "live" mode. > See https://docs.silverstripe.org/en/developer_guides/debugging/environment_types/ for more information. If a website has been set to the "dev" environment mode, a URL can be provided which includes an XSS payload which will be executed in the resulting error message. ## References - https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/ss-2024-002 ## Reported by Gaurav Nayak from [Chaleit](https://chaleit.com/)
In some cases, form messages can contain HTML markup. This is an intentional feature, allowing links and other relevant HTML markup for the given message. Some form messages include content that the user can provide. There are scenarios in the CMS where that content doesn't get correctly sanitised prior to being included in the form message, resulting in an XSS vulnerability. ### References - https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2024-53277 ## Reported by Leo Diamat from [Bastion Security Group](http://www.bastionsecurity.co.nz/)
### Impact When using the "insert media" functionality, the linked oEmbed JSON includes an HTML attribute which will replace the embed shortcode. The HTML is not sanitized before replacing the shortcode, allowing a script payload to be executed on both the CMS and the front-end of the website. ## References - https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2024-47605 ## Reported by James Nicoll from [Fujitsu Cyber Security Services](https://www.fujitsu.com/nz/services/security/)
### Impact Unintended permanent chain split affecting greater than or equal to 25% of the network, requiring hard fork (network partition requiring hard fork) Lodestar does not verify checksum in snappy framing uncompressed chunks. ### Vulnerability Details In Req/Resp protocol the messages are encoded by using ssz_snappy encoding, which is a snappy framing compression over ssz encoded message. In snappy framing format there are uncompressed chunks, each such chunk is prefixed with a checksum. Let's see how golang implementation parses such chunks - https://github.com/golang/snappy/blob/master/decode.go#L176 ``` case chunkTypeUncompressedData: // Section 4.3. Uncompressed data (chunk type 0x01). if chunkLen < checksumSize { r.err = ErrCorrupt return r.err } buf := r.buf[:checksumSize] if !r.readFull(buf, false) { return r.err } checksum := uint32(buf[0]) | uint32(buf[1])<<8 | uint32(buf[2])<<16 | uint32(buf[3])<<24 // Read directly into r.decod...
### Impact Unintended permanent chain split affecting greater than or equal to 25% of the network, requiring hard fork (network partition requiring hard fork) ### Description Lodestar client may fail to decode snappy framing compressed messages. ### Vulnerability Details In Req/Resp protocol the message are encoded by using ssz_snappy encoding, which is basically snappy framing compression over ssz encoded message. It's mentioned here - https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/dev/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md ``` The token of the negotiated protocol ID specifies the type of encoding to be used for the req/resp interaction. Only one value is possible at this time: ssz_snappy: The contents are first SSZ-encoded and then compressed with Snappy frames compression. For objects containing a single field, only the field is SSZ-encoded not a container with a single field. For example, the BeaconBlocksByRoot request is an SSZ-encoded list of Root's. This encoding type MUST be supp...