ghsa

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability exists within the Formula virtual cell comments functionality. ### Details The nc-gui/components/virtual-cell/Formula.vue displays a v-html tag with the value of "urls" whose contents are processed by the function replaceUrlsWithLink(). This function recognizes the pattern URI::(XXX) and creates a hyperlink tag <a> with href=XXX. However, it leaves all the other contents outside of the pattern URI::(XXX) unchanged, which makes the evil users can create a malicious table with a formula field whose payload is <img src=1 onerror="malicious javascripts"URI::(XXX). The evil users then can share this table with others by enabling public viewing and the victims who open the shared link can be attacked. ### PoC Step 1: Attacker login the nocodb and creates a table with two fields, "T" and "F". The type of field "T" is "SingleLineText", and the type of the "F" is "Fomula" with the formula content {T} Step 2: The attacker sets the content...

## Summary A user with permission to view any collection using redacted hashed fields can get access the raw stored version using the `alias` functionality on the API. Normally, these redacted fields will return `**********` however if we change the request to `?alias[workaround]=redacted` we can instead retrieve the plain text value for the field. ## Steps to reproduce - Set up a simple role with read-access to users. - Create a new user with the role from the previous step - Assign a password to the user The easiest way to confirm this vulnerability is by first visiting `/users/me`. You should be presented with a redacted JSON-object. Next, visit `/users/me?alias[hash]=password`. This time, the returned JSON object will included the raw password hash instead of the redacted value. ## Workaround This can be avoided by removing permission to view the sensitive fields entirely from users or roles that should not be able to see them.

### Summary --- An authenticated attacker with create access could conduct a SQL Injection attack on MySQL DB using unescaped table_name. ### Details --- ### SQL Injection vulnerability occurs in **VitessClient.ts**. ```javascript async columnList(args: any = {}) { const func = this.columnList.name; const result = new Result(); log.api(`${func}:args:`, args); try { args.databaseName = this.connectionConfig.connection.database; const response = await this.sqlClient.raw( `select *, table_name as tn from information_schema.columns where table_name = '${args.tn}' ORDER by ordinal_position`, ); ``` The variable **${args.tn}** refers to the table name entered by the user. A malicious attacker can escape the existing query by including a special character (') in the table name and insert and execute a new arbitrary SQL query. ### Impact --- This vulnerability may result in leakage of sensitive data in the database.

### Summary --- Attacker can upload a html file with malicious content. If user tries to open that file in browser malicious scripts can be executed leading Stored XSS(Cross-Site Script) attack. ### PoC --- NocoDB was configured using the Release Binary `Noco-macos-arm64`, and nocodb version 0.202.9 (currently the latest version) was used. binary hash infos: md5(164b727f287af56168bc16fba622d0b4) / sha256(43e8e97f4c5f5330613abe071a359f84e4514b7186f92954b678087c37b7832e) <img width="665" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/86613161/287472673-aeb60a02-2080-429f-8583-9f130ab62779.png"> ### 1. Run the binary to start the server and access the arbitrary table dashboard. <img width="830" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/86613161/287472852-98b2286e-ad66-45bf-b503-63780619d775.png"> Here, used the default `Features` table. ### 2. Click `+` in the table `field header` to add an `attachment` field. <img width="1173" alt="image" src="https://us...

## Summary Nokogiri v1.16.5 upgrades its dependency libxml2 to [2.12.7](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/releases/v2.12.7) from 2.12.6. libxml2 v2.12.7 addresses CVE-2024-34459: - described at https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/720 - patched by https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/2876ac53 ## Impact There is no impact to Nokogiri users because the issue is present only in libxml2's `xmllint` tool which Nokogiri does not provide or expose. ## Timeline - 2024-05-13 05:57 EDT, libxml2 2.12.7 release is announced - 2024-05-13 08:30 EDT, nokogiri maintainers begin triage - 2024-05-13 10:05 EDT, nokogiri [v1.16.5 is released](https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/releases/tag/v1.16.5) and this GHSA made public

### Impact When opening a form in Valtimo, the access token (JWT) of the user is exposed to `api.form.io` via the the `x-jwt-token` header. An attacker can retrieve personal information from this token, or use it to execute requests to the Valtimo REST API on behalf of the logged-in user. This issue is caused by a misconfiguration of the Form.io component. ### Attack requirements ### The following conditions have to be met in order to perform this attack: - An attacker needs to have access to the network traffic on the `api.form.io` domain. - The content of the `x-jwt-token` header is logged or otherwise available to the attacker. - An attacker needs to have network access to the Valtimo API. - An attacker needs to act within the time-to-live of the access token. The default TTL in Keycloak is 5 minutes. ### Patches Versions 10.8.4, 11.1.6 and 11.2.2 have been patched

### Introduction In Matrix, the server-side *key backup* stores encrypted copies of Matrix message keys. This facilitates key sharing between a user's devices and provides a redundant copy in case all devices are lost. The key backup uses asymmetric cryptography, with each server-side key backup assigned a unique public-private key pair. ### Impact Due to a logic bug introduced in https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/pull/2961/commits/71136e44c03c79f80d6d1a2446673bc4d53a2067, the matrix-sdk-crypto crate version 0.7.0 will sometimes log the private part of the backup key pair to Rust debug logs (using the `tracing` crate). ### Patches This issue has been resolved in matrix-sdk-crypto [version 0.7.1](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/releases/tag/matrix-sdk-crypto-0.7.1). ### Workarounds None. ### References - [crates.io release](https://crates.io/crates/matrix-sdk-crypto/0.7.1) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this adviso...

Improper escaping of a custom field's name allows an attacker to inject HTML and, if CSP settings permit, achieve execution of arbitrary JavaScript when: - resolving or closing issues (bug_change_status_page.php) belonging to a project linking said custom field - viewing issues (view_all_bug_page.php) when the custom field is displayed as a column - printing issues (print_all_bug_page.php) when the custom field is displayed as a column ### Impact Cross-site scripting (XSS). ### Patches https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/447a521aae0f82f791b8116a14a20e276df739be ### Workarounds Ensure Custom Field Names do not contain HTML tags. ### References - https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=34432 - This is related to CVE-2020-25830 (same root cause, different affected pages)

If an issue references a note that belongs to another issue that the user doesn't have access to, then it gets hyperlinked. Clicking on the link gives an access denied error as expected, yet some information remains available via the link, link label, and tooltip. ### Impact Disclosure of the following information: - existence of the note - note author name - note creation timestamp - issue id the note belongs to ### Patches See PR https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/pull/2000 ### Workarounds None ### References https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=34434

Insufficient access control in the registration and password reset process allows an attacker to reset another user's password and takeover their account, if the victim has an incomplete request pending. The exploit is only possible while the verification token is valid, i.e for 5 minutes after the confirmation URL sent by e-mail has been opened, and the user did not complete the process by updating their password. A brute-force attack calling account_update.php with increasing user IDs is possible. ### Impact A successful takeover would grant the attacker full access to the compromised account, including sensitive information and functionalities associated with the account, the extent of which depends on its privileges and the data it has access to. ### Patches 92d11a01b195a1b6717a2f205218089158ea6d00 ### Workarounds Mitigate the risk by reducing the verification token's validity (change the value of the `TOKEN_EXPIRY_AUTHENTICATED` constant in *constants_inc.php*). ### Ref...