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Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0601 Code Execution

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Packet Storm
#vulnerability#web#mac#windows#redis#c++#auth
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0604 Code Execution

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0602 Code Execution

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Ransom.Haron MVID-2022-0609 Code Execution

Haron ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Trojan-Ransom.Thanos MVID-2022-0607 Code Execution

Thanos ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

CVE-2023-26481: Release 2023.2 - Signout and Avatar improvements | authentik

authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Due to an insufficient access check, a recovery flow link that is created by an admin (or sent via email by an admin) can be used to set the password for any arbitrary user. This attack is only possible if a recovery flow exists, which has both an Identification and an Email stage bound to it. If the flow has policies on the identification stage to skip it when the flow is restored (by checking `request.context['is_restored']`), the flow is not affected by this. With this flow in place, an administrator must create a recovery Link or send a recovery URL to the attacker, who can, due to the improper validation of the token create, set the password for any account. Regardless, for custom recovery flows it is recommended to add a policy that checks if the flow is restored, and skips the identification stage. This issue has been fixed in versions 2023.2.3, 2023.1.3 and 2022.12.2.

IcePeony and Transparent Tribe Target Indian Entities with Cloud-Based Tools

High-profile entities in India have become the target of malicious campaigns orchestrated by the Pakistan-based Transparent Tribe threat actor and a previously unknown China-nexus cyber espionage group dubbed IcePeony. The intrusions linked to Transparent Tribe involve the use of a malware called ElizaRAT and a new stealer payload dubbed ApoloStealer on specific victims of interest, Check Point

CVE-2022-0824: Foreign module may need a check · webmin/webmin@39ea464

Improper Access Control to Remote Code Execution in GitHub repository webmin/webmin prior to 1.990.

Hacking Group 'Silk Typhoon' Linked to US Treasury Breach

The attack used a stolen remote support SaaS API key to exfiltrate data from workstations in the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

CVE-2016-9042: TALOS-2016-0260 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

An exploitable denial of service vulnerability exists in the origin timestamp check functionality of ntpd 4.2.8p9. A specially crafted unauthenticated network packet can be used to reset the expected origin timestamp for target peers. Legitimate replies from targeted peers will fail the origin timestamp check (TEST2) causing the reply to be dropped and creating a denial of service condition.